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      in Elections

      Roberta Metsola Elected as President of European Parliament

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      Roberta Metsola of Malta will succeed David Sassoli, an Italian politician who died last week, at a critical time for the institution.BRUSSELS — The European Parliament elected a new president on Tuesday, with Roberta Metsola, a 43-year-old Maltese deputy, picked to lead the institution as its seeks to gain a more prominent place in the E.U. power structure.Ms. Metsola’s predecessor, David Sassoli, died at age 65 last week, and she was selected by an overwhelming majority over two other candidates, all women.The European Union of 27 nations, one of the world’s most ambitious political experiments, is home to 450 million people. The Parliament is the bloc’s only directly elected institution, and voters have been electing lawmakers to the body since 1979, when the union was much smaller.Despite the holding of European Parliament elections every five years, the European Union has a complicated structure and is often accused of being a murky bureaucratic machine, detached from its citizens and lacking democratic accountability, even as it grows in power.“In the next years, people across Europe will look to our institution for leadership and direction, while others will continue to test the limits of our democratic values and European principles,” Ms. Metsola told lawmakers after being elected. “We must fight back against the anti-E.U. narrative that takes hold so easily and so quickly.”Ms. Metsola, a member of the conservative European People’s Party, the Parliament’s largest political group, has a daunting task in leading the most fragmented chamber in decades as it tackles issues such as curbing carbon emissions, upholding the rule of law and setting out rules for major technology companies.European Parliament in 2020. It is the bloc’s only directly elected institution.Sebastien Bozon/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesShe will also have to navigate the Parliament’s relationship with the two other institutions governing the bloc: the European Commission, its executive bureaucracy; and the European Council, which pools together the heads of government of the 27 member states. The three branches often compete with one another for influence, with the Parliament struggling for relevance and usually coming out the weakest.The dance between the E.U. institutions has been unfolding against the backdrop of a larger conundrum: Can the bloc, which has positioned itself as a defender of democracy and which governs many aspects of the lives of Europeans, become more democratic while maintaining its current structure?“The European Union is an unfinished political system,” said Sophie Pornschlegel, a senior policy analyst at the European Policy Center, a Brussels-based think tank. “It’s a question of perspective,” she noted. “If you look at it like an international organization, it is one of the most democratic ones. Obviously, if you compare it to national democracies, it has a democratic deficit.”But according to Ms. Pornschlegel, that comparison would not be fair. “So far, we don’t have the United States of Europe,” she said, referring to a more deeply integrated federal power structure. “It’s much more complicated than that.”The European Parliament can veto legislation, set up budgets, ratify international agreements and has a supervisory role over various institutions. It also has the final say in approving the president of the European Commission.But in December 2019, when the current head of the commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was appointed, national leaders reneged on their promise to nominate a president from candidates proposed by the Parliament’s lawmakers, which was seen as a major blow to the institution’s standing. Lawmakers also cannot dismiss individual commissioners, but can only disband the commission as a whole.The European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, second left, was appointed in 2019.Pool photo by Aris OikonomouAnd in an important divergence from national legislatures, the European Parliament does not have the power to initiate laws, which many see as a huge hindrance. “It puts you in a reactive mode,” said Marietje Schaake, a former member of the European Parliament who now teaches at Stanford University. “It is a major flaw in the design of the union.”Alberto Alemanno, a professor of European Union law at the business school HEC Paris, put it more bluntly. “The European Parliament is neither a parliament, because it has no legislative initiative, nor is it European, because its members are elected at the national and not at the European level,” he said.But analysts say that in recent years the Parliament has gained prominence, expressed both through an increased turnout in the 2019 elections and through a series of unusually bold moves.Under Mr. Sassoli, an Italian, the Parliament took the European Commission to court for not using existing rules to cut funding for member countries breaching rule-of-law standards. And in May, lawmakers blocked a high-profile investment agreement between the bloc and China, citing human rights violations and sanctions against Europeans critical of Beijing, including some lawmakers.As the position of the Parliament has evolved, so has the role of its president. “It is no longer the role of a ceremonial figure, like the president of the German republic,” Professor Alemanno said. “The president is somebody who can allow the European Parliament to advance their political goals and defend its prerogatives. But it will depend on their personality, and their political affiliation.”In many ways, Ms. Metsola, a former lawyer, brings novelty to the role. Nearly 60 percent of the legislators are men, and the average age is about 50. And Ms. Metsola is the first president to come from Malta, the bloc’s smallest member nation.But in other ways, Ms. Metsola is a mainstream choice. She belongs to the Parliament’s dominant group, which is also home to the party of Ms. von der Leyen. Critics say that the political affinity could be an obstacle to Ms. Metsola’s standing up to the commission.Ms. Metsola belongs to the Parliament’s dominant group, which is also home to the party of Ms. von der Leyen.Gonzalo Fuentes/ReutersIn an interview with The Times before her selection as president, Ms. Metsola said, “We have the task to hold the commission to account, and we will keep doing that unapologetically.”“But we will keep in mind the bigger picture of E.U. unity,” she added. “I don’t want the Parliament to get stuck in inter-institutional debates.”Ms. Metsola has been outspoken against corruption and the erosion of the rule of law, especially in her native Malta. But she has faced criticism over her socially conservative views, in particular her stance against abortion. She said that once elected, she would push forward “the position of the house” on reproductive rights.Referring to Ms. Metsola’s vote against a resolution condemning Poland’s anti-abortion laws, Alice Kuhnke, a Green candidate for president, said, “All women in the E.U. should rely on the president of the Parliament to fight for us when needed.”“I find it hard to see how she would manage to do that with credibility and strength,” Ms. Kuhnke added, in an interview before Ms. Metsola was confirmed as president.The institution of the Parliament has often been chided for not upholding the principles it preaches. Transparency International, an anticorruption watchdog, said in a recent report that the Parliament’s internal rules were not sufficient to guarantee accountability of lawmakers. Despite the systemic flaws, there are reasons for the Parliament to be optimistic, analysts say. In a recent poll, 63 percent of Europeans said that they would like the body to play a more important role. One proposal would see some lawmakers elected from Pan-European rather than national lists, aiming to bolster the connection with voters across the bloc. But in typical E.U. fashion, it is unclear whether such a change would be ready before the next election, planned for 2024. More

