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    Facing Tough Election, Orban Turns to Putin for Support

    The Hungarian leader made his name by defying Moscow. But he has increasingly turned toward Russia in an effort to secure the natural gas he needs to keep energy prices low and voters happy.BUDAPEST — Facing a tough election in two months, Hungary’s far-right populist prime minister, Viktor Orban, last week opened the centerpiece of a new state-funded museum district celebrating his country’s role as an anchor of European culture and identity.A shrine in the newly opened “House of Music” honors Hungarian champions of democracy routed by Austrian and Russian troops in 1848, anti-communist rebels crushed by Soviet soldiers in 1956 and, on a happier note, Hungary’s successful defiance of Moscow in 1989, when Mr. Orban made his name by demanding that 80,000 Soviet troops go home.On Tuesday, just days after the museum opening, a celebration of the national pride that Mr. Orban has long used to rev up his voters, the Hungarian prime minister swerved in the opposite direction to shore up another vital if contradictory pillar of his support — Russia.Meeting in Moscow with President Vladimir V. Putin, he signaled sympathy for Russia in its standoff with the West over Ukraine, and pleaded for more deliveries of the natural gas he needs to keep energy prices low and voters happy.Mr. Orban has long been seen as a political chameleon — and reviled by foes as a brazen opportunist — but he is now pushing his shape-shifting talents to a new level. He has broken ranks not only with Hungary’s allies over Ukraine but also with his country’s own long history of wariness toward Russia as he seeks to reconcile economic populism with the nationalism that underpins his political brand.Hungary, according to the European Union’s statistical agency, has the lowest electricity prices and third lowest gas prices for consumers in the 27-member European bloc. While prices elsewhere have doubled or tripled over the past year, Hungary has kept them steady, a feat that Mr. Orban’s governing Fidesz party is hoping will help it defeat an unusually united opposition in elections on April 3.A basilica in Budapest last September. A recent poll found that Hungary views Russia and China as more important strategic partners than the United States.Akos Stiller for The New York TimesAnalysts question whether Hungary can keep prices low for consumers indefinitely without crippling the finances of a huge state-owned electricity provider. But Mr. Orban has turned to Moscow to help convince voters he has their economic interests in hand.Hungary has sided unequivocally with Mr. Putin as fellow members of the European Union and NATO have voiced growing alarm over what they see as Russian bullying of Ukraine, on whose borders Moscow has massed more than 100,000 troops.Speaking on Hungarian radio Friday, Mr. Orban brushed off criticism of his cozying up to the Kremlin, saying that Hungary wanted to act as an “icebreaker” by pursuing a policy that he acknowledged “deviates entirely from most E.U. and NATO ally countries.”Understand Russia’s Relationship With the WestThe tension between the regions is growing and Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly willing to take geopolitical risks and assert his demands.Competing for Influence: For months, the threat of confrontation has been growing in a stretch of Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Threat of Invasion: As the Russian military builds its presence near Ukraine, Western nations are seeking to avert a worsening of the situation.Energy Politics: Europe is a huge customer of Russia’s fossil fuels. The rising tensions in Ukraine are driving fears of a midwinter cutoff.Migrant Crisis: As people gathered on the eastern border of the European Union, Russia’s uneasy alliance with Belarus triggered additional friction.Militarizing Society: With a “youth army” and initiatives promoting patriotism, the Russian government is pushing the idea that a fight might be coming.At a news conference Tuesday in the Kremlin with Mr. Putin, Mr. Orban left no doubt about the main reason for this deviation.“If we have Russian gas, we can provide a cheap supply of it to Hungarian households. If there is no Russian gas then we cannot do this,” he explained.Peter Kreko, the director of Political Capital in Budapest, said cheap energy was one of Fidesz’s main selling points to voters. “The party says that while people in the rest of Europe are freezing or becoming impoverished because of energy prices, Hungary has no problems.”Mr. Orban’s Moscow trip, he said, could therefore be a “big win — so long as the war does not escalate in Ukraine.” But if Russia invades, he added, Mr. Orban, who described his trip to Mr. Putin as a “mission of peace,” will be “in serious trouble internationally and also domestically. His whole narrative crumbles.”At a joint news conference with Mr. Orban in Moscow on Tuesday, Mr. Putin effectively endorsed the Hungarian leader.Pool photo by Yuri KochetkovMr. Orban is not the first Hungarian leader to go cap in hand to Moscow in pursuit of energy. But when a predecessor did so in 2007 and reached a gas deal with Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled energy behemoth, Mr. Orban lambasted the arrangement as evidence his country was slipping back into Moscow’s orbit.Since then, however, Mr. Orban has dropped the anti-Moscow sentiments that catapulted him to prominence in 1989, and instead developed a form of far-right populism more focused on stoking contemporary cultural wars by targeting the European Union as a menacing threat to Hungarian sovereignty and values.Nationalist leaders in other European countries like Poland share Mr. Orban’s hostility toward Brussels but reject his outreach to Mr. Putin, a rift that has hobbled a yearslong effort by Europe’s far right to form a united front.“We had a bad relationship with the Soviet Union for many reasons that I do not need to list here,” Mr. Orban told radio listeners on Friday. “But that era is over, and now we are trying to have a system of relations with this new Russia that is different from what we had with the Soviet Union.”Mr. Putin has returned the favor.After blasting NATO for “ignoring” Russia’s security concerns as Mr. Orban stood at his side in the Kremlin, the Russian president effectively endorsed the Hungarian leader.“As we usually say when our partners are having elections, we will work with any elected leader,” Mr. Putin said, adding: “But I must note that you have done so much in your work on the Russian track in both the interest of Hungary and Russia. I hope our cooperation will continue.”A station for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, owned by the Russian energy company Gazprom, in Lumbin, Germany. Around 80 percent of the gas used in Hungary is imported from Gazprom.Sean Gallup/Getty ImagesMore important, he offered Mr. Orban a helping hand with energy, noting that underground storage facilities for gas in Europe are just 40 percent full and “our European partners in Europe will probably face problems next year.” But Hungary, Mr. Putin promised, “will have no problems because we will coordinate additional volumes.”Around 80 percent of the gas used in Hungary is imported from Gazprom, more than double the European Union’s average level of Russian imports. Then there is nuclear energy. The biggest producer of electricity in Hungary is the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, a Soviet-designed facility whose expansion Mr. Orban also discussed with Mr. Putin. It generates around half of Hungary’s electricity. Russia has provided loans of $10 billion to fund the plant’s expansion, a project led by Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company, Rosatom.“It should be clear for everyone that as long as this government is in power, energy prices will be reduced,” Mr. Orban’s chief of staff, Gergely Gulyas, declared last year.Hungary’s dependence on Russia for energy helps explain why, when the Biden administration announced this week that it would send more American troops to the region, Hungary said it didn’t need them. Poland and Romania welcomed the American offer.Hungary has a long history of animosity toward Russia, but this has faded as media outlets controlled by Mr. Orban and his supporters have praised Mr. Putin and steadily eroded trust in the Western alliance.Mr. Putin on TV during his meeting with Mr. Orban in Moscow on Tuesday. Hungary’s long history of animosity toward Russia has faded in recent years.Sergey Ponomarev for The New York TimesA survey of public opinion across East and Central Europe last year by Globsec, a research group in Slovakia, found that Hungary, alone among countries in the region, views Russia and China as more important strategic partners than the United States.Some analysts believe Mr. Putin’s pledges of support for Hungary in Moscow were largely symbolic and won’t help Mr. Orban keep utility prices in check.“The era of cheap Russian gas has ended,” said Attila Weinhardt, an energy analyst at Portfolio, an online financial journal. The government’s hope that it can keep fixed energy prices for households, he said, is probably unsustainable.Mr. Orban’s Moscow visit secured no written commitment of additional supplies and mostly just reaffirmed a 15-year deal signed last September. That deal, which advanced Russian efforts to reduce gas deliveries to Europe through Ukraine by using alternative pipelines, was condemned by Ukraine as a “purely political, economically unreasonable decision.”Mr. Orban’s foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, responded that Hungary was not playing politics but simply securing its own economic and security interests. “You cannot heat homes with political statements,” he said.Valerie Hopkins More

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    What America Would Look Like in 2025 Under Trump

