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    Trump’s Failure in the Middle East

    A stunning and humiliating sign of America’s loss of leadership was the UN Security Council’s rejection on August 14 of the US attempt to extend the arms embargo on Iran. None of its traditional allies, including Britain, France and Germany, supported the US. Washington was only backed by one country: the Dominican Republic. 

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    The Trump administration is now scrambling to force a “snapback” in order to reinstate UN sanctions on Iran. As per the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), if the Iranians violate the terms of the agreement, sanctions can be reintroduced. Yet Donald Trump, the US president, unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 and has no standing to try to enforce its provisions. This latest attempt will also founder, further underlining the failure of Trump’s Middle Eastern adventure.

    “Maximum Pressure“

    Since 2017, Trump has set out to destroy the regime in Iran and, for this, he has had the support — indeed the encouragement — of Gulf Arab states and Israel but no one else. The rest of the world wants to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Gulf by binding Iran to a permanent agreement to put its nuclear activities under an intrusive inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The purpose of the JCPOA was to make this happen. 

    Trump’s policy of putting “maximum pressure” on Iran has caused unemployment, inflation, shortages of medicines and a near-collapse of the Iranian rial, but it has not toppled the regime, nor brought about its surrender. US pressure has united Iranians against America’s bullying, encouraged a resumption of some nuclear activity and pushed Iran further into the arms of Russia and China.

    It has also led to the Iranians firing missiles at Saudi and Emirati oil refineries and tankers in 2019 as a demonstration of the potential costs of an all-out assault on Iran. The Gulf states and the US blinked and didn’t respond to these strikes. The US has stepped back from threats of a full-scale attack — a further sign of the Trump administration’s muddled thinking.

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    The JCPOA is on life support, but it is not yet dead. If Joe Biden is elected as president in November, rejoins the nuclear pact — which was negotiated under the Obama administration that Biden served as vice president in — and lifts unilateral US sanctions, then Iran will cooperate. This is the strongest signal Iran has been sending and which all the other members of the UN Security Council have heard. Iran has also been sending this message through a multitude of back channels to the Gulf Arab states and even the US. But Trump refuses to listen.

    So, who does Trump listen to? Not his NATO allies, whom he prefers to insult and threaten. And not the strong bench of Middle Eastern scholars, diplomats and businessman who have spent the last 75 years building US influence and prestige in the region. Trump dismisses this group as the “deep state.”

    Instead, the president listens to the Gulf despots who fear Iran will undermine their power and to whom he can sell arms. He also listens to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli hawks who paint Iran as the antichrist that is bent on the destruction of Israel. 

    Lack of Strategy

    Trump, the narcissist, believes that he is right and the rest of the thinking world is wrong. His announcement of the UAE’s diplomatic pact with Israel — a public acknowledgment of a comprehensive relationship that already existed — was a public relations stunt to try show that his Gulf policies are working. National Security Adviser Richard O’Brien’s call for a Nobel Peace Prize for Trump was an added embarrassment.  

    The net result of Trump’s multiple Middle Eastern failures is that Syria has been partitioned between Turkish, Iranian and Russian interests, Iraq is firmly in the Iranian camp, Yemen is a humanitarian disaster, Libya is in the midst of a civil war where the US has no say whatsoever, Egypt is run by an unpopular military dictator whose grip is threatened by economic disaster, Lebanon is a failed state, and Saudi Arabia is ruled by a man who assassinates his enemies.

    Trump’s lack of strategy, absence of moral compass and failure of leadership have damaged America’s prestige and influence enormously. US dominance in the region may never recover.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Is Trump Preparing a Pre-Election Surprise?

    In 2016, Alan Lichtman departed from conventional wisdom to predict a Donald Trump victory in that year’s presidential election. The political scientist was following something he called the “13 keys to the White House.” Using this relatively straightforward metric, Lichtman had correctly predicted the outcome of presidential elections stretching back to 1984. Trump was so delighted with Lichtman’s unorthodox prediction that, after the election, he sent a congratulatory note. Last week, Lichtman applied his model to this year’s presidential election. Biden narrowly beat Trump in seven out of the 13 categories.

    With three months to the election, Trump doesn’t have much of a chance to reverse any of the determinations in Lichtman’s test. Of the seven categories that he lost to Biden, the president can’t change the results of the 2018 midterms, erase the numerous scandals that have beset his administration, suddenly acquire the kind of charisma that attracts people outside his narrow base, eliminate the social unrest that has accompanied his rule or magically revive a cratering economy.

