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      The Russian Pathology Deepens at The NY Times

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      The Daily Devil’s Dictionary cannot help but love The New York Times, with increasingly diabolical ardor. Whenever the news cycle goes dry, we can turn to The Times and its documented paranoia for inspiration. The risk is repetition. The reward is the pleasure of picking and consuming low-hanging fruit.

      Yesterday, we focused on a glossy piece of propaganda designed to dismiss US President Donald Trump’s warnings that the results of the US election will be invalid because the new generation of voting machines will be Russia-proof. Now, we have the pleasure of examining The Times’ latest contribution to the revival of the Cold War. This time it’s a spy-versus-spy story, a true Cold War classic.

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      A trio of Times journalists — Ana Swanson, Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes — has penned an article bearing the title, “U.S. Diplomats and Spies Battle Trump Administration Over Suspected Attacks.” It turns out to be a valiant effort of their part to resuscitate a story that officially died in 2018. That was when scientists proved that the sophisticated sonic weapon some American diplomats in Cuba believed was targeting their mental health turned out to be nothing more than the sound produced by a certain species of cricket. At no point in their article do the authors acknowledge the debunking.

      Patient readers will find the piece confusing, like so many other Times articles that flood the reader with random facts, creating the impression that some great investigative work has been undertaken. The following paragraph contains the core of the authors’ accusations (or rather insinuations). It illustrates the type of paranoid reasoning The Times has now routinely adopted as a key feature of its editorial policy.

      “The cases involving C.I.A. officers, none of which have been publicly reported, are adding to suspicions that Russia carried out the attacks worldwide,” the journalists report. “Some senior Russia analysts in the C.I.A., officials at the State Department and outside scientists, as well as several of the victims, see Russia as the most likely culprit given its history with weapons that cause brain injuries and its interest in fracturing Washington’s relations with Beijing and Havana.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Culprit:

      For The New York Times (and Democratic Representative Adam Schiff), whatever the crime: Russia.

      Contextual Note

      The article consists of a magma of unverified and contradictory accounts of impressionistically reported cases. What the authors cannot achieve by the quality and accuracy of their reporting they try to accomplish through the quantity of random examples. They punctuate the citations with passages of pseudo-reasoning meant to point the reader toward a conclusion that no responsible authority — political or scientific — appears to have reached.

      The paragraph cited above offers a glimpse of the modes of reasoning used to make the article’s thesis sound credible. It cites “cases” that “are adding to suspicions that Russia carried out the attacks worldwide.” In other words, the central fact is that suspicions exist, which is undoubtedly true. But whose suspicions, other than Times journalists? They do cite something that is factual rather than a mere suspicion: “The C.I.A. director remains unconvinced, and State Department leaders say they have not settled on a cause.”

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      Admittedly suspicions exist. That should be true for any thesis that isn’t clearly established. In the same vein, if there are suspicions (in the plural), we might expect that there will also be suspects. But for The Times, there is only one: Russia. The journalists cite different categories of individuals who designate Russia as the culprit: “Some senior Russia analysts in the C.I.A., officials at the State Department and outside scientists, as well as several of the victims.” Now, if “some” Russia analysts see Russia as the culprit, it means that others don’t.

      Readers should always maintain a “suspicion” that journalists who rely on citing “some” of a designated group of people are more likely expressing opinion than reporting news. We know how eagerly climate change deniers love to cite “some scientists” who doubt the majority opinion. The Times reporters never tire of citing “some” authorities for their opinions or assessments. 

      Early in the article, to establish that there was a real and not imaginary health problem, they cite “some officers and their lawyers.” At one point, they tell us, “Some C.I.A. analysts believe Moscow was trying to derail that work.” At another, “Some senior officials at the State Department and former intelligence officers said they believed Russia played a role.”

      They occasionally use “some” disparagingly to identify those who have failed to reach their conclusion about Russian guilt. “Some top American officials insist on seeing more evidence before accusing Russia,” the journalists write. They cite the CIA director, Gina Haspel, who “has acknowledged that Moscow had the intent to harm operatives, but she is not convinced it was responsible or that attacks occurred.” Maybe this article will convince her.

      Critical readers should also be suspicious of sentences that begin with the phrase, “it’s obvious.” Quoting Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen, the article tells us, “It’s obvious how a U.S. adversary would have much to gain from the disorder, distress and division that has followed.” As Sherlock Holmes might observe, the obvious is the first thing to become suspicious of and the last thing to trust, even if what seems obvious does have a bearing on the truth. The Russians probably do think they have something to gain from disorder in the US. But so do others. That “obvious” fact doesn’t point in any specific direction, nor does it imply agency.

