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      India’s New Education Policy Is Full of Hodge-Podge Nonsense

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      The union cabinet of the government of India recently announced its 2020 National Education Policy (NEP). This is the first education policy developed by a non-Congress party government since independence. Coming 34 years after the last formulation of a fully-fledged education policy, Indians anticipated a significant pivot in the education system to leverage the country’s demographic dividend. India’s current political leadership claimed it wanted to make the country a “vishwa guru,” the Sanskrit word for a world teacher, and would dramatically reform its education. Therefore, great expectations from the NEP seemed natural.

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      Prima facie, the NEP might make many Indians happy because it has something in it for everyone. However, a careful read reveals that the NEP does little to change the direction of our education. It largely promises cosmetic changes. In essence, the NEP is a collection of myriad aspirational expressions, not a coherent policy framework.

      The ideologues of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may find the references to ancient wisdom of India heartening. It might lead to young Indians learning that Banabhatta outlined 64 forms of art or Sushruta pioneered glorious surgical techniques. However, it does little to prepare the young to shape the future.

      Given my advocacy of long-term policymaking, I should have reasons to thank those who drafted the NEP. They have taken a 20-year view and set goals for 2040. Just as we plan over a 20-year timespan, not a five-year one, for our children, so should our national plans. Yet a bad 20-year plan is worse than its bad five-year counterpart, and that is my problem with the NEP.

      What Are the Changes Proposed?

      Let me pick on a key aspect of the plan. The NEP proposes the three-language formula. This means that, all over the country, students will learn three languages. These are Hindi, English and the regional language of the respective state. The government believes that it is abolishing language barriers in the country. Instead, this has triggered off a storm in non-Hindi speaking states. In Tamil Nadu, there has been long-standing opposition to Hindi as compulsory learning or administration. The three-language formula has been around since 1968 but failed to take off because parts of India resent the domination and imposition of Hindi.

      There is another tiny little matter. Demand for learning in English has taken off around the country, including and especially in Hindi-speaking areas. Thanks to the legacy of colonization, the advent of globalization and a host of other factors, English has emerged as the language of success in India. The people do not care for the three-language formula one jot. Yet the BJP’s NEP is flogging a dead horse.

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      Many have lauded the NEP for promoting multidisciplinary education. This has long been discussed. At far too young an age, Indians are cast into rigid silos of arts, science and commerce. As a result, they lose love for learning and end up at lower-productivity levels than their counterparts in Europe or East Asia. The NEP allows students to change disciplines more easily along the same lines as in the US. However, this flexibility will only benefit the country if quality education is offered in different disciplines. For instance, English and history are taught terribly in a rote-based manner in most schools. Shifting from science or commerce to study either subject might enable a student to pass more easily but would achieve little else.

      The NEP offers greater flexibility in earning degrees either over a period of time or across subjects. Offering multiple entry and exit points in higher education is a good idea. It may help people find their true interests and give them second or third chances in life. However, the key logical next step is to unlink degrees from jobs, where academic degrees are immaterial. A new form of recruiting that is based on demonstrated merit and knowledge of the work itself is the way forward for the country. The NEP has missed that opportunity to curb India’s fixation with degrees and promote a culture of focus on work.

      Supporters claim that the NEP is focusing on work by combining vocational education with school and college education. In due course of time, vocational education will be on par with other degree programs. A carpenter, a plumber or an electrician will command the same respect as someone with a master’s degree in literature, history or sociology. This argument is disingenuous. Increasing “respect” for vocational programs involves changes in social perceptions. It requires much deeper and drastic changes than those envisaged by the NEP.

      Bad Thinking and Poor Drafting

      In fact, the NEP is full of seemingly good ideas that have simply not been thought through. It has passing references to fostering creativity and instituting a 360-degree view in student report cards. It also throws in digital education, adult learning and lok-vidya (folk education) about local heritage and culture. Yet the NEP fails to tell anyone how these ideas will come into practice.

      The drafters of the NEP forget that soundbites are not policy. Nor are tweaks. Turning a 5+3+2+2 system into a 10+2 or 5+3+3 one does not change the way students are taught or the way they learn. Similarly, giving a certificate after year one, a diploma after year two and a bachelor’s after year three does not change syllabi, pedagogy and learning. Yes, a student can drop out after a year with a certificate, but would that be worth the paper it was written on?

      To change education, India must improve the quality and commitment of its teachers. Training them in institutions with new names or giving students multiple exits or entries in a four-year bachelor of education program offers flexibility in getting a degree but does not improve the quality of their instruction.

      In comparison with earlier education policies, the National Education Policy is a poorly-drafted document. It is a testament to how India has regressed under the BJP. The demonetization policy was instituted by a hasty, poorly-drafted document. It seems that the government does not have the intellectual policymaking firepower of its predecessors.

      One sentence in paragraph 4.13 on page 14 of the NEP captures drafting woes common to recent government documents when it proclaims: “In particular, students who wish to change one or more of the three languages they are studying may do so in Grade 6 or 7, as long as they are able to demonstrate basic proficiency in three languages (including one language of India at the literature level) by the end of secondary school.”

      Does this mean that students can change the languages they are learning as long as they can travel into the future, i.e., Grade 12, and prove they are proficient in the new languages they choose? Or does it mean that students must be prepared to prove proficiency in the languages they choose in Grade 12? Sadly, the NEP is full of such unadulterated absolute nonsense.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Indigenous Communities Can Counter Naxals and Protect Forests in India

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      On the night of July 11, Naxalites blew up 12 buildings in the forest department’s field office-cum-quarters in the Berkela forest area of Pashchimi Singhbhum district in Jharkhand, India. Naxalites are Maoists who have fought a bloody insurgency against the Indian state in some rural and forest areas for over six decades. In 2006, Manmohan Singh, the prime minister at the time, called this insurgency “the single biggest internal-security challenge” the country has ever faced.

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      In recent years, the Naxalite insurgency has ebbed. So, this attack sent shock waves across administration in general and the forest department in particular. Fortunately, no one died in the attack. The Naxals asked staff to vacate the premises and warned of consequences if police were informed before destruction. Even as the police swung into action to apprehend the attackers, forest officials huddled together for introspection.

      Forests, Minerals and Indigenous People

      I have served in the jungles of Jharkhand as a forestry professional. The attack has made me reflect deeply. Naxalite attacks in Jharkhand are not new. For years, Naxals have intimidated state functionaries through various means, including attacks and assassinations. To understand the persisting nature of the Naxalite insurgency, we have to examine Jharkhand closely.

      Jharkhand is a state that lies to the south of Bihar and the west of Bengal, two fertile Gangetic states of India. To its southeast and southwest, it borders two other poor but resource-rich states of Chhattisgarh and Odisha. Jharkhand literally means “bushland.” It is endowed with rich natural resources, including both forests and minerals such as coal, iron, copper, mica and uranium.

