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    Chile Has an Opportunity to Write a New Chapter

    Chile is going through political change. In May, Chileans voted to elect an assembly that will write a new constitution. Those elected to redraw the country’s magna carta feature a large contingent of independents. Left-wing parties are most favorably positioned among institutional actors, but right-wing parties did not reach the one-third threshold needed to enjoy veto power.

    At the end of 2019, months of social protest and days of violence across Chile gripped the country. At the time, mainstream political forces and President Sebastian Pinera’s government managed to appease the protesters and halt social upheaval. In return, he gave in to growing calls for a vote on whether or not Chile should get a new constitution.

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    Almost a year later, in October 2020, Chileans voted in a national referendum and chose to abandon their current constitution, which was inherited from the era of General Augusto Pinochet. Now, the people have elected an assembly that is in charge of writing and proposing a new charter.

    Tectonic Shift

    In a race that represented a political earthquake, 155 constituents were elected to form a Constitutional Convention. Chile’s traditional political elite lost significant ground to independent candidates, political influencers and social movements.

    Center-right and center-left parties, which led the transition to democracy in the 1990s, took the hardest hit. Chile Vamos, a center-right coalition led by the president, failed to reach the one-third of seats it expected. Pinera has led the country since 2018 and had previously governed between 2010 and 2014. The loss means Chile Vamos cannot veto reforms perceived as too left leaning.

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    Apruebo Dignidad, a new, more militant left-wing coalition, outperformed the traditional center left, known simply as Apruebo. Now, Apruebo Dignidad has senior-partner status and a more favorable position within the Constitutional Convention than the Apruebo coalition. A faction of the Apruebo Dignidad coalition, known as the Frente Amplio, first entered the political stage in 2017, emerging from student movements with a militant agenda.

    Independent candidates are the biggest winners. The convention is controlled by 64% of constituents who do not belong to a political party — only 36% of them are party militants, excluding the 17 seats reserved for indigenous peoples. However, it is fair to say that most of these independent constituents have left-leaning affinities.

    The next step in the country’s constitutional process includes the swearing-in of the convention, which will be on July 4. This will be followed by nine months of discussions and the drafting of the new magna carta. Once the new constitution is ready, a national plebiscite or referendum will be held in which Chileans will vote on whether to adopt it.

    Participation and Abstention

    During the referendum in 2020, 79% of voters favored drafting a new constitution. Despite this, electoral participation has been weak throughout the entire process. In 2012, Chile abandoned compulsory voting. Since then, the fact that many Chileans choose not to vote might become an issue in the mid-to-long term. This could have an impact on how representative the Constitutional Convention is of public sentiment. The highest rate of voter participation throughout the constitutional review process was achieved during the initial referendum in 2020, in which 50.8% of registered voters took part.

    Last month, just 43% of the 15 million registered voters cast their ballot, representing just over 6 million in a country of around 19 million people. Taking into account the number of null-and-void votes and blank ballot papers, only 38.3% of registered voters chose their preferred candidates for the composition of the Constitutional Convention. The numbers were even worse in the election of governors, which took place on June 13, in which only 19.6% of voters participated. This was the worst rate ever recorded in Chile.

    A survey conducted two days after the May elections found that people did not vote for four main reasons. Some Chileans cited transportation problems to reach a voting site, while others mentioned election fatigue due to the number of votes that have taken place lately. Some were not sure who to vote for. Others said they had a general lack of interest in politics or in these polls. Election fatigue was compounded by the fact that the vote for the convention was held at the same time as regional and local elections — the latter of which were part of the regular electoral schedule.

    Short-Term Fallout

    Only after the May election did important developments take place. On May 19, three days after polls closed, parties had to register their candidates for the presidential primaries, which will be held in July. The primaries will determine who runs in the general election in November. Whoever wins that contest would be in charge of implementing Chile‘s constitutional transition.