    Okay, on that last item, Trump is indeed trying to bluff the economy into a recovery and, in the absence of congressional action on another stimulus bill, use the limited powers of his executive orders as a magic wand. Wall Street might be fooled, but the tens of millions of unemployed are not.

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    Which leaves the two foreign policy keys in Lichtman’s model. The first, avoiding a foreign policy disaster, tips in Trump’s favor. To my mind, pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization all represent foreign policy fiascos, but Lichtman has in mind a screw-up on the order of the Iraq invasion in 2003.

    The second foreign policy key is achieving a major global victory. This, Lichtman points out, Trump has failed to do. Trump is well aware of Lichtman’s model and track record. He knows that he only has to flip one key to change Lichtman’s prediction. What are the prospects that the president will pull out the stops in an effort to achieve some grand foreign policy success in the final 100 days? Is Donald Trump preparing an October surprise?

    The Hibernating President

    To put it mildly, Donald Trump has not been the most engaged president in US history. He doesn’t pay attention to his briefings. He plays golf while a pandemic rages throughout the land. He has only a vague understanding of the world that exists beyond the global archipelago of Trump Organization holdings.

    Most recently, in discussing the explosions in Beirut, Trump falsely opined that it was “a bomb of some kind.” It was yet another flight of fancy from a president who prefers to make things up instead of hewing to the facts or keeping his mouth shut. “Yet aside from some initial concern among Lebanese officials, Trump’s assertions were largely met with a collective global shrug,” reports The Washington Post.

    The president who shook up the foreign policy consensus by meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, forging a new economic relationship with China and embracing a cadre of autocrats in the Middle East has seemingly gone into hibernation. The world knows quite well how royally Trump has screwed up the US response to the coronavirus. Global leaders see the blood in the water. They’re expecting a change in White House occupancy come November.

    Seasoned observers of the international scene have concluded that, with little geopolitical leverage, Trump will not be able to pull off any major foreign policy success in the days leading up to the election. There’s little time or political commitment on the ground to push through a peace agreement in Afghanistan that hastens the withdrawal of American troops. The much-vaunted Middle East peace deal that Jared Kushner presented to the UN in February is dead on arrival. Any meetings with North Korea, much less a surprise deal, are off the agenda between now and November. Denmark is not interested in selling Greenland.

    That doesn’t leave a lot of options for a president struggling with a raft of domestic issues that are likely to prove more influential in the long run at the polls. But don’t make the mistake of thinking that a foreign policy success has to be something constructive. Donald Trump is much better at destroying things than building them. He has already asked foreign leaders — in Ukraine, in China — for help in destroying Joe Biden’s reputation. He has looked the other way as Russia has worked to destroy American democracy. For an encore in November, Trump may well be planning something even more destructive.

    War With Iran

    Donald Trump has not tried to conceal his antipathy toward Tehran. He has done everything short of war to bring down the Iranian government. He withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear deal. He applied harsh sanctions to squeeze the Iranian economy. Two years ago, he provided the CIA with new authority to intensify a cyberwar against the country. And, to kick off 2020, he orchestrated the assassination of a top Iranian official, Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.

    Bizarrely, Trump continued to maintain throughout that he still held out hope of negotiating a new deal with Iran. But last week, Brian Hook, the instrument of that policy of continued engagement with Iran in the midst of a punishing cold war, stepped down. Hook was something of a moderate in the very skewed politics of the Trump administration. Indeed, compared to his successor, Hook’s a veritable peacenik.

    Replacing Hook as special envoy to Iran is Elliott Abrams. Fresh from his failures to promote regime change in Venezuela, Abrams will likely apply his extremist philosophy to his new portfolio. The first opportunity takes place this week as the administration pushes the UN to extend the arms embargo on Iran due to expire as per the terms of the nuclear deal. It’s part of an effort to destroy any chance of a Biden administration returning to the status quo ante with Iran.

    Abrams is assuming his new position at a fraught moment. An explosion took place last month at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. It was but one of several such mysterious “accidents” that are likely the result of covert Israeli operations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is anxious about the prospect of Joe Biden winning in November and resurrecting some version of the Obama administration’s détente with Iran. So, Netanyahu is getting in his licks while he can, though even he is not interested in a full-scale war with Iran.

