September 11 2001

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      Michael Bloomberg: Cómo la ciudad de Nueva York puede recuperarse de nuevo

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      El futuro de la ciudad de Nueva York está en duda. Los barrios perdieron habitantes que se han mudado a los suburbios. Se han cerrado negocios. La gente está preocupada por la seguridad pública. Las familias lloran la pérdida de sus seres queridos.Ese era el panorama en el otoño de 2001, después de que los terroristas destruyeron el World Trade Center y pusieron a la ciudad de rodillas. Y es el mismo panorama actual, con una pandemia que ha causado estragos y millones de personas que se preguntan una vez más si los días de gloria de esta ciudad son cosa del pasado.El desempleo sigue siendo de dos dígitos, la desocupación de comercios y oficinas se ha disparado y el sector turístico está en una situación desesperada, pero las adversidades económicas son más agudas para las familias de bajos ingresos. Sin embargo, tenemos buenas razones para albergar esperanza, porque lo que se hizo una vez puede volver a hacerse, y mejor, si se tienen en cuenta las lecciones del pasado.Durante los últimos ocho años, he tratado de cumplir mi promesa de no hacer comentarios sobre la gestión de mi sucesor. Los alcaldes no necesitan que sus predecesores intervengan desde la barrera y no tengo intención de empezar ahora. Pero creo que el éxito de la ciudad de Nueva York en la reconstrucción del Bajo Manhattan tras el 11 de septiembre y en la revitalización de los cinco distritos puede ayudar al próximo alcalde cuando tome posesión de su cargo en enero y se enfrente a los dos de los mismos retos generales a los que nos enfrentamos hace 20 años.El primero es urgente: mejorar los servicios vitales de los que dependen los neoyorquinos todos los días, como la vigilancia policial, el transporte, la salubridad y la educación. En los meses posteriores al 11 de septiembre, éramos muy conscientes de que los ciudadanos necesitaban tener confianza en que no permitiríamos que la ciudad entrara en una espiral descendente, como ocurrió en la década de 1970, por lo que nos concentramos de inmediato en mejorar la calidad de vida haciendo que los vecindarios fueran más seguros y limpios, recuperando las escuelas públicas y reduciendo la cantidad de indigentes.Para mantener a los residentes y a las empresas en la ciudad, el próximo gobierno debe implementar programas y políticas que refuercen esos mismos servicios básicos desde el inicio. Los fondos serán escasos, pero manejables; el déficit de ingresos al que nos enfrentamos era más de tres veces mayor, en términos de porcentaje del presupuesto, que el que se prevé que herede el próximo alcalde.El segundo gran reto es más difícil y de manera inevitable está en conflicto con el primero: centrarse en el futuro no inmediato de la ciudad. En última instancia, el alcalde será juzgado no por las noticias del día siguiente, sino por la próxima generación. Su trabajo consiste en mirar más allá de la luz al final del túnel y empezar a construir más vías, aun cuando sea impopular hacerlo.Me vienen a la mente dos ejemplos del Bajo Manhattan.Poco después de haber tomado pposesión como alcalde, cancelé un subsidio planeado para la nueva sede de la Bolsa de Nueva York a pesar de que ésta amenazaba con abandonar la ciudad. No me pareció que ese fuera un uso inteligente de los escasos recursos, pero la perspectiva de que la Bolsa abandonara Wall Street hizo temer que otras grandes instituciones financieras también se marcharan, más aún con gran parte del Bajo Manhattan en ruinas.Lo más fácil y políticamente seguro era no tocar el subsidio. Pero durante décadas, la ciudad había dependido en exceso de la industria bancaria y de servicios financieros. Se decía que cuando Wall Street se estornudaba, la ciudad se resfriaba. Así que en lugar de sobornar a las grandes empresas para que se quedaran en Manhattan, invertimos en proyectos en todos los distritos que atrajeran a nuevas compañías de diferentes sectores, como la biociencia, la tecnología y el cine y la televisión. Años después, estas y otras industrias —y los trabajos e ingresos que generaron— nos ayudaron a sortear la Gran Recesión mucho mejor que la mayoría de las ciudades.El próximo gobierno tal vez se enfrente a exigencias similares de subsidios de empresas que amenacen con abandonar la ciudad. Pero hay mejores formas de retener y crear puestos de trabajo que las dádivas, sobre todo si se invierte en infraestructura fundamental, empezando por el metro..css-1xzcza9{list-style-type:disc;padding-inline-start:1em;}.css-3btd0c{font-family:nyt-franklin,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:1rem;line-height:1.375rem;color:#333;margin-bottom:0.78125rem;}@media (min-width:740px){.css-3btd0c{font-size:1.0625rem;line-height:1.5rem;margin-bottom:0.9375rem;}}.css-3btd0c strong{font-weight:600;}.css-3btd0c em{font-style:italic;}.css-w739ur{margin:0 auto 5px;font-family:nyt-franklin,helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-weight:700;font-size:1.125rem;line-height:1.3125rem;color:#121212;}#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-w739ur{font-family:nyt-cheltenham,georgia,’times new roman’,times,serif;font-weight:700;font-size:1.375rem;line-height:1.625rem;}@media (min-width:740px){#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-w739ur{font-size:1.6875rem;line-height:1.875rem;}}@media (min-width:740px){.css-w739ur{font-size:1.25rem;line-height:1.4375rem;}}.css-9s9ecg{margin-bottom:15px;}.css-uf1ume{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-box-pack:justify;-webkit-justify-content:space-between;-ms-flex-pack:justify;justify-content:space-between;}.css-wxi1cx{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-flex-direction:column;-ms-flex-direction:column;flex-direction:column;-webkit-align-self:flex-end;-ms-flex-item-align:end;align-self:flex-end;}.css-12vbvwq{background-color:white;border:1px solid #e2e2e2;width:calc(100% – 40px);max-width:600px;margin:1.5rem auto 1.9rem;padding:15px;box-sizing:border-box;}@media (min-width:740px){.css-12vbvwq{padding:20px;width:100%;}}.css-12vbvwq:focus{outline:1px solid #e2e2e2;}#NYT_BELOW_MAIN_CONTENT_REGION .css-12vbvwq{border:none;padding:10px 0 0;border-top:2px solid #121212;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-rdoyk0{-webkit-transform:rotate(0deg);-ms-transform:rotate(0deg);transform:rotate(0deg);}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-eb027h{max-height:300px;overflow:hidden;-webkit-transition:none;transition:none;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-5gimkt:after{content:’See more’;}.css-12vbvwq[data-truncated] .css-6mllg9{opacity:1;}.css-qjk116{margin:0 auto;overflow:hidden;}.css-qjk116 strong{font-weight:700;}.css-qjk116 em{font-style:italic;}.css-qjk116 a{color:#326891;-webkit-text-decoration:underline;text-decoration:underline;text-underline-offset:1px;-webkit-text-decoration-thickness:1px;text-decoration-thickness:1px;-webkit-text-decoration-color:#326891;text-decoration-color:#326891;}.css-qjk116 a:visited{color:#326891;-webkit-text-decoration-color:#326891;text-decoration-color:#326891;}.css-qjk116 a:hover{-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;}En colaboración con el estado, el alcalde puede trabajar para que los trenes vuelvan a tener horarios completos, lo que ayudaría a los empresarios de todos los sectores a recuperar a sus trabajadores y a miles de pequeñas empresas y sus empleados a recuperar a sus clientes. Además, daría confianza a quienes estén pensando en abrir un negocio propio.Sea cual sea la política que adopte el próximo alcalde, la idea fundamental es que para que una ciudad se recupere económicamente es necesario algo más que ayudar a las empresas existentes. Es necesario crear las condiciones para que otros negocios abran y se expandan, a fin de diversificar aún más la economía.El segundo ejemplo del Bajo Manhattan tiene que ver con la vivienda. Tras los atentados, muchos querían convertir todo el World Trade Center en un monumento conmemorativo o simplemente reconstruir lo que había antes. Me pareció que ambas cosas serían un error y recibí fuertes críticas por sugerir que se construyeran viviendas en el lugar. Sin embargo, nuestro gobierno quería que el Bajo Manhattan dejara de ser un distrito comercial con movimiento solo de 9 a 5 y se convirtiera en un barrio diverso y abierto las 24 horas del día.Los líderes de la ciudad llevaban intentando hacerlo desde la década de 1950, pero habían centrado su atención en el desarrollo de edificios, incluido el World Trade Center original, en lugar de atraer a la gente. Nosotros le dimos la vuelta al guion al fomentar el desarrollo de nuevas viviendas y generar aquello que todos los residentes quieren: parques, escuelas y oportunidades culturales, incluido un centro de artes escénicas en el World Trade Center, cuya construcción está a punto de finalizar.A medida que nuestra visión tomaba forma, más familias y jóvenes se mudaron al centro, abrieron más negocios, se crearon más empleos y llegaron más visitantes. El último lugar de desarrollo del World Trade Center será una torre que tendrá más de mil unidades de vivienda.El próximo gobierno tendrá sus propias oportunidades no solo para recuperarse de la pandemia, sino para reimaginar zonas de la ciudad. Por supuesto, nunca es fácil enfrentarse a grupos ruidosos y poderosos que claman: “No en mi patio trasero”. Pero a lo largo y ancho de Nueva York hay estacionamientos, almacenes, playas de maniobras y otras propiedades que ofrecen al próximo alcalde oportunidades de crear viviendas para todos los ingresos y empleos para todos tipo de habilidades.Estos proyectos requieren ambición y valor político. Como candidato, Eric Adams ha demostrado ambas cosas. Por eso lo apoyo en las elecciones a la alcaldía de este otoño. Su pragmatismo y disposición a enfrentar asuntos difíciles, al igual que la comprensión de la importancia de la seguridad pública que le dio su experiencia como policía, le serán de gran utilidad en el Ayuntamiento. Y espero que Bloomberg Philanthropies tenga la oportunidad de apoyar su gobierno, porque este es un momento en el que todos tenemos que poner manos a la obra.En el gobierno, la colaboración es tan importante como la competencia, y la reconstrucción del World Trade Center, que incluyó la creación de un monumento nacional y museo en memoria del 11 de septiembre, demostró lo crucial que son las asociaciones sólidas para volver realidad una visión. El trabajo conjunto con nueve gobernadores de Nueva York y Nueva Jersey nos permitió construir el monumento y el museo para que fueran un poderoso tributo a los que perdimos y para enseñar a las generaciones futuras el extraordinario heroísmo y los sacrificios que inspiraron y unieron al mundo.Hubo tensiones y obstáculos, por supuesto. Pero es fundamental que haya una buena relación de trabajo entre el alcalde y el gobernador para que los grandes proyectos tengan éxito.Ahora, incluso antes de tomar posesión del cargo, Adams tiene la oportunidad de empezar a establecer una estrecha relación con la nueva gobernadora del estado, Kathy Hochul. No siempre estarán de acuerdo, pero necesitamos que trabajen juntos.Al caer la noche del 11 de septiembre de 2001, era difícil imaginar que la ciudad pudiera recuperarse con la rapidez y la fuerza con que lo hizo. Pero al unirnos, pensar con creatividad, planear con ambición y trabajar enfocados en una visión clara del futuro —fiel a los valores de nuestra ciudad, entre ellos acoger a los inmigrantes y refugiados—, dimos inicio a un periodo de renacimiento y renovación nunca antes visto en la historia.Ahora, podemos volver a hacerlo. Si tenemos en cuenta las lecciones del pasado, sé que lo lograremos.Michael R. Bloomberg (@MikeBloomberg) fue alcalde de la ciudad de Nueva York de 2002 a 2013. Es presidente del Museo y Monumento Nacional del 11 de septiembre desde 2006. More