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      in World Politics

      What Does the Future Success of the Euro Depend On?

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      The first euro banknotes and coins came into circulation 20 years ago. Although the exchange rates of almost all participating countries had already been fixed two years earlier, only the introduction of the euro marked Europe’s irreversible economic integration. For after the creation of the single monetary policy and the introduction of hundreds of tons of euro cash, a return to national currencies would have ended in disaster for the European Union and its member states.

      The global financial crisis and the euro crisis have shown that the single market would not function without the common currency, the euro — one reason being exchange rate differences. Even though the euro has not displaced the dollar from first place in the global monetary system, it protects the European economies from external shocks, that is, negative impacts from the global economy.

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      Moreover, monetary integration has shown its advantages during the COVID-19 pandemic. Without the euro, some member states would not only face a demand and supply crisis, but also a sharp weakening of their currency, which could even lead to a currency crisis. This would make it extremely difficult to fight the pandemic and support jobs with public money.

      The citizens of the EU seem to appreciate the stabilizing effect of the common currency. According to the May 2021 Eurobarometer survey, 80% of respondents believe that the euro is good for the EU; 70% believe that the euro is good for their own country.

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      Moreover, joining the euro area is seen as attractive: Croatia will most likely join the euro area in 2023. Bulgaria also aspires to join. Due to dwindling confidence in the currencies of Poland and Hungary, the introduction of the euro could become a realistic scenario in the event of a change of governments in these countries.

      A Long List of Reforms

      Despite these developments, many of the euro area’s problems remain unresolved 20 years after the currency changeover. The fundamental dilemma is between risk-sharing versus risk elimination. It is a question of how many more structural reforms individual member states need to undertake before deeper integration of the euro area, which implies greater risk-sharing among member states, can take place. In the banking sector, for example, the issue is to improve the financial health of banks — that is, among other measures to increase their capitalization and reduce the level of non-performing loans before a common deposit insurance scheme can be created.

      A second problem is the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. Currently, the European Central Bank is the main stabilizer of the euro area public debt, which increased significantly as a result of the pandemic, and it will remain so by reinvesting its holdings of government bonds at least until 2024. However, an alternative solution is needed to stabilize the euro area debt market.

      Joint debt guarantees, as recently proposed by France and Italy, must be combined with incentives to modernize the economies, especially of the southern euro are countries. In this context, it is important to keep in mind the limits of fiscal policy, which is currently too often seen as the magic cure for all economic policy problems. Linked to fiscal policy are the questions of how many rules and how much flexibility are needed in the euro area.

      Heated discussions are to be expected this year on the corresponding changes to the fiscal rules. This is because there is a great deal of mistrust between the countries in the north and south of the euro area, which is mainly due to the different performance levels of the economies and the different views on economic policy. The persistent inflation and the problems with the implementation of the NextGenerationEU stimulus package, which is supposed to cushion coronavirus-related damage to the economy and society, could exacerbate the disparities in economic performance and thus also the disagreements within the euro area.

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      The euro crisis has shown that turbulence in one member state can have fatal consequences for the entire currency area. In the coming years, however, the biggest challenge for the euro area will not be the situation in small member states such as Greece, but in the largest of them. The economies of Italy, France, and Germany, which account for almost 65% of the eurozone’s gross domestic product, are difficult to reform with their complex territorial structures and increasing political fragmentation. At the same time, these economies lack real convergence.

      A decisive factor for the further development of the euro currency project will be whether the transformation of their economic models succeeds under the influence of the digital revolution, the climate crisis, and demographic change.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      The Value of EU Citizenship in a Post-Brexit World

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      In the 1980s, I was born having freedom of movement across Europe, when Britain was part of the European Economic Community. The concept of EU citizenship was formally established in 1993, as part of the creation of the European Union itself, under the Maastricht Treaty.

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      Freedom of movement in Europe was always something I took for granted. I saw Europe as part of our heritage, despite the grumblings of euroskeptics and sly articles in the British press about the perils of straight bananas and the metric system. 

      I traveled a lot in my youth, but travel was never really the issue. Citizens of many countries from outside the EU can stay in the Schengen zone for up to 90 days without a visa. It wasn’t until 2009 that the benefits of being an EU citizen became obvious to me. 