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    Thus, the last few weeks have represented a political earthquake for traditional coalitions. In particular, the historically dominant center left dropped several presidential candidates for November’s contest. It also broke historical alliances and failed to reach broad agreements to nominate a single coalition candidate for the general election. Only the center-right Chile Vamos and the left-wing Apruebo Dignidadregistered their candidates for the primaries on July 18. To the surprise and concern of many, communist candidate Daniel Jadue will, according to the latest polling, make it to the presidential election’s runoff.

    Meanwhile, the June election for the 16 governors of Chile’s regions, which is an early indicator for the presidential race, shifted territorial power to the moderate left.

    The outcome of the presidential and parliamentary elections will be significant in the short term as it will determine the checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government. This, in turn, will affect the practical workings of the Constitutional Convention. It will also have an impact on whether Chile’s political shift to the left is structural or temporary.

    The End of the Chicago Boys

    With this in mind, it is currently difficult to predict the makeup of Chile’s next government. The question is whether it will be dominated by left-wing forces or if the Chile Vamos coalition manages to distance itself from the unpopular Pinera and secure another term in office. Nevertheless, as the work of the Constitutional Convention gets underway, it is evident that the resulting charter will represent a much more socioeconomically progressive framework than what Chile has had since its transition to democracy in 1990.

    Chile’s new constitution will undoubtedly turn the page on the country’s laissez-faire orthodoxy inherited from the “Chicago Boys,” who shaped the country’s economy under Pinochet. The constitution will likely also have an impact on other issues, including gender equality, the recognition of indigenous peoples, the social safety net and environmental concerns.

    It remains to be seen whether Chile’s constitutional revisions will set it on a path of more equitable growth or one of uncontrolled state spending. But one thing is clear: Chile’s post-Pinochet model has become unsustainable. It is now up to the statespersons of South America’s most prosperous and advanced economy to ensure that this chapter does not go down in history as a missed opportunity.

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Los expresidentes de América Latina tienen demasiado poder