    For hawks in the United States who were disappointed that the Bush administration didn’t march into Tehran after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the latest turmoil in the region is encouraging. “Iran has been in a weakened state, its economy hobbled by U.S. sanctions and its regime facing domestic discontent, including a massive protest campaign last fall,” writes Jonah Shepp in New York magazine. “Those protests raised hopes among Iran hawks in the U.S. that their dreams of regime change might soon be realized.”

    A war with a major Middle Eastern power is probably not on Trump’s agenda. After all, he’s been pushing for a withdrawal of US forces from the region. And in June 2019, after Iran shot down a US drone, Trump decided not to retaliate, even though a number of his advisers were urging him to do so. But this time, an election beckons, Trump is down in the polls, and desperate times call for desperate measures. It wouldn’t be the first time that Donald Trump rolled the dice in one last bid for the jackpot.

    What about China?

    After experimenting with North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, the Trump administration has decided that China is the most useful adversary to distract attention from the president’s many failures. Just last week, the administration placed new restrictions on TikTok and WeChat, two Chinese social media applications. Microsoft has been in negotiations to acquire part of TikTok’s business, a deal Trump’s actions potentially disrupt.

    The administration also announced new sanctions against 11 Chinese and Hong Kong officials over the imposition of the recent national security law in the former British colony. Included in the list is Carrie Lam, Hong Kong’s chief executive. Other recent US sanctions targeting China have focused on the treatment of the Uighur minority, on cybersecurity and for transporting Iranian oil. This week, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar is visiting Taiwan, a previously unheard-of breach in diplomatic etiquette since US officials have studiously ignored Taiwan for four decades.

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    These actions take place against an ominous backdrop: the US closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston in July, high-level complaints about Chinese actions in the South China Sea and the ongoing attempts to draw together security allies from India to Australia into an Indo-Pacific alliance against China. And don’t forget the speech by Mike Pompeo last month in which the secretary of state essentially declared the end of engagement with China because it failed to induce “the kind of change inside of China that President Nixon had hoped to induce.” Actually, Nixon was more interested in driving a further wedge between Beijing and Moscow and opening China up for business. That kind of change is exactly what happened. Democracy and human rights were never really much of a consideration for either Nixon or Henry Kissinger — just as they’re of little interest to Pompeo or Donald Trump.

    Pompeo’s speech and the various punitive measures directed at Beijing all amount to a fundamental shift in US policy: not just skepticism about engagement but support for regime change inside China. As with Iran, Trump is probably not thinking about starting a war with China. But a skirmish in the South China Sea that produces a rally-around-the-flag surge in support of the president could certainly fit the bill for an October surprise.

    The US military seems to be preparing for such a contingency, with Pentagon chief Mark Esper effectively drawing a line in the water near China. “The secretary said that the U.S. military is positioning forces to counter Chinese behavior and support U.S. policies, revealing that the U.S. conducted more freedom-of-navigation operations challenging unlawful movement restrictions and excessive claims in 2019 than it has any year in the past four decades,” writes Ryan Pickrell in Business Insider.

    Surely, you might be saying, Donald Trump wouldn’t pick a fight with China or Iran just to win an election. Wouldn’t the potential casualties, if nothing else, stay his hand? But remember, this is a president who has already dismissed more than 150,000 American coronavirus deaths as “it is what it is.” What’s another few thousand deaths to guarantee four more years?

    *[This article was originally published by Foreign Policy in Focus.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Israel-UAE Deal: Arab States Are Tired of Waiting on Palestine

    The August 13 announcement of normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates breaks the quarter-century standstill in Arab-Israeli relations and shows that Arab states will no longer hold their interests hostage to the long-dormant Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. President Donald Trump made the announcement of the establishment of relations between the two countries from the White House, suggesting that his administration played an instrumental role in the action. He referred to a call the same day with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates.

    The exact American role in the deal — other than giving the agreement a name, the Abraham Accord, in honor of the prophet important to both Judaism and Islam as well as Christianity — is unclear.

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    What is most apparent is that the two countries, which have had substantial informal interactions in fields like trade, technology, health and security for years, have finally moved to normalize those ties. The immediate upshot is that for the first time in nearly 26 years, an Arab state has formally recognized the Jewish state. Moreover, the UAE becomes the first Arab nation that has relations with Israel but no shared border. Egypt and Jordan, which each share borders with Israel, established ties in 1980 and 1994, respectively.

    Why Wait?