      Free to Work and Study in Europe 

      I signed up for a master’s degree in Brussels, Belgium. The beauty of this was, as an EU citizen, the entire degree cost me only €500 ($560). It was taught in English and full of students from all over the world.

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      There was no paperwork to deal with, no need to prove income, no need to apply for any student visas. Education in Belgium was as open to me as education in my country of origin. And that would have been the same for education in any country in the EU. 

      I stayed in Belgium for two years. During that time, I could work freely without any authorization. I taught English at the European Parliament. I also did a number of freelance jobs on the side. But I could have worked anywhere, from behind a bar, to the top levels of the European institutions. 

      As an EU citizen, I had the right to live and work in Belgium, just as I did with any other country in the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). No sponsorship needed, no work visa, no permission of any kind. 

      I often traveled back and forth between London and Brussels. The Eurostar was, and still is, the best mode of transport. It takes you directly from the center of one capital into the center of the other. With an EU passport, going through immigration was quick and simple. In contrast, passport holders from outside the EU had to wait in a separate queue, all herded together. 

      I didn’t use my EU freedom of movement rights again for 10 years. But that would be for the final time, as a big change was coming. 

      The Vote That Changed Everything

      In 2016, a majority of British voters decided the UK should leave the European Union. Millions of British citizens would soon lose their EU rights. People with Irish or other European relatives were desperately applying for second passports.

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      The next few years were chaotic, full of political turmoil and tribalism. The Brexit referendum had split the country down the middle, and things would never be the same again.

      After the vote, there was a rapidly closing window of opportunity to move to the EU. I knew that was the only option for me. So, in the early weeks of 2020, I moved to Lisbon, the capital of Portugal. Time was running out by then, with the Brexit transition period in full swing. Within months, UK citizens would be officially relegated to third-country national status. 

      There was no time to waste in securing residency in Portugal. As an EU citizen, it was easy. I landed in Lisbon, took my passport and showed up at the nearest municipal office. Thirty minutes and €15 later, I had a five-year temporary residency document for Portugal. 

      Portugal’s citizenship timeline is five years. All being well, that document will allow me to regain my EU rights sometime in 2025, this time as a proud citizen of Portugal — the country I chose.  

      The EU project is far from perfect. Like any large-scale collaboration of humans, it’s fraught with issues. Yes, there’s corruption. Yes, there’s waste and inefficiency. Despite that, the EU is an ambitious project that emerged out of the devastation of the Second World War. The resulting economic cooperation has kept Europe peaceful ever since. In that sense, it’s doing exactly what it was designed to do.

      Citizen of Another Somewhere

      I don’t like nationalism. It’s too easily misused. And I can’t be proud of something that I didn’t achieve: the coincidence of being born on a certain piece of land. Does that mindset make me a “citizen of nowhere”? If so, that’s good. Thanks for the compliment, Theresa. 

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      As the late John le Carre once said, “If you want to make me a citizen of nowhere, I will become a citizen of another somewhere.” An Englishman all his life, le Carre died an Irish citizen, so disappointed was he at the fallout from Brexit. He was fortunate to have that Irish heritage. Not everyone does. And those that don’t have become second-class citizens in Europe.

      National pride is artificially constructed to hold the nation-state together. It plays on our natural inclinations toward tribalism, which is merely an evolutionary hangover. Benedict Anderson’s classic book, “Imagined Communities,” explains these ideas better than I ever could.

      Perhaps the EU is an “imagined community” too. But countries working together, no matter how flawed the process, is the only route we have to improving the world. It’s a project I’m determined to be part of. And if I can’t do so as a British citizen, then I’ll happily do so as a Portuguese. 

      *[Samantha North is the founder of Digital Émigré, an EU citizenship consultancy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      The Response to Russia’s Brinkmanship Over Ukraine

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      The Russian military buildup along Ukrainian borders conducted over the last few months — similar to an escalation by Russia in April — has led to new direct talks between US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. The biggest fear in the West is whether Russia intends to invade Ukraine. The Russian leadership has claimed that its more than 100,000 troops deployed along Ukrainian borders are on Russian territory, are conducting routine training and should not worry anyone. 

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      In stark contrast, Russia perceives the potential deployment of NATO troops close to its borders as a major security threat. This reveals that Russia understands very well the signals it is sending by amassing an unprecedented-in-size military strike group to Ukraine’s frontiers. There is solid evidence that Russia is engaging in a bold brinkmanship game over Ukraine, using the logic of threat to create strategic ambiguity about a potential military invasion. Its goal is to force Western concessions on Ukraine, in particular, and to obtain a strategic carte blanche in the post-Soviet area more generally.   

      The Logic of Threats

      Following a videoconference on December 7 between Biden and Putin, the Russian leadership sent a number of signals that created more clarity about the Kremlin’s intentions. Their form was accurately reflected in a few analyzes published by the Russia-based Carnegie Moscow Center. One Russian analyst argued that, unless Putin’s demand for guarantees that Ukraine will never join NATO is accepted, the United States would see a military defeat of Ukraine, which would be “an especially humiliating re-run of recent events in Afghanistan.” Another Russian expert hinted that, unless the US ensures that Ukraine implements the Russian version of the Minsk agreements, it may risk a war in Ukraine.