    What will happen if the political tables are turned, and the Republican Party wins the White House in 2024 and the House and Senate along the way?One clue is that Donald Trump is an Orban worshiper — that’s Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, a case study in the aggressive pursuit of a right-wing populist agenda.In his Jan. 3 announcement of support for Orban’s re-election, Trump declared: “He is a strong leader and respected by all. He has my Complete support and Endorsement for re-election as Prime Minister!”What is it about Hungary under Orban that appeals so powerfully to Trump?“Call it ‘soft fascism,’ ” Zach Beauchamp of Vox.com, wrote on Sept. 13, 2018:a political system that aims to stamp out dissent and seize control of every major aspect of a country’s political and social life, without needing to resort to “hard” measures like banning elections and building up a police state. One of the most disconcerting parts of observing Hungarian soft fascism up close is that it’s easy to imagine the model being exported. While the Orban regime grew out of Hungary’s unique history and political culture, its playbook for subtle repression could in theory be run in any democratic country whose leaders have had enough of the political opposition.In “How the American Right Fell in Love With Hungary,” in The New York Times Magazine, Elizabeth Zerofsky quotes Rod Dreher, the combative conservative blogger, on Orban’s immigration policies — building a fence on the border to keep Muslims out, for example. “If you could wind back the clock 50 years, and show the French, the Belgian and the German people what mass immigration from the Muslim world would do to their countries by 2021, they never, ever would have accepted it” Dreher remarked.In contrast to conservatism as practiced in the United States, Zerofsky writes about Hungary under Orban: “Here was this other, European tradition of Catholic conservatism, that was afraid neither of a strong state, nor of using it to promote a conservative vision of life.”In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, political scientists at Barnard and Georgetown, argue that Orban has “emerged as a media darling of the American right,” receiving high praise from Tucker Carlson, “arguably the single most influential conservative media personality in the United States.”The Conservative Political Action Conference, “a major forum of the American right, plans to hold its 2022 annual meeting in Hungary,” Cooley and Nexon write. What has Orban done to deserve this attention?The two authors briefly summarize Orban’s record: “Orban consolidated power through tactics that were procedurally legal but, in substance, undercut the rule of law. He stacked the courts with partisans and pressured, captured, or shut down independent media.”Cooley and Nexon demonstrate a parallel between what has taken place in Hungary and current developments in the United States: “Orban’s open assault on academic freedom — including banning gender studies and evicting the Central European University from Hungary — finds analogies in current right-wing efforts in Republican-controlled states to ban the teaching of critical race theory and target liberal and left-wing academics.”In an email, Nexon elaborated:There is definitely a transmission belt of ideas between the U.S. and European right; for various stripes of conservatives — reactionary populists, integrationists, ethnonationalists — Hungary is becoming what Denmark is for the left: part real-life model, part idealized dreamscape.Trump and Orban, Nexon continued,are both opportunists who’ve figured out the political usefulness of reactionary populism. And Trump will push the United States in a broadly similar direction: toward neo-patrimonial governance. During his first term, Trump treated the presidency as his own personal property — something that was his to use to punish enemies, reward loyalists and enhance his family’s wealth. If he wins in 2024, we’re likely to see this on steroidsTrump, in Nexon’s view, will be unable to match Orban — by, for example, installing a crony “as president of Harvard” or forcing “Yale to decamp for Canada” — butIt’s pretty clear that he’ll be better at installing absolute loyalists at the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. So, if Trump succeeds, we’ll be able to find a lot of similar parts, but it won’t be the same model. I suspect it will be worse. The U.S. is a large federation with a lot of capacity for private violence, a major international footprint, and a multi-trillion-dollar economy. Hungary is a minor player in a confederation dominated by democratic regimes.Cooley stressed in an email the “active networking among right-wing political associations and groups with Orban,” citing the Jan. 24 endorsement of Orban’s re-election by the New York Young Republican Club:Today, both the United States of America and countries in Europe like Hungary face an existential crisis. The ruling elite and political establishment’s failed leadership and ideology have eroded the meaning and purpose of citizenship. For those against this ideology and for the preservation of Western civilization for all countries in the West, it is imperative that we stand in support of one another as national communities.Orban’s appeal to the right flank of the Republican Party, in Cooley’s view, lies in anideology — which rests on redefining the meaning of “the West” away from liberal principles and toward ethnonational ideals and conservative values — and his strategy for consolidating power is to close or take over media, stack the courts, divide and stigmatize the opposition, reject commitments to constraining liberal ideals and institutions, and publicly target the most vulnerable groups in society — e.g. refugees.Orban has described Hungary under his rule as an “illiberal democracy.” In 2019, Freedom House downgraded Hungary from “free” to “partly free,” making it “the first country in the European Union that is not currently classified” as “free,” according to the Budapest Business Journal.I asked a number of European scholars about the agenda Trump and a Republican-controlled Congress would be most likely to push in 2025.In a March 2021 paper “Authoritarian Values and the Welfare State: The Social Policy Preferences of Radical Right Voters,” Philip Rathgeb, a professor of social policy at the University of Edinburgh, Marius R. Busemeyer and Alexander H. J. Sahm, both of the University of Konstanz, surveyed voters in eight Western European countries to determine “what kind of welfare state do voters of populist radical right parties want and how do their preferences differ from voters of mainstream left- and right-wing parties.”Rathgeb and his co-authors found that populist European voterswant a particularistic-authoritarian welfare state, displaying moderate support only for “deserving” benefit recipients (e.g., the elderly), while revealing strong support for a workfare approach and little support for social investment.Rathgeb wrote in an email:From an ideological perspective, it wouldn’t surprise me if Trump prioritized Medicare over Medicaid, given that the former is targeted at the “deserving” poor, i.e., the elderly and disabled. A pro-elderly outlook is very typical of the radical right in Europe too, because the beneficiaries of schemes like Medicare are typically native (white) citizens who have demonstrated their willingness to “work hard” over their lifetime, thus being deserving of welfare support. By contrast, I expect little support, perhaps even cuts, for Medicaid.Rathgeb noted that populist parties oppose social investment policies because such programs are often based onprogressive gender values and a commitment to “lifelong learning.” For example, public provision of childcare helps working women to reconcile work-family life (vs. the male breadwinner model), while training and education foster social mobility in the “knowledge economy” (e.g., high-end services). These ideological considerations are reinforced by material interests, as the main target groups of social investment policies (i.e., the new middle classes, including women and the young with high levels of education) are distant from the typical radical right voter, who usually displays lower levels of formal education.In an email, Busemeyer described some of the differences and similarities between Trumpism and European populism:In Europe, the welfare state and social policy more generally are much ingrained in people’s minds. This means that in the U.S., Trumpism goes along with criticism about the welfare state in general (see the attempts of the Trump administration to get rid of Obamacare), whereas in Europe, it’s really more about “welfare chauvinism,” i.e., protecting the good old welfare state for “deserving” people, namely hard-working natives.In addition, Busemeyer wrote, “there is a strong ‘corporatist’ element in the Trump movement (i.e., business elites), whereas in European right-wing populism that’s typically not the case.”The right-wing populist movements on both continents, he continued,are similar in their rejection of a liberal attitude toward globalization, both regarding the economic side as well as the identity part of globalization. Also, they both subscribe to a traditional role model in the family and traditional gender roles.Cécile Alduy, a professor at Stanford who studies French politics and the far right, wrote in an email:If in 2024 Trump or a Ron DeSantis wins the presidency and Republicans control both the House and Senate, the general agenda would be a backlash against any anti-discrimination, against inclusive policies implemented by the Biden administration, for an attempt to shift further the Supreme Court pendulum toward anti-abortion, for Originalist constitutionalists, for implementing voter suppression policies and for federal funding limitations on some forms of speech (critical race theory, the teaching or research of segregation, anti-Semitism or racism in the States) as well for as a return to extremely restrictive anti-immigration policies (rebuilding the Wall; for curbing down further visa and green cards, and for increasing deportations).The Republican agenda, Alduy argues,would be fueled by increased moral panic about white America’s decline, a professed sense of having been spoliated