More stories

  • in

    Why Andrew Yang’s New Third Party Is Bound to Fail

    Let’s not mince words. The new Forward Party announced by the former presidential candidate Andrew Yang, former Gov. Christine Todd Whitman and former Representative David Jolly is doomed to failure. The odds that it will attract any more than a token amount of support from the public, not to mention political elites, are slim to none. It will wither on the vine as the latest in a long history of vanity political parties.Why am I so confident that the Forward Party will amount to nothing? Because there is a recipe for third-party success in the United States, but neither Yang nor his allies have the right ingredients.First, let’s talk about the program of the Forward Party. Writing for The Washington Post, Yang, Whitman and Jolly say that their party is a response to “divisiveness” and “extremism.”“In a system torn apart by two increasingly divided extremes,” they write, “you must reintroduce choice and competition.”The Forward Party, they say, will “reflect the moderate, common-sense majority.” If, they argue, most third parties in U.S. history failed to take off because they were “ideologically too narrow,” then theirs is primed to reach deep into the disgruntled masses, especially since, they say, “voters are calling for a new party now more than ever.”It is not clear that we can make a conclusion about the public’s appetite for a specific third party on the basis of its general appetite for a third party. But that’s a minor issue. The bigger problem for Yang, Whitman and Jolly is their assessment of the history of American third parties. It’s wrong.The most successful third parties in American history have been precisely those that galvanized a narrow slice of the public over a specific set of issues. They further polarized the electorate, changed the political landscape and forced the established parties to reckon with their influence.This also gets to the meaning of success in the American system. The two-party system in the United States is a natural result of the rules of the game. The combination of single-member districts and single-ballot, “first past the post” elections means that in any election with more than two candidates, there’s a chance the winner won’t have a majority. There might be four or five or six (or even nine) distinct factions in an electorate, but the drive to prevent a plurality winner will very likely lead to the creation of two parties that take the shape of loose coalitions, each capable of winning that majority outright.To this dynamic add the fact of the presidency, which cannot be won without a majority of electoral votes. It’s this requirement of the Electoral College that puts additional pressure on political actors to form coalitions with each other in pursuit of the highest prize of American politics. In fact, for most of American history after the Civil War, the two parties were less coherent national organizations than clearinghouses for information and influence trading among state parties and urban machines.This is all to say that in the United States, a successful third party isn’t necessarily one that wins national office. Instead, a successful third party is one that integrates itself or its program into one of the two major parties, either by forcing key issues onto the agenda or revealing the existence of a potent new electorate.Take the Free Soil Party.During the presidential election of 1848, following the annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, a coalition of antislavery politicians from the Democratic, Liberty and Whig Parties formed the Free Soil Party to oppose the expansion of slavery into the new Western territories. At their national convention in Buffalo, the Free Soilers summed up their platform with the slogan “Free soil, free speech, free labor, free men!”The Free Soil Party, notes the historian Frederick J. Blue in “The Free Soilers: Third Party Politics, 1848-1854,” “endorsed the Wilmot Proviso by declaring that Congress had no power to extend slavery and must in fact prohibit its extension, thus returning to the principle of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.” It is the duty of the federal government, declared its platform, “to relieve itself from all responsibility for the existence of slavery wherever that government possesses constitutional power to legislate on that subject and is thus responsible for its existence.”This was controversial, to put it mildly. The entire “second” party system (the first being the roughly 30-year competition between the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans) had been built to sidestep the conflict over the expansion of slavery. The Free Soil Party — which in an ironic twist nominated Martin Van Buren, the architect of that system, for president in the 1848 election — fought to put that conflict at the center of American politics.It succeeded. In many respects, the emergence of the Free Soil Party marks the beginning of mass antislavery politics in the United States. They elected several members to Congress, helped fracture the Whig Party along sectional lines and pushed antislavery “Free” Democrats to abandon their party. The Free Soilers never elected a president, but in just a few short years they transformed American party politics. And when the Whig Party finally collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions, after General Winfield Scott’s defeat in the 1852 presidential election, the Free Soil Party would become, in 1854, the nucleus of the new Republican Party, which brought an even larger coalition of former Whigs and ex-Democrats together with Free Soil radicals under the umbrella of a sectional, antislavery party.There are a few other examples of third-party success. The Populist Party failed to win high office after endorsing the Democratic nominee, William Jennings Bryan, for president in 1896, but went on to shape the next two decades of American political life. “In the wake of the defeat of the People’s party, a wave of reform soon swept the country,” the historian Charles Postel writes in “The Populist Vision”: “Populism provided an impetus for this modernizing process, with many of their demands co-opted and refashioned by progressive Democrats and Republicans.”“By turn of fate,” Postel continues, “Populism proved far more successful dead than alive.”On a more sinister note, the segregationist George Wallace won five states and nearly 10 million ballots in his 1968 campaign for president under the banner of the American Independent Party. His run was proof of concept for Richard Nixon’s effort to fracture the Democratic Party coalition along racial and regional lines. Wallace pioneered a style of politics that Republicans would deploy to their own ends for decades, eventually culminating in the election of Donald Trump in 2016.This is all to say that there’s nothing about the Forward Party that, as announced, would have this kind of impact on American politics. It doesn’t speak to anything that matters other than a vague sense that the system should have more choices and that there’s a center out there that rejects the extremes, a problem the Democratic Party addressed by nominating Joe Biden for president and shaping most of its agenda to satisfy its most conservative members in Congress.The Forward Party doesn’t even appear to advocate the kinds of changes that would enable more choices across the political system: approval voting where voters can choose multiple candidates for office, multimember districts for Congress and fundamental reform to the Electoral College. Even something as simple as fusion voting — where two or more parties on the ballot share the same candidate — doesn’t appear to be on the radar of the Forward Party.The biggest problem with the Forward Party, however, is that its leaders — like so many failed reformers — seem to think that you can take the conflict out of politics. “On every issue facing this nation,” they write, “we can find a reasonable approach most Americans agree on.”No, we can’t. When an issue becomes live — when it becomes salient, as political scientists put it — people disagree. The question is how to handle and structure that disagreement within the political system. Will it fuel the process of government or will it paralyze it? Something tells me that neither Yang nor his allies have the answer.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

