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    How the Supreme Court May Rule on Trump’s Presidential Run

    The legal issues are novel and tangled, experts said, and the justices may be wary of knocking a leading presidential candidate off the ballot.The Supreme Court, battered by ethics scandals, a dip in public confidence and questions about its legitimacy, may soon have to confront a case as consequential and bruising as Bush v. Gore, the 2000 decision that handed the presidency to George W. Bush.Until 10 days ago, the justices had settled into a relatively routine term. Then the Colorado Supreme Court declared that former President Donald J. Trump was ineligible to hold office because he had engaged in an insurrection. On Thursday, relying on that court’s reasoning, an election official in Maine followed suit.An appeal of the Colorado ruling has already reached the justices, and they will probably feel compelled to weigh in. But they will act in the shadow of two competing political realities.They will be reluctant to wrest from voters the power to assess Mr. Trump’s conduct, particularly given the certain backlash that would bring. Yet they will also be wary of giving Mr. Trump the electoral boost of an unqualified victory in the nation’s highest court.Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. will doubtless seek consensus or, at least, try to avoid a partisan split of the six Republican appointees against the three Democratic ones.He may want to explore the many paths the court could take to keep Mr. Trump on state ballots without addressing whether he had engaged in insurrection or even assuming that he had.Among them: The justices could rule that congressional action is needed before courts can intervene, that the constitutional provision at issue does not apply to the presidency or that Mr. Trump’s statements were protected by the First Amendment.“I expect the court to take advantage of one of the many available routes to avoid holding that Trump is an insurrectionist who therefore can’t be president again,” said Nicholas Stephanopoulos, a law professor at Harvard.Such an outcome would certainly be a stinging loss for Mr. Trump’s opponents, who say the case against him is airtight. But the Supreme Court would be attracted to what it would present as a modest ruling that allows Mr. Trump to remain on the ballot.“This is a fraught political issue,” said Derek Muller, a law professor at the University of Notre Dame. “I think there will be an effort for the court to coalesce around a consensus position for a narrow, unanimous opinion. That probably means coalescing around a position where Trump stays on the ballot.”If there is a consensus among legal experts, it is that the Supreme Court must act.“For the sake of the country, we need resolution of this issue as soon as possible,” said Richard L. Hasen, a law professor at the University of California, Los Angeles. “Republican primary voters deserve to know if the candidate they are considering supporting is eligible to run. Otherwise they waste their votes on an ineligible candidate and raise the risk of the party nominating an ineligible candidate in the general election.”Mr. Trump was disqualified in Colorado and Maine based on Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, which bars officials who have taken an oath to support the Constitution from holding office if they then engage in an insurrection.Professor Stephanopoulos said those determinations were legally sound. But he added that he was “highly skeptical” that the Supreme Court, which has a six-justice conservative supermajority, would agree.“I think Roberts very much doesn’t want the court disrupting a presidential election, especially based on a novel legal theory that doesn’t have years of support from conservative judges and academics,” Professor Stephanopoulos said. “I also doubt that the court’s conservative justices want to start a civil war within the Republican Party by disqualifying the candidate whom most Republican voters support.”Tara Leigh Grove, a law professor at the University of Texas, said the court has no options that will enhance its prestige.“Although many members of the public would of course embrace a decision affirming the Colorado Supreme Court,” she said, “others would recoil at the decision. I don’t think there is any way for the Supreme Court to issue a decision on this issue that will clearly enhance its legitimacy with the public as a whole.”Former President Donald J. Trump was disqualified from the Republican primaries in Colorado and Maine based on Section 3 of the 14th Amendment.Rachel Mummey for The New York TimesShe proposed a general rule of thumb: “Whenever the Supreme Court considers a truly extraordinary constitutional case, it must confront at least two issues: first, what is the better answer to the legal question; and second, how confident are the justices in that answer.”“When it comes to cases that will have a massive impact on society,” she said, “one might assume that the confidence level has to be particularly high.”In her ruling on Thursday, Secretary of State Shenna Bellows of Maine wrote that the facts about Mr. Trump’s conduct were “not in serious dispute.”“The record establishes that Mr. Trump, over the course of several months and culminating on Jan. 6, 2021, used a false narrative of election fraud to inflame his supporters and direct them to the Capitol to prevent certification of the 2020 election and the peaceful transfer of power,” she wrote, adding: “The weight of the evidence makes clear that Mr. Trump was aware of the tinder laid by his multimonth effort to delegitimize a democratic election, and then chose to light a match.”Like the Colorado Supreme Court, Ms. Bellows put her ruling on hold while appeals move forward. That means the U.S. Supreme Court has some breathing room.The Colorado case is already before the justices in the form of a petition seeking review filed by the state’s Republican Party, which urged the court to resolve the case by March 5, when many states, including Colorado and Maine, hold primaries. Otherwise, they said, voters “will face profound uncertainty and the electoral process will be irrevocably damaged.”The six voters who prevailed in the Colorado case asked the justices to move even faster, culminating in a decision on the merits by Feb. 11.Professor Hasen said the ruling from Maine added to the need for prompt resolution.“The fact that a second state, at least for now, has ruled Trump ineligible for the ballot puts major pressure on the Supreme Court to intervene in the case and to say something about how to apply Section 3 to Trump,” he said. “The plaintiffs bringing these lawsuits are relentless, and they will keep trying to get Trump removed.”Agreeing to hear the case is one thing. Resolving it is another. As the Colorado Supreme Court recognized, there are at least eight discrete issues in the case, and the voters challenging Mr. Trump’s eligibility must prevail on all of them.“For Trump to win, he only needs to win on one issue,” Professor Muller said. “There are many options at the court’s disposal.”On the other hand, leading conservative law professors who have examined the original meaning of Section 3, which was adopted after the Civil War, have recently concluded that it plainly applies to Mr. Trump and bars him from another term. Such originalist arguments generally resonate with the court’s most conservative members.But other considerations may prevail.“As much as the court may want to evade politics in its decisions, it’s unavoidable,” Professor Muller said. “The best it can do right now is try to achieve consensus to avoid the appearance of partisanship.” More

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    Nikki Haley Erases Civil War History

