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    The Iberian Solution Could Offer Europe More Gas

    Never has the question of where Europe’s foreign gas supplies come from, and whether there are alternatives to the continent’s dependence on Russia, been so much debated as in recent weeks. A subject that is usually the preserve of specialists has become the focus of endless discussion. Are there other sources of gas supplies for the European Union?

    The Unthinkable: War Returns to Europe

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    The immediate answer is there are very few today outside of Russia itself, hence the large rise in gas prices witnessed lately. Over the medium term, however, Libya and Algeria have ample opportunity to increase their supplies to the EU.

    Supplies From Libya and Algeria

    Libya boasts proven gas reserves of 1,500 billion cubic meters (bcm). Its production is a modest 16 bcm. Algeria has 4,500 bcm of proven reserves and 20-25 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of unconventional gas reserves, the third-largest in the world after the United States and China (and Argentina whose proven reserves tie with Algeria). How much gas that could produce is anyone’s guess, but we are speaking of a figure in the tens of bcm.

    Algeria today produces 90 bcm, of which 50 bcm were exported. Another feature of Algeria is the huge storage capacity — 60 bcm — of the Hassi R’Mel gas field, its oldest and largest compared with the EU’s storage capacity of 115 bcm.

    Pierre Terzian, the founder of the French energy think-tank Petrostrategies, points out that four underwater gas pipelines link these two producers directly to the European mainland: the first links Libyan gas fields with Italy; the second Algerian gas fields to Italy via Tunisia; the third Algerian gas fields to southern Spain; and the fourth the same gas fields to southern Spain via Morocco.

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    The latter has been closed since November 1, 2021, due to deteriorating relations between Algeria and Morocco, but this has not affected the supply of gas to the Iberian Peninsula. Algeria also has two major liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, which adds flexibility to its export policy. Its exports to France and the United Kingdom are in LNG ships.

    The leading cause of the current crisis is structural as, according to Terzian, EU domestic gas production has declined by 23% over the last 10 years and now covers only 42% of consumption, as compared with 53% in 2010. That decline is the result, in particular, of the closing of the giant Groningen gas field, which is well underway and will be completed by 2030.

    Europe has done a lot to expand the gas transmission grid among EU countries, but some major gas peninsulas remain. In 2018, it was suggested that connections between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe needed developing. Spain boasts one-third of Europe’s LNG import capacity, much of it unused, and is connected to Algeria by two major pipelines that could be extended.

    As Alan Riley and I noted four years ago, the “main barrier to opening up the Iberian energy market’s supply routes to the rest of the EU is the restricted route over the Franco-Spanish border. Only one 7-bcm gas line is available to carry gas northwards … The main blocking factor has been the political power of Electricité de France, which is seeking to protect the interests of the French nuclear industry.” An Iberian solution, we added, would not only “benefit France and Spain, but also Algeria, creating additional incentives to explore for new gas fields and maybe kick start a domestic renewables revolution,” which would encourage a switch in consumption from gas to solar in Algeria.

    Germany, the Netherlands and Italy

    Germany, for its part, has never put its money where its mouth is with regard to Algeria. In 1978, Ruhrgas (now absorbed in E.ON) signed a major contract to supply LNG to Germany. Germany never built the LNG terminal needed to get that contract off the ground. So far, it is the only major European country to have no LNG import terminals, although it can rely on existing facilities in the Netherlands and Belgium.

    In 1978, the Netherlands also contracted to buy Algerian gas. Algeria dropped the contract in the early 1980s because of Germany’s refusal to go ahead. Later in the 1980s, Ruhrgas again expressed its interest in buying Algerian gas, but the price offered was too low and because Ruhrgas wanted to root the gas through France, which insisted on very high transit fees. By discarding Algerian gas, Germany has tied itself to Russian goodwill.

    Italy, like Germany, a big importer of Russian gas, has positioned itself much more adroitly. In December 2021, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state oil and gas monopoly, increased the amount of gas pumped through the TransMed pipeline, which links Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and the Strait of Sicily at the request of its Italian customers. This followed a very successful state visit by Italian President Sergio Mattarella to Algeria in early November. On February 27, Sonatrach confirmed it could pump additional gas to Europe, but contingent on meeting current contractual commitments.

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    Relations between the Italian energy company ENI and Sonatrach are historically close because of the important role played by the Italian company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, in advising the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria in its negotiations with France, which resulted in the independence of Algeria in July 1962.

    The pursuit of very liberal energy policies since the turn of the century by the European Commission overturned the policies of long-term gas and LNG purchase contracts, which were the norm in internationally traded gas until then. Yet security of supply does not rest on such misguided liberalism. New gas reserves cannot be found, let alone gas fields brought into production if producers and European customers are, as Terzian points out, “at the mercy of prices determined by exchange platforms which have dubious liquidity (and can be influenced by major players).” This is an attitude, he adds, “that borders on the irresponsible.”

    German energy policy has mightily contributed to the present crisis. It has blithely continued to shut down the country’s nuclear plants, increased its reliance on coal in the electricity sector and with that a consequent increase in carbon emissions.

    Serious Dialogue

    When considering Caspian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, I would add another country, Turkey, which has a very aggressive and independent policy as a key transit for gas. However, few observers would argue that such a solution would increase Europe’s security.

    Engaging in serious long-term strategic dialogue with Algeria would provide Spain and the EU with leverage. This could help to build better relations between Algeria, Morocco and also the troubled area of the Sahel. When trying to understand the politics of different nations, following the money often offers a good guide. One might also follow the gas.

    *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Emmanuel Macron cuenta sobre su reunión con Vladimir Putin