and ‘stolen the election,’ and a renewed sentiment of impunity for his most extreme backers from the Jan. 6 insurrection. My bet is that there is an active plan to reshape the political system so that elections are not winnable by Democrats, and the State be run without the foundation of a democracy.Trump has made it clear that he is a Viktor Orban superfan.Photo Illustration by The New York Times; Photographs by Attila Kisbenedek/AFP,Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images, Cooper Neill for The New York TimesTrump signaled his intentions at a rally last week in Conroe, Texas, declaring that in the case of the Jan. 6 insurrectionists, “If it requires pardons, then we will give them pardons because they are being treated so unfairly.”Trump went on: “If these radical, vicious, racist prosecutors do anything wrong or illegal, I hope we are going to have in this country the biggest protests we have ever had in Washington, D.C., in New York, in Atlanta and elsewhere.”Or take Ron DeSantis, the governor of Florida, who may challenge Trump for the Republican presidential nomination. On April 10, 2021, DeSantis signed the Combating Public Disorder Act into law, which his office described as “a robust approach to uphold the rule of law, to stand with those serving in law enforcement and enforce Florida’s zero tolerance policy for violent and disorderly assemblies.”On Sept. 9, 2021, U.S. District Judge Mark Walker, issued a 90-page opinion declaring that the law’s “vagueness permits those in power to weaponize its enforcement against any group who wishes to express any message that the government disapproves of” and that “the lawless actions of a few rogue individuals could effectively criminalize the protected speech of hundreds, if not thousands, of law-abiding Floridians.”On Dec. 15 DeSantis proposed the “Stop the Wrongs to Our Kids and Employees (W.O.K.E.) Act,” which would give parents the right to sue school systems if they believe their children are being taught “critical race theory” with a provision granting parents the right to collect attorneys’ fees if they win.The enactment of laws encouraging citizens to become private enforcers of anti-liberal policies has become increasingly popular in Republican-controlled states. Glenn Youngkin, the newly elected governor of Virginia, has created a “tip line” that parents can used to report teachers whose classes cover “inherently divisive concepts, including Critical Race Theory.”Youngkin told an interviewer:We have set up a particular email address, called helpeducation@governor.virginia.gov, for parents to send us any instances where they feel that their fundamental rights are being violated, where their children are not being respected, where there are inherently divisive practices in their schools. We’re asking for input right from parents to make sure we can go right to the source as we continue to work to make sure that Virginia’s education system is on the path to reestablish excellence.“We’re seeing dozens of G.O.P. proposals to bar whole concepts from classrooms outright,” the Washington Post’s Greg Sargent wrote earlier this week:The Republican governor of Virginia has debuted a mechanism for parents to rat out teachers. Bills threatening punishment of them are proliferating. Book-banning efforts are outpacing anything in recent memory.In a parallel strategy focused on abortion, Texas Republicans enacted “The Texas Heartbeat Act” in May, legislation that not only bans abortions as soon as a fetal heartbeat is detected but also turns private citizens into enforcers of the law by giving them the power to sue abortion providers and any person whoknowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion, including paying for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance or otherwise, if the abortion is performed or induced in violation of this subchapter, regardless of whether the person knew or should have known that the abortion would be performed or induced in violation of this subchapter.Winners of such suits would receive a minimum of $10,000 plus court costs and other fees.Not to be outdone, Republican members of the New Hampshire legislature are pushing forward legislation that proclaims thatNo teacher shall advocate any doctrine or theory promoting a negative account or representation of the founding and history of the United States of America in New Hampshire public schools which does not include the worldwide context of now outdated and discouraged practices. Such prohibition includes but is not limited to teaching that the United States was founded on racism.The use of citizens as informants to enforce intrusions of this sort is, to put it mildly, inconsistent with democratic norms — reminiscent of East Germany, where the Stasi made use of an estimated 189,000 citizen informers.One of the early goals of a Trump White House backed by Republican congressional majorities, in the view of Harry Holzer, a professor of public policy at Georgetown, would be the immediate rollback of legislation and executive orders put in place by the Biden administration:The first priority of a Trump or DeSantis presidency would be to undo any major changes Biden had implemented through executive orders. That would include a vaccination/testing mandate for health care workers, environmental regs, bolstering A.C.A. and anything Biden had done on race relations or immigration.A critical issue for both Senate Republicans and a second Trump administration would be whether to eliminate the filibuster to prevent Democratic Senators from blocking their wilder legislative plans.Holzer remarked that he is “sure” thatthey would love to pass laws outlawing mask mandates in schools, the teaching of Critical Race Theory or liberal voting rules, but they won’t have 60 votes in the Senate for that unless they also manage to kill or limit the filibuster. If they kill the filibuster, they might try to outlaw abortion, although Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski and others would balk at that.Herbert P. Kitschelt, a political scientist at Duke, emailed a selection of likely Republican initiatives:The new government will use regulatory measures to support the sectors and industries that support it most in terms of electoral votes and party funding: carbon industries, the construction sector, domestic manufacturing.The Republican regime will exit from all participation in efforts to stop global warming.The politics of a populist Republican administration will aim at undermining American democracy and changing the “level playing field” in favor of a party-penetrated state apparatus.Kitschelt cites Orban as a model for Trump in achieving the goals ofUndermining the professionalism and neutrality of the judiciary, starting the with Attorney General’s office.Undermining the nonpartisanship of the military, using the military for domestic purposes to repress civil liberties and liberal opposition to the erosion of American democracy.Redeploying the national domestic security apparatus — above all the F.B.I. — for partisan purposes.Passing libel legislation to harass and undercut the liberal media and journalists with the objective to drive them economically out of business, while simultaneously consolidating conservative media empires and social websites.The politics of cultural polarization, Kitschelt argues, “will intensify to re-establish the U.S. as a white Christian-Evangelical country,” although simultaneouslyefforts will be made to attract culturally traditionalist strands in the Hispanic community. The agenda of the culture war may shift to gender relations, emphasizing the “traditional” family with male authority. At the margin, this may appeal to males, including minorities.Kitschelt’s last point touches on what is sure to be a major motivating force for a Republican Party given an extended lease on life under Trump: the need to make use of every available tool — from manipulation of election results, to enactment of favorable voting laws to appeals to minority voters in the working class to instilling fear of a liberal state run amok — to maintain the viability of a fragile coalition in which the core constituency of white “non-college” voters is steadily declining as a share of the electorate. It is an uphill fight requiring leaders, at least in their minds, to consider every alternative in order to retain power, whether it’s democratic or authoritarian, ethical or unethical, legal or illegal.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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    Eastern Europe Tests New Forms of Media Censorship

    With new, less repressive tactics, countries like Serbia, Poland and Hungary are deploying highly effective tools to skew public opinion.BELGRADE, Serbia — When Covid-19 reached Eastern Europe in the spring of 2020, a Serbian journalist reported a severe shortage of masks and other protective equipment. She was swiftly arrested, thrown in a windowless cell and charged with inciting panic.The journalist, Ana Lalic, was quickly released and even got a public apology from the government in what seemed like a small victory against old-style repression by Serbia’s authoritarian president, Aleksandar Vucic.But Ms. Lalic was then vilified for weeks as a traitor by much of the country’s news media, which has come increasingly under the control of Mr. Vucic and his allies as Serbia adopts tactics favored by Hungary and other states now in retreat from democracy across Europe’s formerly communist eastern fringe.