    Nikki Haley drew criticism this week for what she didn’t say. As she campaigned in New Hampshire for the Republican presidential nomination, a person asked her to name the cause of the Civil War.Ms. Haley, a former South Carolina governor, joked it was not an “easy question.” She then mentioned “how government was going to run,” “freedoms,” the need for “capitalism” and individual liberties. When the questioner observed that she hadn’t mentioned slavery, she asked, “What do you want me to say about slavery?”She told a radio interviewer the next morning that “of course” the war was about slavery, that she was not evading the issue but trying to reframe it in modern terms. While we shouldn’t read too much into one video clip, it’s fair to ask: How is the Civil War’s cause not an easy question?The facts of our history are currently contested — especially that history. Gov. Ron DeSantis of Florida has acted to restrict what he sees as woke views of slavery and race in schools. Other Republican-led states have taken similar measures, and Donald Trump has offered his own hazy views of the past. It’s no wonder Ms. Haley spoke cautiously. The history of race has become as fraught a topic on the political right as it has been on the left.All this points to a reality we would do well to confront: Some Americans do not believe slavery was the cause of the Civil War. I encountered some of them while discussing a recent book on Abraham Lincoln.A few days ago, a caller on C-SPAN identified as “William in Lansford, Pa.,” asserted this to me: “The Civil War wasn’t about slavery. It was about the states fighting with one another about money.”It was far from the first time I’ve heard such claims. It’s not hard to see why a candidate might avoid engaging too deeply with voters on this topic.But the rest of us can arm ourselves with a few base-line facts. Far more than most historical events, the Civil War is debated among ordinary people as much as among historians. (Lincoln called it “a people’s war,” and it’s now a people’s history. I recently attended the annual Lincoln Forum in Gettysburg, Pa., where scholars shared the room with hundreds of superfans.) If we are to hold on to our history, we can prepare ourselves to respond calmly and with facts when someone makes a doubtful claim. Evidence shows what the war was about. It also shows why some people think it wasn’t about slavery — and why it matters a century and a half later.The evidence is straightforward. Southern states rejected Lincoln’s 1860 election as a president from the antislavery Republican Party. South Carolina was the first of 11 states that tried to leave the Union, and Confederates fired the first shot of the Civil War there at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor.Leaders of the would-be new republic named slavery as their cause. Alexander H. Stephens, the vice president of the Confederacy, gave a speech in 1861 in which he said “the assumption of the equality of races” was “an error” and “a sandy foundation” for the country he intended to leave.More than 30 years of agitation over slavery preceded the war. Northern antislavery leaders denounced the South’s institution more and more loudly and finally organized through the new Republican Party to gain political power. Southern leaders, who once cast slavery as a tragic inheritance from colonial times, increasingly defended it as moral and good.After the South’s defeat in 1865, these plain facts were obscured. Former Confederates cast their war heroes, like Robert E. Lee, as defenders of their home states rather than champions of slavery.The United Daughters of the Confederacy campaigned for generations to downplay slavery’s role in the war. In a 1924 speech to the group’s annual convention, Hollins N. Randolph asserted that “Southern men” had “fought to the death” for “the liberty of the individual, for the home and for the great principle of local self-government.” Never mind that it was “the liberty of the individual” to own other human beings. The speech advocated raising money for a great Confederate monument that still exists at Stone Mountain, Ga.Beyond the bombast, historians contested many facets of the long road to war. To give just one example from the immense scholarly record: T. Harry Williams, a 20th-century writer, put some blame for the war on Northern capitalists. He said they foresaw “fat rewards” in knocking proslavery aristocrats out of power and reshaping the economy to benefit their own factories and railroads. But really, such arguments amount to different interpretations of how the United States came to fight a war over slavery.Today some people quote Lincoln — accurately — saying his main war aim was preserving the Union, not ending slavery. But these quotes cannot sustain any argument longer than a social media meme. Lincoln also said that slavery was “the cause of the war.” Preserving the Union ultimately required slavery’s destruction.It seems that people question the historical record less because of doubt about the past than because of conflicts in the present. Some conservatives feel that progressives use slavery as a cudgel against their side in modern debates over race and equality.The first Republican president saw slavery neither as a cudgel nor as something that he needed to obscure. In an 1864 letter, he described slavery as a “great wrong” and added that people of the North and South alike shared “complicity in that wrong.”Complicity. Lincoln affirmed his country’s responsibility for failing to live up to its promise of equality. He still believed in the country and its promise.Lincoln never claimed to be morally superior to his countrymen. He focused on an immoral system, which he worked to restrict and then to destroy. The end of slavery is now part of this country’s legacy. It’s also part of the legacy of Lincoln’s party, though Ms. Haley’s example shows it can be hard for Republican candidates to talk about it.Steve Inskeep, a co-host of NPR’s “Morning Edition” and “Up First,” is the author of “Differ We Must: How Lincoln Succeeded in a Divided America.”The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X and Threads. More

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    Biden’s Christian ‘Persecution’? We Assess Trump’s Recent Claims.