      Jharkhand is predominantly inhabited by diverse indigenous communities. The Indian Constitution gives these communities a “scheduled tribes” status. As per the 2011 census, they comprise 8.2% of India’s population. In contrast, scheduled tribes form a much higher 26.3% of the population in Jharkhand. Historically, Jharkhand was a part of Bihar and the people of Jharkhand felt neglected and marginalized. Therefore, they agitated for a separate state both to safeguard their identity and to achieve control over their rich resources of “jal, jungle aur jameen,” Hindi for water, forests and land.

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      On November 15, 2000, Jharkhand was formed. I remember the date fondly. A grand function was held in Ranchi’s Raj Bhawan, the governor’s house. I was still what is called a “probationer” in government parlance. As an officer of the Indian Forest Service (IFS), I was doing my training at the Shri Krishna Institute Public Administration just across the road from the Raj Bhawan. Many officers were visiting from Patna and staying at the institute’s guest house. They were also milling around the resplendent surroundings of the Raj Bhawan.

      The staff of the guest house who belonged to the scheduled tribes were in a jubilant mood. I asked one of them, a gentleman named Khalkho, as to what the formation of Jharkhand meant for him. His instant response, “abua dishum, abua raj,” which translates as “our state, our rule,” still rings in my ears. Khalkho also went on to inform me that henceforth it would be his children, not dikus, the local term for outsiders, who would get preference in  jobs.

      Despite two decades of abua raj in abua dishum, all is clearly not well in Jharkhand. Berkela is barely 15 kilometers from Chaibasa, the district headquarters of Pashchimi Singhbhum. Scheduled tribes form 67.3% of the population in the district, and the region is rich both in mineral and forest resources. Forest cover forms about 47% of the area, making the district rich in biodiversity. The famous Saranda forest, known for excellent Sal trees and its natural regeneration, is also located here. Much of the Jharkhand’s mineral wealth, especially iron ore, is found under these forests.

      These rich resources have not improved the living standards of scheduled tribes of the area. Instead, the forests have become home to the Naxals who take refuge there. Various development agencies have shied away from this area. Only the forest department dares to venture there to fulfill its duty to protect and conserve Pashchimi Singhbum’s forests for posterity. The Naxal attack will certainly sap the department’s morale.

      To combat Naxalism, the forest department has to connect with local communities. Addressing their livelihood issues is essential for winning the trust of marginalized people in a resource-rich land. Only winning goodwill in Pashchimi Singhbhum and elsewhere would help combat the Naxal menace.

      Yet there is a problem. First, the mandate of the forest department is mainly the protection, conservation and development of forests, not providing livelihood or improving living standards for local communities. Second, the department lacks adequate resources to reach out to communities even if it was given the mandate to do so. The budget allocations for forest departments across India have been low and Jharkhand is no exception.

      Involve Indigenous Communities to Save Forests

      Few realize that forests and indigenous communities have a symbiotic relationship whether in the Amazon or in Pashchimi Singhbhum. They worship nature and tend to revere trees. They have used forest resources sustainably for centuries if not millennia. Therefore, it is important for any forest department to work with these communities. To be fair to the forest department in Jharkhand, it is already making an effort to do so. However, it faces a vicious timber mafia that is hell-bent on chopping down trees to meet rising urban demand. Mining — legal and illegal — is another threat to forests and local communities. Too often, the forest department finds itself outgunned and is unable to protect these communities or the forests they live in.

      Goal 15 of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations aims to “protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.” To achieve this, the government of Jharkhand has to focus on people-oriented natural resources governance. Simply put, they have to involve local communities in the conservation of forests and make the forest department work closely with them.

      My experience of working in various forests in Jharkhand tells me that sometimes, overzealous measures by dogmatic forest officials do more harm than good. They often take draconian action against indigenous communities for petty offenses that probably should not have been illegal in the first place. After all, these communities have to live. The forests are their only sustenance. So, draconian implementation of some laws leads to the forest department losing the trust and faith of the indigenous communities.

      Of course, there are many forest officials who are empathetic, courageous and exceptional. They interact with local communities on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, these officials maintain high moral standards even when their very lives are in danger.

      The Naxals are not like Russian or Chinese communists of the last century. They do not really have any ideology. Instead, they have become a vocation for unemployed, disgruntled and misguided youths. Many Naxals are recruited by intimidation and are then subjected to indoctrination. Quite a few of them start enjoying the power that comes from wielding a gun. These youths invariably come from marginalized indigenous communities and find Naxal propaganda seductive.

      To counter the Naxals, both the state and central governments must gain the confidence of the indigenous communities living in the forests. To do so, the government must protect their forest-based livelihood. It must also generate sustained employment through forest-based skill development programs that teach indigenous communities to put their incredibly rare know-how to good use.

      Such policies would increase the living standard of local people. They would also turn the indigenous communities into the eyes and ears of the government, thwarting Naxal violence. These policies would also involve the delegation of some powers and financial authority to local forest officials and indigenous communities. It would be fair to say that it is time for a real abua raj in abua dishum.

      *(Atul Singh, the founder, CEO and editor-in-chief of Fair Observer, provided inputs for this article.)

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      India Must Modernize Its Inefficient Defense Production System

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      In a complex world, countries have to clearly identify and evaluate external threats on a continuous basis. These are no longer only military, insurgent and terror, but also scientific, technological and economic.

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      In the Indian situation, foreign powers have engaged in cyberattacks, electronic warfare, illegal fake currency circulation and media manipulation to exacerbate the country’s internal fault lines. To counter such a multiplicity of threats, India must build up comprehensive national power. More than ever, this power is a composite of economic, industrial, scientific, technological, innovation, military and intelligence capabilities.

      Threats, External and Internal

      India is the only country that shares land borders with two nuclear states: China and Pakistan. With Pakistan, India shares a maritime boundary too. Pakistan, a country born after the partitioning of British India in 1947, has been congenitally hostile to and consistently opposed the very idea of India. It waged wars against India in 1948, 1965 and 1971. A little more than two decades ago, it destroyed a promising Indian peace initiative by taking over strategic heights in Kargil, an Indian district in Ladakh, provoking a limited but bloody conflict in 1999.

      The bitter bone of contention between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. As a self-defined haven for Muslims, Pakistan refuses to accept Kashmir as a part of India. It has backed an armed insurgency as part of its strategy to bleed India with a thousand cuts. Pakistan’s goal is to dismember its larger neighbor, beginning with Kashmir. In the 1980s, it backed a bloody insurgency in Punjab, which eventually failed. Since then, it has doubled down on Kashmir.

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      Pakistan’s fixation with India has defined its foreign policy since its inception. During the Cold War, Islamabad allied with the US, mainly to wrest Kashmir from India. In recent years, it has aligned itself with China to counter India in every possible manner.

      China’s relations with India are becoming increasingly complicated. This can be explained as a big power competition. This began as early as the 1950s when both countries were emerging from the shadows of imperial powers after two centuries of domination. In 1962, India lost to China in a brief but traumatic war. Since then, the two countries have not been able to agree upon a border, and the Chinese have been nibbling away at Indian territory more aggressively in recent years. At its essence, the Chinese game plan is simple: China wants to emerge as a superpower and a rival to the US. It wants to block India’s rise as an Asian power and a rival in the region.