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      The Guardian view on the 20th anniversary of 9/11: no end in sight | Editorial

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      OpinionSeptember 11 2001The Guardian view on the 20th anniversary of 9/11: no end in sightEditorialThe devastating al-Qaida attack, and America’s response, had far-reaching consequences which are still developing Fri 10 Sep 2021 12.49 EDTLast modified on Fri 10 Sep 2021 13.29 EDTA new and deadly era began when the planes sliced into the twin towers on the morning of 11 September 2001. That evening, the historian Tony Judt wrote that he had seen the 21st century begin. The nearly 3,000 lives stolen by al-Qaida were only a small part of the toll. The horror began a chain of events that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, including huge numbers of civilians abroad and many US military personnel. It is still unfolding.If the killing of the plot’s mastermind Osama bin Laden a few months before the 10th anniversary perhaps let some hope that an end to that new era might be in sight, there can be no such false confidence at the 20th. The establishment of a Taliban government in Kabul, two decades after the US ousted the militants for harbouring Bin Laden, has underscored two things: that far from reasserting its global supremacy, the US looks more vulnerable today; and that the echoes of 9/11 are still reverberating across the region – but will not stay there.Al-Qaida itself survives and others claim its mantle. In the west, the threat from Islamist terrorism endures – from 7/7 and the Madrid train bombings, to the attacks at Manchester Arena, the Berlin Christmas market and Vienna – though the nature of the threat has shifted, from a heavily financed, complex and internationally organised plot to more localised, less sophisticated attacks. This week, 20 men went on trial over the 2015 massacre at the Bataclan concert hall and other sites in Paris. Ken McCallum, MI5’s chief, said on Friday that the agency had prevented six “late stage” terrorist plots during the pandemic, and that with the Taliban’s triumph, “more risk progressively may flow our way”.The determination to pursue a military solution fed the political problems, as history should have warned. (A Rand Corporation study of 248 terrorist groups worldwide suggested that only 7% were ended by military force.)In Afghanistan, the refusal to accept a Taliban surrender paved the way for America’s longest war and ultimate acceptance of defeat. Islamic State arose from the ashes of the invasion of Iraq. Extraordinary renditions, torture, the atrocities of Abu Ghraib and the unwillingness to acknowledge or atone for civilian deaths at the hands of US forces or their allies all stoked the fire. These abuses and crimes were not anomalies but intrinsic to the war on terror. Men swept up in the aftermath are still held at Guantánamo Bay.Around the world, basic rights were erased at home too. The US saw a massive expansion of presidential power; the veneration of secrecy; the destruction of norms; the normalisation of Islamophobia; the promotion of a narrative linking immigration and terrorism, breeding broader intolerance; and the encouragement of the belief that ordinary citizens were in a state of war. It is not hard to draw the line to the rise of Donald Trump and white supremacy, or rightwing populism elsewhere. In the US, far-right terror groups were behind most attacks last year; in the UK, police have said that the fastest growing terror threat is from the far right. The biggest perils to the US now appear not external but internal. The future of a divided and distrustful country looks increasingly precarious, its status in the world weakened.Whatever many in the country once believed, American citizens cannot be isolated from the dangers of the outside world; trouble is not “always someplace else”. On 9/11, the country transitioned from a dream of unending tranquility at home to a nightmare of forever war. With the return of soldiers from Afghanistan, the US is more distanced from the enemy. But the conflict continues by other means, and without boots on the ground, drone strikes are more likely than ever to claim the lives of civilians as well as terrorist suspects. The US, and the west, cannot be safe at home while insecurity reigns abroad.TopicsSeptember 11 2001OpinionAl-QaidaUS politicsAfghanistaneditorialsReuse this content More

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      After 20 years, Biden's Afghanistan withdrawal has finally ended the 9/11 era | Ben Rhodes