    El líder francés relató su cara a cara con Vladimir Putin y desestimó el intercambio de cartas de Washington con Moscú, apostando a que su diplomacia podría dar frutos antes de las elecciones de abril.PARÍS — La semana pasada, en una mesa mucho más pequeña que la ovalada de más de 6 metros de largo en la que el presidente de Francia, Emmanuel Macron, se sentó frente al presidente de Rusia, Vladimir V. Putin, en Moscú, el mandatario francés reunió a algunos periodistas. Ahí dijo que la crisis en Ucrania le estaba ocupando “más de la mitad de mi vida, la mayor parte de mi tiempo” porque el mundo se encuentra “en un momento crítico” de la historia.Esta mesa estaba a unos diez kilómetros de altura, en el avión presidencial que la semana pasada llevó a Macron con prontitud a Moscú; a Kiev, la capital de Ucrania, y a Berlín, donde alertó de un daño “irreversible” si Rusia invadía Ucrania y señaló que era crucial “no aceptar la fatalidad”.Macron está convencido de que la crisis actual —marcada por el revanchismo de Rusia tras su aparente humillación por parte de Occidente— significa que la seguridad colectiva de Europa no se ha podido repensar desde el fin de la Guerra Fría. Parece que, al menos en eso, coincidieron Macron y Putin. El enorme desafío que se le presenta a Macron es determinar cómo podría suplirse, y convencer a los demás, entre ellos a Estados Unidos, sobre sus beneficios.Para el final de la semana pasada, el estancamiento con Rusia, que derivó en maniobras militares cerca de las fronteras de Ucrania, parecía más amenazante que nunca. Sin embargo, a solo ocho semanas de las elecciones presidenciales en Francia, Macron ha tomado la arriesgada apuesta de intentar convencer a Putin de que recurra al diálogo y de que los electores franceses estén más complacidos con su autoridad a nivel global que enfadados por su falta de atención.Si fracasa, no solo se arriesga a perder sus votos y su confianza, sino a dañar su prestigio y el de su país al ser visto en el extranjero como un líder que fue demasiado ambicioso.Consciente de esa percepción, se ha esmerado mucho en coordinar sus esfuerzos con los de otros dirigentes europeos, algunos de ellos escépticos, y con Joe Biden, el presidente de Estados Unidos. El viernes, en una conversación de 75 minutos entre los líderes de Occidente, se activó un frente unido para convencer a Rusia de “distender la crisis y optar por el camino del diálogo”, manifestó la Comisión Europea.Una imagen satelital que muestra el despliegue de viviendas y vehículos militares en Rechitsa, Bielorrusia.Maxar Technologies, vía ReutersCuando cayó el Muro de Berlín, Macron tenía 11 años y Biden, 46, por lo que tal vez es inevitable que haya ciertas divergencias de opinión. Macron no ve ninguna razón para que la estructura de la alianza que prevaleció sobre la Unión Soviética sea eterna.“El asunto no es la OTAN, sino cómo creamos una zona de seguridad”, dijo. “¿Cómo podemos vivir en paz en esta región?”. Macron insinuó que parte de su objetivo en Moscú había sido sugerirle a Putin que abandonara su obsesión por la OTAN —que Ucrania no debe unirse nunca a esta organización— y se concentrara en otro “esquema”. Mencionó que le había dicho al dirigente ruso que “el esquema que usted propone es falso”.Understand Russia’s Relationship With the WestThe tension between the regions is growing and Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly willing to take geopolitical risks and assert his demands.Competing for Influence: For months, the threat of confrontation has been growing in a stretch of Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Threat of Invasion: As the Russian military builds its presence near Ukraine, Western nations are seeking to avert a worsening of the situation.Energy Politics: Europe is a huge customer of Russia’s fossil fuels. The rising tensions in Ukraine are driving fears of a midwinter cutoff.Migrant Crisis: As people gathered on the eastern border of the European Union, Russia’s uneasy alliance with Belarus triggered additional friction.Militarizing Society: With a “youth army” and initiatives promoting patriotism, the Russian government is pushing the idea that a fight might be coming.Macron advirtió que era necesario presentarse en el Kremlin y enfrentar al hombre que le ha puesto una pistola en la cabeza a Occidente con 130.000 soldados congregados en la frontera con Ucrania. Se ganaba tiempo al abrir otra ruta diplomática, más flexible que el intercambio de cartas entre Rusia y Estados Unidos, que en repetidas ocasiones Macron rechazó por considerarlas inútiles, y programar próximas reuniones. Los dos líderes se reunieron durante más de cinco horas el lunes pasado. Macron dijo que insistió tanto en “las garantías que podía darme sobre la situación en la frontera” que, en algún momento, Putin dijo que estaba siendo “torturado”.Putin, con la misma insistencia, atacó la expansión hacia el este de la OTAN desde 1997 y la agresión que esto implicaba.Marinos ucranianos en la región oriental de Donetsk el miércoles de la semana pasada.Tyler Hicks/The New York TimesCuando le preguntaron acerca de esa mesa tan larga y ridiculizada, Macron dijo: “Bueno, para nada era algo fraternal”.El Kremlin no ha aceptado que Macron haya obtenido alguna concesión, pero dijo que su enfoque tenía “simientes de razón”, a diferencia del intento de diplomacia por parte del Reino Unido, el cual fue tachado por el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Serguéi Lavrov, de una conversación entre “sordos y mudos”.No se sabe bien cuál podría ser el nuevo esquema propuesto por Macron para la