First Amendment (US Constitution)

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    Judge Fines Ex-Fox News Reporter, Catherine Herridge, for Not Revealing Sources

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    The journalist, Catherine Herridge, had reported on an F.B.I. investigation of a scientist’s Chinese ties. She was held in contempt of court.A federal judge held a veteran investigative reporter in contempt of court on Thursday for not revealing her sources for articles she wrote about a scientist who was investigated by the F.B.I.The journalist, Catherine Herridge, formerly of CBS News and Fox News, was ordered to pay $800 a day until she divulged the information. The judge, Christopher Cooper of U.S. District Court in Washington, stayed the fine for 30 days to give Ms. Herridge time to appeal.The case, which has alarmed First Amendment advocates, relates to a series of articles that were written by Ms. Herridge and her colleagues in 2017, while she worked at Fox News. The articles revealed that the F.B.I. had investigated the scientist, Dr. Yanping Chen, a Chinese American who is the president of the University of Management and Technology in Arlington, Va., over suspicions of Chinese military ties and whether she had lied on U.S. immigration forms.The F.B.I. ended its investigation without bringing charges against Dr. Chen, a year before Ms. Herridge and her colleagues published and aired their reporting.In 2018, Dr. Chen sued the F.B.I. and other government agencies, accusing them of violating the Privacy Act by leaking information to Ms. Herridge. The Privacy Act has protections for personal information collected by federal agencies.Judge Cooper ruled last year that Ms. Herridge must reveal her confidential sources. On Thursday, he held her in civil contempt for disobeying that order. He said he had not issued the order lightly, deciding that Dr. Chen’s need for the information overcame Ms. Herridge’s First Amendment protections.“Herridge and many of her colleagues in the journalism community may disagree with that decision and prefer that a different balance be struck, but she is not permitted to flout a federal court’s order with impunity,” Judge Cooper wrote in Thursday’s ruling.A lawyer for Ms. Herridge did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Ms. Herridge, who left Fox in 2019 to join CBS News as a senior investigative correspondent, was among nearly two dozen CBS News journalists who were laid off by the network this month.“Holding a journalist in contempt for protecting a confidential source has a deeply chilling effect on journalism,” a Fox News spokeswoman said in a statement. “Fox News Media remains committed to protecting the rights of a free press and freedom of speech and believes this decision should be appealed.”Gabe Rottman, a senior lawyer at the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, said in a statement on Thursday that while he disagreed with the ruling against Ms. Herridge, “it’s a relief that Judge Cooper is enabling her to pursue an appeal without the financial pressure of daily fines.”“The court’s opinion makes clear that the answer here has to be Congress passing a federal shield law,” Mr. Rottman said. More

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      Supreme Court to Decide How the First Amendment Applies to Social Media

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      Challenges to laws in Florida and Texas meant to protect conservative viewpoints are likely to yield a major constitutional ruling on tech platforms’ free speech rights.The most important First Amendment cases of the internet era, to be heard by the Supreme Court on Monday, may turn on a single question: Do platforms like Facebook, YouTube, TikTok and X most closely resemble newspapers or shopping centers or phone companies?The two cases arrive at the court garbed in politics, as they concern laws in Florida and Texas aimed at protecting conservative speech by forbidding leading social media sites from removing posts based on the views they express.But the outsize question the cases present transcends ideology. It is whether tech platforms have free speech rights to make editorial judgments. Picking the apt analogy from the court’s precedents could decide the matter, but none of the available ones is a perfect fit.If the platforms are like newspapers, they may publish what they want without government interference. If they are like private shopping centers open to the public, they may be required to let visitors say what they like. And if they are like phone companies, they must transmit everyone’s speech.“It is not at all obvious how our existing precedents, which predate the age of the internet, should apply to large social media companies,” Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote in a 2022 dissent when one of the cases briefly reached the Supreme Court.Supporters of the state laws say they foster free speech, giving the public access to all points of view. Opponents say the laws trample on the platforms’ own First Amendment rights and would turn them into cesspools of filth, hate and lies. One contrarian brief, from liberal professors, urged the justices to uphold the key provision of the Texas law despite the harm they said it would cause.We are having trouble retrieving the article content.Please enable JavaScript in your browser settings.Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and log into your Times account, or subscribe for all of The Times.Thank you for your patience while we verify access.Already a subscriber? Log in.Want all of The Times? Subscribe. More

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      Appeals Court Finds DeSantis Violated Prosecutor’s First Amendment Rights