  • in

    2016 Campaign Looms Large as Justice Dept. Pursues Jan. 6 Inquiry

    Top officials at the department and the F.B.I. appear intent on avoiding any errors that could taint the current investigation or provide ammunition for a backlash.As the Justice Department investigation into the attack on the Capitol grinds ever closer to former President Donald J. Trump, it has prompted persistent — and cautionary — reminders of the backlash caused by inquiries into Mr. Trump and Hillary Clinton during the 2016 presidential campaign.Attorney General Merrick B. Garland is intent on avoiding even the slightest errors, which could taint the current investigation, provide Mr. Trump’s defenders with reasons to claim the inquiry was driven by animus, or undo his effort to rehabilitate the department’s reputation after the political warfare of the Trump years.Mr. Garland never seriously considered focusing on Mr. Trump from the outset, as investigators had done earlier with Mr. Trump and with Mrs. Clinton during her email investigation, people close to him say.As a result, his investigators have taken a more methodical approach, carefully climbing up the chain of personnel behind the 2020 plan to name fake slates of Trump electors in battleground states that had been won by Joseph R. Biden Jr.That has now led them to Mr. Trump and his innermost circle: Justice Department lawyers are questioning witnesses directly about the actions of Mr. Trump and top advisers like his former chief of staff, Mark Meadows.Christopher Wray, the F.B.I. director, appears to be proceeding with caution in hopes of armoring the bureau against future attacks by making sure his agents operate by the book. Stefani Reynolds for The New York TimesAs prosecutors delve deeper into Mr. Trump’s orbit, the former president and his allies in Congress will almost certainly accuse the Justice Department and F.B.I. of a politically motivated witch hunt.The template for those attacks, as Mr. Garland and the F.B.I. director, Christopher Wray, well know, was “Crossfire Hurricane,” the investigation into the Trump campaign’s connections to Russia, which Mr. Trump continues to dismiss as a partisan hoax.The mistakes and decisions from that period, in part, led to increased layers of oversight, including a major policy change at the Justice Department. If a decision were made to open a criminal investigation into Mr. Trump after he announced his intention to run in the 2024 election, as he suggests he might do, the department’s leaders would have to sign off on any inquiry under an internal rule established by Attorney General William P. Barr and endorsed by Mr. Garland.“Attorney General Garland and those investigating the high-level efforts to overturn the results of the 2020 election are acutely aware of how any misstep, whether by the F.B.I. or prosecutors, will be amplified and used for political purposes,” said Mary B. McCord, a top Justice Department official during the Obama administration. “I expect there are added layers of review and scrutiny of every investigative step.”Key Revelations From the Jan. 6 HearingsCard 1 of 9Making a case against Trump. More

  • in

    The Fake Electors Scheme, Explained

    The plan to reverse the outcome of the 2020 election by creating slates of electors pledged to Donald Trump in states he had lost was expansive, long-running and often confusing.The brazen plan to create false slates of electors pledged to former President Donald J. Trump in seven swing states that were actually won by Joseph R. Biden Jr. was arguably the longest-running and most expansive of the multiple efforts by Mr. Trump and his allies to overturn the results of the 2020 election.It was also one of the most confusing, involving a sprawling cast of pro-Trump lawyers, state Republican officials and White House aides in an effort that began before some states had even finished counting their ballots. It culminated in the campaign to pressure Vice President Mike Pence to use the false slates to subvert congressional certification of the outcome on Jan. 6, 2021 — and in the violent attack on the Capitol that unfolded as he refused to do so.The scheme had a vague historical precedent and was rooted, at least in theory, in a post-Reconstruction Era law designed to address how to handle disputed elections. But it was deemed illegal by Mr. Trump’s own White House Counsel’s Office. Even some of the lawyers who helped come up with the idea referred to it as fake and acknowledged that it was of dubious legality, according to a cache of email messages brought to light by The New York Times.The fake electors tactic caught the attention of state law enforcement officials around the beginning of this year, and soon became a focus of the inquiry being conducted by the House select committee investigating the events of Jan. 6.The plan has also figured prominently in an investigation that an Atlanta-area prosecutor is conducting into Mr. Trump’s alleged election meddling. And it is at the heart of the Justice Department’s own wide-ranging Jan. 6 inquiry.Here is a look at the plan: where it came from; how it was meant to work; the various inquiries it has now become a part of; and the ways in which it could serve to implicate Mr. Trump in criminal activity.Vice President Richard M. Nixon campaigned in Hilo, Hawaii, during the presidential race of 1960. A dispute over the outcome there was cited by Trump allies in developing slates of so-called alternate electors after the 2020 race.Associated PressHawaii, 1960, Provided the Template In one of the first legal memos laying out the details of the fake elector scheme, a pro-Trump lawyer named Kenneth Chesebro justified the plan by pointing to an odd episode in American history: a quarrel that took place in Hawaii during the 1960 presidential race between Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon.The results of the vote count in Hawaii remained in dispute — by about 100 ballots — even as a crucial deadline for the Electoral College to meet and cast its votes drew near. A recount was underway but it did not appear as though it would be completed by the time the Electoral College was expected to convene, on Dec. 19, 1960.(The winner of the popular vote in nearly all of the states is allocated all of that state’s electors, which are apportioned based on population. Maine and Nebraska are the exceptions; they allocate their electors based on the winners in congressional districts. To win the presidency, a candidate has to win a majority of the 538 total electoral votes.)Key Revelations From the Jan. 6 HearingsCard 1 of 9Making a case against Trump. More