      The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, confirmed that the West should accept these two conditions if it wants to avoid Europe returning to “the nightmare scenario of a military confrontation.” Following the teleconference, the deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, reiterated the idea, stating that if NATO refuses Russia’s right to veto the alliance’s further expansion to the East, it will risk “serious consequences” and would lead to “its own weakened security.”

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      These are the most direct and bold threats that the Kremlin has issued against the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are strong signals that this brinkmanship over Ukraine is a strategic calculation, triggered by the Kremlin’s perception that both the European Union and the United States are irresolute. 

      For instance, in his November 18 address to foreign policy officials, Putin observed that Russia has managed to create a feeling of tension in the West. He went on to recommend that this state of tension “should be maintained for as long as possible” and exploited to demand “serious, long-term guarantees” to prevent NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. 

      Following Putin’s videoconference with Biden, the Russian foreign ministry published its concrete demands for talks on a new European security order. Among these demands, Russia requested that NATO withdraw its 2008 Bucharest summit “open doors” pledge for Ukraine and Georgia.

      Assessing the Risk of War

      Why is Russia so bold to directly threaten war and confront the West with an ultimatum: either accept a war in Europe or give up the post-Soviet area? The Kremlin has concluded that there is little appetite in the West to confront Russia on Ukraine, beyond economic sanctions. 

      Russia’s leadership has also come to believe that the West is extremely risk-averse and not ready to call the Kremlin’s bluff. The brazenness of the threats, the reference to NATO’s “humiliation” in Afghanistan and interviews with Russian and foreign experts confirming the strategic timidity of the West — all of this speak to that. For instance, in an interview with Harvard’s Timothy Colton in the Russian newspaper Izvestia during the recent “Valday Club” conference, the reporters emphasized the idea that Ukraine is not important to the US. In an interview with the former US ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, the journalists of the Echo Moskvy radio station pointed out that “we sell the Americans their own fears.”

      Under the current conditions, the risk of a massive conventional Russian invasion of Ukraine is very small. Russia is not yet ready for a total break up with the West, similar to the one the USSR had, which would be very likely if it attacked Ukraine. Therefore, the question of whether Russia is going to attack Ukraine is not helpful for strategic planning. Instead, for a more effective engagement of Russia, the EU and the US should ask: What actions, short of giving up Ukraine’s sovereignty, should be taken to decrease the risk of war?

      Responding to Russia’s Threats

      There are three strategic objectives that the European Union and the United States should pursue and strengthen. They all stem from an effective crisis diplomacy rationale. First, it is necessary to signal a strong resolve to impose high costs on Russia where it is vulnerable. Second, it is necessary to make these signals credible. Third, it has to engage in intensive diplomacy to show that Russia’s demands are not linked to its actual security concerns. 

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      The biggest vulnerability of Russia is the high military costs of an invasion. Providing defense equipment to Ukraine, deploying instructors and even small military units for joint exercises with Ukrainian troops in the vicinity of the line of contact in Donbas and near Crimea — on a rotational basis — would serve as a passive obstruction to potential Russian attacks. These are the most effective deterrence tools, which would greatly strengthen the credibility of the resolve of the EU and the US from Russia’s outlook. 

      Finally, the EU and the US should confront Russia’s manipulation of the “indivisible security” concept, which is a major element of its international propaganda campaign. To counter Russia’s legalistic approach and hidden agenda, they should suggest and discuss alternative proposals, such as the pact of non-aggression or parity of forces in the border areas. The West should not ignore that its response to Russia’s threat of war is likely to affect how other international actors — China, for example — view its resolve in responding to comparable challenges in other regions.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in Elections

      After Months, a ‘New’ Dutch Coalition With the Same Leader and Parties

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      Mark Rutte, who has weathered a scandal and criticism for overstaying his welcome, will be prime minister for a fourth term.After nine months of negotiations among a group of fractious political parties after an election in the spring, the Netherlands finally has a new government.But it will not have a new leader; that position has been taken by Mark Rutte, who will be starting a fourth term as prime minister. It is a testament to his ability to weather crises and shake off a scandal that brought down his previous coalition last January — earning him the nickname “Teflon Mark.”Mr. Rutte’s party will be in coalition with the same two centrist parties and a more right-leaning Christian party that made up the last government.“It took too long,” Mr. Rutte acknowledged in brief remarks when announcing the formation of the four-party coalition that will be led by his Party for Freedom and Democracy. Mr. Rutte, who is known for his sober lifestyle, has been leading the Netherlands since 2010, and he has been criticized in recent years for clinging to power. He has said that he will lead the country with renewed “zeal.”The road to Mr. Rutte’s fourth term started after his previous cabinet resigned over a scandal involving overzealous tax authorities who had hunted down a number of innocent families, often after racial profiling, and accused them of falsely claiming child care benefits. Many were forced to repay huge amounts of money, reducing them to ruin.But Mr. Rutte faced perhaps the biggest crisis in his career as the country’s caretaker prime minister after the resignation of his cabinet amid widespread calls for systematic change in the Netherlands and for his departure from the political stage. But he weathered the criticism, and opposition from the far-right parties that have been gaining ground in the Netherlands in recent years; he won the March elections by a landslide.On Wednesday, Mr. Rutte and other leaders in his centrist coalition announced that an extra 35 billion euros, about $40 billion, would be allocated over the coming 10 years to help Dutch people make the transition to greater energy efficiency as part of efforts to tackle climate change.The government said it also planned to free up more money to address housing shortages, health care and education and more subsidies for child care, areas that Mr. Rutte’s previous administration had been criticized for cutting back.“Rutte came in as a budget hawk,” who trimmed government spending and increased some taxes, said Tom-Jan Meeus, a political columnist for the newspaper NRC Handelsblad. “Now he is advocating spending, also because that was the only way to get other parties on board with another term of him leading the government.”Talks with coalition partners dragged on for months, highlighting the increasing complexity of forming coalition governments in a changing political landscape with the emergence of populists and fringe parties. In the Netherlands and other northern European countries, traditional parties have lost lots of ground to numerous smaller parties, making it harder and harder to form compromise governments.The departure of Angela Merkel, who led Germany for 16 years, makes Mr. Rutte one of the longest continuously serving leaders in Europe. He shares that position with one of his political enemies, Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, who has been his country’s leader continuously since 2010.In June, Mr. Rutte challenged Mr. Orban to “leave the European Union,” after Hungary created a law that several other European countries said undermined the rights of L.G.B.T.Q. people. Mr. Orban later replied that he was persuaded that Mr. Rutte “hated” him. More