    Previously, Arab states, including the UAE, held out the prospect of normalized relations on condition of the establishment of two states, Israel and Palestine, along the borders that existed prior to the 1967 War. With its decision today, the UAE is saying it is no longer willing to wait for such an outcome, especially when its own interests are advanced by opening formal ties with Israel. Despite the Trump administration’s announced “deal of the century” — officially Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People — to much fanfare in June of last year, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have made no headway since Secretary of State John Kerry’s failed year-long effort six years ago.

    The UAE extracted one apparent concession from Jerusalem: Netanyahu will suspend annexation plans for the West Bank. That gives the Emirates the political cover it needs not only for its own population — by now probably agnostic on the whole Israel-Palestine dispute — but also for other Arab states, especially those more likely to criticize Abu Dhabi’s decision (likely few outside the usual pariahs). In fact, aware of the benefits that accrue to normalizing ties with the nation now considered the most powerful and technologically advanced in the Middle East, other Arab nations are now more likely to follow the UAE’s lead.

    Moreover, nations recognizing Israel are also more likely to earn Washington’s — and especially this administration’s — favor. In the case of the UAE, which already enjoys close ties with the US, that won’t mean a great deal immediately. Down the road, however — that is after the November election — it could mean attractive baubles like a free trade agreement or expanded security ties, regardless of who comes out on top in the American election.

    A Boon to Bibi in Troubled Times

    Traditionally, when nations establish diplomatic relations, they open embassies in respective capitals. For Israel, that will mean a new embassy in Abu Dhabi, and probably a consulate in Dubai as well, given its economic prominence in the country. But the UAE must decide where to locate its embassy. Will it be in Tel Aviv, where most nations of the world have had their embassies after Israeli independence in 1948, or in Jerusalem, Israel’s official capital and where the US relocated its embassy in February of 2018? Other nations also have opened embassies in Jerusalem, but no other major country. By setting up an embassy in Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi would implicitly recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, effectively a double win for Israel. That decision will be a thorny one for the wealthy Gulf state. It may wish to hold out for further concessions than just the annexation postponement.

    Annexation has been on indefinite hold since early last month when Netanyahu failed to act on previous pledges, reportedly because of Washington’s cold feet. Taking it off the table now is, therefore, hardly a sacrifice for Netanyahu. Even in Israel itself, it was viewed with mixed emotions.

    The ever-wily Bibi turned what had looked to be a political loss into a fairly significant foreign policy win for the Jewish state. And he needed it. Since early summer, thousands of Israelis have taken to the streets, mostly in Jerusalem, to protest against Netanyahu and call for his departure. Most of those critics are on the political left, which poses little threat to his continued rule. But he is also facing heat from his right, which presents far more of a threat. The conservative prime minister has historically drawn his support from the powerful right of Israel’s political spectrum, which dominates Israel’s electorate. So, getting this victory today — recognition by a major Arab state — allows him to again show his remarkable ability to advance Israel’s interests.

    That’s doubly important in view of the declining state of affairs between him and his erstwhile partner in government, Benny Gantz. Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial, a budget dispute between him and Gantz, and the recent surge in COVID-19 infections in Israel have cast a shadow over the unity government. Were it not for today’s announcement and Gantz’s declining political support within Israel, a new election, which now seems likely, Netanyahu’s 11-year reign might have been facing its denouement.

    Nothing for the Palestinians, Even Less for Iran

    Pointedly, in the entire announcement event at the White House, Palestine was not mentioned. Trump was accompanied by a parade of other administration officials, whose involvement in the accord was never made clear. None of them referred to either Israel-Palestine relations or to the annexation postponement. This is bad news for President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinians. The annexation postponement is a mere short-term sop, and they know it. Given the ambitions of those on Israel’s political right, annexation will be a fact of life. A Joe Biden win in November might stall it, but only for a while. A Trump victory will make it inevitable and likely soon.

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    The real message to Abbas is that Arab governments are tired of waiting. The UAE has made the first move. Other Arab states are likely to follow suit in the near future. Two in particular, Qatar and Oman, have already shown interest in expanded ties with Jerusalem for the very same reasons as the UAE.

    The announcement’s unspoken message to Ramallah is to get on with it — to negotiate and settle with Israel while there’s still some chance for an independent Palestinian state. The previous Arab conditions to the normalization of ties with Israel have exceeded their shelf life. Arab states are moving on. Abbas and the Palestinians need to do the same. Even a Biden victory won’t change this.