    Es hora de bajarlos de sus pedestales.El domingo, los votantes de Ecuador eligieron a Guillermo Lasso, un exbanquero que está a favor de las políticas de libre mercado, como presidente. Votaron por él en lugar de por Andrés Arauz, un populista de izquierda. Algunos analistas lamentan el fin del progresismo, pero lo que realmente vimos fue un bienvenido golpe a una extraña forma de política del hombre fuerte: el fenómeno de expresidentes que buscan extender su control e influencia eligiendo y respaldando a sus “delfines” en elecciones nacionales.Arauz fue designado personalmente por el expresidente Rafael Correa, un economista semiautoritario que gobernó Ecuador de 2007 a 2017. La elección no fue solo un referendo sobre el papel del Estado en la economía, sino de manera más fundamental sobre la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué papel deben desempeñar los expresidentes en la política, si es que acaso deben desempeñar alguno?En América Latina se ha vuelto normal que exmandatarios impulsen a candidatos sustitutos. Se trata de una forma extraña de caudillismo, o política del hombre fuerte, combinada con continuismo, o continuidad de linaje, pensada para mantener a los rivales al margen.Los expresidentes son los nuevos caudillos: pretenden extender su mandato a través de los herederos que escogen, algo llamado delfinismo, de “delfín”, el título dado al príncipe heredero al trono de Francia entre los siglos XIV y XIX.En la última década, al menos siete presidentes elegidos democráticamente en Latinoamérica fueron escogidos por su predecesor. El más reciente, Luis Arce, llegó al poder en Bolivia en 2020, patrocinado por el exmandatario Evo Morales. Estos candidatos sustitutos le deben mucho de su victoria a la bendición de su jefe, la cual tiene un precio: se espera que el nuevo presidente se mantenga leal a los deseos de su patrocinador.Esta práctica ata con esposas de oro a aquellos recién electos y socava la democracia en el proceso. Más que pasar la estafeta, los expresidentes emiten una especie de contrato de no competencia. En Argentina, una expresidenta, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, contendió como compañera de fórmula de su candidato presidencial escogido, Alberto Fernández.Después de ser la primera dama de Argentina y luego convertirse en presidenta, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, a la derecha, se convirtió en vicepresidenta de su candidato elegido, Alberto Fernández, a la izquierda.Foto de consorcio de Natacha PisarenkoEste estilo actual de política caudillista es la actualización de una actualización. En la versión clásica de la política del hombre fuerte —que dominó la política latinoamericana tras las guerras de independencia del siglo XIX y hasta la década de los setenta— muchos caudillos buscaban mantener su poder al prohibir o amañar las elecciones una vez que llegaban a la presidencia, una maniobra que usó famosamente el dictador mexicano Porfirio Díaz, o simulando golpes de Estado si no podían ganar, una estrategia empleada por el dictador cubano Fulgencio Batista en 1952.Este modelo clásico de continuismo era traumático. En México y en Cuba, incitó ni más ni menos que dos revoluciones históricas que resonaron en el mundo entero.Latinoamérica actualizó este modelo de caudillismo. Los golpes de Estado y las prohibiciones de elecciones se volvieron obsoletos en la década de 1980 y, en lugar de abolir la democracia, se volvió usual que los líderes comenzaran a reescribir las constituciones y a manipular las instituciones para permitir la reelección. Comenzó el auge de las reelecciones. Desde Joaquín Balaguer en la República Dominicana en 1986 hasta Sebastián Piñera en Chile en 2017, Latinoamérica tuvo a 15 expresidentes que volvieron a la presidencia.No obstante, el modelo del continuismo a través de la reelección ha enfrentado obstáculos de manera reciente debido a que varios expresidentes se han visto envueltos en problemas legales.Tan solo en Centroamérica, 21 de 42 expresidentes han tenido problemas legales. En Perú, seis expresidentes de los últimos 30 años han enfrentado cargos de corrupción. En Ecuador, Correa