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      OpinionSeptember 11 2001After 20 years, Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal has finally ended the 9/11 eraBen RhodesThe US’s departure has prompted a national sense of shame and a recognition there will be no victory in the ‘war on terror’Ben Rhodes was a US deputy national security adviser in the Obama administration Fri 10 Sep 2021 12.00 EDTLast modified on Fri 10 Sep 2021 12.43 EDTForeign policy, for better or worse, is always an extension of a nation’s domestic politics. The arc of America’s war in Afghanistan is a testament to this reality – the story of a superpower that overreached, slowly came to terms with the limits of its capacity to shape events abroad, and withdrew in the wake of raging dysfunction at home. Viewed through this prism, President Joe Biden’s decisive yet chaotic withdrawal comes into focus.The story begins with trauma and hubris. On September 11 2001, American power was at its high-water mark. The globalisation of open markets, democratic governance, and the US-led international order had shaped the previous decade. The spectre of nuclear war had been lifted, the ideological debates of the 20th century settled. To Americans, mass violence was something that took place along the periphery of the post-cold war world. And then suddenly, the periphery struck the centres of American power, killing thousands.As a young New Yorker, I saw a plane plough into the World Trade Center and the first tower fall. I smelled the air, acrid from burnt steel and death, for days afterwards. Like most Americans, I assumed my government would retaliate against the people who did this. But President George W Bush’s administration had larger ambitions. Speaking days after 9/11 to an audience that included the US Congress and British prime minister, Tony Blair, Bush declared: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”Out of this trauma, the American public supported Bush’s declaration of a “war on terror” as a kind of blank slate, with details to be filled in by his administration. Most Americans were afraid, wanted to be protected, and were rooting for their government to succeed. Within weeks, Congress granted Bush open-ended powers to wage war, passed the Patriot Act, and set to work reconstructing the US national security apparatus. But rapidly toppling the Taliban and scattering al-Qaida did not meet the ambitions of Bush, who had likened this conflict to the second world war and the cold war. Instead of wiping out al-Qaida’s leadership (who escaped into Pakistan) and coming home, the Bush administration decided to build a new Afghan government and then promptly shifted its attention to Iraq – while tarring its political opponents as weak and unpatriotic. The die was cast.The objectives of those early years – to defeat every terrorist group of global reach and also build liberal democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq – appear unfathomable with the distance of 20 years, but they were broadly accepted after September 11, in a climate of American hegemony and post-9/11 fervour. By 2009, when Bush’s presidency ended amid the ruins of Iraq and the wreckage of the global financial crisis, it had become clear that those objectives were unachievable, and that American hegemony itself was receding.But the US national security establishment had been charged with achieving those objectives, and was therefore both invested in their completion and increasingly detached from shifting public opinion.The Obama presidency, which I was a part of for eight years, was a gradual reckoning with this reality. Paradoxically, the 2009-2011 troops surge in Afghanistan coupled diminished ambitions and increased resources: the US, Obama concluded, could not defeat the Taliban militarily, but needed to create time and space to defeat al-Qaida and build up an Afghan government to fight the Taliban. This conclusion reflected public opinion: in the politics of post-9/11, post-Iraq, post-financial crisis America, there was zero tolerance for terrorist attacks and zero appetite for nation building. This was the view that Biden, then vice-president, represented in the White House situation room – arguing against the surge on the grounds that we had to understand the limits of what could be achieved in Afghanistan.By May 2011, the killing of Osama bin Laden removed what many Americans regarded as the original rationale for the war in Afghanistan, just as the surge was approaching its endpoints. At the same time that our counter-terrorism mission achieved its greatest success, the expansive new counter-insurgency campaign was proving far more difficult than promised, suggesting that Biden’s warnings had been prescient. In June 2011, the American drawdown began.Obama’s downsized ambitions for the “war on terror” triggered harsh reactions from both the jingoistic right and the US national security establishment. For prominent military leaders, congressional hawks, and thinktank warriors who had set out to achieve these impossible objectives, Obama was insufficiently committed to the missions. To admit otherwise, you would have to accept that the mission itself was flawed – and that was a bridge too far for national security elites shaped by post-1989 American exceptionalism. For the Republican party, which had promised great victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was impossible to acknowledge there were any limits to our power; instead, it was easier to shift focus to other perceived threats to the US and American identity, which now came not just from “radical Islam”, but from any available Other – be it a black president or immigrants at the