    Former President Donald J. Trump has repeatedly accused the Biden administration of criminalizing Christians, and Catholics in particular, for their faith. Here are the facts.Former President Donald J. Trump has repeatedly tried to appeal to Christian voters in recent weeks by accusing the Biden administration of criminalizing Americans for their faith.On multiple occasions this month, Mr. Trump has claimed that President Biden has “persecuted” Catholics in particular. Mr. Biden himself is Catholic.“I don’t know what it is with Catholics,” Mr. Trump said during a rally in Coralville, Iowa. “They are going violently and viciously after Catholics.”Mr. Trump repeated similar comments days later at another rally, in Waterloo, and in a video posted before Christmas he said that “Americans of faith are being persecuted like nothing this nation has ever seen before.”The message fits into a larger theme for Mr. Trump, who — facing criminal charges in relation to his bid to say in office after losing the 2020 election and criticism for praising strongmen — has tried to paint Mr. Biden and Democrats as being the real threat to democracy.Here’s a closer look at his claims.WHAT WAS SAID“Under Crooked Joe Biden, Christians and Americans of faith are being persecuted like nothing this nation has ever seen before. Catholics in particular are being targeted and evangelicals are surely on the watchlist as well.”— in a video on Truth Social this monthFalse. Experts say they are unaware of any data to support the idea that Catholics in the United States are being persecuted by the government for their faith — let alone at record levels.“In terms of the evidence, I find it to be pretty hard to kind of support the idea that there’s a concerted, marked increase in a particular kind of Christian targeting,” said Jason Bruner, a religious studies professor at Arizona State University and historian who studies Christian persecution.Instead, Mr. Bruner said, it’s most likely that Mr. Trump is extrapolating from cases — say, churches that faced penalties for congregating during the Covid pandemic or anti-abortion activists who have been charged with crimes — to suggest a systemic issue.“There’s a long history of discrimination against Catholics in the United States, from the framing way through the 1970s,” said Frank Ravitch, a professor of law and religion at Michigan State University. “And if anything, it’s probably better now in terms of nondiscrimination than it ever, probably, ever has been.”Mr. Trump’s claims, Mr. Ravitch said, show “such an incredible blindness to the history of anti-Catholicism in the U.S.”Advocates who track Christians fleeing persecution around the world note that the Biden administration has been gradually increasing the number of refugees admitted into the United States after the number dropped precipitously during the Trump era. At the end of fiscal year 2023, the country recorded about 31,000 Christian refugee arrivals — about half of all refugees and the highest number recorded since fiscal year 2016. (Not all were necessarily fleeing persecution on religious grounds.)“We’re encouraged by that trajectory,” said Matthew Soerens, vice president of advocacy and policy at World Relief, a Christian humanitarian organization that has pushed the Biden administration to establish policies welcoming those facing faith-based discrimination.The Trump campaign did not respond to requests for the sources behind his claims.WHAT WAS SAID“Over the past three years, the Biden administration has sent SWAT teams to arrest pro-life activists.”— in a video on Truth Social this monthThis is misleading. The Justice Department has initiated an increasing number of criminal prosecutions under a law that makes it a violation to interfere with reproductive health care by blocking entrances, using threats or damaging property. In at least one case, a defendant’s family claimed he was arrested by a “SWAT” team, but the Federal Bureau of Investigation said that was not the case.The law is called the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances, or FACE, Act and was enacted in 1994. Federal prosecutors have used it to initiate 24 criminal cases, involving 55 defendants, since January 2021, according to the Justice Department.While a majority of those cases have involved acts at facilities that provided abortion services, prosecutors have also used it to charge several individuals who supported abortion access and targeted Florida centers that offered pregnancy counseling and abortion alternatives.Moreover, Mr. Trump omits that such arrests are not for “pro-life” activism but for specific actions, including violence, that prosecutors argue were attempts at blocking access to or interfering with reproductive health care services.In one case, federal attorneys charged a man for allegedly using a slingshot to fire metal ball bearings at a Chicago-area Planned Parenthood clinic. In another, prosecutors said that a New York man used locks and glue to prevent the opening of a clinic’s gate. And three men were accused of firebombing a clinic in California; one recently pleaded guilty.Mr. Trump’s claims about the use of “SWAT teams” may be a reference to the 2022 arrest of a Catholic activist in Pennsylvania. The defendant, Mark Houck, was charged with shoving a volunteer at a Planned Parenthood center in Philadelphia in 2021. Mr. Houck’s defense maintained that he was responding to abusive comments made toward his 12-year-old son by the volunteer. He was acquitted earlier this year.Republican lawmakers have criticized Mr. Houck’s arrest by armed agents, but the F.B.I. has rejected the claim that it used a SWAT team and said its tactics were consistent with standard practices.“There are inaccurate claims being made regarding the arrest of Mark Houck,” the F.B.I. said in a statement. “No SWAT team or SWAT operators were involved. F.B.I. agents knocked on Mr. Houck’s front door, identified themselves as F.B.I. agents and asked him to exit the residence. He did so and was taken into custody without incident pursuant to an indictment.”Christopher A. Wray, the F.B.I. director, when asked about the circumstances of Mr. Houck’s arrest, has said such decisions are made at the local level, “by the career agents on the ground, who have the closest visibility to the circumstances.”WHAT WAS SAID“The F.B.I. has been caught profiling devout Catholics as possible domestic terrorists and planning to send undercover spies into Catholic churches, just like in the old days of the Soviet Union.”— in a video on Truth Social this monthThis needs context. Mr. Trump was likely referring to a leaked January memo prepared by the F.B.I.’s field office in Richmond, Va., that warned of the potential for extremism for adherents of a “radical-traditionalist Catholic” ideology. Republicans have criticized the memo for months.But the memo was withdrawn and the nation’s top law enforcement officials have repeatedly denounced it.The memo warned of potential threats ahead of the 2024 election and suggested gathering information and developing sources within churches to help identify suspicious activity. It also distinguished between those radicalized and not radicalized, saying “radical-traditionalist Catholics” were a small minority.Some researchers believe there is some merit to those concerns, even if the memo was flawed. Mr. Ravitch, the Michigan State University professor, said he believed agents erred in focusing on Catholicism. “What they’re really talking about is an extremely radical brand of Christian nationals,” he said, emphasizing that they are a small subset and not representative of the Roman Catholic Church or evangelicals.Attorney General Merrick B. Garland said during a September congressional hearing that he was “appalled” by the memo and that “Catholics are not extremists.” He called suggestions that the government was targeting Americans based on their faith “outrageous,” referencing the fact that his own family fled Europe to escape antisemitism before the Holocaust.And earlier this month during a Senate hearing, Mr. Wray said of the document: “That particular intelligence product is something that, as soon I saw it, I was aghast. I had it withdrawn.”In a statement this week, the F.B.I. reiterated, “Any characterization that the F.B.I. is targeting Catholics is false.”Curious about the accuracy of a claim? Email factcheck@nytimes.com. More

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    Las claves de los intentos por retirar a Trump de las boletas en 2024