  • in

    Class Divisions Harden Into Battle Lines in Arizona’s Republican Primary

    PRESCOTT VALLEY, Ariz. — As Shardé Walter’s family cut back on everything from camping trips to Eggo waffles to balance their inflation-strained budget this summer, she became more and more fed up with the Republicans who have governed Arizona for more than a decade.“You’ve got those hoity-toity Republicans, and then you’ve got ones like me — just trying to live,” Ms. Walter, 36, said as she waited for former President Donald J. Trump to arrive at a rally on Friday for his slate of candidates in Arizona’s bitterly fought Republican primaries.“We’re busting our asses off,” she continued, “but we’re broke for no reason.”The Aug. 2 Republican primary in Arizona has been cast as a party-defining contest between traditional Republicans and Trump loyalists, with the power to reshape a political battleground at the heart of fights over voting rights and fair elections. Several leading Republican candidates in Arizona for governor, secretary of state, attorney general and U.S. Senate have made lies about the “stolen” 2020 election a centerpiece of their campaigns.But the choice between traditional conservatives and Trump-backed firebrands is also tapping into working-class conservatives’ frustrations with a state economic and political system firmly controlled by Republicans, highlighting the gap between voters who have profited from Arizona’s rising home values and tax cuts tilted toward the wealthy, and those who feel left out and are eager to punish the Republican establishment at the ballot box.“It’s like ‘The Great Gatsby’ — old versus new,” said Mike Noble, the chief of research with the polling firm OH Predictive Insights, which is based in Phoenix. “It’s a very telling moment for the G.O.P. Are they going the way of MAGA, or the McCain-Goldwater conservative way that gave them dominance over the state?”Supporters watched Mr. Trump speak on an outdoor screen at the Findlay Toyota Center in Prescott Valley, Ariz.Adriana Zehbrauskas for The New York TimesSeveral leading Republican candidates in Arizona for governor, secretary of state, attorney general and U.S. Senate have made lies about the “stolen” 2020 election a centerpiece of their campaigns.Adriana Zehbrauskas for The New York TimesNational surveys of Republicans show that voters’ views of Mr. Trump and the 2020 election are fracturing along lines of education.A New York Times/Siena College poll released this month found that 64 percent of Republican primary voters without a college degree believed that Mr. Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election. Forty-four percent of Republican voters with a bachelor’s degree or more said Mr. Trump was the winner.Mr. Trump was still a clear favorite for Republican voters with a high school degree or less, with 62 percent saying they would vote for him in the 2024 Republican presidential primary if the election were held today. Less than 30 percent of Republican primary voters with college degrees said they would vote for Mr. Trump.In Arizona’s race for governor, the Republican establishment has coalesced around Karrin Taylor Robson, a wealthy real estate developer pitching herself as a competent leader who has been reliably conservative ever since her days as a staff member in the Reagan White House.The Trump wing of the party is locked in behind Kari Lake, a Trump-endorsed former news anchor who has stoked an anti-establishment rebellion fueled by falsehoods about the 2020 election and provocations like vowing to bomb smuggling tunnels on the southern border.Ms. Robson has cut into Ms. Lake’s early lead in the polls, but recent surveys suggest that Ms. Lake is still ahead.Key Themes From the 2022 Midterm Elections So FarCard 1 of 6The state of the midterms. More