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      Macron and Scholz Meet and Call for More ‘European Sovereignty’

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      The new German chancellor made his first foreign stop in Paris, where the two leaders discussed a more independent, bolder Europe.PARIS — On the face of it, President Emmanuel Macron, a showman, and Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a study in reserve, would not be natural companions. But the world has changed, and for France and Germany the imperative of building what they call a “sovereign Europe” has become overwhelming.So Mr. Scholz, who took over from Angela Merkel on Wednesday, chose France as his first foreign destination, not only because that tends to be what newly installed German chancellors do, but also because, as he said standing beside Mr. Macron in Paris on Friday, “We want to reinforce Europe, work together for European sovereignty.”The two men, who first met in Hamburg, Germany, in 2014, held a working lunch at the presidential palace that reflected “the essential need to meet quickly,” as Mr. Scholz put it afterward at a 20-minute news conference. “Our first exchanges demonstrated a solid convergence of views,” Mr. Macron said.Their tone was serious but convivial, with Mr. Macron referring repeatedly to “dear Olaf” and using the less formal “tu,” rather than “vous,” when addressing the chancellor. At the end of the news conference they fist-bumped — a far cry from the image of President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl holding hands on the battlefield of Verdun in 1984, but a Covid-era indication of friendship.Mr. Scholz’s embrace of “European sovereignty” was surely music to Mr. Macron’s ears, as the French president prepares to take over the rotating six-month presidency of the European Union on Jan. 1. The bloc faces an immediate crisis as Russia builds up troops on the Ukrainian border and the pandemic refuses to wane.Asked about the Russian buildup, Mr. Scholz said, “It is clear to all of us that there is no alternative to de-escalation.” Mr. Macron, who seemed skeptical of any imminent Russian threat, said, “We must avoid all useless tension.”Mr. Macron’s vision for a Europe of “power,” backed by real European military and technological capacity, tends toward the grandiose. Mr. Scholz may not like that style — his German government coalition prefers the more prosaic “enhancing European capacity to act” — but the general goal is intensely shared, perhaps more so than in the later Merkel years or at any time since the Cold War.The distance from shared goals to shared action in the European Union is always great because 27 countries have to be aligned. Still, the trauma of Covid-19 and its accompanying economic challenges have brought urgency, as has a sense of European vulnerability in a more unstable world where American leadership is no longer assured.Demonstrations in Frankfurt last week after Germany imposed new Covid regulations.Kai Pfaffenbach/Reuters“I’m more optimistic than I was with Ms. Merkel toward the end,” said Wolfgang Ischinger, a veteran German diplomat. “We have a window of opportunity.”That window may be narrow. Any joint Franco-German plans could be rudely interrupted in April if Mr. Macron is defeated in the French presidential election. He is the favorite, but if France lurched toward the ascendant nationalist hard right, all bets would be off.A German priority in the coming months will be to avoid that outcome, making accommodating gestures toward Mr. Macron more likely.France and Germany have always been the motor of European integration; when they stall, so does the whole project. Although the need to confront the pandemic brought budgetary breakthroughs, Europe has found itself in the shadow of Brexit and internal division while China rose and the United States turned its attention elsewhere.The 177-page coalition agreement of Mr. Scholz’s three-party government alludes to ultimate evolution toward a “federal European state.” Mr. Macron, with the election in mind, has not gone that far — the French attachment to the nation is fierce — but the mere German mention of a United States of Europe suggests new boldness and revived ambition.Still, there are differences. Where Mr. Macron speaks of European “strategic autonomy,” Mr. Scholz prefers “strategic sovereignty.” The difference is not small.“Germans do not want strategic autonomy if that means independence from the United States,” said Cathryn Clüver, the director of the German Council on Foreign Relations.The French president offered some de rigueur praise of NATO when laying out his European presidency program on Thursday. He said it had proved its “usefulness.” But he broadly views European independence as an emancipation from the United States.Germany, intensely attached for historical reasons to the American anchor of European security, is wary of any strategic distancing from Washington. This view is broadly shared in several European Union states, including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, especially at a time when Russian troops are massed on the Ukrainian border.All this complicates both the meaning and the attainability of whatever European sovereignty may be.A Christmas market in Paris last week as virus cases were rising in Europe.Ian Langsdon/EPA, via ShutterstockFrance and Germany share the view that they preserved a multilateral global system based on the rule of law and Western values while the United States, under former President Donald J. Trump, embraced nationalism and disparaged Europe.Understand Germany’s New GovernmentCard 1 of 6The post-Merkel era begins. More