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      Dealing a blow to Gov. Ron DeSantis of Florida, a federal court of appeals on Wednesday ruled that he had violated First Amendment protections when he suspended a progressive state prosecutor for political gain.The ruling, by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, undercut Mr. DeSantis on an episode he has made a key credential in his presidential campaign. Mr. DeSantis forced Andrew Warren, a Democratic state attorney representing the Tampa area, out of office in August 2022 after he had spoken out against Republican policies on abortion and transgender rights.On the campaign trail, Mr. DeSantis has used the suspension of Mr. Warren, who had been elected to his post twice, to illustrate his strong-arm approach to progressive public officials who push what he calls a “woke” agenda.The court on Wednesday vacated a decision from a federal judge in Tallahassee in January 2023 not to reinstate Mr. Warren, who has fought the suspension in court, arguing that it violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Now, that judge must reconsider his ruling.Testimony and records released as part of a late 2022 trial in the case revealed the extent to which the removal of Mr. Warren was motivated by a desire to bolster Mr. DeSantis’s political standing. The district court judge, Robert L. Hinkle, ruled that Mr. DeSantis did not violate Mr. Warren’s First Amendment rights when he suspended him for his own political benefit.But in its 59-page decision, a three-judge appeals court panel unanimously ruled that Mr. DeSantis did violate Mr. Warren’s First Amendment rights. The panel said Mr. DeSantis needed to prove that Mr. Warren’s performance and policies were the reason he was suspended, and not his personal views on matters such as abortion.In a statement calling the decision “an egregious encroachment on state sovereignty,” Jeremy Redfern, a spokesman for Mr. DeSantis, said the governor’s office was looking over the decision to determine next steps, which could include appealing to the larger 11th Circuit court or the U.S. Supreme Court.Mr. Warren, who has said he will not run for office again this year, said he looked forward to seeking his reinstatement in court.“This is what we’ve been fighting for from the beginning — the protection of democracy,” he said in a statement.Nicholas Nehamas More

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      Supreme Court Wary of Trademark for ‘Trump Too Small’

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      In earlier cases, the justices struck down provisions of the trademark law on First Amendment grounds. But the one at issue here seemed likely to survive.The Supreme Court, which has in recent years struck down parts of the trademark law that prohibited registration of immoral, scandalous and disparaging marks, did not appear ready on Wednesday to do the same thing in a case concerning a California lawyer’s attempt to trademark the phrase “Trump too small.”The provision at issue in the case forbids the registration of trademarks “identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.”There seemed to be consensus among the justices that the provision was different from the ones the court had rejected in 2017 and 2019. Some said that it did not discriminate based on viewpoint, which the First Amendment generally does not allow the government to do. Others added that there is a long history of allowing people to control the use of their names in commercial settings.Some justices pressed a more fundamental objection. Noting that the lawyer, Steve Elster, could use the phrase on merchandise without trademarking it, they wondered whether the First Amendment applied at all.“The question is, is this an infringement on speech?” Justice Sonia Sotomayor said. “And the answer is no.”The contested phrase drew on a taunt from Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, during the 2016 presidential campaign. Mr. Rubio said Donald J. Trump had “small hands,” adding, “And you know what they say about guys with small hands.”Mr. Elster, in his trademark application, said that he wanted to convey the message that “some features of President Trump and his policies are diminutive.” He sought to use the phrase on the front of T-shirts with a list of Mr. Trump’s positions on the back. For instance: “Small on civil rights.”A unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the First Amendment required the trademark office to allow the registration.“As a result of the president’s status as a public official, and because Elster’s mark communicates his disagreement with and criticism of the then-president’s approach to governance, the government has no interest in disadvantaging Elster’s speech,” Judge Timothy B. Dyk wrote for the court.The Biden administration appealed the Federal Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme Court.Malcolm L. Stewart, a deputy solicitor general who was presenting his 100th Supreme Court argument, said that granting Mr. Elster a trademark would allow him to forbid others from using it, diminishing the amount of the political speech the First Amendment is meant to protect.Chief Justice John G. Roberts echoed the point. “Particularly in an area of political expression,” he said, “that really cuts off a lot of expression other people might regard as important infringement on their First Amendment rights.”Justice Elena Kagan asked Jonathan E. Taylor, a lawyer for Mr. Elster, to identify a precedent in which the court had struck down a law conferring a government benefit like trademark registration that did not involve viewpoint discrimination.He replied, “I can’t point you to a case that’s precisely on all fours.”Justice Kagan responded that she could cite many decisions supporting the opposite proposition, naming a half-dozen.Commentary on the size of Mr. Trump’s hands has a long history. In the 1980s, the satirical magazine Spy needled Mr. Trump, then a New York City real estate developer, with the recurring epithet “short-fingered vulgarian.”In 2016, during a presidential debate, Mr. Trump addressed Mr. Rubio’s critique.“Look at those hands, are they small hands?” Mr. Trump said, raising them. “And, he referred to my hands — ‘if they’re small, something else must be small.’ I guarantee you there’s no problem. I guarantee.”If the Supreme Court upholds the provision challenged in the new case, it will be the end of a trend.In 2017, a unanimous eight-justice court struck down a different provision, one forbidding marks that disparage people, living or dead, along with “institutions, beliefs or national symbols.”The decision, Matal v. Tam, concerned an Asian American dance-rock band called the Slants. The court split 4 to 4 in much of its reasoning, but all the justices agreed that the provision at issue in that case violated the Constitution because it took sides based on speakers’ viewpoints.In 2019, the court rejected a provision barring the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks.That case concerned a line of clothing sold under the brand name FUCT. When the case was argued, Mr. Stewart told the justices that the term was “the equivalent of the past participle form of the paradigmatic profane word in our culture.”Justice Kagan, writing for a six-justice majority, did not dispute that. But she said the law was unconstitutional because it “disfavors certain ideas.”If the justices were divided in the new case, Vidal v. Elster, No. 22-704, it was over the rationale for ruling to uphold the law before them, not on the outcome.Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., for instance, asked Mr. Stewart for a theory that would allow him to vote for the government without rejecting a position he had staked out in an earlier case.The justice added that the task was not pressing. “I mean,” he said, “you don’t need my vote to win your case.” More