  • in

    Red and Blue America Will Never Be the Same

    Donald Trump’s dominance of the political stage for the past seven years galvanized what had been a slow-burning realignment, creating a profound upheaval in the electorate and in both the Democratic and Republican parties.The support Trump received in rural communities and the animosity he provoked among well-educated suburbanites accelerated the ongoing inversion — on measures of income, education and geographic region — of white Democratic and Republican voters. (White voters make up 67 percent of the electorate.)In 2018, according to ProximityOne, a website that analyzes the demographics of congressional districts, Democratic members of Congress represented 74 of the 100 most affluent districts, including 24 of the top 25. Conversely, Republican members of Congress represented 54 of the 100 districts with the lowest household income. The median household income in districts represented by Democrats was $66,829, which is $10,324 more than the median for districts represented by Republicans, at $56,505.The 2018 data stands in contrast to the income pattern a half-century ago. In 1973, Republicans held 63 of the 100 highest-income districts and Democrats held 73 of the 100 lowest-income districts.These trends prompted Nolan McCarty, a political scientist at Princeton, to comment in an email that the Democratsare mostly the party of the master’s degree — modestly advantaged economically but not exactly elite. On the flip side, the Republicans are the party of the associate degree (a two-year college degree), less educated than the Democrats but not exactly the proletariat.Richard Pildes, a law professor at N.Y.U., argued thatpolitics throughout the Western democracies is in recent years in the midst of the most dramatic reconfiguration of the political parties and their bases of support in seventy or so years. Since the New Deal in the United States and WWII in Western Europe, the base of the dominant parties of the left was less affluent, less highly educated voters; the dominant parties of the right drew their primary support from higher income, more highly educated voters.Now, Pildes continued, “we are witnessing the complete inversion of that pattern, and the question is whether this is a temporary or more enduring realignment of the political parties throughout the West.”In his email, Pildes noted that in the 1940sDemocratic candidates received twenty-two points less support from voters in the top ten percent of the income bracket than from those in the bottom ninety percent. By 2012, that gap had dropped to only an eight-point difference and in 2016, voters in the top ten percent had become eight points more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. Similarly, in the 1940s, those with university degrees in the United States were twenty points less likely to vote for Democrats, while in 2000 there was no difference and by 2016, they were thirteen points more likely to vote for Democrats.The ramifications of these developments, which predate Trump’s entry into presidential politics in 2015, “radiate throughout the electoral process in the United States,” Pildes argued:Take the Electoral College: for most of the time from the 1950s until 2016, it was actually biased toward the Democrats. But in 2016, it suddenly became strongly biased toward the Republicans, and 2020 added even more to that bias.At the same time, there are counter-developments more favorable to the left.Nicholas Stephanopoulos, a law professor at Harvard who focuses on redistricting and demographic trends, argued in an email that “the country’s political geography is now less pro-Republican.” While “the conventional wisdom has it that Democrats are disadvantaged in redistricting because of their inefficient over-concentration in cities,” he continued, “the Trump era seems to have changed the country’s political geography in ways that are beneficial to Democrats.”Trump, Stephanopoulos continued,modestly reduced the enormous Democratic edge in cities, thus undoing some of this packing of Democratic voters. Trump also did significantly better in rural areas, to the point that some of them are about as red (and so as packed with Republicans) as cities are blue. And Trump bled support in the suburbs, so that the country’s most populous and competitive areas now lean toward the Democrats instead of the Republicans.As a result, Stephanopoulos argued,the U.S. House will likely be close to unbiased in partisan terms in 2022. A group of scholars peg the likely bias at around 3 percent pro-Republican, while Nate Silver’s model, which incorporates additional variables like incumbency and polling, thinks the likely bias will be around 1 percent pro-Democratic.Republicans won 234 seats in 2012 despite the fact that Democrats won, by 2 percent, a majority of votes cast in House elections, according to Stephanopoulos, “but Nate Silver now thinks that Republicans will win the national House vote by 5 percent in 2022, yet only pick up the same 234 seats they got in 2012.”Robert M. Stein, a political scientist at Rice University, agrees with Stephanopolous and cites trends in Texas to show the pro-Democratic shift:Consider the Texas Republican Party’s redistricting plan in 2010 and its durability over the last decade. Beginning in 2010 Republicans held a 100 to 50 seat advantage in the Texas House of Representatives. By 2020, this margin had shrunk to 83-67. In each biennial election since 2010, Democrats picked up House seats, mostly in suburban and exurban areas of the state.The shift, Stein continued,was largely driven by the changing demography of the state. Another source of this shift can be laid at the feet of candidates like Donald Trump and Ted Cruz. The result, at least in Texas, is that some of the most competitive areas (districts) in the state are not the big cities, but exurban and suburban counties including Collin, Denton, Fort Bend and Williamson. Prior to 2016 voters in these counties were trending Republican; now they are leaning Democratic or tossups.Brian Schaffner, a political scientist at Tufts, cited surveys conducted by the Cooperative Election Study from 2010 to 2020 showing that “one of the most significant shifts we see in our data is increasing Democratic strength in suburbs, especially since the early 2010s.”Schaffner provided data from the study showing that the Democratic share of the two-party vote rose from 54.5 to 63.5 percent in urban areas over the decade and remained low — 35.2 to 36.1 percent — in rural America. The biggest shift, 12.5 points, was in suburban areas, which went from 41.8 percent Democratic in 2010 to 54.3 percent in 2020.Nolan McCarty suggested that these trends may prove beneficial to the Democratic Party:The natural tilt of our single-member district system has shifted away from the Republicans as the rural vote moves toward the Republicans and the suburbs move toward the Democrats. But it is not clear what the aggregate effects of those shifts will be. It should help the House Democrats in November but it is not clear how much.The effects of these shifts on the Senate and Electoral College, McCarty continued, will be slower in the short term but could eventually become significant: “Once such changes push states like Georgia, Texas and North Carolina sufficiently toward the Democrats, they would be the party with the structural advantage in the Electoral College and Senate.”Jonathan Rodden, a political scientist at Stanford, noted in an email the possibility that very recent changes in suburban voting will hurt the future prospects of the Republican Party:The most noteworthy change to political geography in 2020 was the success of Biden in pivotal suburban areas. In the most recent round of redistricting, when examining proposed districting plans — whether drawn by computer simulations or humans — the number of Democratic-leaning districts in a state was often greater if one added up the votes of Biden and Trump in 2020 than if one used past presidential results, Senate results, gubernatorial results, or some other down-ballot elections.The geographic distribution of Biden votes, Rodden continued, “was more ‘efficient’ for the Democrats than that of other recent Democratic candidates.” But, he cautioned,what is unclear is whether this was a specific reaction to Donald Trump as a candidate in relatively educated suburbs, or a lasting trend in political geography that will outlive the Trump era. The latter is at least plausible, especially in the wake of the Dobbs decision, but it is too early to tell. Even in 2020, a non-trivial number of these suburban Biden voters split their tickets and voted for Republican House candidates.I asked Rodden what it means for statewide elections in contested states if these trends continue. He replied:This really depends on the numbers in each state, but in sun-belt states that are gaining educated and/or minority in-migrants, like Georgia and Arizona, we already have evidence that this was a pretty good trade for statewide Democrats, but in other states where in-migration is limited, like those in the Upper Midwest, this trade might work out better for statewide Republicans.Along similar lines, William Frey, a demographer and a senior fellow at Brookings, emphasized in an email that “Biden won the suburbs in 2020, I believe largely due to his gains among minorities and college whites.” Even if