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      German Election Heralds Messier Politics and Weaker Leadership After Merkel

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      Preliminary results indicated an outcome so tight that it could take months of talks to form a new government at a critical moment for Europe.BERLIN — After 16 years of Angela Merkel as their chancellor, Germans scattered their votes across the political spectrum on Sunday in the election to replace her, a fractured return that heralds a messier political era in Germany and weaker German leadership in Europe.Preliminary official results gave the center-left Social Democrats a lead of 1.6 percentage points, an outcome so close that no one could yet say who the next chancellor would be nor what the next government would look like.The only thing that seemed clear was that it would take weeks if not months of haggling to form a coalition, leaving Europe’s biggest democracy suspended in a kind of limbo at a critical moment when the continent is still struggling to recover from the pandemic and France — Germany’s partner at the core of Europe — faces divisive elections of its own next spring.Sunday’s election signaled the end of an era for Germany and for Europe. For over a decade, Ms. Merkel was not just chancellor of Germany but effectively the leader of Europe. She steered her country and the continent through successive crises and in the process helped Germany become Europe’s leading power for the first time since two world wars.Her time in office was characterized above all by stability. Her center-right party, the Christian Democratic Union, has governed in Germany for 52 of the 72 postwar years, traditionally with one smaller party. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany clenching her hands as she listened to speeches on Sunday at her party headquarters in Berlin after parliamentary elections.Markus Schreiber/Associated PressBut the campaign proved to be the most volatile in decades. Armin Laschet, the candidate of Ms. Merkel’s Christian Democrats, was long seen as the front-runner until a series of blunders compounded by his own unpopularity eroded his party’s lead. Olaf Scholz, the Social Democratic candidate, was counted out altogether before his steady persona led his party to a spectacular 10-point comeback. And the Greens, who briefly led the polls early on, fell short of expectations but recorded their best result ever.On Sunday, the Christian Democrats’ share of the vote collapsed well below 30 percent, heading toward the worst showing in their history. For the first time since the 1950s, at least three parties will be needed to form a coalition — and both main parties are planning to hold competing talks to do so.“It’s so unprecedented that it’s not even clear who talks with whom on whose invitation about what, because the Constitution does not have guardrails for a situation like that,” said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, the Berlin-based vice president of the German Marshall Fund, a research group.Even before the first official returns were announced, the battle lines were drawn as both main contenders to succeed Ms. Merkel as chancellor announced their claims to the top job — and their intention to fight for it. A long tradition of deferential, consensus-driven politics was quickly evaporating, giving way to a more raucous tone.At the headquarters of the Social Democrats in Berlin, loud cheering erupted when the first exit polls were announced. “The S.P.D. is back!” Lars Klingbeil, the party’s general secretary, told the crowd of party members, before Mr. Scholz took the stage with his wife and insisted “that the next chancellor is called Olaf Scholz.”Across town, at the conservative headquarters, Mr. Laschet, the candidate of Ms. Merkel’s party, made clear who he thought the next chancellor should be, saying, “We will do everything to form a government.”The unpopularity of Armin Laschet, the Christian Democratic Union candidate, appears to have dragged the party down.Fabrizio Bensch/ReutersIt is a messy set of circumstances likely to complicate the negotiations to form a government. And whoever ends up being chancellor will have not just a weaker mandate — but less time to spend on leading in Europe, analysts said.“Germany will be absent in Europe for a while,” said Andrea Römmele, dean of the Hertie School in Berlin. “And whoever becomes chancellor is likely to be a lot more distracted by domestic politics.”The election’s outcome gives significant leverage to the two smaller parties that are almost certain to be part of any new government: the Greens and the pro-business Free Democrats. Courted by both Mr. Scholz and Mr. Laschet, they have signaled they will first talk among themselves.“Two Maybe-Chancellors and Two Kingmakers,” read one headline of the German public broadcaster ARD.The murky outcome made for a tense night of election-watching in the Pankow district of Berlin. Lena Mucha for The New York TimesIn one way Sunday’s returns were an expression of how disoriented voters are by the departure of Ms. Merkel, who is leaving office as the most popular politician in her country.The chancellor oversaw a golden decade for Europe’s largest economy, which expanded by more than a fifth, pushing unemployment to the lowest levels since the 1980s.As the United States was distracted by multiple wars, Britain gambled its future on a referendum to leave the European Union and France failed to reform itself, Ms. Merkel’s Germany was mostly a haven of stability.