      Like any large and diverse country, India has numerous internal security challenges. Insurgency remains a serious threat in Kashmir as well as India’s northeastern region that borders Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh. India has faced a communist Naxalite insurgency since the 1950s. Islamic extremism, aided and abetted by foreign powers and jihadi organizations, especially Pakistan and its proxies, is increasing dramatically. The long coastline of India makes it extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks as the 2008 massacre in Mumbai demonstrated.

      Given such threats, it goes without saying that India needs a strong security apparatus of military, police and intelligence. Importantly, the country also requires a robust defense production apparatus for three reasons.

      First, India must have the ability to produce key requirements of its armed forces to enable them to be combat-ready. Otherwise, India would be dependent on imports and at the mercy of foreign suppliers, especially at critical times. Second, India must profit from new dual-use technologies and capabilities that emerge from defense production as France, Russia and the US have demonstrated repeatedly. These have a multiplier effect in boosting a country’s technological base, driving growth in its economy and creating new jobs. Third, India cannot rely exclusively on the public exchequer for ensuring defense preparedness, given competing demands on the budget, paucity of foreign exchange reserves, dependency on Middle Eastern oil and welfare-oriented policies. Hence, the participation of the private sector in defense production is a sine qua non.

      The Story of Defense Production in India    

      India has credible experience in defense production for over two centuries. The British set up a gun carriage factory in 1801 that began production in 1802 and is still operational today. World War I provided the impetus for the British to increase production. The number and range of these factories increased significantly until the end of World War II. Defense facilities and their management structure, namely the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), are yet another legacy of the British like India’s bureaucracy, judiciary and military.

      After the defeat in 1962, India created a number of defense public sector undertakings (DPSUs). These are units owned and managed by the government. Like most other government-owned entities, these units never really had any incentive to achieve excellence. They have been unable to satisfy the requirements of the armed forces even partially. India has consequently continued to import critical equipment from foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The foreign OEMs have earned the trust of the armed forces for quality, delivery schedules and even confidentiality. India continues to pay huge royalties for technologies transferred for producing imported equipment in the DPSUs.

      These foreign OEMs are largely privately owned but enjoy strong state support from their home governments. Yet India has not demonstrated the same level of trust in its own private sector companies. Even though India liberalized its economy in 1991, it permitted private sector participation in defense only in 2001. Nearly 20 years later, the private sector production of 170 billion rupees ($2.27 billion) comprises just about 21.3% of the 800 billion rupees ($10.67 billion) total defense sector. Most of this production is in low-value goods.

      While the US relies on Boeing, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman for many of its new defense technologies, India has entrusted the task of development of such technologies exclusively to its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). In theory, India should be producing cutting-edge, high-quality defense material with institutions like the DRDO. The reality is very different

      In a nutshell, the present apparatus that India has for satisfying the requirements of its defense services is entirely inadequate. In view of the deteriorating security conditions on its borders and increasing internal threats, this failure could prove catastrophic. In the past, India’s failures led to colonization. Tomorrow, these might lead to Balkanization.

      What Has Gone Wrong?

      Ordnance factories are India’s oldest defense production units. They produce a vast variety of equipment and supplies. Run by the OFB, they fall under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defense. These OFB factories are run by officers of the Indian Ordnance Factory Service (IOFS) who are a part of Indian civil services. They are generalist administrators with little technological expertise.

      Like much of the government, the OFB is not accountable for quality, timeliness and efficiency. There is no pressure to produce returns on public investment. The OFB pays little attention to operational efficiency, and cost-effectiveness has seldom been part of its calculus. They do not even produce annual profit and loss statements or balance sheets. They function in absolute opacity as monopolies with captive buyers.

      The Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA), another colonial legacy, is responsible for the quality assurance of products produced by OFB factories. It falls under the administrative control of the defense ministry just like the OFB. This arrangement is misguided. While the OFB is the producer, the DGQA is supposedly responsible for the quality of OFB products. The armed forces are the consumers but have no right to evaluate the quality of the products they use. The DGQA neither produces nor consumes and is not responsible or liable for poor quality or anything going wrong. It is bureaucratic, inefficient and incompetent. Over time, the DGQA has even acquired an odious reputation for its integrity. This has serious implications for India’s national security.

      Many in India have long recognized the need for reform. A proposal recently emerged to convert the OFB into a public sector company. This would make India’s 33 ordnance factories into DPSUs. Importantly, the DPSUs themselves have been a failure as explained above. This reform measure is ill-conceived, half-hearted and doomed to failure.

      The problems of the post-1962 DPSU model run deep too. They also operate as monopolies with the armed forces as their captive customers. DPSU employees enjoy complete job security, are not accountable for quality, delays or cost overruns. Strong unions resist any reforms. DPSUs operate in an environment of financial indiscipline. There is no compulsion to generate a reasonable return on capital and even continuous losses do not lead to closure. These losses have become a persistent drain on the public exchequer and suck up taxpayer money that could have gone to health, education or infrastructure.

      To be fair to DPSUs, they are not responsible for all their shortcomings. They have no autonomy to run their organizations. The Ministry of Defense micromanages recruitment, promotion, pay structure and investment decisions. DPSUs do very little in-house research or development. Instead, they rely on the DRDO or foreign licenses. Top management appointments by the government are far too often dispensed as patronage. Merit and achievement often become secondary considerations and, at times, interventions to promote a social justice agenda weaken DPSU performance.

      This performance has dangerous consequences. If a soldier guarding India’s borders gets inferior DPSU products, then it diminishes his fighting ability. The lack of DPSU accountability for quality, timely delivery and cost control weakens India’s national security. When a plane made by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) fails midair and the pilot dies, the country does not hold HAL accountable. This means that DPSUs have no incentive to maintain quality standards. Even items produced under a license are subject to unconscionable delays and extreme cost escalations. For example, the Germans can produce a submarine completing all trials within two years. In contrast, India’s DPSUs take over 10 years to assemble semi-knocked-down kits. DPSUs took an eternity to manufacture Arjun, India’s main battle tank, even though most of its critical components are simply imports.

      Whose Fault?

      Undoubtedly, it is not just DPSUs who are at fault. There are deeper reasons for India’s failure to achieve even a reasonable degree of self-reliance in the vital area of defense production and its defense research and development capabilities.

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      First, India has a narrow technological and scientific base. Since the mid-1990s India has invested less than 1% of its GDP for research and development activities. On the other hand, China has steadily boosted its research and development expenditure and has crossed 2% of its GDP.

      It is important to note that China’s GDP has grown faster than India’s and is now four times the size of its southern neighbor. Thanks to its increased expenditure, China now manufactures products that sell across the world.

      In contrast, Indian industry still struggles to sell globally and is starved of skilled manpower. India’s best technical talent still migrates to greener pastures. Except for a handful of enterprises, none of the vaunted information technology firms in India have created a top brand or a reputed product line. The situation is worse in the manufacturing sector.