    En más de una decena de estados hay demandas que buscan impedir que el expresidente aparezca en las papeletas de las votaciones primarias. Esto es lo que hay que saber.La campaña para que el expresidente Donald Trump sea eliminado de la boleta electoral debido a sus intentos de permanecer en el poder después de las elecciones de 2020 ha cobrado impulso con los fallos en dos estados, Maine y Colorado, que le impiden aparecer en las papeletas para las elecciones primarias.Hay impugnaciones aún en curso en muchos otros estados, basadas en una cláusula poco conocida de una enmienda constitucional promulgada después de la Guerra Civil que inhabilita a funcionarios del gobierno que “participaron en insurrección o rebelión” de ocupar cargos públicos.A lo largo de los años, los tribunales y el Congreso han hecho poco para aclarar cómo se debe aplicar ese criterio, lo que aumenta la urgencia de los llamados a que la Corte Suprema de EE. UU. intervenga en la disputa, políticamente explosiva, antes de las próximas elecciones.Esto es lo que hay que saber sobre las impugnaciones.¿Qué estados ya han resuelto el asunto?La secretaria de Estado de Maine dijo el jueves que Trump no calificaba para aparecer en la boleta primaria republicana en ese territorio debido a su papel en el ataque del 6 de enero al Capitolio de EE. UU. Ella dio la razón a un grupo de ciudadanos que afirmaban que Trump había incitado una insurrección y, por lo tanto, estaba impedido de candidatearse nuevamente a la presidencia conforme a la sección 3 de la 14ª enmienda de la Constitución.En un fallo emitido por escrito, la secretaria de Estado, la demócrata Shenna Bellows, dijo que aunque nadie en su posición había prohibido la presencia de un candidato en la boleta electoral con fundamento en la sección 3 de la enmienda, “ningún candidato presidencial ha participado antes en una insurrección”.Horas después, la secretaria de Estado de California anunció que Trump permanecería en la boleta electoral en la entidad más poblada del país, donde los funcionarios electorales tienen un poder limitado para eliminar a los candidatos.En Colorado, la Corte Suprema del estado decidió la semana pasada en un fallo 4-3 que al expresidente no se le debe permitir aparecer en la boleta para las primarias allí porque participó en una insurrección. La sentencia no abordó las elecciones generales.Los jueces en Colorado dijeron que si su fallo fuera apelado ante la Corte Suprema de EE. UU., entonces a Trump se le permitiría permanecer en la boleta electoral hasta que el tribunal superior decidiera el asunto. La secretaria de Estado de Colorado ha dicho que la orden seguirá vigente el 5 de enero, cuando el estado tenga que certificar las boletas electorales.El miércoles, el Partido Republicano de Colorado dijo que había pedido a la Corte Suprema que escuchara una apelación a la decisión de Colorado.En Míchigan y Minnesota, los tribunales han dictaminado que los funcionarios electorales no pueden impedir al Partido Republicano incluir a Trump en sus boletas para las elecciones primarias. Pero ambos fallos dejaron abierta la puerta a nuevas impugnaciones que le impidan aparecer en la boleta electoral para las elecciones generales.¿En dónde más hay impugnaciones para que Trump no aparezca en la boleta electoral?Se presentaron demandas para sacar a Trump de la boleta electoral en unos 30 estados, pero muchas fueron desestimadas; según una base de datos mantenida por Lawfare, un sitio web de asuntos legales y de seguridad nacional, hay demandas activas en 14 estados.Esos estados son: Alaska, Arizona, Nevada, Nueva Jersey, Nuevo México, Nueva York, Oregón, Carolina del Sur, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Virginia Occidental, Wisconsin y Wyoming. (Un juez ha desestimado la demanda de Arizona, pero se apeló el fallo).¿De qué tratan las impugnaciones?Las iniciativas de descalificación se fundamentan en la 14ª enmienda de la Constitución, que fue adoptada en 1868 y tiene una sección que descalifica de ocupar cargos públicos a los exfuncionarios de gobierno que han traicionado sus juramentos al participar en actos de “insurrección o rebelión”. La disposición, incluida en la sección 3, tenía la intención de prohibir que funcionarios confederados pudieran trabajar para el gobierno de EE. UU.La disposición específicamente dice que cualquier persona que haya fungido como “funcionario de Estados Unidos”, juró apoyar la Constitución y, si luego “participó en insurrección o rebelión”, no podrá ocupar ningún cargo gubernamental. Incluye una disposición en la que el Congreso puede dispensar la prohibición con un voto de dos tercios en la Cámara y el Senado.Al aumentar las impugnaciones legales, se prevé que la Corte Suprema de EE. UU. aborde el tema, y los expertos dicen que el alcance del fallo determinaría si las impugnaciones se manejan rápidamente o se prolongan durante meses.Ashraf Ahmed, profesor de la Escuela de Derecho de Columbia que estudia la ley electoral, dijo que si la Corte Suprema llega a examinar el caso, podría evitar profundizar en los asuntos más importantes, como definir la sección 3. En cambio, dijo, los jueces podrían emitir un fallo en gran medida en función de las cuestiones procesales.¿Qué estados podrían decidir el asunto próximamente?Se espera una decisión pronto en Oregón, donde el mismo grupo que presentó la demanda en Míchigan, Free Speech for People, busca que la Corte Suprema del estado elimine a Trump de la boleta para las elecciones primarias allí. En ese caso, la secretaria de Estado ha pedido a la corte que acelere su consideración del caso porque debe dar los toques finales a la boleta para las primarias antes del 21 de marzo.John Bonifaz, presidente de Free Speech for People, dijo que el grupo planea presentar nuevas impugnaciones en otros estados próximamente, aunque no quiso decir en cuáles.Free Speech for People también ha pedido directamente a los principales funcionarios electorales en los 50 estados, así como en Washington, D.C., que retiren a Trump de las boletas en esos estados.Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs es reportero de noticias nacionales en Estados Unidos y se enfoca en la justicia penal. Es de Nueva York. Más de Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs. More

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    The U.S. Economy, the Southern Border, Oct. 7: How 13 Biden and Trump Voters Saw 2023

    What word would you use to describe the American economy as 2023 ends? What word would youuse to describe the American economy as 2023 ends? “Optimistic.” Chris, 59, Mich., Biden 2020 voter “Upward.” Deborah, 51, Tenn., Biden 2020 voter “Uncertain.” Joe, 37, Ark., Trump 2020 voter Something strange happened during our recent Times Opinion focus […] More

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    Wall Street strategists’ bull and bear scenarios for 2024.

    Wall Street’s forecasts mostly missed this year’s bull market rally. Here’s what strategists are saying about 2024.Last November and December, veteran stock market watchers forecast that 2023 would be a year to forget. They saw high inflation, a looming global recession and rising interest rates as sapping households’ buying power and denting corporate profits. For investors, they penciled in paltry gains and one of the worst performances for the S&P 500 in the past 15 years.But the market pros got the story only partly right. While interest rates did climb to a near two-decade peak, the S&P 500 has surprisingly soared to a near record high. Fueled partly by a rally in the so-called Magnificent Seven megacap tech stocks, it’s risen nearly 25 percent this year, as of Thursday’s close, shaking off a banking crisis, wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, and slowing growth in China’s economy.Crypto managed to do even better. Bitcoin bulls have swept aside a legal crackdown against the industry’s biggest players to fuel an impressive rally. The digital token has gained more than 150 percent this year, making it one of the best performing risky assets.“Twenty twenty-three was a great year for the contrarians,” David Bahnsen, the founder and chief investment officer of the Bahnsen Group, a wealth management firm, told DealBook. “You had macroeconomic concerns a year ago that didn’t come to bear, and you had valuation and financial concerns that didn’t come to bear. And it’s particularly ironic that it didn’t, because actually everything investors feared a year ago got worse.”Wall Street’s outlook for 2024 is rosier. Analysts see lower borrowing costs, a soft landing (that is, an economic slowdown that avoids a recession) and a pretty good year for investors.But if 2023 taught the market pros anything, it’s that forecasts can look out of date pretty fast. A slew of things could disrupt the markets in the year ahead — inflation creeping up again, or not, is one big factor to watch. And there are wild cards, too, with voters expected to head to the polls in over 50 countries next year, including the U.S.Here’s how Wall Street sees 2024 playing out:The bull caseThe median year-end 2024 forecast for the S&P 500 is 5,068, according to FactSet. Such a level would imply an annualized gain of roughly 6 percent for 2024.Bank of America’s equity strategists, led by Savita Subramanian, are among those in the bullish camp. In their annual forecast, they said that the S&P 500 would be likely to close out next year at 5,000, helped by a kind of “goldilocks” scenario of falling prices and rising corporate profits.Goldman Sachs is even more upbeat. Its analysts upgraded their year-end 2024 call on the S&P 500 to 5,100. They made the change after the Fed’s surprise statement on Dec. 13 that the equivalent of three interest-rate cuts were on the table for next year. Lower borrowing costs tend to give consumers and businesses more spending power, which could help Corporate America’s bottom line.Another catalyst: Investors this year put far more money into safe interest-rate sensitive assets, like money market funds, than they did into stocks. That logic could be flipped on its head in 2024. “As rates begin to fall, investors may rotate some of their cash holdings toward stocks,” David Kostin, the chief U.S. equity strategist at Goldman Sachs, said in a recent investor note.The bear caseOn the more pessimistic side is JPMorgan Chase, which carries a 2024 year-end target of 4,200. Its analysts team, led by Marko Kolanovic, the bank’s chief global market strategist, sees a struggling consumer with depleted savings, a potential recession and geopolitical uncertainty that could push up commodity prices, like oil, and push down global growth.The year ahead will be “another challenging year for market participants,” Kolanovic said. (Most strategists are even more downbeat on Europe, where recession fears are more acute. On the flip side, equities in Asia could show another year of solid growth, especially in India and Japan, Wall Street analysts say.)Lee Ferridge, the head of multi-asset strategy for North America at State Street Global Markets, is more optimistic about the American consumer, but points to a different challenge for investors. “If I’m right, the economy stays stronger. But then that’s a double-edged sword for equities,” he said. The prospect of robust consumer and business spending poses an inflation risk that could force the Fed to hold rates higher for longer, and even pause cuts, he said. “That’s going to be a headwind for equities.”“I wouldn’t be surprised to see a fairly flat year next year,” he added. “If we are up, it’s going to be the Magnificent Seven that are the drivers again.”The wild card: politics and the electionsPresidential elections are not rally killers, according to market analysis by LPL Financial that looks at the past 71 years. In that period, the S&P has risen, on average, by 7 percent during U.S. presidential election years. (The market tends to do even better in a re-election year, the financial advice firm notes.)Even with some uncommon questions swirling over next year’s contest — Will a mountain of legal troubles derail the Republican front-runner, Donald Trump? Will President Biden’s sagging polling ratings open the door for a strong third-party challenger? Will the election result be disputed, causing a constitutional crisis? — that’s unlikely to add much volatility to the markets, Wall Street pros say.“The election will not be a story in the stock market, up until November 2024, for the simple reason that the stock market will not know who’s going to win the election until November 2024,” Bahnsen said.His advice: Don’t even try to game out the election’s impact on the markets. More