“She was the steady hand at the helm, the steady presence,” said Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff of the German Marshall Fund.“Now there is an uneasiness about what comes next,” he said. “The presence and reputation of this chancellor is outsized and very hard to emulate.”That explains why both main candidates to succeed her mostly ran on platforms of continuity rather than change, attempting where possible to signal they would be the one most like the departing chancellor.“This election campaign was basically a contest for who could be the most Merkel-like,” Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff said.Even Mr. Scholz, whose center-left party is the traditional opposition party to Ms. Merkel’s conservatives, played up his role as finance minister in the departing government rather than his own party’s sensibilities, which are well to the left of his own.Inside a polling station, a gym at a secondary school in Berlin Neukölln on Sunday morning.Lena Mucha for The New York Times“Stability, not change, was his promise,” said Mr. Kleine-Brockhoff. The distinctive political tradition of the Federal Republic of Germany is change through consensus.In the four decades it was split from the Communist East, West Germany had strong governments, traditionally formed by one of the two larger parties teaming up with a smaller partner or, in rare circumstances, the two big parties forming a grand coalition. This tradition was continued after reunification in 1990, with far-reaching changes — like the labor market reforms of the early 2000s — often carried out with support from across the aisle.But four parties have become seven and the two traditional main parties have shrunk, changing the arithmetic of forming a government that represents more than 50 percent of the vote. In the future, analysts say, three or four, not two, parties, will have to find enough common ground to govern together.Some analysts say this increasing fragmentation of Germany’s political landscape has the potential to revitalize politics by bringing more voices into the public debate. But it will no doubt make governing harder, as Germany becomes more like other countries in Europe — among them, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands — that have seen a similar fracturing. And messier politics could make the next chancellor weaker.Ms. Merkel has embodied the tradition of consensus more than perhaps any of her predecessors. Of her four terms in office, she spent three in a grand coalition with her party’s traditional opponents, the Social Democrats. When he took the stage at S.P.D. headquarters on Sunday evening, Olaf Scholz insisted “that the next chancellor is called Olaf Scholz.” Laetitia Vancon for The New York TimesGoverning as Ms. Merkel’s junior partners almost killed the Social Democrats, Germany’s oldest party, stripping it of its identity and its place as the leading voice of center-left opposition. But Mr. Scholz used his cozy relationship with the chancellor to his advantage, effectively running as an incumbent in a race without one.At party headquarters on Sunday night, he was being celebrated as a savior by party members who were adamant that the chancellery was theirs.“The S.P.D. is the winner here,” insisted Karsten Hayde, a longtime party member, while Ernst-Ingo Lind, who works for a parliamentarian, said that only a year ago, he would “not have dreamed of being here.”Among the parties represented in the next German Parliament is the Alternative for Germany, or AfD, which shocked the nation four years ago by becoming the first far-right party to win seats there since World War II. Its vote share slipped to 10.5 percent from almost 13 percent in 2017 and it will no longer be the country’s main opposition party. But it solidified its status as a permanent force to be reckoned with. In two states in the former Communist East it came first.“We are here to stay, and we showed that today,” Tino Chrupalla, co-leader of the party, told party members gathered on the outskirts of Berlin.For all the messiness of this election and Merkel nostalgia, many Germans took heart from the fact that more than eight in 10 voters had cast their ballots for a centrist party and that turnout was high.Early-morning voters in Munich. In a sign that the closest election in years had mobilized voters, turnout was expected to surpass the 76 percent recorded in 2017, when the last national elections were held.Laetitia Vancon for The New York TimesThe mobilization was palpable outside several polling stations in Berlin, where families patiently waited their turn in long lines.“It’s the beginning of a new era,” said Ms. Römmele of the Hertie School. Christopher F. Schuetze, Jack Ewing and Melissa Eddy contributed reporting from Berlin. More