    Iran was briefly mentioned in the proceedings, by former administration Iran point man, Brian Hook, who resigned earlier this month. He needn’t have done so. Tehran can’t be pleased with the decision of the Emirates, which are located barely 25 miles across the Strait of Hormuz from Iran. Israel is likely to gain greater cooperation and coordination with the UAE armed forces, which already maintain very strong ties with the US. In addition, Israel will likely gain a prime observation perch for intelligence gathering on the Islamic Republic.

    Today’s announcement amounts to a significant setback for Iran. It may go too far to say that Washington’s dream of an Arab-Israeli anti-Iran alliance is in the works. But if one other Gulf state acts similarly, that’s exactly how the Trump administration will portray it — and how Iran may come to view it. That may be a good thing for the US, Arab nations and Israel, even if the likelihood of such an actual alliance is remote.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Annexation or No Annexation, Little Will Change in Israel-GCC Relations

    It is important to question how the proposed Israeli annexation of 30% to 40% of the West Bank could impact Tel Aviv’s relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Although it is impossible to safely predict how regional dynamics would change if the annexation goes ahead, there are three main reasons why the move would probably neither elicit a discernible reaction from most Arab Gulf sheikdoms nor irreparably damage Israel’s existing partnerships with GCC members.

    First, most regimes in the Arabian Peninsula do not perceive Israel as a grave strategic threat, nor do most in the GCC view standing up for the Palestinian cause as a high-ranking priority, especially compared to dealing with the perceived Turkish and Iranian threats. Second, throughout the 20th century, Israel has developed extensive relations with some states in the GCC. Such engagement and cooperation spread across numerous domains such as intelligence, security and economic cooperation. Third, the question of Palestinian statehood is generally linked to either pan-Arabism or Islamism, and most Arab Gulf regimes seek to limit the power of such ideologies in their own countries.

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    Furthermore, while officials in the GCC have issued public statements warning Israel to not to go ahead with the planned annexation of the West Bank, such rhetoric is mainly intended for domestic and regional consumption and does not directly reflect the warming relations between Israel and the Gulf capitals. 

    Strategic Relations

    Foreign ministers and Gulf officials have publicly condemned the move, arguing that “annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with UAE.” Moreover, Bahraini minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, expressed that the “Israeli plan threatens international peace and security and endangers the region,” while both Kuwait’s ambassador to the United Nations and Oman’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued similar statements condemning annexation. 

    Doha would likely react negatively to annexation based on the close relationships developed with Hamas and a litany of Islamist movements across the region since the 1990s. However, Qatar has had to go to pains to cement its close relations with the Trump administration amid the past three years of being subjected to a blockade by its neighbors. Thus, officials in Doha would likely have to be cautious about taking any steps vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine that could trigger a negative response from the most pro-Israel leader who has ever occupied the Oval Office.

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    At the same time, examining the strategic relations between Israel and the GCC member states allows one to understand the potential repercussions of annexation. Accordingly, Israel’s economic, security and intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE are likely to withstand annexation. This is mainly due to most Arab Gulf states’ tactical acceptance of Israel’s military and technological predominance in the region, especially when viewed in terms of the perceived Iranian threat, Turkish “neo-Ottomanism” and Washington’s waning military commitment to the region. Notwithstanding Qatar and Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman all formed durable ties in the realms of security, intelligence, and economics. In the domains of security and intelligence, the common enemy — Turkey — and the threat of Iranian hegemony cohere Israel with the UAE, Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

    Israel and Arab Gulf states’ clandestine diplomatic engagement began decades ago and surfaced into overtly public relations. Consequently, the move toward normalization of ties has shuttered away the long-standing Arab demand that Israel withdraw from lands captured in 1967 as a precondition for acceptance of Israel.

    Omani-Israeli relations are largely predicated on clandestine diplomacy and are historically orchestrated by the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency. To be sure, Mossad officers have routinely traveled to Muscat to consult with Omani officials regarding Iran and other shared regional concerns. Oman’s willingness to work with Tel Aviv is based on a historic pattern of bilateral economic and political ties. It follows that Oman will not disrupt ties with the Jewish state but rather continue its historical role as a diplomatic mediator — a position Muscat is likely to attempt to embrace in the short term in the event of annexation.