“For the whole nation, I became a public enemy,” she recalled.Serbia no longer jails or kills critical journalists, as happened under the rule of Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s. It now seeks to destroy their credibility and ensure few people see their reports.The muting of critical voices has greatly helped Mr. Vucic — and also the country’s most well-known athlete, the tennis star Novak Djokovic, whose visa travails in Australia have been portrayed as an intolerable affront to the Serb nation. The few remaining outlets of the independent news media mostly support him but take a more balanced approach.Ana Lalic, a Serbian journalist, last month in Belgrade. She was arrested in 2020 after reporting on a severe shortage of masks and other protective equipment that could be used against the coronavirus.Marko Risovic for The New York TimesAcross the region, from Poland in the north to Serbia in the south, Eastern Europe has become a fertile ground for new forms of censorship that mostly eschew brute force but deploy gentler yet effective tools to constrict access to critical voices and tilt public opinion — and therefore elections — in favor of those in power.Television has become so biased in support of Mr. Vucic, according to Zoran Gavrilovic, the executive director of Birodi, an independent monitoring group, that Serbia has “become a big sociological experiment to see just how far media determines opinion and elections.”Serbia and Hungary — countries in the vanguard of what V-Dem Institute, a Swedish research group, described last year as a “global wave of autocratization” — both hold general elections in April, votes that will test whether media control works.A recent Birodi survey of news reports on Serbian television found that over a three-month period from September, Mr. Vucic was given more than 44 hours of coverage, 87 percent of it positive, compared with three hours for the main opposition party, 83 percent of which was negative.A billboard depicting President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia was displayed on a building in Nis in December, ahead of his visit to the city.Sasa Djordjevic/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesNearly all of the negative coverage of Mr. Vucic appeared on N1, an independent news channel that broadcast Ms. Lalic’s Covid-19 reports. But a bitter war for market share is playing out between the cable provider that hosts N1 — Serbian Broadband, or SBB — and the state-controlled telecommunications company, Telekom Srbija.Telekom Srbija recently made a move that many saw as an unfair effort to make SBB less attractive to consumers when it snagged from SBB the rights to broadcast English soccer by offering to pay 700 percent more for them.Telekom Srbija’s offer, nearly $700 million for six seasons, is an astronomical amount for a country with only seven million people — and nearly four times what a media company in Russia, a far bigger market, has agreed to pay the Premier League each season for broadcast rights.“It is very difficult to compete if you have a competitor that does not really care about profit,” SBB’s chief executive, Milija Zekovic, said in an interview. The offices of the N1 cable news channel in Belgrade. N1 and a smaller station, Nova S, are the only TV outlets in Serbia that give regular airtime to opposition politicians.Marko Risovic for The New York TimesTelekom Srbija declined to make its executives available for comment, but in public statements, the company has described its investments in English soccer and elsewhere as driven by commercial concerns, not politics.“Their goal is to kill SBB,” Dragan Solak, the chairman of SBB’s parent company, United Group, said in an interview in London. “In the Balkans,” he added, “you do not want to be a bleeding shark.”Eager to stay in the game, Mr. Solak announced this month that a private investment company he controls had bought Southampton FC, an English Premier League soccer team. Broadcast rights for the league will stay with his state-controlled rival, but part of the huge sum it agreed to pay for them will now pass to Mr. Solak.Government loyalists run Serbia’s five main free-to-air television channels, including the supposedly neutral public broadcaster, RTS. The only television outlets in Serbia that give airtime to the opposition and avoid hagiographic coverage of Mr. Vucic are Mr. Solak’s cable news channel N1, which is affiliated with CNN, and his TV Nova.Without them, Mr. Solak said, Serbia “will be heading into the dark ages like North Korea.”Telekom Srbija recently snagged from SBB the rights to broadcast English soccer by offering to pay 700 percent more than what SBB had previously paid.Marko Risovic for The New York TimesSpace for critical media has been shrinking across the region, with V-Dem Institute, the Swedish research group, now ranking Serbia, Poland and Hungary among its “top 10 autocratizing countries,” citing “assaults on the judiciary and restrictions on the media and civil society.” Freedom House now classifies Serbia as “partly free.”In each country, security forces — the primary tools for muzzling critical voices during the communist era — have been replaced in this role by state-controlled and state-dependent companies that exert often irresistible pressure on the news media.Poland’s governing party, Law and Justice, has turned the country’s public broadcaster, TVP, into a propaganda bullhorn, while a state-run oil company has taken over a string of regional newspapers, though some national print outlets still regularly assail the government.In December, Law and Justice pushed through legislation that would have squeezed out the only independent television news channel, the American-owned TVN24, but the Polish president, worried about alienating Washington, vetoed the bill.Hungary has gone further, gathering hundreds of news outlets into a holding company controlled by allies of Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Only one television station with national reach is critical of Mr. Orban and financially independent from his government.Mr. Orban’s previously divided political rivals have formed a united front to fight elections in April but have been unsuccessful in shaking his stranglehold on the news media.“It is very difficult to compete if you have a competitor that does not really care about profit,” said Milija Zekovic, the chief executive of SBB.Marko Risovic for The New York TimesIn Serbia, the media space for critical voices has shrunk so far, said Zoran Sekulic, the founder and editor of FoNet, an independent news agency, that “the level of control, direct and indirect, is like in the 1990s” under Mr. Milosevic, whom Mr. Vucic served as information minister.Journalists, Mr. Sekulic added, do not get killed anymore, but the system of control endures, only “upgraded and improved” to ensure fawning coverage without brute force.When United Group started a relatively opposition-friendly newspaper last year, it could not find a printer in Serbia willing to touch it. The newspaper is printed in neighboring Croatia and sent into Serbia.Dragan Djilas, the leader of Serbia’s main opposition party and formerly a media executive, complained that while Mr. Vucic could talk for hours without interruption on Serbia’s main television channels, opposition politicians appeared mostly only as targets for attack. “I am like an actor in a silent movie,” he said.N1, the only channel that sometimes lets him talk, is widely watched in Belgrade, the capital, but is blocked in many towns and cities where mayors are members of Mr. Vucic’s party. Even in Belgrade, the cable company that hosts the channel has faced trouble entering new housing projects built by property developers with close ties to the government. A huge new housing area under construction for security officials near Belgrade, for example, has refused to install SBB’s cable, the company said.Viewers of pro-government channels “live in a parallel universe,” said Zeljko Bodrozic, the president of the Independent Journalists Association of Serbia. Channels like TV Pink, the most popular national station, which features sexually explicit reality shows and long statements by Mr. Vucic, he said, “don’t just indoctrinate, but make people stupid.”A new housing area under construction for security officials near Belgrade has refused to install SBB’s cable, the company said.Marko Risovic for The New York TimesThe European Union and the United States have repeatedly rebuked Mr. Vucic over the lack of media pluralism, but, eager to keep Serbia from embracing Russia or stoking unrest in neighboring Bosnia, have not pushed hard.This has given Mr. Vucic a largely free hand to expand the media control that Rasa Nedeljkov, the program director in Belgrade for the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability, described as “the skeleton of his whole system.” In some ways, he added, Serbia’s space for critical media is now smaller than it was under Mr. Milosevic, who “didn’t really care about having total control” and left various regional outlets untouched.“Vucic is now learning from this mistake by Milosevic,” Mr. Nedeljkov said. Mr. Vucic and his allies, Mr. Nedeljkov added, “are not tolerating anything that is different.”Belgrade this month.Marko Risovic for The New York TimesOnce powerful independent voices have gradually been co-opted. The radio station B92, which regularly criticized Mr. Milosevic during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, for example, is now owned by a supporter of Mr. Vucic and mostly parrots the government line.Journalists and others who upset Mr. Vucic face venomous attacks by tabloid newspapers loyal to the authorities. Mr. Solak, the United Group chairman, for example, has been denounced as “Serbia’s biggest scammer,” a crook gnawing at the country “like scabies” and a traitor working for Serbia’s foreign foes.Mr. Solak, who lives outside Serbia because of safety concerns, said he had become such a regular target for abuse that when he does not get attacked, “my friends call me and ask: What happened? Are you OK?” More

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    En la carrera hacia el futuro, la historia sufre un nuevo asedio