seguridad de Ucrania y de Europa. Pero, al parecer, de alguna manera ofrecería garantías inquebrantables a Ucrania de su soberanía e independencia en una forma en la que su ingreso a la OTAN quedara como un espejismo; al tiempo que Rusia permanecería satisfecha de que la seguridad de Ucrania no se hubiera reforzado a expensas de Moscú.En la práctica, Macron cree que es posible hacer un truco de prestidigitación que logre al mismo tiempo dos cosas: que los ucranianos permanezcan libres y seguros para mirar hacia Occidente para su futuro y que Putin siga pensando que ambos países forman un “espacio histórico y espiritual”, como lo llamó el líder ruso en una reflexión de 5000 palabras publicada el verano pasado sobre “la unidad histórica de los rusos y los ucranianos”.Se trata de una maniobra híbrida, pero que no es inusual en el presidente francés. A través de los años, Macron se ha dado a conocer como el mandatario de “al mismo tiempo” por sus constantes malabares de diferentes aristas de los asuntos —primero a favor de disminuir la dependencia de Francia en la energía nuclear, ahora a favor de aumentarla— y por su intrincada disección de los problemas que a veces deja a los analistas preguntándose qué es lo que él cree en realidad.Es incuestionable que cree apasionadamente en la Unión Europea y en el desarrollo de Europa como una potencia más independiente. Es un tema en el que nunca ha vacilado, y ahora parece pensar que ha llegado la hora de rendir cuentas/jugársela/arriesgarse por esa convicción.Al menos, con la reunión del canciller de Alemania, Olaf Scholz, con Putin en Moscú esta semana, Macron ha hecho que el papel de Europa cuente en esta crisis, junto con Estados Unidos. Eso es más de lo que se puede decir del Reino Unido.El presidente de Rusia, Vladimir V. Putin, durante una reunión con el presidente de Francia, Emmanuel Macron, en Moscú la semana pasada.Foto de consorcio por Thibault Camus“Europa, a través de sus principales Estados, ha regresado de una etapa de la que parecía haber sido marginada”, dijo Michel Duclos, exembajador de Francia, en un artículo publicado recientemente por el Institut Montaigne.Macron ha tenido que trabajar mucho para mantener alineados a los gobiernos europeos indecisos, sobre todo los que solían vivir bajo el yugo soviético, con sus esfuerzos diplomáticos. Puesto que ahora Francia tiene la presidencia rotatoria del Consejo de la Unión Europea, ha tratado de comunicarse con todos, lo cual es una de las razones por las que Ucrania le está consumiendo su tiempo.Sus horarios tendrán que cambiar de alguna manera las siguientes semanas. Macron todavía no anuncia su candidatura para ser reelegido como presidente, pero es casi seguro que tenga que hacerlo en el transcurso de las próximas semanas. La fecha límite es el 4 de marzo y la primera ronda de votaciones es el 10 de abril.Por ahora, Macron lidera las encuestas, que le dan alrededor del 25 por ciento de los votos, con tres candidatos de derecha que le siguen y los partidos de izquierda divididos muy por detrás. Entre los rivales a su derecha hay un apoyo importante a la imagen de caudillo de Putin y su denuncia de la “decadencia” occidental, por lo que un vínculo con el líder ruso también beneficia políticamente a Macron.Aunque es el favorito para ganar, la probabilidad de una alta tasa de abstención entre los franceses desilusionados con la política y el atractivo poderoso de la extrema derecha hacen que la reelección de Macron no sea segura. Si Putin ignora sus esfuerzos diplomáticos e invade Ucrania, las certezas desaparecerán.Partidarios de Éric Zemmourl, candidato presidencial de extrema derecha, en Lille, FranciaChristophe Petit Tesson/EPA vía ShutterstockÉric Zemmour, candidato de la extrema derecha, dijo el mes pasado que Putin “debe ser respetado”, y agregó que “los argumentos y demandas de Putin son completamente legítimos”. También dijo: “Creo que la OTAN es una organización que debió haber desaparecido en 1990”.Marine Le Pen, la perenne candidata nacionalista y antiinmigrante, dijo el año pasado que “Ucrania pertenece a la esfera de influencia de Rusia”.“Al intentar trastocar esta esfera de influencia”, agregó, “se crean tensiones y miedos, y se llega a la situación que estamos viendo hoy”. Le Pen se negó a firmar una declaración emitida el mes pasado por partidos de extrema derecha reunidos en Madrid porque criticaba a Putin.Sus posturas revelan el abismo que separa la admiración de la extrema derecha francesa por Putin de los esfuerzos de Macron. A la convicción del presidente francés de que Rusia necesita ser parte de una nueva arquitectura de seguridad europea se une la determinación de que Ucrania mantenga su soberanía.Aunque Macron haya provocado malestar por sus críticas a la OTAN, se ha mantenido firme en no ceder a las demandas de Putin.Al preguntarle cuándo se dedicaría a anunciar su candidatura, señaló: “En algún momento tendré que ponerme a pensar en ello. Nada se puede hacer con premura. Tiene que ser en el momento adecuado”.Si Macron no encuentra ese momento ideal, su diplomacia y sus ideas de una seguridad europea reinventada pueden quedar en nada. Lo que puede ser factible en un segundo periodo de cinco años al frente de Francia, seguramente no lo será antes del 24 de abril, la fecha de la segunda ronda de las elecciones.Roger Cohen es el jefe del buró de París del Times. Fue columnista del diario de 2009 a 2020. Ha trabajado para el Times durante más de 30 años y se ha desempeñado como corresponsal y editor en el extranjero. Criado en Sudáfrica y Gran Bretaña, es un estadounidense naturalizado. @NYTimesCohen More