Republicans and Trump made marginal gains among minority voters, the support of these voters for Democrats remained overwhelming.In a 2021 Brookings paper, “Biden’s victory came from the suburbs,” Frey pointed to Georgia, whereDemographic shifts — including brisk growth in the state’s Democratic-leaning Black population, gains in Latino/Hispanic, and Asian Americans voters, and an increase in white college graduates, especially in the Atlanta metropolitan area — served to make the state competitive for Democrats this year.In a separate 2022 paper, “Today’s suburbs are symbolic of America’s rising diversity: A 2020 census portrait,” Frey focuses on the continuing stream of minorities moving into the suburbs. From 1990 to 2020, Frey found, the percentage of Asian Americans living in suburbs grew from 53.4 to 63.1 percent, of Hispanics from 49.5 to 61.4 percent and of African Americans, from 36.6 to 54.3 percent, the largest increase.Has geographic division, pitting a disproportionately rural Republican Party against an urban Democratic Party, added a new dimension to polarization making consensus and cooperation even more difficult?I posed a series of questions to an eclectic group of political scholars.Frances Lee, a political scientist at Princeton, replied by email:Rather than claiming that the G.O.P. is becoming the party of the working class, what I see is a long-term trend away from a party system organized along class lines. Knowing that a person is wealthy (or low income) isn’t very predictive of what party that person will prefer. The parties are much better sorted by other factors — region, religion, race — than by social class.This isn’t a new phenomenon, Lee noted, but Trump intensified these divisions: “Trump’s candidacy and presidency accelerated pre-existing trends undercutting the class basis of the parties. For a Republican, Trump had unusual appeal to working-class voters and was unusually alienating to well-off suburbanites.”James Druckman, a political scientist at Northwestern University, draws an interesting distinction: “I do think the perception in the country is that Republicans are working class but not necessarily for economic reasons directly but rather because of diffuse feelings of injustice translated into rhetoric about mistreatment, unfairness and immigrants taking jobs.”At the same time, Druckman contended:Democrats are vulnerable to charges of being the party of the elite for two reasons — one is that a small strain of the party is made up of extreme progressives who offer rhetoric that can be alienating when too wrapped up in politically correct language. Second, the growing anti-intellectualism in parts of the Republican Party reflects the significant degree of education polarization we observe.Herbert Kitschelt, a political scientist at Duke, rejects some recent attempts at classification:Are the Democrats the party of the elites? Yes and no. It is the case that high-income high-education professionals in the last 20 years have moved increasingly to the Democratic Party but these are people most of whom are on the moderate wing of the party. That is to say, they embrace a mildly redistributive agenda on economic issues such as Social Security, universal health care, and support for families with children, and a mildly libertarian social agenda on questions of abortion, family relations, gender relations and ethnic relations.These moderate, mainstream Democrats arefar removed from the more radical, progressive wing and its agenda on identity, diversity, equity, and social transformation. The real driving force of the progressive wing of the Democratic Party are occupational strata that are characterized by low- to middle-incomes and high education. These progressive voters primarily work in social and cultural services, in large urban areas.This progressive constituency, Kitschelt argued, isquantitatively more important for the Democratic electorate than the high-education high-income more moderate segment. By embracing the agenda of “defund the police” and cultural transformation of the schools, this progressive constituency puts itself at odds with many lower- and middle-income families across all ethnic groups.Insofar as the Democratic Party adopts the progressive agenda, Kitschelt wrote, it endangers “its electoral rainbow coalition,” noting that both African American and Hispanic families “are highly concerned about improving the police, not dismantling the police” and about “the quality of basic school instruction.”On the Republican side, Kitschelt argues thatthe core element is not “working class” in any conventional sense of the phrase at all: It is low education, but relatively high-income people. These voters are overwhelmingly white, and many are of the evangelical religious conviction. In occupational terms, they are concentrated in small business, both owners and core employees, in sectors such as construction, crafts, real estate, small retail, personal services and agriculture.Kitschelt continued: “Many of these citizens tend to live in suburban and rural areas. They are the true spearhead of Republican activism, and especially of the Trumpist persuasion.”Pildes addressed these issues in his October 2021 paper, “Political Fragmentation in Democracies of the West.”“The domination of the parties of the left by the more highly educated,” he wrote, “in combination with these cultural conflicts and policy differences, are an important element in the shift of the less educated, less affluent voters away from the parties of the left.”Pildes cites American National Elections Studies data on white voters in the 2016 election showing that Trump won among all income categories of whites making less than $175,000, while Hillary Clinton won only among whites who made in excess of $175,000.Pildes contended that defections from the Democratic Party among conservative and moderate minority voters pose a significant threat to the long-term viability of the party:Democratic support plunged from 49 percent to 27 percent among Hispanic conservatives between 2012 and 2020 and from 69 percent to 65 percent among Hispanic moderates. These changes suggest that ideology, rather than identity, is beginning to provide more of a voting basis among some Hispanics. If a marginally greater number of working-class Latino or Black voters start to vote the way that white working-class voters do, the ability of the Democratic Party to win national elections will be severely weakened.Bart Bonikowski, a professor of sociology and politics at N.Y.U., noted in an email that “the claim that the Republicans are becoming a party of the ‘working class’ is mistaken.” Not only are a majority of working class African Americans and Hispanics Democratic, but, “more accurately, the Republicans have become a party of disaffected white voters, many of whom hold resentments against ethnoracial minorities and a waning commitment to liberal democratic values.” Given “the built-in biases of the Electoral College and Senate — along with gerrymandering and voter disenfranchisement — states with larger shares of noncollege whites will continue to exert outsized influence on U.S. politics, persistently disadvantaging Democrats even when their candidates and policies are broadly popular.”Robert Saldin, a political scientist at the University of Montana, argued by email that “Geographic polarization, or the urban-rural divide, is arguably the most defining feature of American politics.” Over the past 20 years, he continued, “the Democratic Party has hemorrhaged support in the countryside. They’ve got a five-alarm fire in rural America, but much of the party’s elite doesn’t even see the smoke.”For the Democrats, in Saldin’s view,trading the countryside for the cities has come at a political cost even if the party routinely wins many more total votes than the G.O.P. nationally. That’s because geography plays an outsized role in our political system, particularly in the Electoral College and the Senate.Consider the Dakotas, Saldin wrote:It wasn’t that long ago that their congressional delegations were packed with Democrats, but that’s inconceivable now. And to the extent that the same thing is happening in other low-population states, this presents a real problem for Democrats in the Senate.Saldin suggested:Here’s another way of conceptualizing it. Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming have less than 2 percent of the national population, but their ten senators have the same collective power in the Senate as those representing the five most populous states, California, Texas, Florida, New York and Pennsylvania. If a party managed a clean sweep in those five big-box states in flyover country, that would comprise 20 percent of what you need for a Senate majority before you even look at the other 98 percent of the country. The G.O.P. is now very close to accomplishing that feat, with Montana’s Jon Tester the last Senate Democrat standing in those states.Barring an extraordinary economic turnaround or still more explosive disclosures of criminal malfeasance by Trump, these demographic trends may have a modest effect on the outcome on Election Day in November. They do, however, suggest that the balance of political power is more fluid than widely recognized. It should undermine the confidence of those predicting victory for either the left or the right in 2024.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