    Una ola de revisionismo engañoso se ha convertido en una epidemia tanto en las autocracias como en las democracias. Ha sido notablemente efectiva… y contagiosa.En Rusia, una organización dedicada a recordar los abusos de la era soviética se enfrenta a la liquidación ordenada por el Estado mientras el Kremlin impone en su lugar una historia nacional aséptica.En Hungría, el gobierno expulsó o asumió el control de las instituciones educativas y culturales y las utiliza para fabricar un patrimonio nacional xenófobo alineado con su política etnonacionalista.En China, el Partido Comunista en el poder usa abiertamente los libros de texto, las películas, los programas de televisión y las redes sociales para escribir una nueva versión de la historia china que se adapte mejor a las necesidades del partido.Y en Estados Unidos, Donald Trump y sus aliados siguenpromoviendo una falsa versión de las elecciones de 2020, en la que aseguran que los demócratas manipularon los votos y afirman que el ataque del 6 de enero para interrumpir la certificación del presidente Joe Biden fue en su mayoría un acto pacífico o escenificado por los opositores de Trump.Unos revoltosos se enfrentaron a las fuerzas del orden del Capitolio de EE. UU. el 6 de enero de 2021.Erin Schaff/The New York TimesLa historia se reescribe todo el tiempo, ya sea por los académicos que actualizan sus supuestos, los activistas que reformulan el registro o los políticos que manipulan la memoria colectiva para sus propios fines.Pero una oleada de revisiones históricas falsas o engañosas de manera flagrante, tanto por parte de gobiernos democráticos como autoritarios, puede estar amenazando el ya debilitado sentido de un relato compartido y aceptado sobre el mundo.Los académicos creen que esta tendencia refleja algunas de las fuerzas que definen el siglo. Sociedades polarizadas y receptivas a las falsedades que afirman la identidad. El colapso de la fe en las instituciones centrales o en los árbitros de la verdad. El auge del nacionalismo. Tiranos cada vez más astutos. Líderes elegidos que giran cada vez más hacia el antiliberalismo.Como resultado, “deberíamos ser más propensos a ver el tipo de revisionismo histórico” impulsado por estos líderes, señaló Erica Frantz, politóloga de la Universidad Estatal de Michigan.Understand the Jan. 6 InvestigationBoth the Justice Department and a House select committee are investigating the events of the Capitol riot. Here’s where they stand:Inside the House Inquiry: From a nondescript office building, the panel has been quietly ramping up its sprawling and elaborate investigation.Criminal Referrals, Explained: Can the House inquiry end in criminal charges? These are some of the issues confronting the committee.Garland’s Remarks: Facing pressure from Democrats, Attorney General Merrick Garland vowed that the D.O.J. would pursue its inquiry into the riot “at any level.”A Big Question Remains: Will the Justice Department move beyond charging the rioters themselves?En algunos lugares, los objetivos son ambiciosos: rediseñar una sociedad, empezando por su comprensión más básica de su patrimonio colectivo. Para subrayar la importancia de este proceso, el líder de China, Xi Jinping, repite la frase de un erudito confuciano del siglo XIX: “Para destruir un país, primero hay que erradicar su historia”.Victoria Park en Hong Kong el 4 de junio de 2020Lam Yik Fei para The New York TimesEl lugar estaba vacío el 4 de junio de 2021Lam Yik Fei para The New York TimesPero, a menudo y al parecer, el objetivo es más a corto plazo: provocar la rabia o el orgullo de manera que los ciudadanos se unan a la agenda del líder.Las mentiras electorales de Trump parecen ser un ejemplo de éxito. Han escindido el sentido compartido de la realidad de los estadounidenses de manera que podrían fortalecer a los aliados de Trump y justificar los esfuerzos para controlar la maquinaria de futuras elecciones. Si las tendencias globales que permiten tales tácticas continúan, puede que vengan más casos parecidos.Integrantes del Ejército Juvenil de Rusia practicaban el montaje de rifles, técnicas de primeros auxilios y artes marciales el mes pasado en Noginsk, cerca de Moscú.Sergey Ponomarev para The New York TimesUn mundo cambianteLa manera en que los gobiernos tienden a gobernar es uno de los cambios más importantes de esta tendencia.Un reciente artículo académico afirma que el autoritarismo “está sufriendo una transformación”, con lo que resume la opinión cada vez más extendida entre los académicos.Desde la Primavera Árabe y los levantamientos de la “revolución de colores” de hace una década, los dictadores han dejado de hacer hincapié en la represión por la fuerza bruta (aunque esto también sigue ocurriendo) y han adoptado técnicas más sutiles, como la manipulación de la información o la generación de divisiones, con el objetivo de prevenir la disidencia en lugar de suprimirla.Entre otros cambios, se sustituye la estruendosa prensa estatal por una serie de llamativos medios de comunicación alineados con el Estado y bots en las redes sociales, lo que crea la falsa sensación de que la narrativa oficial no se impone desde lo alto, sino que surge de forma orgánica.La propaganda más sofisticada, cuyo objetivo es la persuasión en lugar de la coerción, se manifiesta a menudo como un tipo particular de reescritura histórica. En lugar de limitarse a eliminar a los funcionarios desfavorecidos o los errores del gobierno, cultiva el orgullo nacional y el agravio colectivo con el fin de congregar a los ciudadanos.Por ejemplo, el Kremlin ha manipulado los recuerdos de la Unión Soviética y de su caída para convertirlos en una memoria de grandeza y asedio de la herencia rusa, justificando la necesidad de un líder más fuerte como Vladimir Putin y alentando a los rusos a apoyarlo con gratitud.Esto también se manifiesta en pequeñas formas. Putin ha insistido, falsamente, en que la OTAN prometió nunca extenderse al este de Alemania, justificando así la reciente agresión a Ucrania como una necesidad defensiva.Las democracias cambian también de modos dramáticos y los líderes se vuelven cada vez menos liberales y emplean más mano dura.Las crecientes divisiones sociales, junto con la creciente desconfianza popular hacia los expertos y las instituciones, a menudo contribuyen a encumbrar a esos líderes en primer lugar.Esto puede ser una fuente de apoyo para un líder dispuesto a desechar la historia oficial y sustituirla por algo más cercano a lo que sus partidarios quieren oír. Y da a esos líderes otro incentivo: justificar la toma de poder como algo esencial para derrotar a los enemigos externos o internos.Por ejemplo, Viktor Orbán, el primer ministro húngaro, hizo una revisión de la historia de Hungría para convertirla en una víctima inocente de los nazis y los comunistas, que logró salvarse gracias a su guía patriótica. De este modo, defiende el escepticismo hacia la inmigración como la continuación de una gran batalla nacional, que también le exige suprimir a los rivales, a los críticos y a las instituciones independientes.El presidente Donald J. Trump dijo en 2020 que promovería un nuevo plan de estudios escolar “pro estadounidense”.Oliver Contreras para The New York TimesPor qué funciona el revisionismo históricoSegún las investigaciones, la propaganda más eficaz de cualquier tipo, suele centrarse en una apelación a la identidad de algún grupo, como la raza o la religión.Hay un experimento famoso: a la gente se le da un examen, se le dice su puntuación y luego se le pide que califique la objetividad del examen. Las personas a las que se les dice que han obtenido una buena puntuación tienden a calificar la prueba de justa y rigurosa. Las personas a las que se les dice que han obtenido una mala puntuación son más propensas a considerar que el examen es tendencioso o inexacto.Key Figures in the Jan. 6 InquiryCard 1 of 10The House investigation. More

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    In a Race to Shape the Future, History Is Under New Pressure

    A wave of misleading revisionism has become epidemic in both autocracies and democracies. It has been notably effective — and contagious.In Russia, an organization dedicated to remembering Soviet-era abuses faces state-ordered liquidation as the Kremlin imposes a sanitized national history in its place.In Hungary, the government has ejected or assumed control of educational and cultural institutions, using them to manufacture a xenophobic national heritage aligned with its ethnonationalist politics.In China, the ruling Communist Party is openly wielding schoolbooks, films, television shows and social media to write a new version of Chinese history better suited to the party’s needs.And in the United States, Donald J. Trump and his allies continue to push a false retelling of the 2020 election, in which Democrats stole the vote and the Jan. 6 riot to disrupt President Biden’s certification was largely peaceful or staged by Mr. Trump’s opponents.Rioters confronting law enforcement inside the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021.Erin Schaff/The New York TimesHistory is continuously rewritten, whether by scholars updating their assumptions, activists reframing the record, or politicians massaging collective memory for their own ends.But a wave of brazenly false or misleading historical revision, from democratic and authoritarian governments alike, may be threatening an already-weakened sense of a shared, accepted narrative about the world.The trend, scholars believe, reflects some of the century’s defining forces. Polarized societies receptive to identity-affirming falsehoods. Collapsing faith in central institutions or arbiters of truth. Rising nationalism. Despots growing savvier. Elected leaders turning increasingly toward illiberalism.As a result, “we should be more likely to see the sort of historical revisionism” pushed by these leaders, said Erica Frantz, a Michigan State University political scientist.In some places, the goals are sweeping: to re-engineer a society, starting at its most basic understanding of its collective heritage. Emphasizing the importance of that process, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has repeated a 19th century Confucian scholar’s saying: “To destroy a country, you must first eradicate its history.”Victoria Park in Hong Kong on June 4, 2020.