    Durable Ties

    Moreover, Israel established durable intelligence and security ties with other GCC members. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) caused a bit of a surprise in the regional when he declared that “there are a lot of interests we [Saudi Arabia] share with Israel and if there is peace, there would be a lot of interest between Israel and the GCC.” Further, GCC support for Israel was expressed during the 2019 Warsaw Mideast Summit, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE’s chief diplomats all defending Israel’s right to exist and alluding that the perceived Iranian threat overshadowed the question of Palestinian statehood. That same year, MBS declared that “the Palestinians need to accept [Trump’s] proposal or stop complaining.”

    Although, as noted, Tel Aviv’s intelligence and security relations with GCC member states are predicated on sharing information regarding Tehran and terrorism, many Arab Gulf monarchies are acquiring signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities from the Israeli defense sector. As an anonymous European intelligence official told The Washington Post, “The tools you need to combat terrorism are the same ones you need to suppress dissent.”

    To be sure, the Israeli defense sector has sold GCC member-states SIGINT collection methods and eavesdropping capabilities to monitor internal dissent and entrench the power of the central authority. For example, Israel sold Saudi Arabia over $250 million worth of electronic and signals intelligence eavesdropping equipment in 2018, while Tel Aviv sold the Iron Dome advance air defense system to the kingdom a short time earlier. In 2016, Israel sold more than $1 billion to Arabian Peninsula sheikdoms, with most of the weapons directed to the Emiratis and Saudis, although the majority of such deals are kept secret.

    The defense and intelligence relationships are again important given the convergence of interests around the Iranian threat, Ankara’s ambitious and Muslim Brotherhood-friendly foreign policy, along with the relative decline of Washington’s regional influence. For many Gulf monarchies, Israel represents a strategic partner that can effectively contribute to regional and global efforts to counter Iranian conduct in the wider Arab/Islamic world, provide intelligence information and collection capabilities to counterterrorism operations, and eavesdrop on domestic detractors while also gradually embracing the regional security role previously commanded by Washington.

    Domestic perceptions triggered by annexation among the GCC population are likely to dilute the strength of public diplomacy between the Gulf monarchies and Tel Aviv in the short term, despite Riyadh and Abu Dhabi often viewing Hamas with trepidation given the group’s Islamist ideology and its relations with Turkey, Qatar and Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are worried about Islamist movements and affiliated political power as a challenge to authority, yet they are equally concerned about domestic perceptions of annexation given the overtly public relations between the two monarchies and Tel Aviv.

    In sum, the annexation process is unlikely to rupture Tel Aviv’s relations with GCC members. Israel is united with the Arabian monarchies by the common perception of the Iranian threat, while the Israeli defense and intelligence establishment provides an abundance of weaponry, intelligence information and collection capabilities to Gulf partners. Moreover, while annexation will stir internal opposition in the region, the GCC member states are only likely to publicly condemn the policy while continuing with diplomatic engagement, trade, intelligence sharing and defense acquisitions.*[Gulf State Analytics is a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    India Must Abandon Nehru’s Failed Non-Aligned Policy to Confront China

    Troops from India and China have clashed this year in Ladakh and North Sikkim at the border between the two countries. Although there are immediate reasons for the clash, the deeper causes of India’s border disputes with both China and Pakistan are its post-independence historic blunders. India has catastrophically failed to establish, delineate and demarcate its boundaries when it was in a position to do so.

    Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian prime minister after independence in 1947, was a man of the leftist mold and so were many of his confidantes. They ignored reports of Chinese atrocities and progressive occupation of Tibet sent by Sumal Sinha, the Indian consul general in Lhasa, and Apa Pant, the dewan, the de facto prime minister, of the Himalayan kingdom of Sikkim, which at that time was a protectorate and is now a state of India.

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    Two influential Indians emerge with much discredit. One is V.K. Krishna Menon, India’s defense minister from 1957 to 1962, who resolutely maintained that India had nothing to fear from China. The other is K.M. Panikkar, India’s ambassador to China from 1950 to 1952, whose advice “proved to be unwise.” Panikkar persuaded Nehru to recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet when Mao Zedong’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) took over this de facto independent buffer state in October 1950. The historian T.R. Ghodbole records that Panikkar “advised Nehru not to raise the border issue” with China as the price for accepting the conquest of Tibet.

    One Indian leader shines in contrast. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India’s first home minister and Nehru’s deputy, was prescient about the Chinese threat. He wrote a now well-known letter, to the prime minister, calling Chinese action “little short of perfidy.” Patel, a Gandhian from the right of the Indian National Congress party, argued that Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism were “ten times more dangerous” than Western expansionism or imperialism because it wore “a cloak of ideology.” The wise home minister died soon after writing this letter. Now, Indian policy was firmly in the hands of leftist ideologues who failed to take any of the steps he advocated to safeguard the country’s security interests.