  • in

    Correos inéditos detallan el plan de Trump para seguir en el poder

    Un intercambio de correos electrónicos entre algunos asesores externos y asistentes de la campaña de Trump ofrecen una nueva perspectiva de sus esfuerzos para anular las elecciones en las semanas previas al 6 de enero.Unos correos electrónicos que no habían sido divulgados ofrecen una mirada de los esfuerzos cada vez más desesperados, y a menudo descuidados, de los asesores del expresidente de Estados Unidos Donald Trump para revertir su derrota electoral en las semanas que antecedieron al ataque del 6 de enero, incluidos algunos mensajes que reconocían que algunos elementos cruciales de su plan eran de dudosa legalidad, al punto de que se les llegó a calificar como “falsos”.Decenas de correos electrónicos entre personas vinculadas a la campaña de Trump, asesores externos y aliados cercanos del expresidente muestran una atención especial en reunir listas de personas que, en su nombre, afirmarían —sin fundamento— ser electores en estados clave que Trump había perdido en el Colegio Electoral.En los correos electrónicos revisados por The New York Times y autentificados por personas que trabajaban con la campaña de Trump en ese momento, un abogado que participó en las conversaciones usó en repetidas ocasiones la palabra “falsos” para referirse a los supuestos electores, que pretendían proveer una justificación al vicepresidente Mike Pence y a los aliados de Trump en el Congreso para entorpecer el proceso de certificación del resultado electoral. Y los abogados que trabajaron en la propuesta dejaron claro que sabían que era posible que los electores pro-Trump que estaban presentando no resistirían el escrutinio legal.“Simplemente estaríamos enviando votos electorales ‘falsos’ a Pence para que ‘alguien’ en el Congreso pueda presentar una objeción cuando se empiecen contar los votos, y argumentar que los votos ‘falsos’ deben ser contados”, escribió Jack Wilenchik, un abogado con sede en Phoenix que ayudó a organizar a los votantes a favor de Trump en Arizona, en un correo que le envió a Boris Epshteyn, asesor estratégico de la campaña de Trump, el 8 de diciembre de 2020.En un correo electrónico de seguimiento, Wilenchik escribió que “votos ‘alternativos’ probablemente es un mejor término que votos ‘falsos’”, agregando un emoji de cara sonriente.Los correos brindan detalles inéditos sobre cómo un ala de la campaña de Trump trabajó con abogados y asesores externos para organizar un plan electoral y buscar una variedad de otras opciones, a menudo sin pensar en su practicidad. Un correo electrónico revela que muchos de los principales asesores de Trump fueron informados de los problemas que tenían para nombrar a los votantes de Trump en Michigan —un estado que había perdido—, porque las normas pandémicas habían forzado el cierre del edificio del Capitolio estatal, donde los supuestos electores se habrían reunido.Las comunicaciones muestran que los participantes en las discusiones informaron detalles de sus actividades a Rudolph Giuliani, el abogado personal de Trump y, en al menos un caso, a Mark Meadows, el jefe de gabinete de la Casa Blanca. Casi al mismo tiempo, según el comité de la Cámara de Representantes que investiga el ataque del 6 de enero, Meadows envió un correo a otro asesor de campaña en el que advertía: “Solo necesitamos a alguien que coordine a los votantes de los estados”.Muchos de los correos electrónicos están dirigidos a Epshteyn, quien coordinaba a las personas dentro y fuera de la campaña de Trump y la Casa Blanca y sigue siendo un colaborador cercano de Trump.Epshteyn, según muestran los correos, era un contacto usual para John Eastman, el abogado que diseñó el plan adoptado por Trump para entorpecer la certificación del resultado del Colegio Electoral en el Congreso el 6 de enero de 2021.Epshteyn no solo le presentó y envió a Giuliani la propuesta detallada para el 6 de enero que Eastman preparó, sino que también se encargó de cómo pagarle a Eastman e hizo los arreglos necesarios para que asistiera a la Casa Blanca el 4 de enero de 2021, según los correos electrónicos.Ese fue el día de la reunión en el Despacho Oval en la que Trump y Eastman presionaron sin éxito a Pence para que adoptara el plan, un intercambio del que fueron testigos los dos principales asesores de Pence, Marc Short y Greg Jacob, quienes testificaron la semana pasada frente al jurado federal que investiga el asalto al Capitolio, y las decisiones que provocaron ese incidente.Los correos destacan la actuación de Mike Roman, director de operaciones del día de las elecciones para la campaña de Trump, quien se encargó de buena parte del trabajo preliminar para encontrar las formas de desafiar las derrotas de Trump en los estados clave.Epshteyn y Roman estuvieron en coordinación con otras personas que tuvieron un rol en asesorar a Trump, según muestran los correos electrónicos. Entre esas personas estaban los abogados Jenna Ellis y Bruce Marks; Gary Michael Brown, quien fue subdirector de operaciones del día de las elecciones para la campaña de Trump, y Christina Bobb, quien en ese momento trabajaba para One America News Network y ahora trabaja con el comité de acción política de Trump.Al parecer, los correos electrónicos no se compartieron con los abogados de la Oficina del Abogado de la Casa Blanca, quienes informaron que el plan de “electores falsos” no era sólido legalmente, ni con otros abogados en la campaña.Algunos de los involucrados también expresaron en los correos electrónicos su anuencia para mantener algunas de sus actividades fuera del ojo público.Por ejemplo, después de que Trump recibió a los legisladores del estado de Pensilvania en la Casa Blanca a finales de noviembre para discutir la restitución del resultado de las elecciones, Epshteyn celebró cuando la noticia del encuentro no fue filtrada con rapidez. “La reunión en la CB no se ha hecho pública, lo cual es impactante y grandioso”, le escribió a Ellis.Jenna Ellis, a la izquierda, Rudolph Giuliani y Boris Epshteyn, a la derecha, participaron en el esfuerzo coordinado para anular el resultado de las elecciones de 2020.Jonathan Ernst/ReutersEl 8 de diciembre de 2020, Wilenchik escribió que Kelli Ward, una de las republicanas de Arizona que participaron en el plan de los electores falsos, recomendó tratar de “mantenerlo en secreto hasta que el Congreso cuente los votos el 6 de enero (para que podamos intentar ‘sorprender’ a los demócratas y a los medios con eso), y me inclino a estar de acuerdo con ella”.Epshteyn, Wilenchik, Roman, Eastman, Bobb y James Troupis, otro abogado involucrado en el plan, se negaron a comentar o no respondieron a los correos electrónicos o llamadas para solicitar sus comentarios.Marks, en un correo electrónico, cuestionó que hubiera algo inapropiado o indebido en su trabajo.