fue sentenciado por recibir financiamiento para su campaña a cambio de contratos estatales. Él afirma que es una víctima de persecución política. Su respuesta fue usar la campaña de Arauz como boleto para recuperar su influencia. En cierto momento de la campaña, el candidato promovió la idea de que un voto por él era un voto por Correa.Durante la campaña presidencial de Ecuador, el candidato Andrés Arauz promovió la idea de que un voto por él era un voto por el expresidente Rafael Correa.Dolores Ochoa/Associated PressEstas complicaciones legales alientan a los expresidentes a tratar de respaldar a sustitutos que, como mínimo, podrían darles un indulto si resultan electos.Los expresidentes parecen pensar que la versión más reciente del caudillismo libera al país del trauma. El presidente Alberto Fernández aseguró que cuando su jefa, la expresidenta Fernández de Kirchner, lo eligió como su candidato porque, argumentó, el país no necesitaba a alguien como ella, “que divido”, sino a alguien como él, “que suma”. A su vez, Fernández de Kirchner fue elegida heredera por su difunto esposo, el expresidente Néstor Kirchner.No obstante, esta subrogación política difícilmente resuelve el trauma asociado con su continuismo inherente. De hecho, lo hace más tóxico. Con excepción de los simpatizantes del expresidente, el país ve el truco como lo que es: una tentativa evidente de restauración.Los problemas del delfinismo van más allá de intensificar la polarización al exacerbar el fanatismo político y puede conducir a consecuencias aún más graves. En el México de antes del año 2000, en el que los presidentes prácticamente escogían personalmente a sus sucesores, los exmandatarios solían seguir la norma de retirarse de la política, por lo que concedían suficiente autonomía al sucesor.Sin embargo, en la versión más reciente del delfinismo, los sucesores no son tan afortunados. Los expresidentes que los patrocinaron siguen entrometiéndose. Esta interferencia produce tensiones para gobernar. El mandatario en funciones pierde su relevancia de manera prematura, con todos los ojos puestos en las opiniones del presidente anterior, o en algún momento busca romper con su jefe. La separación puede detonar guerras civiles terribles.Estas rupturas a menudo son inevitables. Los delfines electos enfrentan nuevas realidades con las que sus impulsores nunca lidiaron. Además, con frecuencia tienen que arreglar el desastre que dejaron sus jefes.Lenín Moreno, el actual presidente de Ecuador, quien fue seleccionado por Correa, tuvo desacuerdos con él respecto a una serie de políticas autoritarias de izquierda impulsadas por revelaciones de corrupción. El resultado fue una lucha de poderes que dividió a la coalición gobernante y entorpeció la capacidad del gobierno de lidiar con la crisis económica y luego con la pandemia de la COVID-19.Una lucha similar ocurrió en Colombia cuando el entonces presidente Juan Manuel Santos, escogido por Álvaro Uribe, decidió llegar a un acuerdo de paz con las guerrillas, con lo que desafío la postura de Uribe. El resultado fue una especie de guerra civil entre ambos hombres que rivalizó en intensidad con la guerra contra las guerrillas a la que el gobierno intentaba poner fin.No hay una solución sencilla a este tipo de continuismo. Los partidos deben dejar de poner a sus expresidentes en un pedestal. Necesitan reformar las precandidaturas para asegurarse de que otros líderes, no solo los exmandatarios, tengan los medios para competir de manera interna. Los países latinoamericanos han hecho mucho para garantizar que haya una fuerte competencia entre partidos, pero mucho menos para garantizar la competencia dentro de los partidos.Nada huele más a oligarquía y corrupción que un expresidente que intenta mantenerse vigente a través de candidatos sustitutos. Y Ecuador ha demostrado que esta manipulación política puede acabar por empoderar precisamente a las mismas ideologías políticas que los expresidentes pretendían contener.Javier Corrales (@jcorrales2011) es escritor y profesor de Ciencias Políticas en Amherst College. Su obra más reciente es Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America. More