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    Emmanuel Macron Recounts Face-Off With Vladimir Putin

    The French leader recounted his face-off with Vladimir Putin and dismissed Washington’s exchange of letters with Moscow, gambling that his diplomacy could pay off before April elections.PARIS — Around a table much smaller than the 20-foot-long oval slab across which he confronted President Vladimir V. Putin in Moscow, President Emmanuel Macron gathered a few journalists this week to confide that the crisis in Ukraine was taking up “more than half my time, the bulk of my time” because the world stands “at a tipping point” of history.The table was some six miles up in the air, on the presidential plane that whisked Mr. Macron to Moscow, Kyiv and Berlin this week, where he warned of “irreversible” damage if Russia invaded Ukraine, and said it was imperative “not to surrender to fate.”Mr. Macron is convinced that the current crisis, marked by Russian revanchism after its perceived humiliation by the West, reflects a failure to rethink Europe’s collective security after the end of the Cold War. On that, at least, he and Mr. Putin seem to agree. The formidable task before the French president is to figure out what could possibly replace it, and convince others, including the United States, of its virtues.By the end of the week, the standoff with Russia, which conducted military exercises all around Ukraine’s borders, looked as menacing as ever. Yet just nine weeks from a presidential election, Mr. Macron has made the risky bet that he can coax Mr. Putin toward dialogue and that French voters will be more taken with his global stature than alienated by his inattention.If he fails, he risks not only losing their votes and their confidence, but also damaging his prestige and that of his country by being seen abroad as an overreaching leader.Wary of that perception, he has taken great pains to coordinate his efforts with other European leaders, some of them skeptical, and with President Biden. A 75-minute conversation on Friday among Western leaders displayed a united front behind attempts to persuade Russia “to de-escalate the crisis and choose the path of dialogue,” the European Commission said.A satellite image showing the deployment of military housing and vehicles in Rechitsa, Belarus.Maxar Technologies, via ReutersMr. Macron was 11 when the Berlin Wall came down. Mr. Biden was 46. Some divergence of view is probably inevitable. Mr. Macron sees no reason that the structure of the alliance that prevailed over the Soviet Union should be eternal.“The question is not NATO, but how do we create an area of security,” he said. “How do we live in peace in this region?” Part of his goal in Moscow, he suggested, had been to prod Mr. Putin away from a NATO obsession — that Ukraine should never join the alliance — toward another “framework.” He said he had told the Russian leader “the framework you propose is false.”To turn up at the Kremlin, facing the man who has put a gun to the head of the West with 130,000 troops massed on the Ukrainian border, was necessary, Mr. Macron argued. Opening another diplomatic avenue, more flexible than the exchange of letters between Russia and the United States that Mr. Macron repeatedly dismissed as useless, gained time by locking in meetings in the coming weeks. The two leaders are expected to speak again on Saturday.Understand Russia’s Relationship With the WestThe tension between the regions is growing and Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly willing to take geopolitical risks and assert his demands.Competing for Influence: For months, the threat of confrontation has been growing in a stretch of Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Threat of Invasion: As the Russian military builds its presence near Ukraine, Western nations are seeking to avert a worsening of the situation.Energy Politics: Europe is a huge customer of Russia’s fossil fuels. The rising tensions in Ukraine are driving fears of a midwinter cutoff.Migrant Crisis: As people gathered on the eastern border of the European Union, Russia’s uneasy alliance with Belarus triggered additional friction.Militarizing Society: With a “youth army” and initiatives promoting patriotism, the Russian government is pushing the idea that a fight might be coming.Over more than five hours on Monday, the two leaders confronted each other. Mr. Macron said he hammered on “the guarantees he could give me on the situation at the border” to such a degree that Mr. Putin at one point said he was being “tortured.”Mr. Putin, with equal insistence, attacked NATO’s expansion east since 1997 and the aggression this constituted.Ukrainian marines on Wednesday in the eastern Donetsk region.Tyler Hicks/The New York TimesAsked about the much mocked long table, Mr. Macron said, “Well, it was hardly intimate.”The Kremlin has disputed that Mr. Macron won any concessions, but said there were “seeds of reason” in his approach, in contrast to attempted British diplomacy, which was dismissed by the Russian foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, as a conversation between “the mute and the deaf.”What Mr. Macron’s new framework might be for Ukraine’s security and Europe’s is unclear. But it appears that it would somehow offer Ukraine ironclad guarantees of its sovereignty and independence in ways that left NATO membership as a mirage, as it simultaneously satisfied Russia that Ukrainian security had not been strengthened at the expense of Moscow’s.In effect, Mr. Macron believes that some sleight of hand is conceivable that would at once leave Ukrainians free and secure to look West for their future, and Mr. Putin free to continue thinking the two countries form one “historical and spiritual space,” as the Russian leader put it in a 5,000-word disquisition on “the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” published last summer.This is a hybrid concept, but not atypical of its proponent. Over the years, Mr. Macron has become known as the “at the same time” president for his constant juggling of different sides of questions — first in favor of reducing France’s reliance on nuclear power, now in favor of increasing it — and for his intricate dissection of issues that sometimes leaves observers wondering what he really believes.That he believes passionately in the European Union, and the development of Europe as a more independent power, is unquestionable. It is one issue on which he has never wavered, and now he seems to think the hour of reckoning for that conviction has come.If nothing else, with Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany meeting with Mr. Putin in Moscow next week, Mr. Macron has made Europe count in this crisis, alongside the United States. That is more than can be said for Britain.President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Monday during a meeting with President Emmanuel Macron of France in Moscow.Pool photo by Thibault Camus“Through its major states, Europe has returned to a stage from which it seemed to have been marginalized,” Michel Duclos, a former French ambassador, commented in a paper published this week by the Institut Montaigne.Mr. Macron has had to work hard to keep doubtful European states, particularly those that once lived under the Soviet yoke, aligned with his diplomatic efforts. With France currently holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, he has tried to reach out to everyone — one reason his days are consumed by Ukraine.His schedule will have to shift somewhat in the coming weeks. Mr. Macron has not yet declared his candidacy for re-election as president, but will almost certainly need to do so in the next couple of weeks. The deadline is March 4, and the first round of voting April 10.For now, Mr. Macron leads in polls, which give him about 25 percent of the vote, with three right-wing candidates trailing him and splintered left-wing parties far behind. Among the rivals to his right there is significant support for Mr. Putin’s strongman image and his denunciation of Western “decadence,” so engagement with the Russian leader also serves Mr. Macron politically.Although he is the favorite to win, the likelihood of a high abstention rate among French people disillusioned with politics and the strong appeal of the far right make Mr. Macron’s re-election anything but certain. If Mr. Putin ignores his diplomacy and does invade Ukraine, all bets will be off.Supporters of the far-right presidential candidate Éric Zemmour last week in Lille, France.Christophe Petit Tesson/EPA, via ShutterstockÉric Zemmour, the far-right insurgent in this election, said last month that Mr. Putin “needs to be respected,” adding that “Putin’s claims and demands are completely legitimate.” He also said, “I think NATO is an organization that should have disappeared in 1990.”Marine Le Pen, the perennial nationalist and anti-immigrant candidate, said last year that “Ukraine belongs to Russia’s sphere of influence.”“By trying to violate this sphere of influence,” she added, “tensions and fears are created, and the situation we are witnessing today is reached.” Ms. Le Pen refused to sign a statement issued last month by far-right parties gathered in Madrid because it was critical of Mr. Putin.Their stances demonstrate the gulf that separates far-right French admiration of Mr. Putin from Mr. Macron’s engagement. The French president’s conviction that Russia needs to be part of a new European security architecture is combined with resolve that Ukraine maintain its sovereignty.If Mr. Macron has caused unease through his criticism of NATO, he has held the line on not ceding to the Russian leader’s demands.Asked when he would turn his attention to declaring his candidacy, Mr. Macron said: “I am going to have to think about it at some point. You can’t do over hasty things. You need the right moment.”If he does not find that sweet spot, Mr. Macron’s diplomacy, and his ideas of reinvented European security, may come to nothing. What may be doable in a second five-year term leading France will certainly not be doable by April 24, the date of the second round of the election. More