southern border.As president, Donald Trump waged war against a shifting cast of enemies at home with far more gusto than he approached Afghanistan. For a time, he maintained an awkward detente with hawkish elements of the US establishment, signing off on a small surge in Afghanistan. His disregard for the Afghan people was initially manifest through increased civilian casualties. After he removed national security advisers like HR McMaster and John Bolton, it morphed into a deal with the Taliban that cut out the Afghan government and set a timeline to withdraw American troops. To the right, national security was tied up with white identity politics at home. To the left, terrorism was more evident in the Capitol insurrection than in distant lands. Trump’s withdrawal barely registered in US politics.The lesson we failed to learn from 9/11: peace is impossible if we don’t talk to our enemies | Jonathan PowellRead moreIn this context, there was no way Biden was going to cancel Trump’s deal and extend America’s presence in Afghanistan. Having long doubted the capacity of the US military to reshape other countries, he was not going to continue a policy premised on that assumption. Given the existential threat to American democracy that clouded his transition into power, Biden presumably felt that the purpose of his presidency was to pursue policies responsive to restive public opinion – from a sweeping domestic agenda to a foreign policy for the middle class.Biden’s decision, and the haste with which he carried it out, provoked a firestorm among much of the US national security establishment for several reasons. First, because Biden’s logic carried a rebuke of the more expansive aims of the post-9/11 project that had shaped the service, careers, and commentary of so many people. Second, because unlike Trump, Biden is a part of that establishment – the former chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, a Washington fixture for decades. Biden’s top aides also come from that establishment. These are not illiberal isolationists. Instead, Biden and his team saw the war in Afghanistan as an impediment to dealing with other external threats: from a Russia waging an asymmetric war on western democracy, to a Chinese Communist party aiming to supplant it.Most importantly, the abandonment of Afghans to the Taliban, and Biden’s occasionally callous rhetoric laying the blame on Afghan security forces, who had fought on the frontlines for years, evoked a sense of national shame – even if that emotion should apply to the entirety of the war, and not simply its end. Indeed, in the chaotic days of withdrawal, the predominant concerns in US politics often had little to do with Afghans. The evacuation of Americans, the danger of Islamic State Khorasan Province, and the loss of US service members eclipsed the gargantuan Afghan suffering. Overwhelming public support for Biden’s decision, though undercut by dissatisfaction with the process of withdrawal, confirmed Biden’s core instinct: the thing most Americans agree upon is that we went to Afghanistan to take out the people who did 9/11 and prevent further attacks, and it was past time to abandon the broader aims of post-9/11 foreign policy, no matter the subsequent humanitarian cost.In short, Biden’s decision exposed the cavernous gap between the national security establishment and the public, and forced a recognition that there is going to be no victory in a “war on terror” too infused with the trauma and triumphalism of the immediate post-9/11 moment. Like many Americans, I found myself simultaneously supporting the core decision to withdraw and shuddering at its execution and consequences. As someone who worked in national security, I have to recognise the limits of how the US can shape other countries through military intervention. As someone who has participated in American politics, I have to acknowledge that a country confronting virulent ethno-nationalism at home is ill-suited to build nations abroad. But as a human being, I have to confront how we let the Afghan people down, and how allies like Britain, who stood by us after 9/11, must feel in seeing how it all ended.It is a cruel irony that this is the second time the US has lost interest in Afghanistan. The first time was in the 1990s, after much of the mujahideenwe supported to defeat the Soviets evolved into dangerous extremists, plunged the country into civil war, and led to Taliban rule.The final verdict on Biden’s decision will depend on whether the US can truly end the era that began with 9/11 – including the mindset that measures our credibility through the use of military force and pursues security through partnerships with autocrats. Can we learn from our history and forge a new approach to the rest of the world – one that is sustainable, consistent, and responsive to the people we set out to help; that prioritises existential issues like the fight against the climate crisis and genuine advocacy for the universal values America claims to support?A good place to start would be fighting at home to strengthen our multiracial and multi-ethnic democracy, which must be the foundation of America’s global influence. That effort must include welcoming as many Afghan refugees as we can. What the US needs at the end of the 9/11 era – more than any particular policy, or assertion that “America is back” – is to pursue the kind of politics that makes us a country that cares more about the lives of other human beings like the Afghans we left behind, and expresses that concern in ways other than waging war.