    Misunderstanding China and Abandoning Tibet

    Nehru soon embarked on his misconceived policy of non-alignment. He wanted to be the moral leader of the Third World who pioneered a policy of peace in contrast to the militaristic policies of imperial powers. As a result, India failed to build up its own capabilities to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nehru forgot to heed the Roman doctrine that if “you want peace, be prepared for war; therefore, let him who desires peace get ready for war.” He also forgot the ancient Indian strategist Chanakya who postulated that “every neighbor is a potential enemy and an enemy’s enemy is a friend.”

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    It was this complete absence of strategic thinking that led to the debacle in Tibet in 1950. Even as China was building up its strength and repudiating so-called unequal treaties imposed by imperial powers, Nehru was content to swan around on the world stage as a moral, peaceful beacon for the world. It was this naive thinking that led the country to take the issue of Kashmir to the United Nations and fail to press home its military advantage in 1948. Back then, India was in a position to claim the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, including the parts that China now controls.

    India failed to understand China’s worldview. Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state under President Richard Nixon, had his finger on the Chinese pulse in his book, “World Order.” He observes that China has considered itself as “the sole sovereign government of the world’ since its unification in 221 BC. It did not consider other monarchs as equal. They were mere “pupils in the art of governance, striving towards civilization.” The Chinese emperor commanded “all under heaven,” tianxia in Chinese parlance. China forms the central, civilized part, “the Middle Kingdom” of tianxia. It is supposed to inspire and uplift the rest of humanity.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping is the son of an ardent Maoist. Like Mao, he has emerged as a modern-day Chinese emperor. Xi has reintroduced this idea of tianxia. His first act when he became the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012 was to visit the Museum of Revolution. There he declared that China was ready to be a world leader “because of its 5,000-year-old history, the CCP’s 95-year historical struggle and the 38-year development miracle of reform.” This is the danger that Patel foresaw but Nehru did not.

    In 1950, India could have prevented the Chinese takeover of Tibet. It could have strengthened its garrison in Lhasa instead of withdrawing its troops, used its air force and supported the poorly equipped Tibetan forces. China was isolated internationally in the 1950s. The Western powers were anti-communist and did not like Chinese interference in Vietnam. China’s relations with the Soviet Union spiraled downward after 1955. India failed to build a coalition against China even when the West had shown interest in supporting the Tibetans. Indeed, as Atul Singh, Glenn Carle and Vikram Sood record in a detailed article on Fair Observer, India inexplicably turned down a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.

    Once China conquered Tibet, it was at India’s doorstep. In the 1950s, it stealthily took over 37,244 square kilometers of Aksai Chin and built a road connecting southern Tibet to Xinjiang. It also started claiming large chunks of Indian territory such as Arunachal Pradesh and parts of Ladakh. Indeed, the Chinese claim line extends right up to the plains of Assam.

    Singh, Carle and Sood have examined in some detail the various boundaries the British drew as their boundary with the Qing. China was in turmoil after its revolution of 1911-12 and Tibet was de facto independent. It was a buffer state where the British had many strategic assets, which India inherited but soon gave up to China. Released files of the Central Intelligence Agency reveal the extent of Nehru’s capitulation to Mao. India signed a treaty with China and inexplicably agreed to withdraw troops from Tibetan towns of Yatung and Gyantse, which were mainly trading posts, and also wind up the garrison in Lhasa. It handed over control of postal, telegraph and telephone facilities to the Chinese.

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    None of these concessions satisfied the Chinese. Instead, these missteps whetted the appetite of a resurgent Middle Kingdom. China did not accept any of the lines the British had drawn on the map and kept claiming more and more of Indian territory. Finally, war ensued. In 1962, China handed India a devastating defeat that continues to haunt the country to this day.

    The two countries severed diplomatic relations after the war. They restored them only in 1984. Since then, they have conducted several rounds of negotiations and signed several agreements but never been able to agree to define and demarcate the line of actual control (LAC), the de facto line dividing Indian and Chinese territory, or agree upon an international boundary. Despite India’s repeated efforts to get the LAC demarcated, the Chinese have been intransigent. It is far too convenient for them to have an undefined LAC, which allows them to alter it for strategic advantage whenever they have an opportune moment.