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    Facing Tough Election, Orban Turns to Putin for Support

    The Hungarian leader made his name by defying Moscow. But he has increasingly turned toward Russia in an effort to secure the natural gas he needs to keep energy prices low and voters happy.BUDAPEST — Facing a tough election in two months, Hungary’s far-right populist prime minister, Viktor Orban, last week opened the centerpiece of a new state-funded museum district celebrating his country’s role as an anchor of European culture and identity.A shrine in the newly opened “House of Music” honors Hungarian champions of democracy routed by Austrian and Russian troops in 1848, anti-communist rebels crushed by Soviet soldiers in 1956 and, on a happier note, Hungary’s successful defiance of Moscow in 1989, when Mr. Orban made his name by demanding that 80,000 Soviet troops go home.On Tuesday, just days after the museum opening, a celebration of the national pride that Mr. Orban has long used to rev up his voters, the Hungarian prime minister swerved in the opposite direction to shore up another vital if contradictory pillar of his support — Russia.Meeting in Moscow with President Vladimir V. Putin, he signaled sympathy for Russia in its standoff with the West over Ukraine, and pleaded for more deliveries of the natural gas he needs to keep energy prices low and voters happy.Mr. Orban has long been seen as a political chameleon — and reviled by foes as a brazen opportunist — but he is now pushing his shape-shifting talents to a new level. He has broken ranks not only with Hungary’s allies over Ukraine but also with his country’s own long history of wariness toward Russia as he seeks to reconcile economic populism with the nationalism that underpins his political brand.Hungary, according to the European Union’s statistical agency, has the lowest electricity prices and third lowest gas prices for consumers in the 27-member European bloc. While prices elsewhere have doubled or tripled over the past year, Hungary has kept them steady, a feat that Mr. Orban’s governing Fidesz party is hoping will help it defeat an unusually united opposition in elections on April 3.A basilica in Budapest last September. A recent poll found that Hungary views Russia and China as more important strategic partners than the United States.Akos Stiller for The New York TimesAnalysts question whether Hungary can keep prices low for consumers indefinitely without crippling the finances of a huge state-owned electricity provider. But Mr. Orban has turned to Moscow to help convince voters he has their economic interests in hand.Hungary has sided unequivocally with Mr. Putin as fellow members of the European Union and NATO have voiced growing alarm over what they see as Russian bullying of Ukraine, on whose borders Moscow has massed more than 100,000 troops.Speaking on Hungarian radio Friday, Mr. Orban brushed off criticism of his cozying up to the Kremlin, saying that Hungary wanted to act as an “icebreaker” by pursuing a policy that he acknowledged “deviates entirely from most E.U. and NATO ally countries.”Understand Russia’s Relationship With the WestThe tension between the regions is growing and Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly willing to take geopolitical risks and assert his demands.Competing for Influence: For months, the threat of confrontation has been growing in a stretch of Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Threat of Invasion: As the Russian military builds its presence near Ukraine, Western nations are seeking to avert a worsening of the situation.Energy Politics: Europe is a huge customer of Russia’s fossil fuels. The rising tensions in Ukraine are driving fears of a midwinter cutoff.Migrant Crisis: As people gathered on the eastern border of the European Union, Russia’s uneasy alliance with Belarus triggered additional friction.Militarizing Society: With a “youth army” and initiatives promoting patriotism, the Russian government is pushing the idea that a fight might be coming.At a news conference Tuesday in the Kremlin with Mr. Putin, Mr. Orban left no doubt about the main reason for this deviation.“If we have Russian gas, we can provide a cheap supply of it to Hungarian households. If there is no Russian gas then we cannot do this,” he explained.Peter Kreko, the director of Political Capital in Budapest, said cheap energy was one of Fidesz’s main selling points to voters. “The party says that while people in the rest of Europe are freezing or becoming impoverished because of energy prices, Hungary has no problems.”Mr. Orban’s Moscow trip, he said, could therefore be a “big win — so long as the war does not escalate in Ukraine.” But if Russia invades, he added, Mr. Orban, who described his trip to Mr. Putin as a “mission of peace,” will be “in serious trouble internationally and also domestically. His whole narrative crumbles.”At a joint news conference with Mr. Orban in Moscow on Tuesday, Mr. Putin effectively endorsed the Hungarian leader.Pool photo by Yuri KochetkovMr. Orban is not the first Hungarian leader to go cap in hand to Moscow in pursuit of energy. But when a predecessor did so in 2007 and reached a gas deal with Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled energy behemoth, Mr. Orban lambasted the arrangement as evidence his country was slipping back into Moscow’s orbit.Since then, however, Mr. Orban has dropped the anti-Moscow sentiments that catapulted him to prominence in 1989, and instead developed a form of far-right populism more focused on stoking contemporary cultural wars by targeting the European Union as a menacing threat to Hungarian sovereignty and values.Nationalist leaders in other European countries like Poland share Mr. Orban’s hostility toward Brussels but reject his outreach to Mr. Putin, a rift that has hobbled a yearslong effort by Europe’s far right to form a united front.“We had a bad relationship with the Soviet Union for many reasons that I do not need to list here,” Mr. Orban told radio listeners on Friday. “But that era is over, and now we are trying to have a system of relations with this new Russia that is different from what we had with the Soviet Union.”Mr. Putin has returned the favor.After blasting NATO for “ignoring” Russia’s security concerns as Mr. Orban stood at his side in the Kremlin, the Russian president effectively endorsed the Hungarian leader.“As we usually say when our partners are having elections, we will work with any elected leader,” Mr. Putin said, adding: “But I must note that you have done so much in your work on the Russian track in both the interest of Hungary and Russia. I hope our cooperation will continue.”A station for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, owned by the Russian energy company Gazprom, in Lumbin, Germany. Around 80 percent of the gas used in Hungary is imported from Gazprom.Sean Gallup/Getty ImagesMore important, he offered Mr. Orban a helping hand with energy, noting that underground storage facilities for gas in Europe are just 40 percent full and “our European partners in Europe will probably face problems next year.” But Hungary, Mr. Putin promised, “will have no problems because we will coordinate additional volumes.”Around 80 percent of the gas used in Hungary is imported from Gazprom, more than double the European Union’s average level of Russian imports. Then there is nuclear energy. The biggest producer of electricity in Hungary is the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, a Soviet-designed facility whose expansion Mr. Orban also discussed with Mr. Putin. It generates around half of Hungary’s electricity. Russia has provided loans of $10 billion to fund the plant’s expansion, a project led by Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company, Rosatom.“It should be clear for everyone that as long as this government is in power, energy prices will be reduced,” Mr. Orban’s chief of staff, Gergely Gulyas, declared last year.Hungary’s dependence on Russia for energy helps explain why, when the Biden administration announced this week that it would send more American troops to the region, Hungary said it didn’t need them. Poland and Romania welcomed the American offer.Hungary has a long history of animosity toward Russia, but this has faded as media outlets controlled by Mr. Orban and his supporters have praised Mr. Putin and steadily eroded trust in the Western alliance.Mr. Putin on TV during his meeting with Mr. Orban in Moscow on Tuesday. Hungary’s long history of animosity toward Russia has faded in recent years.Sergey Ponomarev for The New York TimesA survey of public opinion across East and Central Europe last year by Globsec, a research group in Slovakia, found that Hungary, alone among countries in the region, views Russia and China as more important strategic partners than the United States.Some analysts believe Mr. Putin’s pledges of support for Hungary in Moscow were largely symbolic and won’t help Mr. Orban keep utility prices in check.“The era of cheap Russian gas has ended,” said Attila Weinhardt, an energy analyst at Portfolio, an online financial journal. The government’s hope that it can keep fixed energy prices for households, he said, is probably unsustainable.Mr. Orban’s Moscow visit secured no written commitment of additional supplies and mostly just reaffirmed a 15-year deal signed last September. That deal, which advanced Russian efforts to reduce gas deliveries to Europe through Ukraine by using alternative pipelines, was condemned by Ukraine as a “purely political, economically unreasonable decision.”Mr. Orban’s foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, responded that Hungary was not playing politics but simply securing its own economic and security interests. “You cannot heat homes with political statements,” he said.Valerie Hopkins More

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    Italian Lawmakers Say They Have Agreed to Re-Elect Sergio Mattarella as President