“No creo que haya nada ‘falso’ o ilegal en las listas alternas de delegados, y particularmente en Pensilvania”, dijo. “Había un historial de listas electorales alternativas en Hawái en 1960. Nada sobre esto era secreto: se proporcionaron a los Archivos Nacionales, según entiendo que fue el procedimiento, y luego le correspondía al Congreso decidir qué hacer”.Marks agregó: “No estuve involucrado con el consejo del profesor Eastman con respecto al papel del vicepresidente, del cual me enteré después del hecho y no respaldo”.El comité de la Cámara de Representantes que investiga el ataque del 6 de enero al Capitolio ha recopilado pruebas de que Trump tenía conocimiento del plan sobre los electores. Ronna McDaniel, la presidenta del Comité Nacional Republicano (CNR), dijo en una declaración que Trump la había llamado y puso a Eastman al teléfono “para hablar de la importancia de que el CNR ayude a la campaña para reunir a estos electores contingentes”.El panel también escuchó el testimonio de Jacob, quien fue abogado de Pence en la Casa Blanca, quien indicó que Eastman reconoció en la reunión del Despacho Oval del 4 de enero —donde Trump estaba presente— que su plan de que Pence obstaculizara la certificación electoral violaba la Ley de Conteo Electoral.En ocasiones, los correos electrónicos muestran poca precisión en las conversaciones entre los abogados. Marks se refirió en repetidas ocasiones a Cleta Mitchell, otra abogada que ayudaba a Trump, como “Clita” y “Clavita”, lo que ocasionó que Epshteyn replicara: “Es Cleta, no Clavita”.En otra ocasión, Epshteyn le escribió a Marks: “¿Cuando dices Nevada quieres decir Arizona???”.Para principios de diciembre, Epshteyn parecía estar ayudando a coordinar los esfuerzos, al deliberar repetidamente con Marks y otros. Wilenchik le dijo a sus colegas abogados que había estado discutiendo una idea propuesta por otro abogado que trabajaba con la campaña, Kenneth Chesebro, un aliado de Eastman, para enviar listas de electores leales a Trump.“Su idea básicamente es que todos nosotros (Georgia, Wisconsin, Arizona, Pensilvania), hagamos que nuestros electores envíen sus votos (aunque los votos no son legales bajo la ley federal, porque no están firmados por el gobernador), de modo que los integrantes del Congreso se peleen sobre si deben contarse el 6 de enero”, escribió Wilenchik en un correo electrónico enviado a Epshteyn y a otras personas, el 8 de diciembre de 2020.“Medio loco/creativo, me encantaría conversarlo”, continuó Wilenchick. “Lo que le comentó fue que supongo que no hace daño, (al menos legalmente), es decir, solo estaríamos enviando votos electorales ‘falsos’ a Pence para que ‘alguien’ en el Congreso pueda presentar una objeción cuando empiecen a contarse los votos y empiecen a defender que los votos ‘falsos’ deben contarse”.Seguidores del presidente Donald Trump protestaron en Phoenix dos días después del día de las elecciones. Arizona fue uno de los estados escogidos para el esquema de falsos electores.Adriana Zehbrauskas para The New York TimesAl organizar el esquema de falsos electores, los abogados nombraron a una “persona de enlace” en siete estados para organizar a los electores dispuestos a firmar documentos falsos. En Pensilvania, ese enlace era Douglas V. Mastriano, quien ahora es el nominado republicano a la gubernatura y fue partidario de las mentiras de Trump sobre el robo de las elecciones.Pero incluso Mastriano exigía garantías para seguir el plan que otros republicanos le decían era “ilegal”, según un correo electrónico enviado por Bobb que también apuntaba a Giuliani, exalcalde de la Ciudad de Nueva York, el 12 de diciembre.“Mastriano necesita una llamada del alcalde. Hay que hacerlo. Hablarle de la legalidad de lo que están haciendo”, escribió. Y añadió: “Los electores quieren que los tranquilicen de que el proceso es * legal * y esencial para la estrategía general”.Los correos mostraban que, al principio, el grupo esperaba que las legislaturas estatales republicanas o los gobernadores se unieran a sus planes para darles un sello de legitimidad. Pero para diciembre, estaba claro que ninguna autoridad iba a aceptar participar, así que los abogados de Trump se propusieron presionar a Pence, quien debía presidir una sesión conjunta del Congreso el 6 de enero.El 7 de diciembre, Troupis, que trabajaba para la campaña de Trump en Wisconsin, le escribió a Epshteyn que no había “necesidad de que los legisladores actuaran”. Invocó el análisis jurídico de Chesebro de que la clave para las esperanzas de Trump no era bloquear la certificación estatal de los electores el 14 de diciembre, sino crear un motivo para que Pence bloqueara o dilatara la certificación del Congreso de los resultados del Colegio Electoral el 6 de enero.“La segunda lista solo se presenta al mediodía del lunes y vota y luego transmite los resultados”, escribió Troupis sobre la organización de las listas de electores republicanos para que emitieran votos por Trump el 14 de diciembre. “Le corresponde a Pence abrirlos el 6 de enero. Nuestra estrategia, que pensamos se puede replicar en los 6 estados en disputa, es que los electores se reúnan y voten de modo que una decisión interina de una corte certifique a Trump como ganador pueda ejecutarse por la corte y ordenar al gobernador que emita lo necesario para nombrar a los electores. La clave sería que los seis estados lo hagan de modo que la elección siga en duda hasta enero”.Los documentos también mostraron que el equipo legal se había apoyado en información muy desacreditada para los reclamos de fraude electoral. El 17 de diciembre, Epshteyn escribió a Giuliani que un documento de fraude electoral creado por el asesor de Trump en materia de comercio, Peter Navarro — que ha sido desacreditado por informes periodísticos, funcionarios estatales y tribunales— “parece ser el resumen más completo de fraude de votantes de esta temporada electoral”.Los abogados estaban conscientes de que sus esfuerzos jurídicos eran motivo de sorna El 23 de diciembre, Marks escribió: “A ustedes los están matando en los medios por su estrategia de litigio, incluso en Fox y entre los conservadores”.Pero no se amilanaron.Para la víspera de Navidad, Eastman parecía querer aprovechar el poder de los millones de seguidores de Trump.Esa noche, a las 8:04 p. m. Eastman le envió a Epshteyn un correo electrónico que había recibido en el que una mujer le rogaba pedirle a Trump que “le dijera a sus 74 millones de seguidores lo que quiere que hagan para ayudar”. Y añadió: “Tenemos que ser una sola voz, con precisión láser, EXPRESÁNDOSE CON LA FUERZA DE 74 MILLONES”.Un video de John Eastman, a la izquierda, acogiéndose a la Quinta Enmienda durante una declaración ante el comité de la Cámara el 6 de enero.Doug Mills/The New York TimesEn su correo electrónico a Epshteyn, Eastman escribió, “Pensé en reenviarte esto. La fuerza de 74 millones. Averigüemos un modo específico de desplegarlos. ¿Estruendo vibrante? ¿Una legislatura a la vez? Los demás podrían darse cuenta”.Días antes, Trump les había dicho a sus seguidores que fueran a Washington el 6 de enero para una “protesta” que prometía sería “salvaje”.El 27 de diciembre, Epshteyn escribió que a Trump le “gustaba” el enfoque agresivo que proponían los abogados y que Eastman sería el “rostro de la estrategia de medios” junto con Giuliani.“Necesitamos una voz allá”, escribió Epshteyn sobre Eastman, diciendo que a él “ya lo había dado a conocer/apoyado POTUS”.En ese momento, solo faltaban días para el 6 de enero.Maggie Haberman es corresponsal de la Casa Blanca. Se unió al Times en 2015 como corresponsal de campaña y formó parte de un equipo que ganó un Pulitzer en 2018 por informar sobre los asesores de Trump y sus conexiones con Rusia. @maggieNYTLuke Broadwater cubre el Congreso de Estados Unidos. Fue el reportero principal de una serie de artículos de investigación en The Baltimore Sun que ganó un premio Pulitzer y un premio George Polk en 2020. @lukebroadwater More