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      Can Macron Lead the European Union After Merkel Retires?

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      Emmanuel Macron, the French president, would love to fill the German chancellor’s shoes. But a Europe with no single, central figure may be more likely.PARIS — After Germans vote on Sunday and a new government is formed, Chancellor Angela Merkel will leave office after 16 years as the dominant figure in European politics. It is the moment that Emmanuel Macron, the French president, has been waiting for.The German chancellor, though credited for navigating multiple crises, was long criticized for lacking strategic vision. Mr. Macron, whose more swaggering style has sometimes ruffled his European partners — and Washington — has put forward ideas for a more independent and integrated Europe, better able to act in its own defense and its own interests.But as the Anglo-American “betrayal” in the Australian submarine affair has underscored, Mr. Macron sometimes possesses ambitions beyond his reach. Despite the vacuum Ms. Merkel leaves, a Macron era is unlikely to be born.Instead, analysts say, the European Union is heading for a period of prolonged uncertainty and potential weakness, if not necessarily drift. No one figure — not even Mr. Macron, or a new German chancellor — will be as influential as Ms. Merkel was at her strongest, an authoritative, well-briefed leader who quietly managed compromise and built consensus among a long list of louder and more ideological colleagues.That raises the prospect of paralysis or of Europe muddling through its challenges — on what to do about an increasingly indifferent America, on China and Russia, and on trade and technology — or even of a more dangerous fracturing of the bloc’s always tentative unity.And it will mean that Mr. Macron, who is himself up for re-election in April and absorbed in that uncertain campaign, will need to wait for a German government that may not be in place until January or longer, and then work closely with a weaker German chancellor.“We’ll have a weak German chancellor on top of a larger, less unified coalition,’’ said Mujtaba Rahman, managing director for Europe of the Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy. “A weaker chancellor is less capable of exerting influence in Europe, and then with the Macron election, the political cycles of these two key countries will not be in sync.”Campaign posters this month in Berlin showing the top candidates for chancellor: Olaf Scholz, Armin Laschet and Annalena Baerbock.Filip Singer/EPA, via ShutterstockThe uncertainty is likely to last until after the French parliamentary elections in June — and that’s presuming Mr. Macron wins.Mr. Macron has argued forcefully that Europe must do more to protect its own interests in a world where China is rising and the United States is focusing on Asia. His officials are already trying to prepare the ground on some key issues, looking forward to January, when France takes over the rotating European Union presidency. But given the likelihood of lengthy coalition talks in Germany, the window for accomplishment is narrow.Mr. Macron will need German help. While France and Germany together can no longer run the European Union by themselves, when they agree, they tend to bring the rest of the bloc along with them.So building a relationship with the new German chancellor, even a weaker one, will be a primary goal for Mr. Macron. He must be careful, noted Daniela Schwarzer, executive director for Europe and Eurasia of the Open Societies Foundations, not to scare off the Germans.“Macron’s leadership is disruptive, and the German style is to change institutions incrementally,” she said. “Both sides will need to think through how they make it possible for the other side to answer constructively.’’French officials understand that substantive change will be slow, and they will want to build on initiatives already underway, like the analysis of Europe’s interests called “the strategic compass” and a modest but steady increase in military spending on new capabilities through the new European Defense Fund and a program called Pesco, intended to promote joint projects and European interoperability.After the humiliation of the scuttled submarine deal, when Australia suddenly canceled a contract with France and chose a deal with Britain and the United States instead, many of his European colleagues are more likely now to agree with Mr. Macron that Europe must be less dependent on Washington and spend at least a little more in its own defense.Few in Europe, though, want to permanently damage ties with the Americans and NATO.“Italy wants a stronger Europe, OK, but in NATO — we’re not on the French page on that,” said Marta Dassu, a former Italian deputy foreign minister and director of European affairs at the Aspen Institute.Troops from a European tank battalion that consists of Dutch and German soldiers.Laetitia Vancon for The New York TimesMario Draghi, the Italian prime minister, whose voice is respected in Brussels, believes strongly in the trans-Atlantic relationship, she said, adding: “We’re closer to Germany than to France, but without all the ambiguities on Russia and China.’’France also wants to become more assertive using the economic and financial tools Europe already has, especially trade and technology, the officials say. The point, they say, is not to push too hard too fast, but to raise the European game vis-à-vis China and the United States, and try to encourage a culture that is comfortable with power.But France’s German partners will themselves be going through a period of uncertainty and transition. A new German chancellor is expected to win only a quarter of the vote, and may need to negotiate a coalition agreement among three different political parties. That is expected to take at least until Christmas, if not longer.The new chancellor will also need to get up to speed on European issues, which barely surfaced in the campaign, and build credibility as the newcomer among 26 other leaders.“So it’s important now to start thinking of concrete French-German wins during a French presidency that Macron can use in a positive way in his campaign,” Ms. Schwarzer said. “Because Berlin does not want to ponder a scenario in which Macron loses” to the far-right Marine Le Pen or in which Euro-skeptics like Matteo Salvini take over in Italy.Whoever wins, German policy toward Europe will remain roughly the same from a country deeply committed to E.U. ideals, cautious and wanting to preserve stability and unity. The real question is whether any European leader can be the cohesive force Ms. Merkel was — and if not, what it will mean for the continent’s future.“Merkel herself was important in keeping the E.U. together,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund. “She kept in mind the interests of so many in Europe, especially Central Europe but also Italy, so that everyone could be kept on board.’’Ms. Merkel saw the European Union as the core of her policy, said a senior European official, who called her the guardian of true E.U. values, willing to bend to keep the bloc together, as evidenced by her support for collective debt, previously a German red line, to fund the coronavirus recovery fund.“Merkel acted as mediator when there have been a lot of centrifugal forces weakening Europe,’’ said Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, head of the Berlin office of the German Marshall Fund. “It’s less clear how the next chancellor will position himself or herself and Germany.’’Still, Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, noted that “whoever is the chancellor, Germany is still responsible for more than half of Chinese trade with Europe.’’ Germany is “vastly more important than the other countries on all the big issues, from how to handle China to the tech wars and climate change,’’ he said.President Xi Jinping of China, upper left, and European leaders discussing an investment deal last year.Pool photo by Johanna GeronThat means Mr. Macron “knows he has to channel German power behind his vision,’’ he said.But French and Italian positions will be crucial, too, on important pending financial issues, like fiscal and banking integration, trying to complete the single market and monitoring the pandemic recovery fund.Ms. Merkel’s departure may provide an opportunity for the kinds of change Mr. Macron desires, even if in vastly scaled-down version. Ms. Merkel’s love of the status quo, some analysts argue, was anachronistic at a time when Europe faces so many challenges.Perhaps most important is the looming debate about whether to alter Europe’s spending rules, which in practical terms means getting agreement from countries to spend more on everything from defense to climate.The real problem is that fundamental change would require a treaty change, said Guntram Wolff, director of Bruegel, a Brussels research institution. “You can’t have fiscal and defense integration by stealth,’’ he said. “It won’t have legitimacy and won’t be accepted by citizens.’’But the German election debates ignored these broad issues, he said.“The sad news,” Mr. Wolff said, “is that none of the three chancellor candidates campaigned on any of this, so my baseline expectation is continued muddling forward.” More