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      Supreme Court Weighs When Officials May Block Citizens on Social Media

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      The justices struggled to distinguish private conduct, which is not subject to the First Amendment, from state action, which is.The Supreme Court worked hard in a pair of arguments on Tuesday to find a clear constitutional line separating elected officials’ purely private social media accounts from ones that reflect government actions and are subject to the First Amendment. After three hours, though, it was not clear that a majority of the justices had settled on a clear test.The question in the two cases was when the Constitution limits officials’ ability to block users from their accounts. The answer turned on whether the officials’ use of the accounts amounted to “state action,” which is governed by the First Amendment, or private activity, which is not.That same question had seemed headed to the Supreme Court after the federal appeals court in New York ruled in 2019 that President Donald J. Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum from which he was powerless to exclude people based on their viewpoints.Had the account been private, the court said, Mr. Trump could have blocked whomever he wanted. But since he used the account as a government official, he was subject to the First Amendment.After Mr. Trump lost the 2020 election, the Supreme Court vacated the appeals court’s ruling as moot.Justice Elena Kagan said on Tuesday that Mr. Trump’s Twitter feed was in an important sense official and therefore subject to the First Amendment.“I don’t think a citizen would be able to really understand the Trump presidency, if you will, without any access to all the things that the president said on that account,” Justice Kagan said. “It was an important part of how he wielded his authority. And to cut a citizen off from that is to cut a citizen off from part of the way that government works.”Hashim M. Mooppan, a lawyer for two school board officials, said none of that implicated the First Amendment.“President Trump could have done the same thing from Mar-a-Lago or a campaign rally,” Mr. Mooppan said. “If he gave every one of those speeches at his personal residence, it wouldn’t somehow convert his residence into government property.”The cases argued Tuesday were the first of several this term in which the Supreme Court will consider how the First Amendment applies to social media companies. The court will hear arguments next year on both whether states may prohibit large social media companies from removing posts based on the views they express and whether Biden administration officials may contact social media platforms to combat what they say is misinformation.The first case argued Tuesday concerned the Facebook and Twitter accounts of two members of the Poway Unified School District in California, Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T.J. Zane. They used the accounts, created during their campaigns, to communicate with their constituents about activities of the school board, invite them to public meetings, ask for comments on the board’s activities and discuss safety issues in the schools.Two parents, Christopher and Kimberly Garnier, frequently posted lengthy and repetitive critical comments, and the officials eventually blocked them. The parents sued, and lower courts ruled in their favor.“When state actors enter that virtual world and invoke their government status to create a forum for such expression, the First Amendment enters with them,” Judge Marsha S. Berzon wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco.Mr. Mooppan said the accounts were personal and were created and maintained without any involvement by the district.Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh pressed Mr. Mooppan on what it would take to make the accounts official and so subject to the First Amendment. “Is announcing rules state action?” the justice asked.Mr. Mooppan said it would be if the announcement was not available elsewhere. He gave a more equivocal answer to a question about notifications of school closures. But he said a general public safety reminder was not state action.Pamela S. Karlan, a lawyer for the parents, said Ms. O’Connor-Ratcliff’s Facebook feed was almost entirely official. “Of the hundreds of posts, I found only three that were truly non-job-related,” Ms. Karlan said, adding, “I defy anyone to look at that and think this wasn’t an official website.”The second case, Lindke v. Freed, No. 22-611, concerned a Facebook account maintained by James R. Freed, the city manager of Port Huron, Mich. He used it to comment on a variety of subjects, some personal and some official. Among the latter were descriptions of the city’s responses to the coronavirus pandemic.The posts prompted critical responses from a resident, Kevin Lindke, whom Mr. Freed eventually blocked. Mr. Lindke sued and lost. Judge Amul R. Thapar, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, said Mr. Freed’s Facebook account was personal, meaning that the First Amendment had no role to play.“Freed did not operate his page to fulfill any actual or apparent duty of his office,” Judge Thapar wrote. “And he did not use his governmental authority to maintain it. Thus, he was acting in his personal capacity — and there was no state action.”Justice Kagan told Allon Kedem, a lawyer for Mr. Lindke, that Mr. Freed’s page did not look particularly official.“There are a lot of baby pictures and dog pictures and obviously personal stuff,” she said. “And intermingled with that there is, as you say, communication with constituents about important matters. But it’s hard to look at this page as a whole, unlike the one in the last case, and not think that surely this could not be the official communications channel.” More