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesOn June 4, 2021, it was empty.Lam Yik Fei for The New York TimesBut often, the goal is seemingly more short-term: to provoke rage or pride in ways that will rally citizens behind the leader’s agenda.Mr. Trump’s election lies appear to be a successful example. They have splintered Americans’ shared sense of reality in ways that could strengthen Mr. Trump’s allies, justifying efforts to control the machinery of future elections. If global trends that enable such tactics continue, there may be more like this to come.Members of  Russia’s Youth Army  practiced assembling rifles, first aid skills and martial arts last month in Noginsk, near Moscow.Sergey Ponomarev for The New York TimesA Changing WorldOne set of changes may be particularly important in driving this trend: how governments tend to govern.Understand the Jan. 6 InvestigationBoth the Justice Department and a House select committee are investigating the events of the Capitol riot. Here’s where they stand:Inside the House Inquiry: From a nondescript office building, the panel has been quietly ramping up its sprawling and elaborate investigation.Criminal Referrals, Explained: Can the House inquiry end in criminal charges? These are some of the issues confronting the committee.Garland’s Remarks: Facing pressure from Democrats, Attorney General Merrick Garland vowed that the D.O.J. would pursue its inquiry into the riot “at any level.”A Big Question Remains: Will the Justice Department move beyond charging the rioters themselves?Authoritarianism “is undergoing a transformation,” one recent academic paper said, summarizing the growing view among scholars.Since the Arab Spring and “color revolution” uprisings of a decade ago, dictators have shifted emphasis from blunt-force repression (although this still happens, too) to subtler methods like manipulating information or sowing division, aimed at preventing dissent over suppressing it.Among other changes, the blaring state newspaper has been replaced with arrays of flashy, state-aligned outlets and social media bots, creating a false sense that the official narrative is not imposed from on high but emerging organically.More sophisticated propaganda, aimed at persuasion over coercion, often manifests as a particular sort of historical rewriting. Rather than simply excising disfavored officials or government blunders, it cultivates national pride and collective grievance meant to rally citizens.The Kremlin, for instance, has massaged memories of the Soviet Union and its fall into a heritage of Russian greatness and besiegement, justifying the need for a strong leader like Vladimir V. Putin and encouraging Russians to gratefully embrace him.This manifests in smaller ways, too. Mr. Putin has falsely insisted that NATO pledged never to extend east of Germany, justifying his recent aggression toward Ukraine as defensive and necessary.Democracies are changing just as dramatically, with leaders growing more illiberal and strong-fisted.The widening social divides, along with the growing popular distrust of experts and institutions, often help elevate those leaders in the first place.This can be a source of support for a leader willing to throw out the official history and replace it with something closer to what his or her supporters want to hear. And it gives such leaders another incentive: to justify power grabs as essential to defeating enemies abroad or within.Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister, for instance, has revised Hungary’s history to that of an innocent victim of Nazis and Communists that was finally made safe by his patriotic guidance. In this way, he champions skepticism toward immigration as a continuation of a great national battle — one that also requires him to suppress rivals, critics and independent institutions.President Donald J. Trump said in 2020 that he would promote a new “pro-American” school curriculum.Oliver Contreras for The New York TimesWhy Revision WorksThe most effective propaganda of any sort, research finds, often focuses on an appeal to some group identity like race or religion.Key Figures in the Jan. 6 InquiryCard 1 of 10The House investigation. More

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    After Months, a ‘New’ Dutch Coalition With the Same Leader and Parties

    Mark Rutte, who has weathered a scandal and criticism for overstaying his welcome, will be prime minister for a fourth term.After nine months of negotiations among a group of fractious political parties after an election in the spring, the Netherlands finally has a new government.But it will not have a new leader; that position has been taken by Mark Rutte, who will be starting a fourth term as prime minister. It is a testament to his ability to weather crises and shake off a scandal that brought down his previous coalition last January — earning him the nickname “Teflon Mark.”Mr. Rutte’s party will be in coalition with the same two centrist parties and a more right-leaning Christian party that made up the last government.“It took too long,” Mr. Rutte acknowledged in brief remarks when announcing the formation of the four-party coalition that will be led by his Party for Freedom and Democracy. Mr. Rutte, who is known for his sober lifestyle, has been leading the Netherlands since 2010, and he has been criticized in recent years for clinging to power. He has said that he will lead the country with renewed “zeal.”The road to Mr. Rutte’s fourth term started after his previous cabinet resigned over a scandal involving overzealous tax authorities who had hunted down a number of innocent families, often after racial profiling, and accused them of falsely claiming child care benefits. Many were forced to repay huge amounts of money, reducing them to ruin.But Mr. Rutte faced perhaps the biggest crisis in his career as the country’s caretaker prime minister after the resignation of his cabinet amid widespread calls for systematic change in the Netherlands and for his departure from the political stage. But he weathered the criticism, and opposition from the far-right parties that have been gaining ground in the Netherlands in recent years; he won the March elections by a landslide.On Wednesday, Mr. Rutte and other leaders in his centrist coalition announced that an extra 35 billion euros, about $40 billion, would be allocated over the coming 10 years to help Dutch people make the transition to greater energy efficiency as part of efforts to tackle climate change.The government said it also planned to free up more money to address housing shortages, health care and education and more subsidies for child care, areas that Mr. Rutte’s previous administration had been criticized for cutting back.“Rutte came in as a budget hawk,” who trimmed government spending and increased some taxes, said Tom-Jan Meeus, a political columnist for the newspaper NRC Handelsblad. “Now he is advocating spending, also because that was the only way to get other parties on board with another term of him leading the government.”Talks with coalition partners dragged on for months, highlighting the increasing complexity of forming coalition governments in a changing political landscape with the emergence of populists and fringe parties. In the Netherlands and other northern European countries, traditional parties have lost lots of ground to numerous smaller parties, making it harder and harder to form compromise governments.The departure of Angela Merkel, who led Germany for 16 years, makes Mr. Rutte one of the longest continuously serving leaders in Europe. He shares that position with one of his political enemies, Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, who has been his country’s leader continuously since 2010.In June, Mr. Rutte challenged Mr. Orban to “leave the European Union,” after Hungary created a law that several other European countries said undermined the rights of L.G.B.T.Q. people. Mr. Orban later replied that he was persuaded that Mr. Rutte “hated” him. More

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    La inflación pone en aprietos a los líderes populistas de derecha

    Los líderes de Turquía, Hungría y Brasil enfrentan problemas generados por el aumento global de precios antes de los comicios nacionales.Para todos aquellos que serían un desafío para Jair Bolsonaro en la próxima elección presidencial, incluida la prensa, el Supremo Tribunal Federal y los liberales, el aguerrido líder de derecha tiene una respuesta: “Solo Dios me saca de aquí”.Pero Bolsonaro podría perder el poder debido a una dificultad inesperada y para la cual su manual político no tiene una respuesta fácil: la inflación.En Brasil, un país con antecedentes relativamente recientes de episodios inflacionarios desastrosos, los precios suben a los niveles más altos de las últimas dos décadas. La moneda ha ido perdiendo su valor constantemente, al depreciarse alrededor del 10 por ciento contra el dólar solo en los últimos seis meses. Y su economía, la mayor de América Latina, volvió a entrar en recesión en el tercer trimestre del año.Eso ha inquietado a personas como Lucia Regina da Silva, una asistente de enfermería retirada de 65 años de edad que solía apoyar a Bolsonaro. Ha visto cómo en el último año los precios al alza han erosionado el poder de compra de su humilde pensión mensual.