      Second, India suffers from a lack of skilled manpower for even the most basic of industrial activities. An outmoded education system churns out millions of white-collar job seekers. Technical jobs like machining, plumbing, electrical works, mechanical works and quality assurance are treated as inferior pursuits. Even engineers from premier institutes seldom aspire for a hands-on career profile. They prefer to go into management or government service.

      India is desperately short of a workforce with advanced manufacturing floor skills. The few skilled technicians are a prized lot. Both the private and the public sectors compete for them. Enlightened thought leaders in the information technology sector like Narayana Murthy have often bemoaned the fact that India’s education system is failing to produce employable candidates, forcing private enterprises to establish in-house training institutions.

      To increase the scale and improve the quality of industrial production, India needs to raise an army of trained workers. This would involve nothing short of a cultural revolution in both industry and education.

      Some Solutions to Defense Production Problems

      In truth, the real answer to the problem is privatization. Taxpayer money must not be wasted on inefficient ordnance factories or DPSUs. If the armed forces could choose suppliers from a competitive marketplace, there would be huge savings for the taxpayer. Furthermore, the forces would be able to get high-quality products that meet the highest standards. Those who object to privatization should remember that India buys all its high-end defense equipment from private players, well-known OEMs such as Rafale jets from Dassault Aviation and M777 howitzers from BAE Systems.

      Not all ordnance factories can be turned into DPSUs and not all DPSUs can be privatized. Those units that cannot be turned around must be closed down. In addition, not all DPSUs need to be privatized. Some would be in core strategic sectors and they need professional management and operational autonomy. A part of their shareholding could be sold in the market to bring financial discipline and competitiveness to these DPSUs.

      Like any high-performing company in the world, the government should empower the board of directors of DPSUs and give them operational autonomy. Any DPSU board should be able to select its top management and hold its feet to the fire. The DPSUs must select top management from the open market by offering competitive pay, allowances and incentives. Similarly, they must recruit other employees on the basis of merit, and merit alone. The board must set high-performance standards for employees and foster a culture of excellence. The board and management must exercise financial discipline to generate returns on capital.

      The DPSUs must also do their own research and development. This does not mean that they stop working with the DRDO. It just means that they are responsible for all aspects of their performance. They can and indeed must collaborate with other institutions, especially the DRDO, but the buck for all aspects of their performance stops with them. Also, the DPSUs must have the power to raise capital in the form of both equity and debt from capital markets. The value of their shares and the rating of their debt will reflect the true worth of their enterprise, make the DPSU management accountable and compel them to perform optimally.

      In theory, the DRDO is expected to develop world-class defense technologies India needs to lessen reliance on imports. In reality, the DRDO is yet to establish itself as a reliable source for high-technology and battle-ready products that can more than match that of the adversaries. Of course, there are notable exceptions, particularly when it comes to rockets and guided missiles. The DRDO needs to replicate these successes in other fields.

      Like DPSUs, the DRDO also needs operational autonomy. Those who run the DRDO must be able to hire and fire, set pay and standards, and run the organization optimally to produce technologies that Indian armed forces need. At the same time, the DRDO must be accountable for its performance. Its key job is to produce indigenous technology and reduce dependence on imports. Furthermore, the DRDO has to achieve this under tight timelines, given rising threats to India’s national security.

      The DGQA has become totally outdated. This colonial institution must be disbanded. The consumer of the product must have the right to decide if a product is good enough, while the producer must be held fully responsible for both the quality and the delivery of its supplies. The producer must also suffer penalties for its failures. In practical terms, the armed forces who use defense products must have a choice to select products and producers. They should also be able to go to court and claim damages or ask for penalties if producers supply products that fall short of their quality standards.

      Finally, the defense sector needs some of the same reforms that one of the authors suggested to the prime minister in a memo on May 5. In their words, India “must no longer have the power to throttle supply-side activity.” Indian entrepreneurs do well around the world. It is time to unleash Indian entrepreneurial energy in the defense sector too. This will improve quality, cut costs and make India more secure in the years and decades ahead.

      For too long, India has failed to promote a culture of excellence while allowing mediocrity to flourish. It has derided merit and achievement while tolerating inefficiency and dishonesty. This has caused serious damage to the nation’s economic progress and the welfare of its people. This culture has imperiled national security. Hence, India must focus on developing a culture of excellence in all fields. Given the multiplicity of threats, defense production must be the sector that becomes an exemplar of excellence for this new culture of excellence.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      The State of the Indian Republic

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      On August 15, India celebrated 73 years of independence. By some metrics, the country has been a fantastic success. Multi-ethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s. In contrast, India is still united despite its bewildering diversity in terms of religion, region, language, caste and class. Its democracy has proved resilient and political power still changes hands peacefully.

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      The Republic of India began as and continues to be an audacious experiment. India’s independence came at a terrible cost. In 1947, the departing British partitioned the country into India and Pakistan, leading to violence and the largest migration in history. Despite the violence and chaos, India chose a pluralistic democracy and inspired other colonized nations to pursue independence.

      Since then, India has changed dramatically. Some trumpet the country’s great achievements. Others damn its monumental failures. In 2020, India still offers insights and lessons to many other nations around the world. With a population of more than 1.3 billion people, the state and health of the Republic of India is a matter of global importance.

      The Story of the Republic

      In seven decades, Indians have become much better off physically and financially on aggregate. For a start, they are living longer. Life expectancy in 1947 was 32 years. Today, it is over 69. During British rule, famine was a part of Indian life. It began with the Great Bengal Famine of 1769-70, which killed 10 million people, a third of the population of Bengal. During World War II, an estimated 3 to 5 million people died as Bengal’s grain was diverted to the overseas British war effort. Since independence in 1947, India has suffered no major famine and has achieved food security for the first time in centuries.

      There are many other achievements. India’s per capita GDP has improved dramatically. Literacy has increased from 11% in 1947 to 74% as per the 2011 census. Social mobility for women and members of lower castes has increased. A Dalit (India’s lowest caste) woman has held office as chief minister of India’s largest state and a woman has been prime minister. India now has nuclear and space programs and is on the verge of great power status.

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      Yet there are warts in the picture. Cambridge economist Joan Robinson had a lifelong love affair with India and famously observed, “Whatever you can rightly say about India, the opposite is also true.” Her observation holds true today.

      Indians may not be dying of hunger, but too many of them are still struggling to get enough food or water. In the 2019 Global Hunger Index, India ranks at a lowly 102 out of 117 qualifying countries. As of 2017, 37.9% of children under 5 were stunted and 14.5% of the population was undernourished. These rates are comparable to countries in sub-Saharan Africa, not in East or Southeast Asia. According to NITI Aayog, the premier policy think tank of the government, India faces the worst water crisis in its history and about 600 million face acute shortages. With nearly 70% of the water contaminated, India ranks 120 out of 122 countries in the water quality index.