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      How Free Speech and Willful Blindness Will Play Out in the Trump Prosecution

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      More than a decade ago, a divided Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Alvarez that an elected member of a district water board in California could not be prosecuted criminally for lying to an audience about winning the Medal of Honor. The court ruled that efforts to criminalize mere lying, without linking the lie to an attempt to gain a material advantage, posed an unacceptable threat to robust exercise of First Amendment rights.Given that decision, Jack Smith, the special prosecutor investigating former President Donald Trump, was right in concluding that Mr. Trump has a First Amendment right to lie to the general public.So, where’s the legal beef in the indictment arising from the events that culminated in the storming of the Capitol brought by Mr. Smith against Mr. Trump? It’s in the fact that Mr. Smith isn’t merely charging the former president with lying; he is contending that Mr. Trump lied to gain an unlawful benefit — a second term in office after voters showed him the exit. That kind of speech-related behavior falls comfortably within what the justices call “categorical exceptions” to the First Amendment like true threats, incitements, obscenity, depictions of child sexual abuse, fighting words, libel, fraud and speech incident to criminal conduct.As the court put it in 1949 in the case of Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., “it rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”That is why Mr. Smith will most likely seek to prove that the former president was engaged in “speech incident to criminal conduct” when he and his co-conspirators lied to state legislators, state election officials, gullible supporters, Justice Department lawyers and Vice President Mike Pence in an illegal effort to prevent Joe Biden from succeeding him as president. Since Mr. Trump is charged with, among other crimes, conspiracy to defraud the United States and to deprive people of the right to have their votes counted, Mr. Smith would clearly be right in arguing that the Alvarez decision doesn’t apply.Characterizing Mr. Trump’s words as “speech incident to criminal conduct” would neatly solve Mr. Smith’s First Amendment problem, but at a substantial cost to the prosecution. To win a conviction, the government must persuade 12 jurors to peer inside Mr. Trump’s head and find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew he was lying when he claimed to be the winner of the 2020 election. If Mr. Trump actually believed his false assertions, his speech was not “incident to criminal conduct.”How can Mr. Smith persuade 12 jurors that no reasonable doubt exists that Mr. Trump knew he was lying? The prosecution will, no doubt, barrage the jury with reams of testimony showing that the former president was repeatedly told by every reputable adviser and administration official that no credible evidence of widespread electoral fraud existed, and that Mr. Pence had no choice but to certify Mr. Biden as the winner.But there also will likely be evidence that fervent supporters of Mr. Trump’s efforts fed his narcissism with bizarre false tales of result-changing electoral fraud, and frivolous legal theories justifying interference with Mr. Biden’s certification as president-elect. Those supporters could include Rudy Giuliani; Sidney Powell, a lawyer and purveyor of wild conspiracy theories; Jeffrey Clark, the acting head of the Justice Department’s civil division, who apparently plotted with Mr. Trump to unseat the acting attorney general and take control of the department; and John Eastman, the lawyer who hatched the plan that Mr. Pence refused to follow to keep Mr. Trump in power.Maybe Mr. Trump himself will swear to his good faith belief that he won. With all that conflicting testimony, how is a conscientious juror to decide for sure what was really going on inside his head?The answer lies in the Supreme Court’s doctrine of “willful blindness.” A dozen years ago, in the case of Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB, Justice Samuel Alito, writing for all but one justice, ruled that proof of willful blindness is the legal equivalent of proving guilty knowledge.As Justice Alito explained it: “Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.”In other words, when a defendant, like Mr. Trump, is on notice of the potential likelihood of an inconvenient fact (Mr. Biden’s legitimate victory), and closes his eyes to overwhelming evidence of that fact, the “willfully blind” defendant is just as guilty as if he actually knew the fact. While this argument is not a slam dunk, there’s an excellent chance that 12 jurors will find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Trump hid from the truth by adopting willful blindness.Burt Neuborne is a professor emeritus at New York University Law School, where he was the founding legal director of the Brennan Center for Justice. He was the national legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union from 1981 to 1986.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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      Let’s Have a Face-Off on Trump’s Indictment