“Yo creía que este gobierno mejoraría nuestra vida”, dijo Da Silva en una mañana reciente, mientras empujaba un carrito de supermercado casi vacío —algunas verduras y artículos de uso personal era todo lo que le alcanzaba— por los pasillos de Campeão, una cadena de supermercados económicos de Río de Janeiro. “Pero esto fue un error”.Bolsonaro forma parte de una generación de populistas de derecha que, en la última década y media han ascendido al poder en democracias como Turquía, Brasil y Hungría y cuyos mandatos han coincidido, al menos en principio, con periodos de sólido desempeño económico en sus países. Han permanecido en el poder azuzando las pasiones nacionalistas y causando profundas divisiones en el electorado con temas culturales candentes. En el camino se han apropiado de los medios y amedrentan a sus oponentes.Ahora estos líderes autoritarios —entre ellos Bolsonaro, el primer ministro de Hungría Viktor Orban y el presidente de Turquía Recep Tayyip Erdogan— batallan con el alza de los precios y enfrentan elecciones nacionales en los próximos dos años. La inflación, un peligro nuevo e inesperado, amenaza con organizar y animar a la oposición política en los países de estos tres líderes de un modo que pocos habrían predicho hace unos meses.En Hungría, donde los precios al consumidor aumentan a la mayor velocidad desde 2007, los sondeos sugieren que Orban enfrentará su elección más dura el próximo año, cuando el costo de vida y los bajos salarios serán las principales preocupaciones para los votantes.En Hungría, las encuestas sugieren que el primer ministro Viktor Orban se enfrentará a las elecciones más difíciles de su historia el próximo año, pues el costo de la vida y los bajos salarios se convierten en las principales preocupaciones.Foto de consorcio por John ThysLos votantes en la cercana República Checa —que ha enfrentado una inflación creciente y elevados costos de energía—acaban de sacar del poder por un estrecho margen a Andrej Babis, el primer ministro multimillonario populista y de derecha del país.La situación de Bolsonaro, cuyo gobierno ha sido muy afectado por la gestión de la crisis de covid, se ha tambaleado y las encuestas lo muestran muy por detrás de quien probablemente sea su contendiente en 2022, el expresidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.En preparación, Bolsonaro ha empezado a poner los cimientos para disputar los resultados de la votación del año entrante, que los sondeos sugieren que perdería si se realizara hoy. “Quiero decirles a aquellos que quieren lograr que en Brasil no me elijan, que solo Dios me quitará”, le dijo a una multitud entusiasta en Sao Paulo en septiembre.Pero Da Silva ya ha incorporado la crisis económica a su incipiente campaña. “El gobierno de Bolsonaro es responsable de la inflación”, dijo en una entrevista. “La inflación está fuera de control”.La situación es más seria en Turquía, donde las políticas económicas poco ortodoxas del presidente Erdogan han desatado una crisis monetaria total. El valor de la lira se colapsó aproximadamente 45 por ciento este año. Y los precios aumentan a una tasa oficial de más de 20 por ciento anual, una cantidad que los cálculos extraoficiales ubican en un porcentaje mayor.Los países con líderes derechistas no son los únicos que se tambalean por la inflación. En Estados Unidos los precios aumentan a la mayor velocidad registrada desde 1982. Y los populistas de izquierda, como los que gobiernan en Argentina, también compiten contra feroces corrientes inflacionarias, que los tienen a la defensiva.El repunte representa una ruptura repentina con la tendencia de crecimiento lento e inflación moderada que dominó la economía mundial durante aproximadamente una docena de años antes del impacto de la pandemia. Ese telón de fondo de bajo crecimiento permitió a los poderosos bancos centrales de Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y el Reino Unido mantener bajas las tasas de interés. Y esas decisiones tuvieron grandes implicaciones para los países más pobres de todo el mundo.Eso se debe a que las políticas de bajo interés formuladas por los bancos centrales, entre ellos la Reserva Federal, reducen los retornos que los inversionistas en los países ricos pueden conseguir al comprar bonos del gobierno en sus países de origen, lo que los impulsa a emprender inversiones más arriesgadas en mercados emergentes que prometen mayores retornos.Los economistas dicen que el flujo de dinero hacia los países en desarrollo podría haber sido un elemento poco apreciado del éxito del que han gozado los líderes populistas de derecha en años recientes, pues les brindó un viento económico favorable que coincidió con sus mandatos.Turquía, que en 2009 sufrió una aguda recesión, pudo recuperarse de una manera relativamente rápida gracias a un auge de préstamos de inversionistas extranjeros que le dieron un gran impulso al crecimiento. La elección de Bolsonaro en 2018 coincidió con un renovado impulso para disminuir las tasas de interés de la Reserva Federal, lo que llevó a los inversionistas estadounidenses a comprar más deuda de mercados emergentes y ayudar a levantar el real.“Desde la recesión financiera global, el ambiente macroeconómico global fue una bendición para los autoritarios”, dijo Daron Acemoglu, profesor de economía en el Instituto Massachusetts de Tecnología que ha estudiado el deterioro de las democracias. “Básicamente, con tasas de interés muy bajas, hizo que muchos países que ya tenían o democracias débiles o semi autoritarismos, o francos autoritarismos, siguieran siendo atractivos para el capital extranjero”.Pero cuando la economía global empezó a recuperarse de la pandemia este año, una combinación de perturbaciones en la cadena de suministro, la impresión de moneda de los bancos centrales y el gasto público dirigido a aprovechar la recuperación dieron lugar a un alto incremento en los precios de todo el mundo. Esto hizo que los líderes de muchos países en desarrollo ajustaran sus políticas y que los inversionistas globales repensaran sus inversiones en esos mercados.Claudia Calich, líder de deuda en mercados emergentes en M&G Investments en Londres, ha invertido en bonos gubernamentales turcos, con denominación en liras, durante años. Pero, según Calich, el aumento en la presión pública que Erdogan ejerció este año en el banco central para recortar las tasas de interés ocasionó que el fondo se deshiciera de toda su inversión.En Turquía, liderada por el presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan, el valor de la lira ha perdido alrededor del 45 por ciento este año y los precios aumentan a una tasa oficial de más del 20 por ciento anual.Burhan Ozbilici/Associated Press“Tan pronto como empezamos a ver este año que los cambios iban en la dirección equivocada, es decir hacia una mayor reducción de tasas, entonces nos empezó a preocupar la moneda”, dijo Calich. “Esta ha sido, hasta ahora, la respuesta equivocada en materia de políticas. Y sí, hemos estado muy contentos de salirnos de esa posición”.Hay pocas opciones políticamente aceptables para los países de mercados emergentes que se enfrentan a un repunte inflacionario y al debilitamiento de las monedas. Pero por varias razones, el aumento inflacionario es un terreno político especialmente complicado para populistas como los señores Orban, Erdogan y Bolsonaro, quienes se enfrentan a elecciones en 2022 o 2023.Su enfoque personalista de la política —y el hecho de que todos llevan años en el poder— dificulta que intenten evadir la culpa por las condiciones económicas. Al mismo tiempo, su tipo de populismo, que enfatiza las rivalidades nacionalistas y en el pasado ha dado resultados, puede parecer fuera de la realidad para los ciudadanos cuyo nivel de vida se desploma rápidamente.El remedio tradicional para la inflación requeriría una combinación de tasas de interés más elevadas por parte del banco central y menor gasto público. Pero ambas medidas podrían afectar el crecimiento económico y el empleo, al menos el corto plazo, lo que podría empeorar las perspectivas de reelección.En Turquía, Erdogan —que ha adoptado un estilo de liderazgo cada vez más autoritario desde que sobrevivió a un intento de golpe en 2016— ha descartado una respuesta convencional. En semanas recientes, el Banco Central de la República de Turquía, que Erdogan básicamente controla personalmente, ha recortado las tasas de interés repetidamente.La mayoría de los observadores consideran que Erdogan ha empeorado una situación de por sí difícil, pues la perspectiva de más recortes a las tasas de interés y el declive monetario ha hecho que los inversionistas extranjeros retiren su dinero de Turquía.Al mismo tiempo, los vientos políticos también parecen soplar en contra de Erdogan. La situación económica que cada vez está peor ha motivado algunas protestas callejeras dispersas. Los políticos de oposición piden unas elecciones anticipadas para lidiar con la crisis mientras insisten en criticar a Erdogan por lo que dicen que ha sido una gestión económica desastrosa.Orban y Bolsonaro, quienes alguna vez se perfilaron como conservadores al formular los presupuestos, han abandonado sus posiciones anteriores. En cambio, están impulsando un aumento a corto plazo del gasto gubernamental para proporcionar una entrada de efectivo a los votantes antes de las elecciones del próximo año. Sin embargo, no está claro que este enfoque ayude, ya que es probable que empeore las presiones inflacionarias.Una tarde reciente, sentado en una banca de un mercado local de productores en Budapest, Marton Varjai, de 68 años, se reía del cheque por aproximadamente 250 dólares que Orban le había enviado hace poco como parte de un pago que el gobierno autorizó para todos los pensionados, que representan un 20 por ciento de la población.Varjai cobra una pensión mensual de aproximadamente 358 dólares, de los cuales destina el 85 por ciento al pago de medicinas y servicios. “El resto es lo que tengo para vivir”, dijo y añadió que le preocupaba que le alcanzara para llegar a fin de mes.Estos sentimientos se están convirtiendo en un foco cada vez más importante para los votantes húngaros. Un estudio reciente de Policy Solutions, un grupo progresista de expertos en Budapest, encontró que los húngaros están más preocupados por el costo de la vida y los bajos salarios.“Si estos temas dominan las campañas, no será bueno para Fidesz”, dijo Andras Biro-Nagy, director de Policy Solutions, en referencia al partido oficialista de Orban.Matt Phillips cubre mercados financieros. Antes de integrarse a The New York Times en 2018, fue editor jefe de Vice Money e integrante fundador del personal en Quartz, el sitio de negocios y economía. Pasó siete años en The Wall Street, donde cubría mercados bursátiles y de bonos. @MatthewPhillipsCarlotta Gall es la jefa del buró de Istanbul y cubre Turquía. Previamente ha reportado sobre los efectos de la Primavera Árabe desde Túnez, de los Balcanes durante la guerra en Kosovo y Serbia y ha cubierto Afganistán y Pakistán. @carlottagall • Facebook More

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    Inflationary Wave Changes Political Terrain for Right-Wing Populists