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    The 14th Amendment Disqualification Was Not Meant for Trump

    Challenges to disqualify Donald Trump from the office of president under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment are popping up all over the country. On Thursday, the secretary of state of Maine ruled that Mr. Trump would be ineligible for the state’s primary ballot, a decision that can be appealed to the state’s Supreme Court. On Wednesday, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled narrowly that the state will allow Mr. Trump to stay on the primary ballot — but left open a potential future challenge to his inclusion on a general-election ballot.But so far only one — the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling that bars Mr. Trump from the primary ballot — has reached the doorstep of the U.S. Supreme Court.The Supreme Court should take the case and reverse the Colorado Supreme Court ruling, and do so for the very reason cited by the Colorado judges. According to the Colorado court (itself quoting an earlier, unrelated case), Section 3 should be interpreted “in light of the objective sought to be achieved and the mischief to be avoided.”That is exactly right. The Colorado court failed, however, to follow its own advice.When Congress passed the 14th Amendment, there wasn’t a person in the Senate or House who worried about loyal Americans electing a former rebel like Jefferson Davis as president. Instead, Republicans feared that the leaders of the late rebellion would use their local popularity to disrupt Republican Reconstruction policy in Congress or in the states. Section 3 expressly addressed these concerns and did so without denying loyal Americans their right to choose a president.To date, much of the debate over Section 3 has focused on whether the president is an “officer” who takes an “oath.” This is an issue in the second part of the provision. What neither scholars nor courts have yet focused on is first part of Section 3. The threshold issue is whether the framers and ratifiers thought that the president holds a “civil” office “under the United States.” This is a much more specific and historically difficult question.Here are the key opening words of Section 3: “No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State …”The text begins by expressly naming offices that rebel leaders might conceivably secure for themselves on the basis of their local popularity. The greatest fear was that these rebels would return to Congress and join Northern Democrats in thwarting Republican Reconstruction policy.As Representative Thaddeus Stevens warned his colleagues, without a properly worded Section 3, “that side of the House will be filled with yelling secessionists and hissing copperheads” — a reference to Northern Democrats who had opposed the Civil War. It was possible that a coalition of Southern and Northern Democratic presidential electors would nominate a “hissing copperhead.”Congressional Republicans were so concerned about mischief in the Electoral College that they delayed the passage of the 14th Amendment in order to make sure the issue was properly addressed. The Joint Committee’s draft of Section 3 prohibited rebels from voting for presidential electors, but this left open an enormous loophole. As Representative John Longyear pointed out, this prohibition would be “easily evaded by appointing electors of President and Vice President through their legislatures.”Senator Jacob Howard agreed that Section 3 would not “prevent state legislatures from choosing rebels as presidential electors,” and he led the effort to rewrite Section 3 in a manner that closed the loophole. The result is the final version that prohibits leading rebels from serving as presidential electors, whether elected or appointed.The only reason to secure a trustworthy Electoral College is in order to secure a trustworthy president. So Section 3 focuses on state-level decision making. It expressly addresses three key positions where leading rebels might use their remaining popularity to disrupt Republican Reconstruction: the Senate, the House of Representatives and state-selected presidential electors.Radical Republicans like Thaddeus Stevens would have gone further and completely disenfranchised anyone who had participated in the rebellion, leader or not. Moderate Republicans, however, were more optimistic. As Senator Daniel Clark noted, once leading rebels were removed, “those who have moved in humble spheres [would] return to their loyalty and to the Government.”The strategy worked. In 1868, despite the scattered participation of former rebel soldiers as presidential electors, Southern Black voters helped elect the Republican Ulysses S. Grant over the Democrat Horatio Seymour.It is possible to read Section 3 as impliedly including the office of president as one of the “civil” offices “under the United States” covered by the general catchall provision. It would be odd to stuff the highest office in the land into a general provision that included everything from postmasters to toll takers, but the text is ambiguous enough to make this a possible reading.However, if the framers meant the catchall provision to include both presidents and postmasters, they were remarkably negligent. According to longstanding congressional precedent and legal authority, the phrase “civil office under the United States” did not include the office of president of the United States. As Joseph Story explained in his influential “Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,” the congressional precedent known as “Blount’s Case” established that the offices of president, senator and representative were not civil offices under the government of the United States — they were the government of the United States. The phrase “civil office under the United States” referred to appointed offices.In addition to legal authority, there is also common sense to guide us. The text of Section 3 is structured in a manner that moves from high federal office to low state office, and the apex federal political offices are expressly named. As the former Attorney General Reverdy Johnson explained, “the specific exclusion in the case of Senators and Representatives” led him to initially presume that the framers excluded the office of president. Johnson accepted a colleague’s suggestion to the contrary, but if the text created such a presumption in the mind of a former attorney general, it is reasonable to think it may have created the same presumption in the minds of ratifiers.Actually, we have no idea whether the ratifiers shared Johnson’s initial presumption. This is because no one has discovered a single example of any ratifier discussing whether Section 3 included the office of president of the United States. Despite extraordinary efforts by researchers, no one has yet found evidence that any ratifier even considered the possibility that Section 3 abridged the people’s right to choose their president.The silence of the ratifiers on this point is important. Those favoring the disqualification of Mr. Trump insist that there is nothing “anti-democratic” about constraining the presidential choices of the national electorate. The Constitution, after all, contains a number of provisions that deny the people the right to elect whomever they wish. Article II, Section One, for example, prevents the people from electing anyone who is under age 35 or who is a foreign-born candidate.Those qualifications are expressly declared in the text and they received robust vetting and debate in the ratifying conventions. In the case of Section 3, the Supreme Court is being asked to impose new constraints on the democratic process by way of textual implication and in the absence of any public debate whatsoever.Such a reading is neither democratically appropriate nor textually necessary. And it was most certainly not “the objective sought to be achieved [or] the mischief to be avoided” by Section 3.At best, the text of Section 3 is ambiguous regarding the office of president. The Supreme Court should limit the clause to its historically verifiable meaning and scope.Let the people make their own decision about Donald Trump.Kurt Lash, a professor at the University of Richmond School of Law, is the author of, most recently, “The Reconstruction Amendments: Essential Documents” and the forthcoming “A Troubled Birth of Freedom: The Struggle to Amend the Constitution in the Aftermath of the Civil War.”The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X and Threads. More