    Mr. Mattarella has presided over a chaotic seven years in which the country swung wildly from the left to the right, acting as the guardrails of Italy’s democracy.ROME — After noxious and chaotic back-room negotiations, Italian lawmakers said on Saturday that they had reached a consensus to keep the status quo in place and would ask the country’s current president, Sergio Mattarella, to serve another seven-year term.The Italian Parliament is expected to re-elect Mr. Mattarella later Saturday, in the sixth day of secret votes that have revealed the fractious politics and crumbling alliances just beneath the surface of Italy’s national unity government.In Italy’s unpredictable politics, nothing is certain until the ballots are officially counted, and Mr. Mattarella, at 80, has been reluctant to serve again. But a week of inconclusive voting had already revealed the inability of the different political interests within the governing coalition to rally around a new candidate.The apparent choice of Mr. Mattarella essentially amounted to a punt — to avoid early elections and to prolong Italy’s current period of stability under Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who himself had coveted the job.But in a private meeting on Saturday morning, Mr. Draghi personally asked Mr. Mattarella to consider staying on because the political chaos over the inconclusive ballots had begun to suck in institutional figures, like the president of the Senate and the head of the Secret Service, two prominent women who were proposed as candidates only to be roundly rejected and tarnished.Mr. Draghi returned from the meeting and then called the governing coalition’s party leaders to try to broker a deal, according to an official in Mr. Draghi’s office who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss it publicly.By leaving Mr. Draghi in place, the lawmakers hoped to avert the political chaos of early elections that his departure may have encouraged. The choice of Mr. Mattarella instead increased the likelihood that Mr. Draghi, a former president of the European Central Bank, would continue to lead the unity government.Having Mr. Draghi’s hand on day-to-day affairs was certain to calm international markets as well as the European Union’s leadership in Brussels, which is counting on Italy to effectively manage hundreds of billions of dollars in pandemic recovery funds and demonstrate the wisdom of the bloc’s experiment in collective debt.Mario Draghi, left, at the Quirinal Palace in Rome in February 2021.Francesco Ammendola/Presidential Palace, via ReutersMr. Draghi’s supporters would have preferred that he be elected president, hoping that his steadying influence, even in the often ceremonial role of the presidency, would provide Italy stability beyond the country’s next scheduled elections, in 2023.But for them, the re-election of Mr. Mattarella amounts to the second-best option because it freezes the current political situation in place and leaves open the possibility that Mr. Draghi could still someday ascend to the Quirinal Palace, the home of presidents and the past home of popes.While Mr. Draghi is expected to stay on as prime minister for the months ahead, speculation is rife that Mr. Mattarella would resign early from his second term as president and open the way for Italy’s next Parliament to elect Mr. Draghi at a less politically delicate time. The official in Mr. Draghi’s office said Mr. Draghi and Mr. Mattarella did not discuss anything of the sort on Saturday morning.Mr. Mattarella “understands that this is a critical time for Italy,” said Roberto D’Alimonte, an expert in the Italian political system at Luiss Guido Carli University in Rome. “And that the status quo needs to be kept.”But months can be an eternity in Italy’s volatile politics. Most experts agree that as the elections get closer, the political ambitions and gamesmanship of the opposing political parties in the government will make it increasingly hard for the government to act, to pass new legislation, or even to stay together.And there is no guarantee that Mr. Mattarella would resign, or if he did, that the new Parliament would be filled with electors partial to Mr. Draghi.Mr. Mattarella was first elected in 2015 when he was championed by the prime minister at the time, Matteo Renzi, and he enjoyed broad support across the political spectrum. Born in Palermo, Sicily, he is the younger brother of Piersanti Mattarella, whom the mafia assassinated in 1980 during his term as Sicily’s governor.Sergio Mattarella, a reserved lawyer who taught parliamentary law in Palermo, was elected to Parliament in 1983 as a member of the Christian Democratic Party, which dominated postwar Italy until it imploded after a series of bribery scandals in the early 1990s. He served in Parliament until 2008, holding a number of high-level government posts under the Christian Democrats and in later center-left governments. In 2011, he was elected by Parliament to Italy’s Constitutional Court.As president, the grandfatherly Mr. Mattarella, with his snow-white hair and quiet style, has demonstrated moral authority in his ceremonial role.But he has also presided with a firm hand over a chaotic seven years in which the country swung wildly from the left to the right and elected among the most populist and anti-European Parliaments in Europe before transforming once again into an establishment bedrock under Mr. Draghi, whom Mr. Mattarella personally brought in to end a government crisis last year.After populists scored large victories in the 2018 elections, Mr. Mattarella prevented from taking power a government that he considered in violation of the Italian Constitution for its anti-European character, resulting in leaders of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement calling for his impeachment. It is a mark of how much Italian politics has moderated around Mr. Draghi that those same leaders today urged their followers to vote for Mr. Mattarella. But many of them had a strong personal interest in stability, as early elections were likely to cost many of them their jobs and pensions.Counting votes on Saturday at Parliament in Rome.Pool photo by Roberto MonaldoMr. Mattarella repeatedly made it clear that he did not want to stay in the job and had moved his things to a new apartment in Rome. Memes swapped among Italian politicians and reporters this week showed Mr. Mattarella answering the phone and pretending he was not home, or tying sheets together to sneak out of a window of the presidential palace. After news of his selection became public, Italian commentators jokingly expressed solidarity with his plight of having to pack and unpack boxes.But over a week of disastrous negotiations that highlighted the lack of cohesion across the political spectrum, but especially in the country’s center right, which came into the election hoping to flex its muscles but left weak and splintered, he emerged as the only name anyone could agree on.Matteo Salvini, the leader of the nationalist League party who had hoped the election would act as a show of force for the center right and his role as its de facto leader, exited the week much weaker and politically bloodied. All of his proposed candidates, and there were many, failed to gain traction.“We’ll ask Mattarella to stay,” he said Saturday. “And like this, the team stays as it is. Draghi remains at Palazzo Chigi” in his office of prime minister.Silvio Berlusconi, who had himself hoped to become president before withdrawing his candidacy shortly before voting began, had put a veto on Mr. Draghi becoming president because it could endanger the government. Mr. Berlusconi had a “long and cordial” phone call with Mr. Mattarella “ensuring him our fullest support,” according to Antonio Tajani, a leader of Mr. Berlusconi’s political party, Forza Italia. Mr. Tajani said he was very satisfied with the choice of Mr. Mattarella.The centrist Italia Viva party, led by Mr. Renzi, applauded the choice of Mr. Mattarella. “We voted for him then and today we vote for him again enthusiastically,” the group said on Twitter.If Mr. Mattarella is the winner of the week’s voting, and Mr. Draghi remains a player and a potential president for Italy, the election had its fair share of casualties, too. While the Democratic Party got its chosen candidate, the center right emerged seeming battered and inept. Some of its biggest power players talked about resigning. The contempt and diverging interests among the nominal allies spilled into view.Mr. Mattarella on Saturday outside the Quirinal Palace.Massimo Percossi/EPA, via Shutterstock For days, the competing political parties engaged in all sorts of tactics to pursue their narrow interests, gain the upper hand or defend against partisan candidates. They cast blank ballots and floated symbolic candidates used to measure the compactness of their voting blocs. They timed their own voters to make sure they were not writing down names on blank ballots. They publicly offered what they called ideal, real, credible candidates, but in reality, they meant to burn those candidacies by merely articulating the syllables of their names.On Thursday, the threshold for victory went down to 505 votes, an absolute majority, and tensions increased. On Friday, the number of votes increased to two a day, and Mr. Salvini, tried to force a candidacy of a political ally, Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, the president of the Senate, despite threats from liberals and his nominal partners in the national unity coalition that it would prompt the collapse of the government.Her candidacy came up far short and did not even succeed in winning all of the votes of the center-right bloc. Momentum began to move toward Mr. Mattarella, but on Friday night, desperate politicians, including the embittered former prime minister Giuseppe Conte, whom Mr. Mattarella had replaced with Mr. Draghi, expressed backing for a generic female candidate. The move was roundly interpreted as a last-ditch power tactic and merely claimed new political casualties. But on Saturday, all of those gambits seemed to end and the members of the national unity government decided to keep things exactly how they were, with Mr. Mattarella as president and Mr. Draghi as prime minister. But everything also seemed different. The election had taken a toll.The election, Enrico Letta, the leader of the Democratic Party, told reporters on Saturday, showed “a political system that is blocked.” He added, “This isn’t working.”Elisabetta Povoledo More

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    From the Maghreb to the East, Poking the EU Has an MO

    Contemporary diplomatic relations between Morocco and Spain saw their genesis after the Spanish departed from Western Sahara and the tripartite agreement was reached in 1975. Signed in Madrid, this agreement between Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain tried to normalize the future of the region’s borders and of the people of Western Sahara.