    The leaders of Turkey, Hungary and Brazil are all grappling with problems posed by the global rise in prices ahead of national elections.To all those who would pose a challenge to Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil’s coming presidential election, including the press, the Supreme Court and liberals, the embattled right-wing leader has an answer: “Only God removes me.”But Mr. Bolsonaro might be unseated by an unexpected problem that his political playbook has no easy answer for: inflation.Prices are climbing faster than they have in almost two decades in Brazil, a country with a relatively recent history of disastrous inflationary episodes. The currency has steadily declined in value, losing roughly 10 percent against the dollar in the last six months alone. And the economy, Latin America’s largest, slipped back into recession in the third quarter.That has upset people like Lucia Regina da Silva. A 65-year-old retired nursing assistant and former Bolsonaro supporter, she has watched over the last year as surging prices have eroded the purchasing power of her modest monthly pension.“I believed this government would improve our lives,” said Ms. da Silva on a recent morning as she pushed a mostly empty shopping cart — a few vegetables and some personal products were all she could afford — through the aisles of Campeão, a cheap supermarket chain in Rio de Janeiro. “But that was flawed.”Mr. Bolsonaro is among a generation of right-wing populists who, in the past decade and a half, have risen to power in democracies like Turkey, Brazil and Hungary, and whose reigns have coincided, at least at first, with periods of solid economic performance in those countries. They have remained in power by stoking nationalist passions and driving deep wedges into the electorate with hot-button cultural issues. Along the way, they have co-opted the news media and cowed opponents.Now these strongmen — including Mr. Bolsonaro, Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey — are grappling with rising prices, even as they face national elections within the next two years. A new and unexpected peril, inflation is threatening to organize and animate political opposition in the countries of these three leaders in a way few would have predicted just a few months ago.In Hungary, where consumer prices are rising at their fastest pace since 2007, polls suggest that Mr. Orban will face his toughest election ever next year, as the cost of living and low wages become top concerns for voters.In Hungary, polls suggest that Prime Minister Viktor Orban will face his toughest election ever next year as the cost of living and low wages become top concerns.Pool photo by John ThysVoters in the nearby Czech Republic — which has faced rising inflation and soaring energy costs — just ousted Andrej Babis, the country’s billionaire right-wing populist prime minister, by a narrow margin.Mr. Bolsonaro’s standing, already damaged by his administration’s management of the Covid crisis, has tumbled, with polls showing him badly trailing his likely 2022 opponent, former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.In anticipation, Mr. Bolsonaro has begun laying the groundwork to dispute the results of next year’s vote, which the polls suggest he would lose badly if it were held today. “I want to tell those who want to make me unelectable in Brazil, only God removes me,” he told a cheering crowd in São Paulo in September.But Mr. da Silva has already incorporated the economic crisis into his recent campaign. “The Bolsonaro government is responsible for inflation,” he said in an interview. “Inflation is out of control.”The situation is most dire in Turkey, where the unorthodox economic policies of President Erdogan have set off a full-on currency crisis. The value of the lira has collapsed roughly 45 percent this year. And prices are now rising at an official rate of more than 20 percent annually, with some unofficial estimates even higher.Countries with right-wing populist leaders aren’t the only ones reeling from inflation. In the United States, prices are rising at their fastest rate since 1982. And left-leaning populists, such as those in power in Argentina, are also contending with fierce inflationary currents, which have put them on the defensive.The upsurge represents a sudden break from the trend of sluggish growth and tepid inflation that dominated the global economy for roughly a dozen years before the pandemic hit. That low-growth backdrop allowed powerful central banks in the United States, the European Union and Britain to keep interest rates low. And those decisions had large implications for poorer countries around the world.That’s because the low-rate policies made by central banks such as the Federal Reserve reduce the returns investors in wealthy nations can make by buying safe government bonds in their home countries, pushing them into riskier investments in emerging markets that promise higher returns.Economists say that flow of money toward developing nations might have been an underappreciated element of the success right-wing populist leaders have enjoyed in recent years, as it provided a steadily favorable economic tailwind that coincided with their time in power.Turkey, which suffered a sharp recession in 2009, was able to rebound relatively quickly thanks to a surge of borrowing from foreign investors that supercharged growth. Mr. Bolsonaro’s election in 2018 coincided with a fresh push to lower interest rates from the Federal Reserve, which prompted U.S. investors to buy more emerging market debt and helped prop up the real.“Since the global financial recession, the global macroeconomic environment was a godsend to authoritarians,” said Daron Acemoglu, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has studied the deterioration of democracies. “Essentially, with very low interest rates, it made many countries that had either weak democracies or semi-authoritarianism, or sometimes fully fledged authoritarianism, still attractive to foreign capital.”But as the global economy began to heal from the pandemic this year, a combination of supply chain disruptions, central bank money-printing and government spending aimed at juicing the recovery ignited a sharp rise in prices around the world. That prompted leaders in many developing countries to tweak their policies — and global investors to rethink their investments in those markets.Claudia Calich, the head of emerging market debt at M&G Investments in London, has invested in Turkish government bonds, denominated in lira, for years. But, Ms. Calich said, the increasing public pressure that Mr. Erdogan was putting on the country’s central bank to cut interest rates this year led the fund to sell its entire position.In Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the value of the lira has lost about 45 percent this year, and prices are rising at an official rate of more than 20 percent annually.Burhan Ozbilici/Associated Press“As soon as we started seeing the changes this year going in the wrong direction, namely for further rate reductions, then we started getting worried about the currency,” Ms. Calich said. “That has been, so far, the wrong policy response. And yeah, we’ve been very happy to have exited that position.”There are few politically palatable options for emerging market countries dealing with an inflationary upsurge and weakening currencies. But for a number of reasons, the inflationary rise is especially tricky political terrain for populists like Messrs. Orban, Erdogan and Bolsonaro, who all face elections in 2022 or 2023.Their personalized approach to politics — and the fact that they have all been in office for years — makes it difficult for them to sidestep blame for the condition of the economy. At the same time, their brand of populism, which emphasizes nationalist rivalries and has been effective in the past, can seem out of touch to citizens whose standards of living are swiftly plummeting.The traditional remedy for inflation would call for some combination of higher interest rates from the central bank and skimpier government spending. But both moves would probably hurt economic growth and employment, at least in the short term, potentially worsening prospects of re-election.In Turkey, Mr. Erdogan — who has adopted an increasingly authoritarian leadership style since surviving a coup attempt in 2016 — has ruled out such a conventional response. In recent weeks, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, essentially under Mr. Erdogan’s personal control, has repeatedly cut interest rates.Most observers think Mr. Erdogan has made a difficult situation much worse, with the prospect of more interest rate cuts and currency declines driving foreign investors to pull their money from Turkey.At the same time, the political winds also seem to be blowing against Mr. Erdogan. The worsening economic situation has prompted scattered street protests. Opposition politicians are calling for snap elections to deal with the crisis, while hammering Mr. Erdogan for what they call his disastrous management of the economy.Mr. Orban and Mr. Bolsonaro, both of whom once fashioned themselves as conservative budgeteers, have abandoned their previous positions. Instead, they are pushing a short-term surge of spending to provide an influx of cash to voters ahead of next year’s elections. It’s unclear that such an approach will help, however, as it is likely to make inflationary pressures worse.Sitting on a bench at a local farmers market in Budapest on a recent afternoon, Marton Varjai, 68, laughed at the $250 check Mr. Orban recently sent him, part of a payout his government authorized to all pensioners, who amount to roughly 20 percent of the population.Mr. Varjai earns a monthly pension of about $358, of which 85 percent goes to covering medicine and utilities. “The rest is what I have to live off,” he said, adding that he was concerned about his ability to make ends meet.Such sentiments are becoming an increasing focus for Hungarian voters. A recent study by Policy Solutions, a progressive think tank in Budapest, found that Hungarians are most concerned with the cost of living and low wages.“If these issues dominate the campaign, it’s not good for Fidesz,” said Andras Biro-Nagy, director of Policy Solutions, referring to Mr. Orban’s ruling party. More