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      The latest Trump indictment is much more complicated than the first two Trump indictments and probably any indictment that would come out of Fulton County, Ga. It attacks a scheme that played out across several weeks, in several states, involving dozens of others, including Trump-allied activists, those cited as co-conspirators and G.O.P. hacks who tried to overturn the 2020 election in state after state.I thought the best way to understand the challenges the prosecution and the defense would face before jurors and appellate judges would be to let both sides have their say — through me. Each side’s factual and legal arguments will play out in hundreds of pages of briefs and countless hours of trial testimony and oral advocacy. Let me cut to the chase, arguing the primary issues without, I hope, losing too much of the complexity of the case.Imagine two lawyers arguing their cases for you, a nonlawyer:Prosecution: Look, I know the indictment is long — and the trial may well last for weeks — but the elevator pitch is simple. Donald Trump conspired with a number of other individuals to overturn an election that he knew he lost. That scheme included a number of elements, from deliberately lying to state legislators to defraud them into altering the results to orchestrating a fake elector scheme that cast sham Electoral College votes to threatening a state official to help Trump “find” the votes necessary to change the outcome in Georgia.Defense: Sure, that all sounds compelling, but on closer examination, the case collapses. Let’s just start with the word “knew.” You’re going to present evidence that a number of administration officials and others rendered an opinion that the election was fair and that Joe Biden won. We’re going to present evidence that Trump received an avalanche of legal counsel to the contrary. He heard from lawyer after lawyer who told him that there may well have been decisive amounts of fraud in key swing states. Trump heard from two sets of lawyers who disagreed with each other, and he decided to follow the advice of one team of attorneys over the other. Following bad legal advice shouldn’t land anyone in jail.And you well know that each and every statute in your indictment requires a showing of criminal intent. For example, your most attention-grabbing count — 18 U.S.C. Section 241 — which protects the right to vote from criminal conspiracies, requires proving my client possessed “the intent to have false votes cast.” He intended for electors to cast true votes, in his favor.You also know that the viability of two other counts — obstruction of an official proceeding and conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding — “hangs on by a thread,” in the words of Lawfare’s Saraphin Dhanani. The statute itself is poorly written and may not even apply to Trump’s conduct, and the intent requirement may be more strenuous than you believe. After all, in an appeals court ruling upholding a verdict against a Jan. 6 defendant, Judge Justin Walker wrote in his concurrence that to prove corrupt intent, you don’t just have to prove a defendant knew he was obtaining an unlawful benefit but also that obtaining that unlawful benefit was his “objective” or “purpose.”Good luck making that case. Trump’s objective was to expose fraud.Prosecution: The people you call Trump’s lawyers, we call his co-conspirators. A number of the people that you say Trump relied on weren’t providing legal counsel in good faith; they were scheming right along with him to commit crimes. And you don’t have to trust my word on that. Look at court cases and bar actions. Several of Trump’s co-conspirators have been fined by courts and now face the potential loss of their law licenses because of the advice they gave.In fact, “advice” is the wrong word. Lawyers aren’t fined and disbarred for giving good-faith legal advice. But co-conspirators are punished for breaking the law.Moreover, you might fool Trump supporters, but you won’t fool the jury. Proving intent is not nearly as difficult as you’re telling the public. Defendants lie about their intentions all the time, and juries are fully capable of seeing through those lies. We’re going to show the jury that every credible official gave Trump the same advice, and we’re going to show that Trump thought at least some of his allies’ advice was “crazy” and that he thought Mike Pence was “too honest.” Cassidy Hutchinson told the House Jan. 6 committee that Trump told his chief of staff, Mark Meadows, something like, “I don’t want people to know we lost, Mark. This is embarrassing. Figure it out. We need to figure it out. I don’t want people to know that we lost.”The man wasn’t trying to expose fraud. He was committing fraud.Defense: You believe that Trump told Pence he was too honest? Or that he said Sidney Powell’s case was crazy? Your witnesses are lying. He never said Pence was too honest.Prosecution: So you’re telling me that Trump is going to take the stand and deny those statements to the jury? And then I get to cross-examine him?Defense: I’ll get back to you on that.Prosecution: And don’t get me started on that First Amendment defense I’ve watched you make on Fox News. First-year law students learn, as a former federal prosecutor told The Times, “there is no First Amendment privilege to commit crimes just because you did it by speaking.” Look at the indictment again. We acknowledge that Trump had the right to challenge the election and to file all those absurd lawsuits. We’re not indicting him for any of that. We’re not even indicting him simply for lying. We know that politicians have lied about elections practically since the founding of this country. We’re indicting him for entering into conspiracies, and we both know there is no First Amendment privilege to conspire to cast false electoral votes. Courts have heard cases involving fraud and conspiracies against rights — including voting rights — for decades, and the First Amendment doesn’t shield proven conspirators from criminal liability.Defense: So we’re talking about court precedents now, are we? The key precedents you cite are old. The most important Supreme Court precedent involving conspiracies against rights was written by Thurgood Marshall. Let’s just say that his jurisprudence is out of fashion with the court’s conservative majority.In reality, the Supreme Court has been busy narrowing the reach of federal fraud statutes. If you haven’t read National Review’s editorial about the case, I’d urge you to read it now. Fraud statutes are designed to prevent citizens from swindling the government out of money or tangible property. The obstruction statute is designed to stop witness tampering or destruction of evidence, not to stop litigants from making bad legal arguments about election fraud. And the conspiracy-against-rights count applies a Reconstruction-era statute that was designed to, as National Review