      Ben Rhodes is author of After the Fall: Being American in the World We Made. He served as a deputy national security adviser for Barack Obama from 2009-2017
      TopicsSeptember 11 2001OpinionUS foreign policyUS politicsAfghanistanAl-QaidacommentReuse this content More

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      Mike Bloomberg: New York City Can Recover

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      The future of New York City is being called into question. Neighborhoods have lost residents to the suburbs. Businesses have closed. People are on edge about public safety. And families are mourning the loss of loved ones.This was the situation in the fall of 2001, after hijackers destroyed the World Trade Center and brought the city to its knees. And it’s the same situation today, with a pandemic raging and millions of people once again wondering if this city’s best days are behind it.Unemployment remains in double digits, retail and office vacancies have soared, and the tourism industry is in dire straits, with the economic pain falling hardest on low-income families. Yet we have good reason to be hopeful, because what was done once can be done again — and better, by heeding the lessons of the past.Over the past eight years, I have been careful to stick to my pledge not to comment on my successor’s administration. Mayors don’t need their predecessors chiming in from the sidelines, and I don’t intend to start now. But I do believe New York City’s success in rebuilding Lower Manhattan after Sept. 11 and revitalizing all five boroughs can help the next mayor as he takes office in January and confronts the same two overarching challenges we faced 20 years ago.The first is urgent: improving vital services New Yorkers rely on every day, including policing, transportation, sanitation and education. In the months after Sept. 11, we were acutely aware the public needed confidence that we would not allow the city to enter a downward spiral, as it did in the 1970s, so we immediately focused on improving quality of life by making neighborhoods safer and cleaner, turning around public schools, and reducing street homelessness.To keep residents and businesses in the city, the next administration must come out of the gate with programs and policies to bolster those same essential services. Funding will be tight, but manageable; the revenue shortfall we faced was more than three times as large, as a percentage of the budget, as the one the next mayor is projected to inherit.The second broad challenge is more difficult, and inevitably in tension with the first: focusing on the city’s future years from now. Ultimately, the mayor will be judged not by the next day’s newspapers, but by the next generation. It’s his job to look beyond the light at the end of the tunnel and start building more tracks, even when it’s unpopular to do so.Two examples from Lower Manhattan come to mind.Not long after being sworn in, I canceled a planned subsidy for a new headquarters for the New York Stock Exchange, even though it was threatening to move out of the city. I didn’t think it was a smart use of scarce resources, but the prospect of the exchange leaving Wall Street raised fears that other large financial institutions might go, too, especially with much of Lower Manhattan in ruins.The easy and politically safe thing to do would have been to leave the subsidy in place. But for decades, the city had been overly reliant on the banking and financial services industry. When Wall Street caught a cold, the saying went, the city got sick. So instead of bribing large firms to stay in Manhattan, we invested in projects in all the boroughs that would attract new businesses in different industries, including bioscience, tech, and film and television. Years later, those and other industries — and the jobs and revenue they created — helped us weather the Great Recession far better than most cities did.The next administration may face similar demands for subsidies from companies that threaten to leave the city. But there are better ways to retain and create jobs than giveaways, especially by investing in critical infrastructure, starting with the subway.In partnership with the state, the mayor can work to get trains on a full schedule again, which would help employers in every industry bring back their workers. It would help thousands of small businesses and their employees reclaim their customers. And it would provide confidence to those who may be thinking about opening a business of their own.Whatever policies the next mayor pursues, the crucial idea is that putting a city back on its feet economically requires more than aiding existing businesses. It requires creating the conditions for new ones to open and expand, further diversifying the economy.The second example from Lower Manhattan concerns housing. In the wake of the attacks, many people wanted to turn the entire World Trade Center into a memorial — or simply to rebuild what was there. I thought both would be a mistake, and I was pilloried for suggesting that housing be constructed at the site. But our administration wanted to transform Lower Manhattan from a 9-to-5 business district into a diverse, 24/7 neighborhood.City leaders had been trying to do that since the 1950s, but their focus had been primarily on developing buildings, including the original World Trade Center, rather than attracting people. We flipped the script by encouraging new housing development and creating the things all residents want: parks, schools and cultural opportunities, including a performing arts center at the World Trade Center that is now nearing completion.As our vision took shape, more families and young people moved downtown, more businesses opened, more jobs were created, and more visitors arrived. The last development site of the World Trade Center will be a tower that includes more than a thousand units of housing.The next administration will have its own opportunities not only to recover from the pandemic, but to reimagine areas of the city. Of course, it’s never easy to take on vocal and powerful groups that say, “Not in my backyard.” But across New York, there are parking lots, warehouses, rail yards and other properties that offer the next mayor opportunities to create housing for all incomes and jobs for all skill levels.Such projects require ambition and political courage. As a candidate, Eric Adams has shown both. That’s why I’m supporting him in the mayoral election this fall. His pragmatism and willingness to take on tough issues — and his experience as a police officer who understands the importance of public safety — will serve him well in City Hall. And I hope that Bloomberg Philanthropies will have a chance to support his administration, because this is an all-hands-on-deck moment.In government, collaboration is as important as competence, and the redevelopment of the World Trade Center site — including the construction of the Sept. 11 Memorial and Museum — showed how crucial strong partnerships are to achieving a vision. Working with nine different governors of New York and New Jersey, we built the memorial and museum to serve as a powerful tribute to those we