    China’s Expansionist Policy and Indian Response

    Chinese intransigence is the key reason why the two countries have been unable to come to an agreement. In 1960, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier, proposed formalizing the status quo. He suggested India keep what is now called Arunachal Pradesh while China would retain Aksai Chin. Later, Deng Xiaoping reiterated Zhou’s position. In 1962, Chinese troops largely withdrew from Indian territory and even vacated the strategic town of Tawang, a great center of Buddhist learning and pilgrimage.

    As per these actions, one could infer the Chinese took what they want. Sadly, this is not true. The Chinese have been consistently and persistently moving the goalposts. China now refuses to accept the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh as the international boundary and is claiming Tawang again on the ground that the sixth Dalai Lama was born here. It is important to remember that the border alignment agreed by China with Myanmar follows roughly this very line.

    China has been constantly upgrading its military and building up its border infrastructure. It has also been breaching all the agreements that it signed with India. The only exception is the exchange of maps relating to the middle sector bordering the Indian state of Uttarakhand in 2005.

    This year, China has displayed unusual belligerence far exceeding past practices. It has exerted pressure in both North Sikkim and Ladakh. The proximate reason lies in India belatedly boosting its border infrastructure. It has built the world’s highest airfield at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). An all-weather road now goes east from Leh, the capital of Ladakh, to Durbuk and then further east to the Shyok river, from where it turns north and runs all along the LAC right up to DBO. This airfield sits at the base of a historic pass through the Karakoram and gives India access to Central Asia. It is also close to the strategic Siachen Glacier where India controls the commanding heights and dominates Pakistan.

    For decades, India neglected its border infrastructure. Defeat to China in 1962 scarred the country. Its policymakers went into a defeatist mindset. They thought good roads would be used by the Chinese to speed into Indian territory while rugged undeveloped terrain would slow down Chinese advance. Domestic organizations and foreign private companies have now dramatically altered the ground situation, especially in the western sector. This has made China nervous. It feels the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — a trade route that is important for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and its geopolitical strategy in South Asia — might be under threat. Indian troops could block off its access to Gilgit-Baltistan.

    Possibly as a reaction, Chinese troops have been pressing at strategic points on the Ladakh border such as Gogra Hot Springs, Depsang Bulge, Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso Lake. They want to make sure that the road India has built to its airfield at DBO comes within range of Chinese gunsights. Nibbling Indian territory has been the general strategy for a long time. The Chinese are infamous for following “salami tactics” not only with India but also with other neighbors like Vietnam or Japan.

    Increasingly, China appears to be unnerved by India’s strategic direction. In 2017, New Delhi was firm in defending Bhutan’s territory in Doklam Plateau, which China lays claim to. India has strengthened ties with Australia, the European Union and the US. The specter of the Quad, an alliance of India, Japan, Australia and the US, blocking the Straits of Malacca — an international waterway — haunts China. In particular, China fears that the US is backing India to be a counterweight to China in Asia.

    Under President Xi, China has been increasingly aggressive on its borders. It has also been repressive internally. China has tightened the screws on Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang. The Belt and Road Initiative is another example of Chinese expansionism.

    China’s recent belligerence might come from a deep sense of insecurity due to several recent developments. The US has unleashed a trade war that has hit China’s export-oriented economy hard. Furthermore, capital and manufacturing have been moving to Indonesia and Vietnam. India has now made a play for that capital as well. In addition, Western countries have criticized China for its domestic as well as external actions. The COVID-19 pandemic has blotted its record and lowered its global image. India has supported the US in calling out China on its suppression of information about the pandemic and in instituting an inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 disease.

    India has long borne the brunt of Chinese aggression. It has never raised the issue of an independent Tibet in the international arena. It was the first non-socialist country to recognize China. Yet China has consistently acted against India’s interests. It has used Pakistan as a proxy against India. Beijing has even provided nuclear technology and fissile material to Islamabad. It blocks India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of nuclear-supplier countries. It has built a port in Sri Lanka and instigated the communist government in Nepal to act against India’s interests.

    The time has come for India to stand up to China’s bullying. The nation cannot allow China to keep gobbling up Indian territory. India has to keep modernizing its military, building up its border infrastructure and developing closer ties with other nations threatened by China. Most importantly, India has to recognize that China is its principal strategic enemy, both in the short and the long term. Therefore, India has no option but to cast off its failed non-aligned policy and ally with the US against China. Only a full-fledged military alliance between the world’s two largest democracies will deter the world’s biggest tyrannical regime.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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