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    Esta es la agenda comercial que planea Trump, si gana las elecciones

    El expresidente Donald Trump está planeando una ampliación contundente de las iniciativas de su primer periodo para reformar las políticas comerciales de Estados Unidos si regresa al poder en 2025; por ejemplo, al aplicarle un nuevo impuesto a “casi todas las mercancías importadas”, lo que tendría el riesgo de distanciar a sus aliados e iniciar una guerra comercial a nivel mundial.Aunque el gobierno de Biden ha mantenido los aranceles que el expresidente le impuso a China, Trump iría mucho más lejos e intentará desvincular las dos economías más grandes del mundo, las cuales intercambiaron 758.000 millones de dólares en mercancías y servicios el año pasado. Trump ha dicho que iba a “aplicar otras restricciones contundentes a la participación china” en una amplia variedad de activos en Estados Unidos, prohibiría a los estadounidenses invertir en China e introduciría de manera gradual una prohibición total a las importaciones de categorías importantes de mercancía hecha en China, como artículos electrónicos, acero y productos farmacéuticos.“Impondremos fuertes sanciones a China y a todos los demás países cuando quieran abusar de nosotros”, aseveró Trump en un mitin reciente en Durham, Nuevo Hampshire.En una entrevista, Robert Lighthizer, quien fue el principal negociador comercial en el gobierno de Trump y que lo más probable es que tenga una gran participación en un segundo periodo, ofreció la explicación más amplia y detallada hasta el momento sobre la agenda comercial de Trump. Para este artículo se le hicieron preguntas referidas a la campaña del exmandatario y los integrantes del equipo de campaña estuvieron al teléfono para comentar al respecto.En esencia, la agenda comercial de Trump busca dar marcha atrás a la integración de Estados Unidos en la economía global y hacer que el país se vuelva más autónomo: producir un mayor porcentaje de lo que consume y ejercer su poder a través de acuerdos individuales con otros países.Trump, quien se autodenomina como un “hombre de aranceles” dio algunos pasos en esa dirección cuando fue presidente, por ejemplo, al imponer aranceles a diversas importaciones, obstaculizar a la Organización Mundial del Comercio e iniciar una guerra comercial con China. Si lo vuelven a elegir, tiene planeada una injerencia mucho más audaz con la esperanza de eliminar el déficit comercial y fortalecer el sector manufacturero, lo que traerá consecuencias potencialmente trascendentales para el empleo, los precios, las relaciones comerciales y el sistema de comercio mundial.Sus planes —que ha calificado como “una reforma radical de nuestra política comercial y fiscal en favor de los estadounidenses”— supondría una apuesta de alto riesgo con la salud de la economía debido a que el desempleo ha bajado a 3,7 por ciento, la inflación ha disminuido sustancialmente de su repunte posterior a la pandemia, cada mes se generan cerca de 200.000 empleos y la bolsa de valores está por llegar a un nivel sin precedentes.Robert Lighthizer, en el centro, fue el principal negociador comercial del gobierno de Trump, incluso para el el Acuerdo entre Estados Unidos, México y Canadá que reemplazó al TLCAN.Gesi Schilling para The New York TimesLos planes de Trump han hecho que especialistas en comercio con ideas más tradicionales estén en alerta. Daniel M. Price, un alto asesor en materia de economía internacional durante el gobierno de George W. Bush, calificó esos planes como “erráticos e irracionales”. Afirmó que los costos correrían a cargo de los consumidores y los productores estadounidenses y que esos planes tendrían el riesgo de alejar a los aliados.“La última vez que Trump impuso aranceles de forma abusiva a nuestros aliados (por razones de seguridad nacional inventadas), varios socios comerciales importantes, como Japón y Corea del Sur, se abstuvieron de tomar represalias contra las exportaciones estadounidenses pensando que Trump pronto regresaría a la cordura”, señaló Price. “Esta vez no consentirán esa fantasía”.Resulta complejo evaluar los méritos de la visión comercial de Trump porque podría haber múltiples repercusiones y él está buscando cambios a largo plazo. Pero muchos estudios económicos concluyeron que los aranceles que impuso cuando era presidente le costaron a la sociedad estadounidense más de los beneficios que generaron.La investigación de los economistas de la Reserva Federal y la Universidad de Chicago encontró que los aranceles que Trump impuso a las lavadoras en 2018 crearon alrededor de 1800 empleos al tiempo que aumentaron los precios que los consumidores pagaron por nuevas lavadoras y secadoras en 86 y 92 dólares por unidad. Ese gasto significó alrededor de 817.000 dólares por empleo.Lighthizer descalificó los estudios que criticaban los aranceles de Trump, los tachó de sesgados en favor del libre comercio y alegó que la inflación se había estabilizado durante su gobierno. También afirmó que, aunque la eficiencia, las ganancias y los precios bajos eran importantes, la prioridad debería ser fomentar la creación de más empleos en el sector manufacturero para los estadounidenses que no cuentan con un título universitario.“Si lo único que quieres es eficiencia —si crees que la gente está mejor en la fila del desempleo con tres televisores de 40 pulgadas de lo que estaría si estuviera trabajando, y con solo dos televisores—, entonces no vas a estar de acuerdo conmigo”, comentó Lighthizer. “Hay un grupo de personas que cree que el fin es el consumo, pero mi idea es que el fin sea la producción y que haya comunidades seguras y felices. Debemos estar dispuestos a pagar un precio por eso”.En 2017, Trump comenzó su presidencia contratando a asesores económicos con puntos de vista diversos, incluidos defensores de políticas proteccionistas, como Lighthizer y Peter Navarro, así como veteranos de Wall Street orientados hacia el libre comercio y escépticos respecto a los aranceles, como el expresidente de Goldman Sachs Gary D. Cohn.Pero los asesores económicos con los que mantiene una estrecha relación son, en su inmensa mayoría, de ideología pro-arancelaria, como Lighthizer. Lo más probable es que sus planes más agresivos para un segundo mandato se enfrenten a una oposición interna mucho menor que en su primer mandato.Aranceles universalesMuchos estudios económicos concluyeron que los aranceles, incluidos los del acero, que Trump impuso como presidente le costaron a la sociedad estadounidense más que los beneficios