lost, and to teach future generations about the extraordinary heroism and sacrifices that inspired and united the world.There were tensions and obstacles, of course. But a healthy working relationship between the mayor and governor is crucial to the success of major projects.Now, even before he takes office, Mr. Adams has a chance to begin building a close relationship with the state’s new governor, Kathy Hochul. They will not always see eye-to-eye, but we need them to work hand-in-hand.As the sun set on Sept. 11, 2001, it was hard to imagine the city could rebound as quickly and strongly as it did. But by pulling together, thinking creatively, planning ambitiously, and working toward a clear vision of the future — one that is true to the values of our city, including our welcoming embrace of immigrants and refugees — we began a period of rebirth and renewal unlike any in history.Now, we can do it again. If we heed the lessons of the past, I know we will.Michael R. Bloomberg (@MikeBloomberg) was the mayor of New York City from 2002 to 2013. He has been chair of the National Sept. 11 Memorial and Museum since 2006.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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      9/11: Inside the President’s War Room review – astonishing and petrifying

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      TV reviewTelevision9/11: Inside the President’s War Room review – astonishing and petrifying This remarkable documentary shows exactly how 9/11 unfolded for George W Bush, from the multiple prayer breaks to the anti-anthrax pills – and the vow to ‘kick ass’ before he knew whose ass to kickJack SealeTue 31 Aug 2021 17.00 EDTLast modified on Tue 31 Aug 2021 17.26 EDTThere is a particular kind of political documentary that tries to put us “in the room”, to tell us how historic decisions were made and how the fallible humans who made them felt. But on 11 September 2001, when planes hijacked by al-Qaida terrorists destroyed the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center and took the lives of nearly 3,000 Americans, the chaos was such that there was no single “room”. President George W Bush and his advisers, afraid for their own safety and constantly searching for information, were on the move all day and had to conduct their business in airbase bunkers, the back room of a school and aboard the president’s jet, Air Force One.Nevertheless, 9/11: Inside the President’s War Room (BBC One) gives the sensation of being in the room in a way that few documentaries ever have. That day has often been described as a disaster movie no screenwriter would dare imagine. Here, it is a horrifyingly tragic but also propulsive story, with twin narratives following the president’s movements and the developing carnage on the ground, minute by minute.The film’s archive footage has plenty of Adam Curtis moments, such as Bush killing a fly on the Oval Office desk, seconds before giving the gravest speech of his life, to underline that every moment of 11 September had something odd or terrifying in it. But as every relevant government official shares their recollections on camera, the vivid pictures are outstripped by personal anecdotes. We hear from the situation room captain, who recalls having to brace herself against the president’s desk as Air Force One made a steep emergency takeoff – “I went partially weightless. I was petrified” – and the deputy communications director, who got flustered when Bush’s doctor handed out anti-anthrax pills and took his whole week’s ration in one hit.Chiefly, though, this is an insight into the mind of the star interviewee: George W Bush. At first, we see his notorious folksy simplicity, apparent in his eerily counterintuitive decision to ignore, for several long minutes, the news about the second tower being hit, for fear of being impolite to a class of Florida seven-year-olds having a presidential visit. Bush also called for those around him to stop and pray, more than once, while still in the eye of a storm of unknown lethality and proportion. “Prayer can be very comforting,” he says here.Such reactions could be read as bizarre in the face of doom, or natural responses to a situation where what could immediately be achieved was unclear. One interviewee says that, while analyses of Churchill or Roosevelt in wartime look at actions that took weeks to complete, Bush on 9/11 is a study of a leader being forced to make epic choices on the hop.This is where Inside the President’s War Room is most revealing. We hear how anger became the strongest of Bush’s conflicting emotions: fear and sorrow and a determination to safeguard US citizens had to make room for the desire to, in Bush’s words, “kick their ass”, before it was known whose ass or how. By that evening, the president had publicly formulated the “Bush doctrine”, which said harbouring terrorists was to be treated as the equivalent of perpetrating terror. A new American pathology, the “war on terror”, was born in haste.The consequences of this are clear from the fact that this documentary, marking 20 years since 9/11, airs just as the ensuing military intervention in Afghanistan concludes. The thought of that war and, moreover, the US and its allies’ 2003 attack on Iraq, hangs over the whole piece, making the simplest emotional moments complex. The politician expressing the helpless horror of seeing the twin towers fall on TV is Karl Rove. The bowed head, overcome by the emotion of remembering the dilemma over whether or not to shoot down United Flight 93, belongs to Dick Cheney.Are those moments still affecting, knowing that those men went on to wreak horrors of their own? Yes, but to its credit, Inside the President’s War Room makes sure that context is explicit. Being in the room doesn’t stop us looking beyond.TopicsTelevisionTV reviewUS politicsSeptember 11 2001George BushreviewsReuse this content More

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      In the post-9/11 era, America's greatest threat isn’t jihadist terrorism any more | Michael German, Elizabeth Goitein and Faiza Patel

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      OpinionUS politicsIn the post-9/11 era, America’s greatest threat isn’t jihadist terrorism any moreMichael German, Elizabeth Goitein and Faiza PatelTwenty years after 9/11, it’s time to set priorities based on reason instead of fear – and talk about the true cost of ‘national security’ Tue 17 Aug 2021 06.00 EDTLast modified on Tue 17 Aug 2021 10.36 EDTThe 20th anniversary of the September 11 attacks is a natural time to assess our nation’s response over the last two decades and chart a course for the future. Our single-minded focus on defeating terrorist groups claiming to act in the name of Islam over all other priorities, international or domestic, has allowed vulnerabilities to fester.FBI offer to release some Saudi files not enough, 9/11 families sayRead moreThe biggest problems our nation faces today have little to do with the terrorist groups that have consumed so much of our attention. Far-right militants launched a deadly attack on the US Capitol. Systemic racism continues, vividly illustrated by the killing of unarmed Black men by