  • in

    Justice Dept. Asking Witnesses About Trump in Its Jan. 6 Investigation

    Federal prosecutors sought information about the former president’s role in the efforts to overturn the election as the inquiry accelerates.Federal prosecutors have directly asked witnesses in recent days about former President Donald J. Trump’s involvement in efforts to reverse his election loss, a person familiar with the testimony said on Tuesday, suggesting that the Justice Department’s criminal investigation has moved into a more aggressive and politically fraught phase.Mr. Trump’s personal role in elements of the push to overturn his loss in 2020 to Joseph R. Biden Jr. has long been established, both through his public actions and statements and evidence gathered by the House committee investigating the Jan. 6 attack.But the Justice Department has been largely silent about how and even whether it would weigh pursuing potential charges against Mr. Trump, and reluctant even to concede that his role was discussed in senior leadership meetings at the department.Asking questions about Mr. Trump in connection with the electors plot or the attack on the Capitol does not mean the Justice Department has opened a criminal investigation into him, a decision that would have immense political and legal ramifications.The department’s investigation into a central element of the push to keep Mr. Trump in office — the plan to name slates of electors pledged to Mr. Trump in battleground states won by Mr. Biden — now appears to be accelerating as prosecutors with the U.S. attorney’s office in Washington ask witnesses about Mr. Trump and members of his inner circle, including the White House chief of staff, Mark Meadows, the person familiar with the testimony said.Key Revelations From the Jan. 6 HearingsCard 1 of 9Making a case against Trump. More

  • in

    Emails Reveal Details of Trump Fake Electors Plan

    Previously undisclosed communications among Trump campaign aides and outside advisers provide new insight into their efforts to overturn the election in the weeks leading to Jan. 6.Previously undisclosed emails provide an inside look at the increasingly desperate and often slapdash efforts by advisers to President Donald J. Trump to reverse his election defeat in the weeks before the Jan. 6 attack, including acknowledgments that a key element of their plan was of dubious legality and lived up to its billing as “fake.”The dozens of emails among people connected to the Trump campaign, outside advisers and close associates of Mr. Trump show a particular focus on assembling lists of people who would claim — with no basis — to be Electoral College electors on his behalf in battleground states that he had lost.In emails reviewed by The New York Times and authenticated by people who had worked with the Trump campaign at the time, one lawyer involved in the detailed discussions repeatedly used the word “fake” to refer to the so-called electors, who were intended to provide Vice President Mike Pence and Mr. Trump’s allies in Congress a rationale for derailing the congressional process of certifying the outcome. And lawyers working on the proposal made clear they knew that the pro-Trump electors they were putting forward might not hold up to legal scrutiny.“We would just be sending in ‘fake’ electoral votes to Pence so that ‘someone’ in Congress can make an objection when they start counting votes, and start arguing that the ‘fake’ votes should be counted,” Jack Wilenchik, a Phoenix-based lawyer who helped organize the pro-Trump electors in Arizona, wrote in a Dec. 8, 2020, email to Boris Epshteyn, a strategic adviser for the Trump campaign.In a follow-up email, Mr. Wilenchik wrote that “‘alternative’ votes is probably a better term than ‘fake’ votes,” adding a smiley face emoji.The emails provide new details of how a wing of the Trump campaign worked with outside lawyers and advisers to organize the elector plan and pursue a range of other options, often with little thought to their practicality. One email showed that many of Mr. Trump’s top advisers were informed of problems naming Trump electors in Michigan — a state he had lost — because pandemic rules had closed the state Capitol building where the so-called electors had to gather.The emails show that participants in the discussions reported details of their activities to Rudolph W. Giuliani, Mr. Trump’s personal lawyer, and in at least one case to Mark Meadows, the White House chief of staff. Around the same time, according to the House committee investigating Jan. 6, Mr. Meadows emailed another campaign adviser saying, “We just need to have someone coordinating the electors for states.”Many of the emails went to Mr. Epshteyn, who was acting as a coordinator for people inside and outside the Trump campaign and the White House and remains a close aide to Mr. Trump.Mr. Epshteyn, the emails show, was a regular point of contact for John Eastman, the lawyer whose plan for derailing congressional certification of the Electoral College result on Jan. 6, 2021, was embraced by Mr. Trump.Key Revelations From the Jan. 6 HearingsCard 1 of 9Making a case against Trump. More