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    Ukraine-Russia crisis: who’s winning the international influence war?

    Ukraine-Russia crisis: who’s winning the international influence war? The balance of power in the diplomatic battle is shifting constantly. But are any of the key players making real advances?Briefly raised hopes of averting a “horrendous” war in Ukraine are fading again after the US predicted an invasion in the “next several days” and British officials said they believed Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, had decided to attack.The mood in Washington and London had shifted abruptly after Russian-backed separatists shelled Ukrainian targets in the disputed eastern Donbas region. Moscow claimed Kyiv’s forces opened fire first. Clashes are continuing.Analysis: what can the west expect if Putin gives order to invade?Read more US president Joe Biden said that Russia was “engaged in a false-flag operation to have an excuse to go in” and was increasing, not reducing, troop numbers. That analysis was echoed in other Nato and EU countries, which are preparing punitive sanctions. Diplomatic efforts to halt the slide to war are not yet exhausted. Antony Blinken, the US secretary of state, is due to meet his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Europe this week – assuming there is no invasion. They will discuss Russia’s demands, delivered in writing last week, for a Nato withdrawal from eastern Europe and curbs on US missile deployments. Lavrov will also insist Ukraine be permanently denied Nato membership.In the documents, which are a formal response to American proposals for continued dialogue, Russia warns it will be forced to take measures of an unspecified “military-technical character” if its concerns are not addressed.Western leaders, including Boris Johnson, Kamala Harris, the US vice-president, Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, and Ukraine’s president will discuss the crisis this weekend at the annual Munich security conference. Unusually, Russia and China will not attend.Meanwhile, global stock markets reacted badly to increased fears of war, with share prices falling sharply. Gloom about the prospects for peace overwhelmed a midweek surge of optimism, sparked when predictions that Russia would invade last Wednesday proved wrong. Instead, Putin said he was pulling back some forces from Ukraine’s border. It seemed catastrophe had been averted. Yet within hours US and Nato officials were claiming the pullback was illusory. The White House flatly accused Russia of lying, saying troop numbers have swelled to around 150,000.For his part, Putin alleged, without evidence, that “genocide” against ethnic Russians was under way in the Donbas – another possible pretext for invasion. He continues to insist his troops are withdrawing and that there is no intention to attackWho and what to believe? The next few days could be a turning point. Or the stand-off could drag on inconclusively for months. The only certainty is that the future of Ukraine, and of relations between Russia and the west, hangs in the balance this weekend. Although an armed invasion has not yet happened, the 2022 “war for Ukraine” is already being waged on multiple non-military, political, diplomatic, economic, technological and covert fronts. So who’s winning so far?Vladimir PutinThe question on everyone’s lips: what does Putin want? One theory is this former low-level KGB officer and part-time taxi driver has a massive chip on his shoulder.He has a small man’s visceral need to prove his (and Russia’s) superiority to the western victors of the cold war – but also to the former Soviet elites, from whose ranks he was excluded.A less complex explanation is that Putin views Ukraine as an integral part of historical Russia and Ukrainians and Russians as one people. He claims Ukraine is not a real country. For him, re-absorption into the fatherland is natural and logical, while efforts by Kyiv’s leaders to align with the west are anathema.Experts say Putin is intent on recreating the supposed glories of the Soviet era. He calls the collapse of the Soviet Union a geopolitical tragedy.Looked at this way, a conquest of Ukraine is part of a larger scheme to rebuild a Russian sphere of influence encompassing eastern Europe and central Asia. More mundanely, Putin’s actions can be explained by genuine fear that Russia’s security is threatened, his (disputed) belief that Nato broke a pledge not to expand up to Russia’s borders, and concern that it may accept Ukraine’s membership. Putin, a de facto dictator, feels threatened by a pro-western, democratic Ukraine on his doorstep.Is he winning? Putin has succeeded in forcing the west to consider his security concerns. He has intimidated Ukraine. And he has reminded a rattled Europe of its dependency on Russian gas.At the same time, he has hugely reinvigorated Nato, permanently changed western security assumptions, united the US and Europe against him, and reinforced Russia’s reputation as a rogue state that ignores international law and breaks its word.Joe BidenThe US president was relatively quick out of the blocks over Ukraine. He needed to be. Last year’s chaotic US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the resulting damage to Nato’s credibility were laid at his door. With Covid and economic woes already hurting his domestic approval ratings, Biden could not afford a repeat foreign policy disaster.Having made promotion of democracy and human rights around the world a key foreign policy objective, Biden could also not stand back as Russia threatened a free, independent, democratic state.Biden’s approach to the crisis is influenced by two additional strategic factors. One is his aim to reboot the transatlantic alliance, undermined by his predecessor Donald Trump. The other is his desire to demonstrate to China, Russia’s ally, that the US will stoutly support its friends, be they in Ukraine or Taiwan.Biden has sent US troops to reinforce Nato’s eastern flank, assured Kyiv of non-military US support, and stiffened European