      To add insult to injury, India‘s health care system is in crisis. Numerous research papers have chronicled the low quality of primary care facilities for women and children. A study by The Lancet found that 2.4 million Indians die of treatable diseases every year. A 2016 report by the World Health Organization found that 57.3% of India’s doctors did not have a medical qualification. When it came to nurses and midwives, 67.1% had education only up to secondary school level. Rural areas are poorly served. Public health care has declined dramatically. Even the poor turn to private health care where profiteering is rife.

      Like health care, education is in poor health. Annual reports invariably find young Indians lacking in cognitive development, early language and early numeracy. Teachers are often recruited on the basis of bribery. Like doctors, many are not qualified for their jobs. In addition, schools often lack basic facilities like water or electricity. Anyone who can afford to do so sends their children to private schools. For many, the focus of education is clearing entrance examinations to government-run, highly-subsidized elite universities. As a result, a booming $40-billion private coaching industry has emerged, which trains students for such examinations, allowing little space for innovation.

      Like education, India’s environment is in a dire state. The air in cities like Delhi or Bangalore is almost unbreathable. Sewage and industrial waste are discharged into rivers, streams, ponds, lakes and other water bodies. Plastic litters the land, including the high Himalayas. The levels of pollution have made scientists offer repeated warnings about impending environmental disasters to little effect.

      The Indian economy is in a similar state to the environment. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, growth had stalled and jobs dried up. More than 50% of Indians are under 25 and over 65% under 35. Thanks to selective abortion and gender discrimination, India has higher female mortality and more men than women. These single men present a major national challenge. Thanks to persistently high unemployment, there is a real risk that India’s much-trumpeted demographic dividend could turn into a demographic disaster.

      India’s institutions that are supposed to deal with these challenges are in dangerous decline. In politics, crime pays. Money and muscle power are essential for winning elections. Identity politics in the form of religion, region, caste and class has risen to alarming levels. In bureaucracy, corruption works. Colonial laws and post-independence ones have led to restrictive red tape. Citizens navigate it through bribery, personal networks or political influence.

      Furthermore, elite bureaucrats are held in high esteem. After they clear a grueling exam in their 20s, these mandarins are deemed omniscient. They head everything from exam boards to airlines and move seamlessly across ministries of culture, agriculture and finance. Neither lack of domain expertise nor incompetence holds them back. 

      Like the bureaucracy, India’s judiciary faces major issues. Like Bollywood, the profession of law is known for nepotism, not competence. The judicial system is infamous for its delays. Over 3.7 million, about 10% of the total number of cases, have been pending for over 10 years. Hence, many citizens turn to local crime bosses instead of courts for justice. Many of these criminals go on to run for office. Even the police are accused of behaving like a mafia. With the crumbling of the criminal justice system, they are increasingly taking to vigilante justice and extrajudicial killings.

      The weakening of institutions has gravely undermined the rule of law. The republic may not yet be in peril, but it is not too far off from a major crisis.

      Why Does the Indian Republic Matter?

      When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there were high hopes for a new age of peace and progress. Democracy was the new natural order of the universe. In 2020, that romance with democracy has dimmed. Strongmen are in power in many countries. Polarization runs high. India is no exception to this global trend and it assumes importance for five key reasons.

      First, the Indian republic matters most to its 1.3 billion citizens. Its success would mean better lives for nearly a fifth of humanity.

      Second, if the republic fails to deliver essential services or meet minimal expectations of its citizens, India could experience violence, chaos and even disintegration. The entire region could go up in flames as in 1947 when the British partitioned the country into India and Pakistan.

      Third, India has long been an exemplar for the decolonized world. Countries like Tanzania and South Africa avidly studied India’s imperfect but resilient democracy. India provides a good roadmap for the bumpy transition from a traditional to a democratic society.

      Fourth, the Indian republic offers rich insights for any multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious democracy. The promise and peril of such an experiment are laid bare in India.

      Fifth, India poses difficult questions for our time. Can democracies avoid degenerating into popularity contests between competing special interest groups? If so, how? Can a humongous republic with innumerable moving parts reform itself? If so, what does it take? If not, what lies ahead? Answers to such questions will determine the future course of history.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Can the India-China Confrontation Play Out in East Africa?

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      China and India have never been friendly neighbors. The laws of geopolitics set the two Asian giants against one another. In recent years, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s confrontation with the US and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ambitions for a powerful and global India have inflamed nationalism on both sides of the Himalayan border. Bilateral tensions peaked in June, when a border clash in the Himalayan Galwan Valley resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an unspecified number of Chinese troops.

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      Now, the competition between China and India is moving to Africa, and to East Africa in particular. Since 2000, the continent has witnessed China’s deep and ubiquitous penetration through trade, investments, infrastructures, energy, budget support and security cooperation. In 2008, New Delhi showed a newfound interest in Africa.

      Despite China’s head start, India is trying to catch up to counter Beijing’s predominance over the continent. East Africa is the region where the two Asian powerhouses share vital interests and where their competition will likely play out more seriously.

      India’s Africa Policy

      India–Africa relations are rooted in history. The Indian Ocean constituted a channel of trade and population exchange for centuries. Consequently, East Africa has always enjoyed close ties with India, and around 3 million people of Indian descent live between the Horn and South Africa. After independence from British rule in 1947, India was politically active in Africa as a champion of decolonization and South-South cooperation. The period that followed saw India–Africa relations phase out until New Delhi brought the continent back into the picture from the mid-2000s.

      In economic terms, trade augmented eightfold between 2001 and 2017, making India Africa’s third-largest trading partner with a total exchange worth $62.6 billion. While Chinese trade with the continent largely outnumbers it, India has kept up the pace and investments grew alongside trade, jumping to $54 billion in 2016.

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      As a fast-growing manufacturing power, India places strategic relevance to raw materials for the stability of its supply chain and energy sector. Indeed, New Delhi’s exchange with Africa, like Beijing’s, is driven by natural resources — with oil and gas accounting for approximately two-thirds of the total — followed by gold and other ores.

      Political ties have also strengthened over the years. In 2008, the first India–Africa Forum Summit was launched in New Delhi and took place again in 2011 and 2015, with 41 African heads of state attending; the next conference was scheduled in September 2020. These summits allowed African leaders, on the one hand, to set out their cooperation priorities and India, on the other, to respond accordingly. As a result, India–Africa cooperation pivoted around capacity building, technology transfer and infrastructural investments. Lastly, India has sought support on UN reform, which would be unrealistic without the votes of African countries in the General Assembly.

      Security issues have been on the agenda as well. New Delhi is particularly active in the realm of anti-piracy. After the kidnapping of several Indian citizens by Somali pirates, the Indian navy stepped up its efforts after 2008 and escorted over 1,000 vessels across the Gulf of Aden, sometimes in cooperation with the European Union’s Mission Atalanta.

      Another domain that saw India at the forefront is UN peacekeeping missions. The Indian subcontinent has always been one of the leading suppliers of peacekeepers to UN missions, with 80% of them deployed in Africa. On top of that, Indian defense academies have provided training to the Nigerian, Ethiopian and Tanzanian military.