police. The mishandled coronavirus pandemic killed more than half a million Americans and put millions out of work. The opioid epidemic has claimed more than 500,000 lives, while 2020 saw a record number of gun deaths. Climate change drove natural disasters costing a record $22bn across the US in 2020.Few people would likely argue that they feel more secure today than they did on 10 September 2001. It is time to recalibrate our priorities to ensure that we are protecting all Americans effectively from the most significant threats to their health, safety and wellbeing.Defining our prioritiesWhen government officials claim that national security demands a particular action, few interrogate how national security is defined. Is it the territorial integrity of the nation? The physical safety of its people? Or something less tangible, such as the preservation of constitutional rights, economic prosperity, or the institutions of democracy?Absent a clear definition, the “national security” label is often affixed in ways that seem arbitrary, inconsistent, or politically driven. And yet the invocation automatically elevates the issue’s priority of the issue, triggering increased government attention and resources regardless of any objective measure of the threat’s magnitude.After 9/11, “national security” became nearly synonymous with preventing attacks from groups such as al-Qaida and Isis and any individuals who identified with these groups’ stated goals. Congress practically threw money at counter-terrorism efforts – by some estimates, the United States spent $2.8tn on counter-terrorism between 2002 and 2017. In the meantime, white supremacist violence was often treated as a civil rights or violent crime problem, far lower on the government’s list of priorities, even though this type of terrorism kills more Americans most years than any other. Only recently has the government labeled it a national security threat, with the attendant resources and attention.Moreover, terrorist acts of all kinds are prioritized over problems that are generally not viewed through a national security lens but are far more damaging to public health and safety. Terrorism is typically responsible for fewer than 100 fatalities a year – smaller than the number of Americans killed in bathtub accidents. In comparison, there are over 16,000 annual homicides, mostly by firearms. And the homicide numbers pale in comparison to estimates of American deaths due to environmental pollution, substandard healthcare, and poverty.The ‘liberty versus security’ paradigmWhen something is labeled a “national security” threat, it is often assumed that the response will require extraordinary assertions of executive power and diminished protections for civil rights and civil liberties. This assumption has dominated our government’s response to 9/11. Yet it is rarely tested, as few counter-terrorism tactics have been evaluated for effectiveness using scientific, evidence-based methods. Indeed, in many instances, there is reason to believe these heavy-handed responses have been ineffective or even harmful.Examples abound. The US invaded Afghanistan and Iraq ostensibly to stem terrorism. Instead, the wars destabilized the regions, allowing new terrorist groups to flourish. Our 20-year military presence in Afghanistan neither crippled the Taliban nor gave the Afghan government the means to resist it, as recent events have shown. Tactics that the military and CIA deployed in the name of counter-terrorism – including kidnapping, indefinite detention, torture, and targeted killing – tarnished America’s reputation as a champion of human rights, damaged relationships with allies, and provided fodder for terrorist group recruitment.At home, terrorism prevention efforts have included mass surveillance, bloated and inaccurate watchlists, and racial, religious and ethnic profiling. The benefits of these approaches have been assumed rather than proven. In the few instances where a cost-benefit analysis was conducted, programs designed to identify terrorists were found to be ineffectual or counterproductive.For instance, two independent reviews of the NSA’s program to collect Americans’ phone records in bulk concluded that it resulted in little to no counter-terrorism benefit. A congressional review of fusion centers – information-sharing hubs that try to turn state and local police into intelligence agents – found that they are wasteful and do not produce valuable intelligence. Government reviews of domestic terrorist attacks, such as the 2009 mass shooting at Fort Hood, concluded that important threat information had been missed because it was buried in a flood of collected data.At the same time, these initiatives have imposed heavy costs, not only on the nation’s treasury but on our democratic society and vulnerable communities. Islamophobic and nativist counter-terrorism training materials and countering violent extremism programs have stigmatized American Muslims and immigrants. Ubiquitous “see something, say something” programs have trained Americans to be constantly suspicious of one another. These efforts have exacerbated existing divisions in the country and directly undermined the security of the communities they target.Looking beyond national securityGoing forward, we must take a holistic approach to protecting our country and our people – one that prioritizes the welfare of all Americans in accordance with an objective measurement of the threats we face. The billions wasted on military and intelligence programs that do not demonstrably make Americans safer need to be reinvested in evidence-based solutions to our nation’s biggest problems.This new approach goes beyond shifting resources within the category of threats traditionally considered “national security” issues, or even bringing new categories under that umbrella. Instead, it situates national security threats – however designated – in the broader context of challenges to the health and resilience of our nation.In his 1953 Chance for Peace speech, President Dwight Eisenhower warned about the opportunity costs of war: “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies … a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.” His words are equally salient today.Traditional “national security” issues – terrorism, cybersecurity threats, espionage – will continue to require serious attention and responses. But an evidence-based approach to our problems will almost certainly entail rightsizing our bloated national security establishment. Investing a fraction of the funds that were devoted to terrorism prevention over the last 20 years into the health, education, and welfare of the American people over the next 20 is the best way to build a society that is stronger and more secure.
      Elizabeth Goitein and Faiza Patel are co-directors and Michael German is a fellow at the Liberty & National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law
      This essay is co-published with the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as part of a series exploring new approaches to national security 20 years after 9/11
      TopicsUS politicsOpinionSeptember 11 2001US militarycommentReuse this content More