      Historical Note

      In the same edition of The New York Times (October 19), an op-ed by Michelle Goldberg has a rhetorical question as its title, “Is the Trump Campaign Colluding With Russia Again?” Goldberg’s suspects the omnipresent Russians were behind the story of Hunter Biden’s notorious hard disk that enabled The New York Post to publish compromising emails for the Joe Biden election campaign. National Intelligence Director John Ratcliffe, a Trump administration appointee, claims that there is not an iota of evidence to support the claim that Russia is behind the story. The Times counters with an op-ed by John Sipher, a former CIA man who worked for many years in Russia.

      Sipher complains that Ratcliffe’s denial represents nothing more than his willingness to toe Donald Trump’s line. He offers this astonishing moral reflection: “Rather than operating as an honest steward of the large and important intelligence community, Mr. Ratcliffe appears to regard the nation’s secrets as a place to hunt for nuggets that can be used as political weapons.”

      Let’s try to decipher Sipher’s thoughts. He may be right about Ratcliffe’s loyalty to Trump and the need to suspect he might be lying. No, let’s correct that and say he is absolutely right about not trusting anything Ratcliffe says. But his contention that a director of intelligence should be “an honest steward” is laughable. The whole point about working in intelligence is to be a loyally dishonest steward of somebody’s political agenda. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, a former CIA director, made that clear when he proudly admitted that the CIA trained its people to lie, cheat and steal.

      Presumably, Sipher worked for the CIA under George Tenet, who famously accepted to lie on behalf of President George W. Bush’s agenda and provide false evidence for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In his book, “At the Center of the Storm,” Tenet later complained that Vice President Dick Cheney and the Bush administration “pushed the country to war in Iraq without ever conducting a ‘serious debate’ about whether Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United States.”

      By now, most people are aware of The New York Times’ role in supporting and encouraging the invasion of Iraq and confirming as news the Bush administration’s lies. For some people, it was obvious at the time. That in itself is a lesson in the language of the news. When speaking from a historical perspective about what “some” people did and what was “obvious” in a former time, those much-abused tropes of “some” and “obvious” no longer merit our suspicion. The New York Times doesn’t do history. What it does do, and with much insistence, is contemporary political agendas, despite its claim to be an objective vector of today’s news.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in US Politics

      How will the election affect US relations with allies?: Politics Weekly Extra

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      As reports suggest that No 10 Downing Street has been preparing for Trump’s exit from the White House, Jonathan Freedland and Rafael Behr look at how the election might affect America’s relationship with the rest of the world

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      At the weekend, we saw reports that No 10 Downing Street has concluded that Donald Trump is going to lose the US presidential election (paywall) and that it’s time to cosy up to his Democratic rival, Joe Biden. The story had Jonathan Freedland thinking: “How will the US election affect America’s relationship with the rest of the world?” How will leaders who have enjoyed Trump’s approach to international diplomacy adapt if Joe Biden takes office? And for American allies who have failed to warm to the president, could another four years of Trump take ties that have already been frayed and snap them altogether? Here to help him try to answer all that is Guardian columnist Rafael Behr. Buy tickets for the Guardian Live Event, where Jonathan Freedland and others will be discussing the upcoming election. Let us know what you think of the podcast. Send your feedback to podcasts@theguardian.com Help support the Guardian by going to gu.com/supportpodcasts More

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      in US Politics

      Stephen Cohen obituary

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      The scholar of Russian history and politics Stephen Cohen, who has died aged 81 of lung cancer, challenged the orthodox western analysis of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet affairs. In his magisterial book Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives (2009), he demolished the claim that Leninism led inevitably to totalitarian dictatorship under Stalin and that the Soviet system of one-party rule and state ownership of property could never be reformed.He cited three periods when developments could have gone differently from what actually happened: in the late 1920s, when debates within the Politburo came to a head over the New Economic Policy (NEP), which allowed for private enterprise and ownership of land and property; in the early 60s, when Nikita Khrushchev launched key political reforms; and in 1990 and 1991, after Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a mixed economy and social democratic solutions based on political pluralism in place of the Communist party’s monopoly of power.With his sense of humour, gravelly voice and iconoclastic arguments, Cohen entranced generations of students from his academic perch at Princeton University for the three decades from 1968, in which he rose to be professor of politics and Russian studies, and then at New York University (1998-2011).He wrote a column in the Nation, under the byline Sovieticus from 1982 to 1987 and in recent years hosted a weekly radio broadcast on Russian-American relations, which he feared were leading to a new cold war. He blamed Bill Clinton and policymakers in Washington for failing to include Russia in a new European order after the Soviet Union came to an end and for expanding Nato eastwards in a spirit of “we won” triumphalism. George W Bush and Barack Obama compounded the failure by siting US anti-ballistic missile systems on Russia’s borders.During the Soviet period Cohen was unusual among western specialists on Russia in having friends among dissidents as well as reformist intellectuals in the Moscow thinktanks. His book The Victims Return was based on interviews with dozens of survivors of Stalin’s labour camps about their problems in returning to freedom.Amid the new freedoms permitt- ed by Gorbachev after 1985, Cohen and his wife, Katrina vanden Heuvel, the publisher and editor of the Nation, made frequent long trips to Moscow and got to know the new Soviet leader personally. At one of the last May Day celebrations in Red Square, Gorbachev invited them both to stand beside the Lenin mausoleum to watch the parade. More

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      in World Politics

      Nord Stream 2: Leverage Against Russia?