      Modi and the Challenge to China

      Modi has given further impetus to India–Africa relations. In July 2018, he outlined the 10 guiding principles of India’s engagement with Africa during a visit to Rwanda and Uganda. On that occasion, the prime minister leveraged India’s role in South-South cooperation to advance his credentials as leader of the developing world. Besides rhetoric, Modi moved from words to action by signing a defense agreement with President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and by extending two credit lines worth nearly $200 million to the Ugandan government. He also announced the opening of 18 new diplomatic missions in Africa by 2021, bringing the total to 47.

      The prime minister has placed a keen eye on East Africa, which is set to become the epicenter of the India–China confrontation. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are essential maritime routes for India’s export-oriented economy. China is heavily investing along these two waterways through the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), especially in the port of Djibouti and the Suez Canal.

      Djibouti is indeed becoming yet another element of the Chinese maritime network in the Indian Ocean, along with Pakistan, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. This network, the so-called “String of Pearls,” geographically surrounds India and is perceived as a strategic nightmare in New Delhi. Therefore, the Chinese expansion in the western Indian Ocean urges India to intervene.

      To counter the BRI in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi launched a similar initiative for East Africa: the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). Conceived in 2016 and still at an early stage, this Indo-Japanese project will attract investments on development, quality infrastructure, institutional connectivity, capacity building and people-to-people cooperation to the region. Due to its anti-Chinese nature, the AAGC primarily targets contested countries like Djibouti and Ethiopia.

      In 2017, Indian President Ram Nath Kovind clustered both countries for his first official visit. At the time, Ethiopia was already the largest beneficiary of India’s scholarship scheme and lines of credit for Africa with $1.1 billion, besides being the scene of the 2011 India-Africa Forum Summit. Djibouti was a relatively new target for New Delhi. In the year of the visit, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti. Consequently, Kovind not only signed some cooperation agreements, but he also reportedly expressed India’s interest in a military base on Djiboutian soil, a project still under discussion.

      The geopolitical confrontation between India and China looms on the horizon. Africa — particularly the east — is set to become an arena of such a global, momentous challenge. India has economic, energetic and security reasons to deepen its relations with the continent. Furthermore, China’s ubiquitous presence in Africa and the Indian Ocean is a direct menace to Modi’s global ambitions. Although China is still out of reach, New Delhi’s engagement has been steadily expanding in all fields, and its approach based on soft power looks promising. The concepts of building Africa’s capacities and unleashing its potential, along with the employment of African workers instead of foreign labor like China, have resonated across the continent.

      On the one hand, East Africa is under India’s radar more than any other region of the continent for its strategic position. On the other, East African governments have a long track record of balancing off the influence of external actors. East Africa is also the region where India can rely on a robust diaspora community. Hence, India presents itself as a useful ally to balance China’s growing influence in the region.

      Finally, yet importantly, the US and the European powers might prefer New Delhi’s penetration into the continent at the detriment of China’s, which is perceived as a growing geopolitical threat to the West. East Africa, in sum, might soon become the new battleground of the economic and security confrontation between the two Asian giants.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Gulf State Analytics.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in Elections

      With a word of Tamil, Kamala Harris boosts her fanbase in India

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      As a child wandering between the legs of the aunts, uncles and family friends who filled her grandparents’ apartment in Chennai, in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, a young Kamala Harris grew used to being addressed in Tamil.It was the main language spoken by her grandmother, who had only fragmented English, and over the years of Harris’s childhood trips from California to Chennai – which back then was called Madras – to visit her mother’s side of the family, she slowly learned to understand, if not speak, the mother tongue of her Indian relatives.Standing at the Democratic convention podium last week accepting her historic nomination for US vice-president, Harris made a passing but significant nod to this aspect of her heritage. She said her mother had “raised us to know and be proud of our Indian heritage”, adding: “Family is my uncles, my aunts and my chithis.” More

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      India and China: A Time for Diplomacy, Not Confrontation

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      Chinese and Indian forces have pulled back from their confrontation in the Himalayas, but the tensions that set off the deadly encounter this past June — the first on the China–India border since 1975 — are not going away. Indeed, a poisonous combination of local disputes, regional antagonisms and colonial history could pose a serious danger to peace in Asia.

      In part, the problem is Britain’s colonial legacy. The “border” in dispute is an arbitrary line drawn across terrain that doesn’t lend itself to clear boundaries. The architect, Henry McMahon, drew it to maximize British control of a region that was in play during the 19th-century “Great Game” between England and Russia for control of Central Asia. Local concerns were irrelevant.

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      The treaty was signed between Tibet and Britain in 1914. Although India accepts the 550-mile McMahon Line as the border between India and China, the Chinese have never recognized the boundary. Mortimer Durand, Britain’s lead colonial officer in India, drew a similar “border” in 1893 between Pakistan (India’s “Northern Territories” at the time) and Afghanistan that Kabul has never accepted, and which is still the source of friction between the two countries. Colonialism may be gone, but its effects still linger.

      Although the target for the McMahon Line was Russia, it has always been a sore spot for China, not only because Beijing’s protests were ignored, but also because the Chinese saw it as a potential security risk for its western provinces. England had already humiliated China in the two Opium Wars as well as by seizing Shanghai and Hong Kong. If it could lop off Tibet — which China sees as part of its empire — so might another country… like India.

      A Threat to China?

      Indeed, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unilaterally revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and absorbed Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, the Chinese saw the grab as a threat to the security of Tibet and its restive western province of Xinjiang. The area in which the recent fighting took place, the Galwan Valley, is close to a road linking Tibet with Xinjiang.

      The nearby Aksai Chin, which China seized from India in the 1962 border war, not only controls the Tibet-Xinjiang highway, but also the area through which China is building an oil pipeline. The Chinese see the pipeline — which will go from the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Kashgar in Xinjiang — as a way to bypass key choke points in the Indian Ocean controlled by the US Navy.

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      The $62-billion project is part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a piece of the huge Belt and Road Initiative to build infrastructure and increase trade between South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and China.

      China moves 80% of its oil by sea and is increasingly nervous about a budding naval alliance between the United States and Beijing’s regional rivals, India and Japan. In the yearly Malabar exercises, the three powers’ war-game closes the Malacca Straits through which virtually all of China’s oil passes. The Pakistan-China pipeline oil will be more expensive than tanker supplied oil — one estimate is five times more — but it will be secure from the US.

      In 2019, however, Indian Home Minister Amit Shah pledged to take back Aksai Chin from China, thus exposing the pipeline to potential Indian interdiction.

      From China’s point of view the bleak landscape of rock, ice and very little oxygen is central to its strategy of securing access to energy supplies. The region is also part of what is called the world’s “third pole,” the vast snowfields and glaciers that supply the water for 11 countries in the region, including India and China. Together, these two countries make up a third of the world’s population but have access to only 10% of the globe’s water supplies. By 2030, half of India’s population — 700 million people — will lack adequate drinking water.

      The “pole” is the source of 10 major rivers, most of them fed by the more than 14,000 thousand glaciers that dot the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush. By 2100, two-thirds of those glaciers will be gone, the victims of climate change. China largely controls the “pole.” It may be stony and cold, but it is the lifeblood to 11 countries in the region.