argues, “punish violent intimidation and forcible attacks” against Black Americans who tried to vote.In other words, even if you prove the facts of your case, the statutes just don’t apply.Prosecution: Yes, I’ve read the National Review editorial, but might I direct you to the former prosecutor Ken White’s comprehensive response? The bottom line is that you’re describing what you want the law to be, not what the law is. For example, your arguments about the fraud count don’t apply to the actual fraud statute we charged. Moreover, National Review’s interpretation of the law conflicts with court precedent that’s more than a century old.In 1910 the court wrote that the definition of a conspiracy to defraud the United States “is broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of government.”I know you don’t think that Section 1512, the obstruction statute, applies to this case, but the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld our broader interpretation just this April — in a case you already cited, by the way. You’re banking on the Supreme Court disagreeing with a decision rendered by a circuit court majority that included a judge who once clerked for Brett Kavanaugh.As for Section 241, which prohibits a “conspiracy against rights,” once again our interpretation of the statute is supported by generations of precedent. A review of relevant case law takes us from a series of critical cases in the 1930s to the 1974 Supreme Court opinion I talked about earlier and to a conviction this year of a man named Douglass Mackey. He engineered a scheme to deceive Hillary Clinton voters into “voting” by text message rather than casting an actual, legal ballot. His scheme wasn’t violent or forcible, but it was certainly illegal.Look, lawyers make good-faith arguments to reverse or revise precedent all the time. Sometimes those arguments succeed. But you need to tell your client that the existing case law is on my side, not yours, and if he is resting his defense on the Supreme Court coming to his aid, you might want to remind him that even the justices he appointed rejected or refused to hear his legal arguments many times before.Defense: There’s a Supreme Court case you failed to mention, McDonnell v. United States. I know it doesn’t involve the statutes at issue here, but the case shows the Roberts court’s desire to narrow broad criminal statutes. A unanimous Supreme Court threw out the conviction of the former Virginia governor Robert McDonnell on the grounds that the lower courts had construed the term “official act” too broadly in a bribery case. This is a clear indication that the Supreme Court is looking to limit, not expand, the interpretation of federal criminal statutes.Also, remember the rule of lenity? When a law is unclear or ambiguous, the benefit of the doubt goes to the defendant, not the government. And again, this is a principle embraced by justices across the ideological spectrum. This term, the court used the rule of lenity to rule in favor of a defendant in a Bank Secrecy Act case, and Justices Ketanji Brown Jackson and Neil Gorsuch were in lock step agreement. I can read the judicial signs, and the signs point toward narrowing the law.Prosecution: We’re not applying new or novel interpretations to criminal law. Every single count is supported not just by the text but also by a vast amount of precedent. You say the age of our precedent is a problem. I say it’s an advantage. The law has already been interpreted. It is already clear. There is no legal ambiguity in casting fake electoral votes or in utilizing clear threats of criminal prosecution to try to coerce state officials to change the outcome of an election.Your best legal argument rests on what the law might be. Our legal argument rests on what the law actually is. You need to disrupt American law to prevail. We simply need to persuade a conservative court to remain conservative, to follow its instincts to resist radical change.Defense: We’ve not yet begun to fight. I’ve barely scratched the surface of your proof problems. Your indictment might fool Democrats and those Never Trump traitors, but it doesn’t fool me. For example, in Paragraph 66 of the indictment, you say that “fraudulent electors convened sham proceedings” to cast “fraudulent electoral ballots” at the “direction” of Trump.But that’s a conclusory statement. Where is the actual evidence that he was in command of that process and not one of his lawyers and allies? You’re making a big, bold claim, and that’s going to require big, bold evidence. And that indictment just doesn’t deliver the goods.Prosecution: The indictment describes in detail Trump’s intimate cooperation with his co-conspirators. Are you arguing they were acting on their own? That Trump was just a bystander to the fraudulent efforts on his behalf? Trump was so involved in the effort to overturn the election that he made calls. He said Georgia’s secretary of state and legal counsel faced a “big risk” of criminal prosecution if they (as we said in our indictment) “failed to find election fraud as he demanded.” He called the Republican National Committee chairwoman to put the fake electors plan in motion. Yes, Trump had free-agent allies who tried to help him steal the election, but none of the co-conspirators were free agents. They were all his partners in crime. Besides, as you well know, this indictment is the summary of our evidence, not the sum total of our evidence. Not only do we possess the evidence sufficient to make that claim; the grand jury is still at work.I think this exercise spotlights the most important issues, for now. Both sides have barely begun to fight, and the public has barely begun to consider the full range of evidence and arguments in the case.Moreover, this piece doesn’t deal at all with the effect of the prosecution on the body politic. On Tuesday, The Times published a compelling piece by a Harvard Law School professor, Jack Goldsmith, warning of the consequences of prosecuting a former president during an election campaign.My view is that the American government faces greater risks if prosecutors don’t try to punish Trump for his coup attempt. As I wrote on the day of the indictment, it’s necessary to prosecute Trump on these facts — not because a conviction is inevitable but because our nation cannot set a precedent that presidents enjoy a zone of impunity for their misconduct that no other citizen enjoys.I wouldn’t just be comfortable bringing this case to a jury; I’d be eager to make my argument. But I’d also know that Trump’s legal team has its own defenses, and it’s far from certain that a judge or a jury will agree with the prosecution’s case. But democracies aren’t sustained without risk, and prosecuting Trump is a risk our nation needs to take.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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      Trump Election Charges Set Up Clash of Lies Versus Free Speech