que produjeron.Damon Winter/The New York TimesEntre los planes más ambiciosos de Trump en materia comercial para 2025, el de consecuencias más globales es imponer un presunto arancel universal de base, es decir, un nuevo impuesto para la mayoría de las mercancías importadas.La campaña de Trump no ha especificado cuán elevado sería este arancel. En una entrevista de agosto con Fox Business, Trump mencionó una cifra del 10 por ciento y dijo: “Creo que debemos trabajar mucho” en la economía estadounidense.Trump no ha precisado otros detalles. Por ejemplo, no ha explicado si concibe el arancel universal como un nuevo piso o como un complemento de los aranceles existentes. Es decir, si un producto importado tenía un impuesto del cinco por ciento, ¿ahora aumentaría al 10 o al 15 por ciento? Lighthizer mencionó que sería esto último.El exmandatario tampoco ha dicho si el nuevo arancel se aplicaría a las importaciones de las dos decenas de países con los que Estados Unidos tiene acuerdos de libre comercio, entre ellos México y Canadá, los que juntos representan casi una quinta parte del déficit comercial total de Estados Unidos en mercancías y con los cuales el gobierno de Trump renegoció el acuerdo comercial casi libre de aranceles que sustituyó al Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte.El equipo de campaña señaló que Trump no ha anunciado ninguna decisión al respecto. Pero la embajadora de Canadá en Estados Unidos, Kirsten Hillman, dijo en una entrevista que su país cree que sus exportaciones deberían estar exentas de cualquier nuevo arancel universal.“Acabamos de concluir este acuerdo con el 99 por ciento de los aranceles a cero bajo la gestión anterior de Trump, por lo que es nuestra expectativa que estas políticas propuestas no se apliquen a Canadá”, dijo.Trump tampoco ha dicho si cree que podría imponer de manera unilateral el agresivo nuevo arancel según la ley actual o si tendría que autorizarlo el Congreso.Clete Willems, que fue asistente adjunto del presidente Trump para los temas de economía internacional, dijo en una entrevista que simpatizaba con el deseo de reciprocidad del exmandatario, pero agregó: “La autoridad del presidente para promulgar aumentos arancelarios generalizados no está clara, y soy escéptico de que el Congreso vaya a respaldarlo”.Sin embargo, Lighthizer afirmó que, dada la magnitud del déficit comercial de EE. UU. y su impacto en la economía estadounidense, un presidente tendría “clara autoridad” para imponer aranceles de manera unilateral en virtud de dos leyes, la Ley de Poderes Económicos de Emergencia Internacional y la Sección 338 de la Ley Arancelaria de 1930 .Sin embargo, dijo que, dependiendo de las condiciones políticas, Trump podría optar en cambio por pedir al Congreso que promulgue una nueva legislación para que un sucesor no pueda revocarla fácilmente. “Él tiene la autoridad legal para hacerlo y tiene dos rutas”, dijo Lighthizer. “Hasta donde yo sé aún no ha tomado una decisión al respecto”.Independientemente del fundamento jurídico, se levantaría un torbellino de pérdidas y ganancias confusas derivadas de esa política de aranceles universales. Por un lado, repuntarían algunas manufactureras nacionales puesto que los fabricantes nacionales de mercancías rivales podrían incrementar los precios y ampliarían la producción. Ahí es donde está la atención de Trump: “Rápidamente nos convertiremos en una potencia manufacturera como ninguna otra que se haya visto en el mundo”, prometió en un video de campaña.Como algo básico de la economía, también habría inconvenientes. La medida supondría un aumento de impuestos que los consumidores tendrían que pagar cuando se incrementen los precios, y este se dejaría sentir más en la población de pocos recursos, puesto que son los consumidores que emplean una parte mayor de su ingreso en la compra de mercancías.Esta política también podría ocasionar una presión descendente sobre otras manufacturas nacionales. Los productores que compran insumos del extranjero pagarían costos más elevados, lo que haría que sus productos fueran menos competitivos en el mercado mundial. Los aranceles de represalia disminuirían la demanda de exportaciones estadounidenses.La desvinculación de ChinaTrump ha dicho que intentará separar las economías estadounidense y china, que intercambiaron unos 758.000 millones de dólares en bienes y servicios el año pasado.Ruth Fremson/The New York TimesTrump también ha dicho que iría más lejos al imponer “una serie audaz de reformas para eliminar por completo la dependencia de China en todas las áreas esenciales”. En 2022, Estados Unidos importó 536.300 millones de dólares en mercancía procedente de China y le exportó a este país mercancías por un valor de 154.000 millones de dólares.Entre otras cosas, Trump ha mencionado que aplicaría “un plan de cuatro años para eliminar gradualmente todas las importaciones de productos esenciales chinos, desde artículos electrónicos hasta acero y productos farmacéuticos”, junto con reglas nuevas para evitar que las empresas estadounidenses inviertan en China e impedir que ese país compre bienes estadounidenses.No obstante, Trump se protegió al decir, sin dar mayores detalles, que permitiría “todas las inversiones que sirvieran de manera manifiesta para los intereses de Estados Unidos”.El gobierno de Biden también ha trabajado para imponer más restricciones a los intercambios económicos con China, pero de una manera más reducida y adecuada. El gobierno prohíbe exportar a China determinada tecnología que tenga aplicaciones militares y, en agosto, el presidente Joe Biden firmó una orden para prohibir que los estadounidenses realicen nuevas inversiones en empresas chinas que estén tratando de desarrollar algunas cosas como semiconductores y computadoras cuánticas.Ahora Trump está proponiendo llegar aún más lejos y pedir que se anule la categoría comercial de “país más favorecido” con la que cuenta China, lo cual implica cesar las relaciones comerciales normales permanentes y los aranceles reducidos que Estados Unidos le otorgó a China después de que esta se uniera a la Organización Mundial del Comercio en 2001. Concretamente, este mes, un comité de la Cámara de Representantes publicó un informe bipartidista que también solicitaba esa medida.De acuerdo con un estudio publicado el mes pasado por Oxford Economics que fue encargado por el Consejo Empresarial Estados Unidos-China, hacer esto trastornaría de manera importante la economía estadounidense. Este estudio estimaba que el aumento resultante en aranceles conllevaría