      Back in Time

      The recent standoff has a history. In 2017, Indian and Chinese troops faced-off in Doklam — Dongland to China — the area where Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim come together. There were fistfights and lots of pushing and shoving, but casualties consisted of black eyes and bloody noses. But the 73-day confrontation apparently shocked the Chinese. “For China, the Doklam stand-off raised fundamental questions regarding the nature of India’s threat,” says Yun Sun, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington.

      Doklam happened just as relations with the Trump administration were headed south, although tensions between Washington and Beijing date back to the 1998-99 Taiwan crisis. At that time, President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area, one of which traversed the Taiwan Straits between the island and the mainland. The incident humiliated China, which re-tooled its military and built up its navy in the aftermath.

      In 2003, President George W. Bush wooed India to join Japan, South Korea and Australia in a regional alliance aimed at “containing” China. The initiative was only partly successful, but it alarmed China. Beijing saw the Obama administration’s “Asia pivot” and the current tensions with the Trump administration as part of the same strategy. If one adds to this the US anti-missile systems in South Korea, the deployment of 1,500 Marines to Australia and the buildup of American bases in Guam and Wake, it is easy to see why the Chinese would conclude that Washington had it out for them.

      China has responded aggressively, seizing and fortifying disputed islands and reefs, and claiming virtually all of the South China Sea as home waters. It has rammed and sunk Vietnamese fishing vessels, bullied Malaysian oil rigs and routinely violated Taiwan’s airspace.

      China has also strengthened relations with neighbors that India formally dominated, including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives, initiatives which India resents. In short, there are some delicate diplomatic issues in the region, ones whose solutions are ill-served by military posturing or arms races.

      The dust-up in the Galwan Valley was partly an extension of China’s growing assertiveness in Asia. But the Modi government has also been extremely provocative, particularly in its illegal seizure of Jammu and Kashmir. In the Galwan incident, the Indians were building an airfield and a bridge near the Chinese border that would have allowed Indian armor and modern aircraft to potentially threaten Chinese forces.

      Dangerous Thoughts

      There is a current in the Indian military that would like to erase the drubbing India took in its 1962 border war with China. The thinking is that the current Indian military is far stronger and better armed than it was 58 years ago, and it has more experience than the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. The last time the Chinese army went to war was its ill-fated invasion of Vietnam in 1979.

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      But that is dangerous thinking. India’s “experience” consists mainly of terrorizing Kashmiri civilians and an occasional firefight with lightly-armed insurgents. In 1962, India’s and China’s economies were similar in size. Today, China’s economy is five times larger and its military budget four times greater.

      China is clearly concerned that it might face a two-front war: India to its south, the US and its allies to the west. That is not a comfortable position, and one that presents dangers to the entire region. Pushing a nuclear-armed country into a corner is never a good idea.

      The Chinese need to accept some of the blame for the current tensions. Beijing has bullied smaller countries in the region and refused to accept the World Court’s ruling on its illegal occupation of a Philippine reef. Its heavy-handed approach to Hong Kong and Taiwan, and its oppressive treatment of its Uighur Muslim minority in Xinjiang, is winning it no friends, regionally and internationally.

      There is no evidence that the US, India and China want a war, one whose effect on the international economy would make COVID-19 look like a mild head cold. But since all three powers are nuclear-armed, there is always the possibility — even if remote — of things getting out of hand.

      In reality, all three countries desperately need one another if the world is to confront the existential dangers of climate change, nuclear war and pandemics. It is a time for diplomacy and cooperation, not confrontation.

      *[This article was originally published by FPIF.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      India Must Abandon Nehru’s Failed Non-Aligned Policy to Confront China

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      Troops from India and China have clashed this year in Ladakh and North Sikkim at the border between the two countries. Although there are immediate reasons for the clash, the deeper causes of India’s border disputes with both China and Pakistan are its post-independence historic blunders. India has catastrophically failed to establish, delineate and demarcate its boundaries when it was in a position to do so.

      Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian prime minister after independence in 1947, was a man of the leftist mold and so were many of his confidantes. They ignored reports of Chinese atrocities and progressive occupation of Tibet sent by Sumal Sinha, the Indian consul general in Lhasa, and Apa Pant, the dewan, the de facto prime minister, of the Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim, which at that time was a protectorate and is now a state of India.

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      Two influential Indians emerge with much discredit. One is V.K. Krishna Menon, India’s defense minister from 1957 to 1962, who resolutely maintained that India had nothing to fear from China. The other is K.M. Panikkar, India’s ambassador to China from 1950 to 1952, whose advice “proved to be unwise.” Panikkar persuaded Nehru to recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet when Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took over this de facto independent buffer state in October 1950. The historian T.R. Ghodbole records that Panikkar “advised Nehru not to raise the border issue” with China as the price for accepting the conquest of Tibet.

      One Indian leader shines in contrast. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s first home minister and Nehru’s deputy, was prescient about the Chinese threat. He wrote a now well-known letter, to the prime minister, calling Chinese action “little short of perfidy.” Patel, a Gandhian from the right of the Indian National Congress party, argued that Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism were “ten times more dangerous” than Western expansionism or imperialism because it wore “a cloak of ideology.” The wise home minister died soon after writing this letter. Now, Indian policy was firmly in the hands of leftist ideologues who failed to take any of the steps he advocated to safeguard the country’s security interests.

      Misunderstanding China and Abandoning Tibet

      Nehru soon embarked on his misconceived policy of non-alignment. He wanted to be the moral leader of the Third World who pioneered a policy of peace in contrast to the militaristic policies of imperial powers. As a result, India failed to build up its own capabilities to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nehru forgot to heed the Roman doctrine that if “you want peace, be prepared for war; therefore, let him who desires peace get ready for war.” He also forgot the ancient Indian strategist Chanakya who postulated that “every neighbor is a potential enemy and an enemy’s enemy is a friend.”

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      It was this complete absence of strategic thinking that led to the debacle in Tibet in 1950. Even as China was building up its strength and repudiating so-called unequal treaties imposed by imperial powers, Nehru was content to swan around on the world stage as a moral, peaceful beacon for the world. It was this naive thinking that led the country to take the issue of Kashmir to the United Nations and fail to press home its military advantage in 1948. Back then, India was in a position to claim the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, including the parts that China now controls.

      India failed to understand China’s worldview. Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state under President Richard Nixon, had his finger on the Chinese pulse in his book, “World Order.” He observes that China has considered itself as “the sole sovereign government of the world’ since its unification in 221 BC. It did not consider other monarchs as equal. They were mere “pupils in the art of governance, striving towards civilization.” The Chinese emperor commanded “all under heaven,” tianxia in Chinese parlance. China forms the central, civilized part, “the Middle Kingdom” of tianxia. It is supposed to inspire and uplift the rest of humanity.