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      The indictment of former President Donald J. Trump over his efforts to retain power accuses him of conspiracies built on knowing falsehoods. His supporters say he is protected by the First Amendment.Running through the indictment charging former President Donald J. Trump with conspiring to overturn the 2020 election was a consistent theme: He is an inveterate and knowing liar.The indictment laid out how, in the two months after Election Day, Mr. Trump “spread lies” about widespread election fraud even though he “knew that they were false.”Mr. Trump “deliberately disregarded the truth” and relentlessly disseminated them anyway at a “prolific” pace, the indictment continued, “to make his knowingly false claims appear legitimate, create an intense national atmosphere of mistrust and anger, and erode public faith in the administration of the election.”Of course, Mr. Trump has never been known for fealty to truth.Throughout his careers in business and politics, he has sought to bend reality to his own needs, with lies ranging from relatively small ones, like claiming he was of Swedish and not German descent when trying to rent to Jewish tenants in New York City, to proclaiming that President Barack Obama was not born in the United States.If you repeat something enough, he has told confidants over time, people will believe it.By and large, this trait has served him well, helping him bluster and bluff his way through bankruptcies and then to the White House and through crises once he was there: personal scandals, two impeachments and a special counsel’s investigation when he was in office.But now he is being held to account in a way he never has been before for what a new special counsel, Jack Smith, is asserting was a campaign of falsehoods that undermined the foundations of democracy.Already, Mr. Trump’s lawyers and allies are setting out the early stages of a legal strategy to counter the accusations, saying that Mr. Trump’s First Amendment rights are under attack. They say Mr. Trump had every right to express views about election fraud that they say he believed, and still believes, to be true, and that the actions he took or proposed after the election were based on legal advice.Jack Smith, the special counsel, announced an indictment of former President Donald J. Trump in Washington on Tuesday.Doug Mills/The New York TimesThe indictment and his initial response set up a showdown between those two opposing assertions of principle: that what prosecutors in this case called “pervasive and destabilizing lies” from the highest office in the land can be integral to criminal plans, and that political speech enjoys broad protections, especially when conveying what Mr. Trump’s allies say are sincerely held beliefs.While a judge and jury will ultimately decide how much weight to give each, Mr. Trump and his allies were already on the offensive after the indictment.“So the First Amendment protects President Trump in this way: After 2020, he saw all these irregularities, he got affidavits from around the country, sworn testimony, he saw the rules being changed in the middle of the election process — as a president, he’s entitled to speak on those issues,” Mr. Trump’s defense lawyer in the case, John Lauro, said on Wednesday in an interview on CBS.”What the government would have to prove in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, is that speech is not protected by the First Amendment, and they’ll never be able to do that,” he said.Representative Elise Stefanik of New York, the No. 3 Republican in the House, said in a statement that Mr. Trump had “every right under the First Amendment to correctly raise concerns about election integrity in 2020.”Representative Gary Palmer of Alabama, the chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, called the indictment a “criminalization of disinformation and misinformation, which raises serious concerns about the public’s right to speak openly in opposition to policies they oppose.”Legal experts were skeptical about the strength of those claims as a defense. They pointed out that the indictment said on its second page that all Americans had the right to say what they wanted about the election — even if it was false. But, the indictment asserts, it is illegal to use those false claims to engage in criminal conduct, the experts said.An individual’s free-speech rights essentially end as soon as those words become evidence of criminality, they said. In the case of the indictment against Mr. Trump, the prosecutors argue that Mr. Trump used his statements to persuade others to engage in criminal conduct with him, like signing fake slates of electors or pressuring Vice President Mike Pence to block or delay Electoral College certification of President Biden’s victory.According to the indictment, Mr. Trump “knowingly” used “false claims of election fraud” to try to “convince the vice president to accept the defendant’s fraudulent electors, reject legitimate electoral votes or send legitimate electoral votes to state legislatures for review rather than counting them.”The indictment goes on to say that when those efforts failed, Mr. Trump turned to using the crowd at the rally on the Ellipse “to pressure the vice president to fraudulently alter the election results.”Samuel W. Buell, a professor of law at Duke University and a lead federal prosecutor in the Justice Department’s prosecution of Enron, said that it “won’t work legally but it will have some appeal politically, which is why he is pushing it.”“There is no First Amendment privilege to commit crimes just because you did it by speaking,” Mr. Buell said.Referring to both public and private remarks, Mr. Buell said that “there is no First Amendment privilege for giving directions or suggestions to other people to engage in illegal acts.”Referring to the fictional television mafia boss Tony Soprano, Mr. Buell added, “Tony Soprano can’t invoke the First Amendment for telling his crew he wants someone whacked.”For decades, Mr. Trump’s penchant for falsehoods and exaggerations was well known in New York City. He was so distrusted by Mayor Ed Koch in the 1980s that one of the mayor’s deputies, Alair Townsend, famously quipped, “I wouldn’t believe Donald Trump if his tongue were notarized.”Mr. Trump spoke with journalists by phone while pretending to be a spokesman representing himself, in order to leak information about his business or his personal life. He claimed to have dated women who denied being involved with him. He claimed that he lived on the 66th through 68th floors of Trump Tower, which in fact has only 58 floors.Reaching the presidency did not lead to a change in his habits. The Washington Post’s fact checker identified more than 30,000 false or misleading claims from him over his four years in office, a figure equivalent to 21 a day.Mr. Trump has already tried to invoke the First Amendment in civil cases related to the attacks on the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. In February 2022, a federal judge in Washington ruled that lawsuits related to whether he incited the crowd that stormed the Capitol could proceed, in part because the First Amendment did not protect the speech he gave on the Ellipse before the riot.“Only in the most extraordinary circumstances could a court not recognize that the First Amendment protects a president’s speech,” Judge Amit P. Mehta of the Federal District Court in Washington ruled. “But the court believes this is that case. Even presidents cannot avoid liability for speech that falls outside the expansive reach of the First Amendment. The court finds that in this one-of-a-kind case the First Amendment does not shield the president from liability.”The experts and defense lawyers who read the indictment against Mr. Trump said that claiming that he was relying on the advice of lawyers was likely to provide Mr. Trump with a stronger defense than if he invoked the First Amendment.In the interview on CBS, Mr. Lauro leaned into that argument, saying that Mr. Trump had a “smoking gun of innocence” in a memo that the conservative legal scholar John Eastman wrote for him. The memo said Mr. Trump could ask Mr. Pence to pause the congressional certification of the election. Mr. Eastman was not a White House lawyer at the time.“John Eastman, who is an eminent scholar, gave the president an option — several options,” Mr. Lauro said.Alan Feuer More