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    Latin America’s Former Presidents Have Way Too Much Power

    It’s time to take them down from their pedestals.On Sunday, voters elected Guillermo Lasso, a former banker and a supporter of free-market policies, as president of Ecuador over Andrés Arauz, a left-wing populist. Some analysts are decrying the end of progressivism, but what we are really seeing is a welcome setback for a strange form of strongman politics: the phenomenon of former presidents seeking to extend their control and influence by choosing and backing their protégés in national elections.Mr. Arauz was handpicked by former President Rafael Correa, a semiauthoritarian economist who governed Ecuador from 2007 to 2017. The election was a referendum not just on the role of the state in the economy but also more fundamentally on the question, “What, if any, role should former presidents play in politics?”In Latin America, it has become normal for former presidents to promote surrogate candidates. This is a bizarre form of caudillismo, or strongman politics, combined with continuismo, or lineage continuity, intended to keep rivals at bay.Today, former presidents are the new caudillos, and they are hoping to extend their rule through their chosen heirs — in what is called delfinismo, from “dauphin,” the title given to the heir apparent to the French throne in the 14th through 19th centuries.In the last decade, at least seven democratically elected presidents in Latin America were handpicked by a predecessor. The most recent, Luis Arce, came to power in Bolivia in 2020, sponsored by former strongman Evo Morales. These surrogate candidates owe much of their victory to their patron’s blessing, which comes with a price. The new presidents are expected to stay loyal to their patron’s wishes.The practice binds those newly elected in golden handcuffs, undermining democracy in the process. More than passing the torch, former presidents issue a sort of noncompete contract. In Argentina, a former president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, ran as vice president with her chosen candidate, Alberto Fernández.After serving as Argentina’s first lady and then president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, right, became vice president under her chosen candidate, Alberto Fernández, left.Pool photo by Natacha PisarenkoThis current style of strongman politics is an update of an update. In the classic version of the strongman politics, which dominated Latin American politics after the wars of independence during the 19th century until the 1970s, many caudillos sought to stay in office by banning or rigging elections, a tactic famously utilized by the Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz, or by staging coups if they couldn’t win office, a tradition employed by the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1952.This classic model of continuismo was intensely traumatic. In Mexico and Cuba, the model incited nothing less than two world-historic revolutions.Latin America updated this model of caudillismo. Coups and election bans became unfashionable by the 1980s, and so rather than abolish democracy, it became more common for leaders to rewrite constitutions and manipulate institutions to permit re-election. A re-election boom followed. From Joaquín Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 1986 to Sebastián Piñera in Chile in 2017, Latin America saw 15 former presidents return to the presidency.But lately, the model of continuismo through re-election has run into trouble after a number of former presidents found themselves entangled in legal troubles.In Central America alone, 21 of 42 former presidents have had brushes with the law. In Peru, six ex-presidents from the past 30 years have faced corruption charges. In Ecuador, Mr. Correa was convicted of trading campaign finance contributions for state contracts. He claimed he was a victim of political persecution. His response was to use Mr. Arauz’s campaign as the ticket back to influence. At some point during the campaign, the candidate even promoted the idea that a vote for him was a vote for Mr. Correa.During Ecuador’s presidential campaign, the candidate Andrés Arauz promoted the idea that a vote for him was a vote for former President Rafael Correa.Dolores Ochoa/Associated PressThese legal complications encourage former presidents to promote surrogates who might, at the very least, pardon them if elected.Former presidents seem to think that this latest update of caudillismo liberates the country from trauma. President Alberto Fernández claimed that when her sponsor, former president Fernández de Kirchner, chose him as her candidate, she justified her decision by arguing that the country didn’t need someone like her, “who divides,” but someone like him, who can “draw people together.” Ms. Fernández de Kirchner was herself chosen as an heir by her late husband, former president Néstor Kirchner.But this political surrogacy hardly solves the trauma associated with its inherent continuismo. In fact, that makes it more toxic. Except for the former president’s followers, the country sees the gimmick for what it is: an obvious effort at restoration.The problems with delfinismo go beyond intensified polarization by exacerbating political fanaticism and can lead to even greater problems. In Mexico until the 1990s, where presidents essentially handpicked their successors, former presidents typically observed the norm of retiring from politics, granting the successor sufficient autonomy.But in the most recent version of delfinismo, successors are not that lucky. The sponsoring former presidents keep meddling. This interference produces governance travails. The sitting presidents either become premature lame ducks, with all eyes turned to the former presidents’ views, or eventually seek a break from their patrons. Splits can unleash nasty civil wars.Such breaks are often inevitable. Elected delfines face new realities that sponsors never confronted. Frequently they have to clean up messes their sponsors left behind.Lenín Moreno, the current president of Ecuador, who was selected by Mr. Correa, broke with him on a number of leftist-authoritarian policies, prompted by revelations of corruption. The result was a power struggle that splintered the ruling coalition and hindered the government’s ability to cope with the economic crisis and then the Covid-19 pandemic.A similar battle occurred in Colombia when President Juan Manuel Santos, chosen by the then president Álvaro Uribe, decided to make peace with guerrillas, defying Mr. Uribe’s preference. The result was a near civil war between those men that rivaled in intensity the war against guerrillas that the government was trying to settle.There is no easy solution to this type of continuismo. Parties need to stop placing their former presidents on a pedestal. They need to reform primaries to ensure leaders other than former presidents have the means to compete internally. Latin American countries have done a lot to ensure strong competition among parties, but less so within parties.Nothing screams oligarchy and corruption like a former president trying to stay alive through surrogate candidates. And Ecuador has demonstrated that this political maneuver may end up also empowering rather than weakening the very same political ideologies the former presidents were trying to contain.Javier Corrales is a professor and the chair of the political science department at Amherst College.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More