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      Following the poisoning of the Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny with a nerve agent from the Novichok group, the possibility of using Nord Stream 2 to put pressure on Russia has been widely discussed. Specifically, there are calls to abandon the project, to impose a moratorium or to block gas deliveries through the pipelines if the Kremlin refuses to assist investigations.

      The Nord Stream 2 Baltic gas pipeline is highly symbolic, embodying the willingness of Germany and other European partners to cooperate with Russia. Five European energy companies hold stakes in the project, which is led by Gazprom. It began in 2015 — one year after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea — and has been the target of unrelenting criticism ever since, initially concentrating on Moscow’s declared goal of bypassing Ukraine.

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      The German government recognizes the project’s economic benefits for consumers and the gas market and has backed it within the existing legal framework under the paradigm of keeping politics out of business. In order to cushion Ukraine’s losses, Berlin also backed a Russian-Ukrainian agreement guaranteeing Kyiv gas transit revenues for another five years. To keep its options for completing the pipeline open, Berlin blocked attempts by Brussels to assert control. That is now both a burden and an opportunity.

      Pressure From Washington

      Recent developments have been largely driven by the US, which has successively stepped up pressure to abandon the project. The American Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act has succeeded in stopping pipelaying since the end of 2019, and Congress has taken steps to make it impossible to resume the work. The US administration has also altered the guidance of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, threatening to penalize any entity or individual involved in construction since July 15, 2020.

      If construction is to resume, Berlin will have to act more proactively to counter the impact of Washington’s sanctions. On the one hand, it will be difficult to politically justify actively supporting the construction of Nord Stream 2, while on the other hand, Berlin must continue to reject and criticize such secondary sanctions as a matter of principle.

      Stopping Nord Stream 2 would be seismic. But what happens when the dust has settled? The government will have to make difficult choices. The following four aspects need to be considered.

      First, the immediate effect on the energy supply would be marginal. The project is neither — as so often asserted — a danger to European energy security, nor is it essential. Existing pipelines through Ukraine retain an annual capacity estimated at 100 to 120 billion cubic meters, with the Yamal-Europe pipeline through Poland and Belarus adding 33 billion cubic meters and Nord Stream 1 another 55 billion. There are also pipelines to Turkey and Finland. Together, these would easily cope with the peak volume of more than 190 billion cubic meters, which Gazprom supplied to Europe in 2017-18.

      Embed from Getty Images

      That means, conversely, that stopping Nord Stream 2 would not in the slightest reduce the volume of gas purchased from Gazprom. But this direct, efficient modern pipeline would reduce the risks of transit disruption and technical failure. Without it, Nord Stream 1 and its connecting pipelines become crucial.

      Second, indirect effects on the economy and energy supply are hard to estimate. Sunk costs in the Baltic would hurt Gazprom but would also be costly for European companies. Aside from the commercial repercussions, it should be remembered that Nord Stream 2 would improve the resilience of the European gas supply and that an expanded gas supply would benefit industry and consumers.

      The gas reserves on the Siberian Yamal Peninsula have already been developed, while the global LNG market can quickly tighten again. The “Energiewende” (green energy transition) will naturally reduce demand for natural gas, but the speed with which that occurs will also depend on an expansion of the power grid and a rapid, consistent transformation in heating and industry. Here, there is still much work to be done.

      Third, abandoning an economic infrastructure project for political reasons would represent a paradigm shift for Berlin. Major infrastructure projects undeniably have (geo)political implications, and other states do link business and politics in pursuit of national interests, too. That new geo-economic reality represents a challenge for Germany’s strategic sovereignty, also in the energy sphere.

      But that is precisely the point: Other states act in pursuit of their interests. For all the political fireworks, the project is a strategic asset for German commerce and industry. Germany and its EU partners would only be harming themselves if they stopped construction just to send a normative message to the Kremlin. Putin would probably interpret this as Germany simply caving to US pressure, further weakening the political signal

      Fourth, the normative justification raises questions: Is the situation really qualitatively new? Would earlier events not actually have offered more solid grounds? Here, we are confronted with an almost insoluble dilemma of the fossil-based energy system: We purchase oil and gas from authoritarian regimes every day. In that regard, the Energiewende has a geopolitical dividend.

      But make no mistake: Even a successful energy transition will rely on energy imports from these countries, and on the ability to reliably realize major infrastructure projects. The days of the special strategic energy partnership with Russia are over, but a functioning modus vivendi for trade and exchange with this big and resource-abundant neighbor remains essential. From that perspective, a moratorium would gain time for all involved. But the conditions for resumption would have to be clearly communicated, agreed with EU partners and implementable for Russia.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More