    However, after signing the deal, the government in Madrid never formalized its political and diplomatic position regarding Moroccan sovereignty over Spain‘s former colony in Western Sahara. A geopolitical matter of vital importance for Morocco, the question of Western Sahara remains an unhealed wound in the relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

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    In 2021, this wound was reopened after Spain, in a somewhat secret and irregular move, welcomed Brahim Ghali, secretary-general of the Polisario Front, a nationalist movement seeking independence for Western Sahara vis-à-vis Morocco. On top of the fact that Ghali is wanted in Spain for crimes against humanity, rape and torture, among others, he is also a staunch enemy of the government in Rabat.

    This politically embarrassing situation, a product of a diplomatic miscalculation by the Spanish government, created a feeling of betrayal in Rabat. Morocco quickly conveyed its discomfort, considering Spain’s harboring of Ghali a challenge to the kingdom’s sovereignty and interference in an internal state matter. Thus, Morocco issued a warning that continuing to host Ghali would have consequences.

    Spain in North Africa

    Despite these warnings, the government in Madrid decided not to make any political or diplomatic overtures to Morocco, declining to resolve the misunderstanding in a consensual manner. Therefore, in a way, the Spanish government forwent its diplomatic relationship with Morocco and disregarded the important role that Rabat has always played as a critical partner in the fight against illegal trafficking and terrorism stemming from the Maghreb and the Sahel.

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    Though the relationship between Morocco and Spain has lived through ups and downs, the tensions last year felt much different. Through relaxation of its military controls, Rabat‘s threat became a reality in May 2021 when Morocco effectively opened its border with Ceuta, a Spanish enclave and autonomous city located on the African continent, which made it easier for waves of irregular migrants to reach Tarajal beach. Around 8,000 people, including more than 1,500 estimated minors, tried to cross the Spanish-Moroccan border on foot and by swimming to enter Spanish soil illegally.

    As crude as it may seem, this political move by the government in Rabat, using Moroccans and Africans in general as a weapon against Spain, is not new. For years, Morocco has used this modus operandi as a diplomatic weapon to pressure and obtain concessions from its European neighbor. However, there has not been such a mass arrival of people, especially such a high percentage of minors, to the Spanish border in recent history.

    The diplomatic crisis last May led to authentic moments of chaos and siege along Ceuta‘s border, making the passage of many of these immigrants to the European territory possible. Through its actions, Rabat sent a message without palliatives and implored the Spanish government to back down from political moves, such as open invitations to regional nationalist leaders.

    The Existential Issue of Territorial Integrity

    Morocco’s red lines related to Western Sahara have been drawn, and the kingdom has reiterated that interferences with its national sovereignty will not be tolerated. The crude political response at the Spanish border of Ceuta represents the harshness of Rabat‘s diplomatic relations, choosing, yet again, to weaponize its population.

    Spain needs Morocco; indeed, Europe needs Morocco. Rabat is a crucial partner in Africa, especially given the many challenges in the region. However, Spain and the European Union should not allow the pressure and blackmail from their North African neighbor to stand because they embolden others. Spain and the EU should impose strict red lines on Morocco as well as clear and intelligent economic sanctions concerning development, education and health funds.

    Political, and diplomatic issues can be resolved with class and delicacy without cheap blows and without trivializing despair and compassion. For this, Spain needs to reach a rapprochement with Morocco regarding the status and future of Western Sahara.

    Energy and Copycats

    In tandem with Morocco’s migrant valve vis-à-vis Spain, Algeria started leveraging its gas valve to counter France’s escalation on matters like issuing visas to Algerian citizens. In this latter issue, Spain and Morocco, neither of whom are particularly close with Algeria, are collateral damage to the Paris-Algiers feud whether in the form of declining pipeline revenues or a higher power bill.

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    Since these episodes toward the middle of last year, the same playbook has been used by Moscow’s client in Minsk, who has fostered a migrant cul-de-sac along the EU’s Polish border. In doing so, Russia and Belarus are feeding the euroskeptic spirits within the Visegrad countries and beyond, which are particularly sensitive to migration and border sovereignty issues. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin are playing good cop, bad cop on the issue of Europe’s gas supply by offering both threats and assurances that further highlight the EU’s vulnerable dependency on external providers when it comes to energy.

    On the migration front, the European Union needs to reinforce its external borders and FRONTEX agency, particularly within the Schengen area, and formulate a common framework to tackle both migration quotas and allocation throughout Schengen member countries. Not only is the migrant reality in places like Spain, Greece, and Poland a human tragedy, but it is also increasingly a geopolitical lever weaponized by Morocco, Turkey, Belarus and other adversaries to destabilize the EU and bolster internal chaos to the benefit of figures such as Viktor Orban, Geert Wilders, Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Eric Zemmour.

    Whether nuclear, solar or wind, a common and comprehensive European defense framework urgently requires a holistic approach that tackles the issue of energy independence, in addition to that of border security, particularly in an increasingly hostile and multipolar neighborhood.

    Building Solutions Where Possible

    Along the Maghreb, one of the best solutions would be a new pragmatic and flexible bipartisan agreement between Spain and Morocco. An agreement that commemorates the golden jubilee of the Tripartite Agreement provides a firm solution to the Western Sahara dispute in a framework that benefits coexistence in the region and maintains collaboration in critical matters such as the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

    In the same way, Spain and the EU must encourage the good behavior of Morocco with humanitarian aid and fruitful commercial relations to definitively close the post-colonial wound that sometimes reopens between the two countries.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    When Will Montenegro’s Dreams of Joining the EU Become Reality?

    Four students, rejoicing in the good news, partied in one of the numerous Irish pubs in Podgorica. Fed up with nationalism, populism and other breeds of pestilence engulfing the Western Balkan region, they reveled in a brighter future awaiting them in the European Union. It was summertime, the Thessaloniki Summit had just ended, and the promise of EU membership had been conveyed to the region.

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    For the students, the EU was not a gold pot you could dip your hand in and harvest the low-hanging fruit. Quite the contrary, at their very core, they felt that the EU resonated with them in a peculiar but enchanting harmony. German punctuality, cars and the Scorpions’ “Wind of Change”; French “liberte, egalite, fraternite” and wine; Italian canzone and eternal Rome; Greek philosophy and the cradle of democracy; Spanish flamenco and the mesmerizing sound of guitars — all came together in a beautiful constellation, comprising the 12 stars on the blue flag.

    Fast forward two decades and one of those four students has become the minister of foreign affairs of Montenegro. Without pretending to be Dr. Nicolaes Tulp from the famous Rembrandt painting, looking back at the lost time in between, I cannot help but ask whether both Montenegro and the EU could have done better. Are we where we wanted to be?

    Montenegro Calling

    Over those years since Thessaloniki, Montenegro has accomplished a lot. It opened up its economy and became a WTO member. It has no open issues with its neighbors. It joined NATO in 2017 and is ahead of others in the region in the EU accession process. It is also the only aspiring member country showing 100% alignment with EU foreign policy. Looking at these achievements, some may wonder why Montenegro still isn’t part of the European Union.