      Chinese President Xi Jinping is the son of an ardent Maoist. Like Mao, he has emerged as a modern-day Chinese emperor. Xi has reintroduced this idea of tianxia. His first act when he became the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 was to visit the Museum of Revolution. There he declared that China was ready to be a world leader “because of its 5,000-year-old history, the CCP’s 95-year historical struggle and the 38-year development miracle of reform.” This is the danger that Patel foresaw but Nehru did not.

      In 1950, India could have prevented the Chinese takeover of Tibet. It could have strengthened its garrison in Lhasa instead of withdrawing its troops, used its air force and supported the poorly equipped Tibetan forces. China was isolated internationally in the 1950s. The Western powers were anti-communist and did not like Chinese interference in Vietnam. China’s relations with the Soviet Union spiraled downward after 1955. India failed to build a coalition against China even when the West had shown interest in supporting the Tibetans. Indeed, as Atul Singh, Glenn Carle and Vikram Sood record in a detailed article on Fair Observer, India inexplicably turned down a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.

      Once China conquered Tibet, it was at India’s doorstep. In the 1950s, it stealthily took over 37,244 square kilometers of Aksai Chin and built a road connecting southern Tibet to Xinjiang. It also started claiming large chunks of Indian territory such as Arunachal Pradesh and parts of Ladakh. Indeed, the Chinese claim line extends right up to the plains of Assam.

      Singh, Carle and Sood have examined in some detail the various boundaries the British drew as their boundary with the Qing. China was in turmoil after its revolution of 1911-12 and Tibet was de facto independent. It was a buffer state where the British had many strategic assets, which India inherited but soon gave up to China. Released files of the Central Intelligence Agency reveal the extent of Nehru’s capitulation to Mao. India signed a treaty with China and inexplicably agreed to withdraw troops from Tibetan towns of Yatung and Gyantse, which were mainly trading posts, and also wind up the garrison in Lhasa. It handed over control of postal, telegraph and telephone facilities to the Chinese.

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      None of these concessions satisfied the Chinese. Instead, these missteps whetted the appetite of a resurgent Middle Kingdom. China did not accept any of the lines the British had drawn on the map and kept claiming more and more of Indian territory. Finally, war ensued. In 1962, China handed India a devastating defeat that continues to haunt the country to this day.

      The two countries severed diplomatic relations after the war. They restored them only in 1984. Since then, they have conducted several rounds of negotiations and signed several agreements but never been able to agree to define and demarcate the line of actual control (LAC), the de facto line dividing Indian and Chinese territory, or agree upon an international boundary. Despite India’s repeated efforts to get the LAC demarcated, the Chinese have been intransigent. It is far too convenient for them to have an undefined LAC, which allows them to alter it for strategic advantage whenever they have an opportune moment.

      China’s Expansionist Policy and Indian Response

      Chinese intransigence is the key reason why the two countries have been unable to come to an agreement. In 1960, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, proposed formalizing the status quo. He suggested India keep what is now called Arunachal Pradesh while China would retain Aksai Chin. Later, Deng Xiaoping reiterated Zhou’s position. In 1962, Chinese troops largely withdrew from Indian territory and even vacated the strategic town of Tawang, a great center of Buddhist learning and pilgrimage.

      As per these actions, one could infer the Chinese took what they want. Sadly, this is not true. The Chinese have been consistently and persistently moving the goalposts. China now refuses to accept the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh as the international boundary and is claiming Tawang again on the ground that the sixth Dalai Lama was born here. It is important to remember that the border alignment agreed by China with Myanmar follows roughly this very line.

      China has been constantly upgrading its military and building up its border infrastructure. It has also been breaching all the agreements that it signed with India. The only exception is the exchange of maps relating to the middle sector bordering the Indian state of Uttarakhand in 2005.

      This year, China has displayed unusual belligerence far exceeding past practices. It has exerted pressure in both North Sikkim and Ladakh. The proximate reason lies in India belatedly boosting its border infrastructure. It has built the world’s highest airfield at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). An all-weather road now goes east from Leh, the capital of Ladakh, to Durbuk and then further east to the Shyok river, from where it turns north and runs all along the LAC right up to DBO. This airfield sits at the base of a historic pass through the Karakoram and gives India access to Central Asia. It is also close to the strategic Siachen Glacier where India controls the commanding heights and dominates Pakistan.

      For decades, India neglected its border infrastructure. Defeat to China in 1962 scarred the country. Its policymakers went into a defeatist mindset. They thought good roads would be used by the Chinese to speed into Indian territory while rugged undeveloped terrain would slow down Chinese advance. Domestic organizations and foreign private companies have now dramatically altered the ground situation, especially in the western sector. This has made China nervous. It feels the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — a trade route that is important for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and its geopolitical strategy in South Asia — might be under threat. Indian troops could block off its access to Gilgit-Baltistan.

      Possibly as a reaction, Chinese troops have been pressing at strategic points on the Ladakh border such as Gogra Hot Springs, Depsang Bulge, Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso Lake. They want to make sure that the road India has built to its airfield at DBO comes within range of Chinese gunsights. Nibbling Indian territory has been the general strategy for a long time. The Chinese are infamous for following “salami tactics” not only with India but also with other neighbors like Vietnam or Japan.

      Increasingly, China appears to be unnerved by India’s strategic direction. In 2017, New Delhi was firm in defending Bhutan’s territory in Doklam Plateau, which China lays claim to. India has strengthened ties with Australia, the European Union and the US. The specter of the Quad, an alliance of India, Japan, Australia and the US, blocking the Straits of Malacca — an international waterway — haunts China. In particular, China fears that the US is backing India to be a counterweight to China in Asia.

      Under President Xi, China has been increasingly aggressive on its borders. It has also been repressive internally. China has tightened the screws on Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang. The Belt and Road Initiative is another example of Chinese expansionism.

      China’s recent belligerence might come from a deep sense of insecurity due to several recent developments. The US has unleashed a trade war that has hit China’s export-oriented economy hard. Furthermore, capital and manufacturing have been moving to Indonesia and Vietnam. India has now made a play for that capital as well. In addition, Western countries have criticized China for its domestic as well as external actions. The COVID-19 pandemic has blotted its record and lowered its global image. India has supported the US in calling out China on its suppression of information about the pandemic and in instituting an inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 disease.

      India has long borne the brunt of Chinese aggression. It has never raised the issue of an independent Tibet in the international arena. It was the first non-socialist country to recognize China. Yet China has consistently acted against India’s interests. It has used Pakistan as a proxy against India. Beijing has even provided nuclear technology and fissile material to Islamabad. It blocks India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of nuclear-supplier countries. It has built a port in Sri Lanka and instigated the communist government in Nepal to act against India’s interests.

      The time has come for India to stand up to China’s bullying. The nation cannot allow China to keep gobbling up Indian territory. India has to keep modernizing its military, building up its border infrastructure and developing closer ties with other nations threatened by China. Most importantly, India has to recognize that China is its principal strategic enemy, both in the short and the long term. Therefore, India has no option but to cast off its failed non-aligned policy and ally with the US against China. Only a full-fledged military alliance between the world’s two largest democracies will deter the world’s biggest tyrannical regime.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More