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      Supreme Court to Hear Dispute Over ‘Trump Too Small’ Slogan

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      In earlier cases, the justices struck down provisions of the trademark law that discriminated based on the speaker’s viewpoint.The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to decide whether a California lawyer may trademark the phrase “Trump too small,” a reference to a taunt from Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, during the 2016 presidential campaign. Mr. Rubio said Donald J. Trump had “small hands,” adding: “And you know what they say about guys with small hands.”The lawyer, Steve Elster, said in his trademark application that he wanted to convey the message that “some features of President Trump and his policies are diminutive.” He sought to use the phrase on the front of T-shirts with a list of Mr. Trump’s positions on the back. For instance: “Small on civil rights.”A federal law forbids the registration of trademarks “identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.” Citing that law, the Patent and Trademark Office rejected the application.A unanimous three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the First Amendment required the office to allow the registration.“The government has no valid publicity interest that could overcome the First Amendment protections afforded to the political criticism embodied in Elster’s mark,” Judge Timothy B. Dyk wrote for the court. “As a result of the president’s status as a public official, and because Elster’s mark communicates his disagreement with and criticism of the then-president’s approach to governance, the government has no interest in disadvantaging Elster’s speech.”The size of Mr. Trump’s hands has long been the subject of commentary. In the 1980s, the satirical magazine Spy tormented Mr. Trump, then a New York City real estate developer, with the recurring epithet “short-fingered vulgarian.”In 2016, during a presidential debate, Mr. Trump addressed Mr. Rubio’s critique.“Look at those hands, are they small hands?” Mr. Trump said, displaying them. “And, he referred to my hands — ‘if they’re small, something else must be small.’ I guarantee you there’s no problem. I guarantee.”The Biden administration appealed the Federal Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme Court. Solicitor General Elizabeth B. Prelogar said Mr. Elster was free to discuss Mr. Trump’s physique and policies but was not entitled to a trademark.The Supreme Court has twice struck down provisions of the trademark law in recent years on First Amendment grounds.In 2019, it rejected a provision barring the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks.That case concerned a line of clothing sold under the brand name FUCT. When the case was argued, a government lawyer told the justices that the term was “the equivalent of the past participle form of the paradigmatic profane word in our culture.”Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a six-justice majority, did not dispute that. But she said the law was unconstitutional because it “disfavors certain ideas.”A bedrock principle of First Amendment law, she wrote, is that the government may not draw distinctions based on speakers’ viewpoints.In 2017, a unanimous eight-justice court struck down another provision of the trademarks law, this one forbidding marks that disparage people, living or dead, along with “institutions, beliefs or national symbols.”The decision, Matal v. Tam, concerned an Asian American dance-rock band called The Slants. The court split 4 to 4 in much of its reasoning, but all the justices agreed that the provision at issue in that case violated the Constitution because it took sides based on speakers’ viewpoints.The new case, Vidal v. Elster, No. 22-704, is arguably different, as the provision at issue does not appear to make such distinction. In his Supreme Court brief, Mr. Elster responded that “the statute makes it virtually impossible to register a mark that expresses an opinion about a public figure — including a political message (as here) that is critical of the president of the United States.” More