una pérdida de 1,6 billones de dólares para la economía estadounidense y 774.000 empleos menos en cinco años.En sus memorias de 2023, tituladas No Trade Is Free, Lighthizer reconoció que las empresas estadounidenses que operan en China y las que dependen de las importaciones chinas se opondrían a esa idea, pero afirmó que “con el tiempo” la fabricación de más productos como computadoras y teléfonos móviles regresaría a Estados Unidos o a sus aliados, lo que beneficiaría a los trabajadores estadounidenses y al país.También escribió que las inevitables represalias chinas para perjudicar las exportaciones estadounidenses “contribuirían aún más al desacoplamiento estratégico” de las dos economías. “Cualquiera que admita que China es un problema pero insista en que existe una solución mágica y sin perturbaciones para el problema que representa China es muy probablemente un mentiroso, un tonto, un bribón, un globalista irredimible, o alguna combinación de ellos”, escribió.Décadas de lucha contra el déficitUn edificio industrial abandonado en Rockford, Illinois. Los críticos han señalado el deterioro social ocasionado por el cierre de fábricas en todo el país como una desventaja del comercio.Jamie Kelter Davis para The New York TimesEl nacionalismo económico de Trump le ha ayudado a cambiar el Partido Republicano. Ha reunido a una coalición más obrera que la que solían atraer los republicanos antes de que fuera el abanderado del partido.Sus puntos de vista son un retroceso a un enfoque mercantilista del comercio, en el que los países utilizaban aranceles elevados para proteger y desarrollar sus capacidades de fabricación nacionales. El sitio web de la campaña de Trump afirma que su política comercial “está firmemente arraigada en la historia estadounidense” porque Estados Unidos “solía imponer aranceles a más del 95 por ciento de todas las importaciones”. Esa estadística es de antes de la Guerra Civil, cuando los aranceles constituían la gran mayoría de los ingresos del gobierno federal.A lo largo del siglo XX, muchos economistas llegaron a considerar eso como un planteamiento miope. En la década de 1990, a pesar de la oposición de los sindicatos, se formó un consenso bipartidista a favor de un comercio más libre. La idea era que la reducción de aranceles y el aumento del comercio aumentarían la prosperidad material general de la sociedad al mejorar la eficiencia y bajar los precios.Pero esas ganancias no se han distribuido equitativamente y, con el tiempo, han surgido diversas formas de desilusión con la reducción de las barreras comerciales.En Estados Unidos, los críticos tanto de izquierda como de derecha han señalado cada vez más las desventajas del comercio para las comunidades obreras. La decadencia social se extendió a medida que las empresas cerraban fábricas cuya producción podían trasladar al extranjero, para bajar costos, lo que contribuyó —junto con otros factores, como el aumento de la automatización— al estancamiento de los salarios de la clase trabajadora. Las interrupciones de la cadena de suministro durante la pandemia centraron la atención en otro riesgo de la globalización.Y existe una creciente ansiedad sobre las implicaciones de seguridad de la dependencia de Estados Unidos de China para ciertos bienes y recursos críticos, y la indignación por las prácticas de China de obligar a las empresas a compartir tecnología y su robo descarado de secretos comerciales.Políticamente, Trump se adelantó al centrarse en los aspectos negativos del libre comercio. Durante más de 30 años, ha arremetido contra los déficits comerciales, que considera, al igual que los balances de las empresas, una simple cuestión de beneficios y pérdidas. Se queja de que los países extranjeros que exportan más a Estados Unidos de lo que importan están estafando a Estados Unidos.En 2017, Trump hacía sistemáticamente una pregunta sencilla a sus informadores antes de sus llamadas con líderes extranjeros, según una persona con conocimiento directo: “¿Cuál es el déficit comercial?”. A menudo, la respuesta establecería el estado de ánimo de Trump para la llamada y cuán amistoso sería con el jefe de Estado.Trump retiró a Estados Unidos del Acuerdo Transpacífico, el tratado comercial más importante del presidente Barack Obama. Su gestión paralizó la capacidad de la OMC para resolver disputas comerciales entre países al bloquear su capacidad para sustituir a los miembros de un órgano de apelación.Trump impuso aranceles a determinadas importaciones, aumentando los precios de las lavadoras y los paneles solares, así como del acero y el aluminio. E inició una guerra comercial con China, imponiendo aranceles a más de 360.000 millones de dólares de productos chinos.A pesar de los agreivos aranceles de Trump, los datos de la Oficina del Censo muestran que el déficit comercial anual de bienes creció de 735.000 millones en 2016 a 901.000 millones de dólares en 2020. Pero Lighthizer señaló una ligera disminución en el déficit comercial en 2019 en comparación con 2018, argumentando que los aranceles estaban empezando a tener su efecto previsto antes de la agitación del año pandémico.Las guerras comerciales de Trump fueron costosas. Después de que China —que se ha convertido en el mayor mercado de exportación para los agricultores estadounidenses— tomó represalias aumentando los aranceles sobre los productos agrícolas estadounidenses como la soya, el gobierno de Trump comenzó un rescate gubernamental de 28.000 millones de dólares para mantener a los agricultores a flote. Un estudio de febrero de 2020 calculó que el mayor coste del metal para los fabricantes estadounidenses debido a los aranceles sobre el acero había causado la pérdida de unos 75.000 puestos de trabajo.Por muy agresivas que fueran las políticas comerciales de Trump en su primer mandato, no siempre llegó tan lejos como quería. A pesar de amenazar con retirarse de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, por ejemplo, nunca lo hizo. Aunque detestaba el TLCAN, su administración negoció un sustituto que, aunque modernizaba varios términos, mantenía un mercado casi libre de aranceles con México y Canadá.Lighthizer, que dirigió esas negociaciones, escribió en sus memorias que, independientemente de si el Congreso debería haber aprobado el TLCAN en 1993, retirarse abruptamente de él después de décadas de integración económica habría causado “una catástrofe económica y política”, enviando “ondas de choque a través de la economía” y perjudicando a “los votantes de Trump en Texas y en todo el cinturón agrícola”.Ana Swanson More