    Well, things are never that simple. In contrast to the undeniable success of its foreign policy, the murky labyrinths of domestic politics are still blocking the country’s path to EU membership. Since negotiations with Brussels began, the ruling party has acted as if it were the sole custodian of the process. But to be successful, the course must involve the whole of society and political spectrum. Montenegro is joining the EU as a community, not as a ruling majority. Every success in this effort belongs to all political stakeholders, NGOs and other participants. The same applies to all failures.

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    Of course, the main responsibility lies with the government that creates the framework for how the accession will evolve, but the sustainability of the process can only be attained if utmost inclusion is assured. There was a persistent lack of political will to tackle the most treacherous pestilence of any society — corruption and organized crime. For too long, political stakeholders turned a blind eye to these flaws blocking Montenegro’s European path and deferred the attempts to eradicate them to better times.

    Finally, the regional context of the Western Balkans further complicated Montenegro’s course toward Brussels. No matter how much one excels in class, the performance of your classmates can hold you back. Montenegro has been a beacon of good neighborly relations. However, it exists in a region permeated with bilateral disputes that have detrimental spillover effects — an endless game of thrones.

    But every cloud always has a silver lining. In August 2020, the Democratic Party of Socialists — the heir of the Communist Party — headed by President Milo Djukanovic, suffered defeat in elections, marking the first peaceful transition of power after nearly 30 years of one-party rule. The process has been smooth; the absence of riots, rallies or protests on the streets showed how mature the Montenegrin society has become.

    The new political habitat brought to the surface new hopes, zeal and also stakeholders. There emerged a myriad of new, young politicians, with political roots in neither the Communist Party of old nor in the nationalist blocs. Young and prominent, they shine brightly, unburdened by the dark clouds of the wars of the 1990s and the legacy of clientelism. They are progressive, Western-orientated, and they truly walk the talk. They present a stark contrast to the ruling elites of the past, the indoctrinated ex-members of the Communist Party who, despite being able to subscribe to the messages coming from our European partners, never genuinely understood them. 

    Embed from Getty Images

    And how could they? A vast majority of these party cadres never lived abroad, never left the confines of former Yugoslavia and seldom spoke foreign languages. Unlike them, the new generations are fully in sync with the heartbeat of Europe. They have been raised on Western films, music and culture. They have studied or lived abroad and speak at least one foreign language. Most importantly, they detest corruption. Unlike their predecessors, these new Montenegrins are law-abiding not because the criminal code demands it, but because they find corruption to be a great social ignominy that mars the country’s image. In their mindset, corruption is a red line that must not be crossed.

    Against the backdrop of this mixed bag of legacies, the new government has maintained the same foreign policy and conducted, in parallel, an intrepid fight against corruption and organized crime, achieving outstanding results in a very short period of time. These results have been recognized by the EU and the international community at large.

    Thanks to these accomplishments, the myth that only one political party could lead Montenegro toward EU membership has been debunked. Montenegro’s EU and NATO partners have realized that other, young and genuinely progressive political forces are capable to reach the final destination of the country’s EU journey and that they are sparing no effort to deliver. But again, this is a process that belongs to all Montenegrins. Membership in the EU is voluntary and requires dialogue and cooperation from all sides of the political spectrum, no matter how hard it may sometimes be.

    Brussels Calling

    Let us now look at the situation from the EU’s perspective.

    It is widely known that every structure has, among others, a raison d’être, one where others look up to it and find it worth emulating. Without this interaction, its allure would be in vain, creating an inwardly-oriented edifice. This approach is embedded in the EU Global Strategy 2016, meaning that the union must become a more globally-present and assertive international actor. Its enlargement policy, which compels countries to conduct reforms to better align with the EU, is its most appealing stratagem. We in the Western Balkans understand that most clearly.  

    Societies in the former communist countries, from “Sczeczin in the Baltics to Trieste in the Adriatic,” hold this to be a self-evident truth. Enlargement policy has had a hugely transformative effect on all its beneficiary countries and represents the best of Europe to date — its attested power to unite in diversity. This is even more remarkable given the fact that the past decade has not been the easiest ride for the EU. Many crises befell the bloc one after another, including the 2008 global financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the 2015 migrant crisis, Brexit and now COVID-19.

    Embed from Getty Images

    I don’t think it would be wrong to suggest that some states might not have survived these great ordeals if the union, the spiritus movens of European nations and values, had not been there to support them. This structure has proved time and time again that democracies might be shaken, but, when united, they will, at the end of the day, always prevail.

    There is no doubt that the EU needs to enter calmer waters in order to recuperate from a decade of crises before it can continue to expand. Nonetheless, the dream of European might is still vivid and alive among those who have been dreaming about such a European future for almost two decades.

    For all our sakes, we should keep sharing this approach together. Enlargement is a question of credibility, something that the US realized in the wake of the Cold War and manifested in the motto “the US promises — the US delivers.” The EU, if it wishes to have a truly global status, should act along the same principle.

    In the case of the EU, credibility is twofold. First, neither Brussels nor the member states should permit themselves to leave a geostrategic blackhole in the heart of the continent. It would be a blunder, as it would lead to the penetration of other global opponents in the union’s backyard. If the EU fails to secure the very heart of the continent, it will become its Achilles’ heel that would prevent the union from expanding, consolidating and deepening.

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    On the other hand, it is also an issue of credibility for the aspiring countries. Since 2003, only two candidates have become member states, so if enlargement becomes too much of a moving target, at the end of the day, the aspiring countries might start looking to other centers of power that are more credible, reliable and able to deliver on promises.

    The Western Balkans is the only region where enlargement coincides with reconciliation among nations. And if incentives for good behavior disappear, bad behavior might prevail.

    For all these reasons, the EU has to be prudent, astute and bold enough to realize that it is much better to have the aspiring countries at the table for the sake of its future, stability and raison d’être.

    The Last Mile

    The case of Montenegro should be an easy one. A country of 620,000 inhabitants, with 75% in support for EU and NATO membership, as well as being fully committed to EU foreign policy, is something that the union could easily digest. A country this size could not, by any means, hamper the EU decision-making process.

    The benefits of this easy enlargement would be manifold. It would demonstrate that, in spite of some setbacks along the way, the EU is still delivering. That would, beyond any doubt, reinvigorate mutual trust. Furthermore, the power of the Montenegrin example would encourage other Western Balkan countries to show real interest in becoming the next member states.

    At the same time, it would be a strong signal to third parties that the region has not been forgotten, that the EU has just made a short break and now, again, claims its full right to it. That would make life easier for NATO as well by providing stability and security on its southern flank.

    The best journeys are never easy or short. But one old European state, too small to have enemies, too smart to create them and too proud to be talked down to by anyone has been on the road for almost two decades, is hurrying toward the European family of nations where it has always belonged. It is high time for Montenegro to get there and for the story of those distant student dreams and hopes, music and harmony to have a happy ending.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More