backbones via an intense diplomatic offensive. In an unusual step, the US continues to disclose detailed (mostly unsubstantiated) intelligence about Russian intentions in an apparent attempt to pre-empt and forestall Putin’s next move.Biden’s tactics may have succeeded in heading off an invasion until now. There are two large caveats. One is that Washington’s attempts to find a diplomatic solution have struggled, while its tough stance may have compromised European efforts. This vacuum is dangerous. The other big reservation is that Biden controversially vowed from the start that US forces would not fight to defend non-Nato Ukraine – despite past US interventions in non-Nato Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and elsewhere.Putin could yet take catastrophic advantage of this most un-American display of caution.Volodymyr ZelenskiyUkraine’s president impressed world leaders in the Munich security conference this weekend with a brave and punchy speech after ignoring warnings to stay at home for fear of a Russian-inspired coup attempt. His response to the unfolding crisis has surprised some in the west. Criticising alarming claims in Washington and London about an “any day” invasion, Zelenskiy said such suggestions risked causing panic and harming his country’s economy. As Russian military pressure increased last week, the official tone in Kyiv shifted. But by and large Ukrainians appear unimpressed by frantic talk of war. A “day of unity” last Wednesday – the supposed invasion D-day – was not widely supported. As western diplomats and nationals hastily evacuate, most Ukrainians are firmly staying put.One explanation is that people have learned to live with threats from Russia. Low-intensity conflict with Russian-backed Donbas separatists has become the new normal since 2014, when Moscow annexed Crimea. Last week’s passage of a resolution in the Russian Duma (parliament) supporting independence for the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” in the Donbas was an attempt to increase Putin’s leverage. Such a unilateral move would spell the end for the so-called Minsk accords, whose terms are disputed by both sides.Ukraine’s aspiration to join Nato lies at the heart of the crisis. Zelenskiy is being pressed by European governments to drop this objective, a key Russian demand, and adopt a neutral, non-aligned status. So far at least, the Kyiv government, cast in the role of underdog, has benefited from increased international support, weapons deliveries and financial aid. It says any war would be about Europe’s future, not just Ukraine’s.True or not, Ukrainians will be the big losers if Putin resorts to force.Emmanuel Macron and Olaf ScholzEmmanuel Macron, the French president who also holds the rotating presidency of the EU council of ministers, has thrust himself into the diplomatic frontline. As the Americans and Russians haggled over Moscow’s demands for new security arrangements in Europe, Macron met Putin in Moscow and sketched possible compromises.These ideas, including recognition of Russian concerns about Nato expansion, its forward deployments in eastern Europe, and current and future US missile capabilities in Poland and Romania, may yet provide the basis for a deal. Macron also raised the possibility of Ukraine adopting neutral status, not unlike Finland during the cold war.Macron publicly supports the US-orchestrated plan to impose severe sanctions on Russia should it invade, and insists he acts in close consultation with Washington. But his Moscow talks raised eyebrows. British officials accused him of appeasement and of undermining the west’s united front.While Macron can shrug off criticism from London, he needs the backing of Germany, the biggest European player. But Olaf Scholz, its newly elected chancellor, has appeared in two minds. On the one hand he wants to salvage the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia. On the other he is under intense pressure from Biden to abandon it in support of anti-Kremlin sanctions.Yet Scholz surprised his critics last week when he met Putin in Moscow. He delivered a feisty performance, raising questions about media freedom and human rights.That may have reassured hawkish allies such as Poland and the Baltic republics, which have accused him of being “soft” on Russia. At the same time, Scholz extracted a commitment from Putin to continue dialogue in line with Macron’s approach.The EU commission has been sidelined during the crisis. But the French and German leaders have emerged with reputations enhanced. So far.Boris JohnsonBeset by scandals arising from illegal lockdown parties and reportedly anxious to change the subject, Boris Johnson seized on the Ukraine crisis in late January after having previously largely ignored it.At his direction Downing St began briefing about a big, cross-departmental Whitehall push to tackle the crisis. Britain, Johnson claimed, would lead western attempts to deter Russia. But saying it does not make it so. Suggestions that this new effort to aid Ukraine was part of so-called Operation Save Big Dog to rescue his career were denied, naturally.The UK has since sent extra troops to Estonia, missiles to Ukraine, and placed Royal Navy ships on alert. It is typically iffy about accepting refugees, but has offered humanitarian aid.But Britain’s emphasis on muscular deterrence has come at the expense of diplomacy. It has contributed almost nothing to peace-making efforts. When Liz Truss, the foreign secretary, met Lavrov in Moscow, their talks ended in an icy standoff.Johnson has gratuitously undermined Macron’s Moscow initiative while Ben Wallace, the UK defence secretary, spoke disparagingly of a “whiff of Munich”. Meanwhile, the government has yet to enforce effective measures to curb Russian money-laundering in London.All else aside, the Ukraine crisis has brutally underscored Britain’s diminished international influence abroad. Separated by choice from the EU, the UK is now viewed in Russia (and much of Europe) as little more than a cheerleader and errand boy for America.When Johnson asked Biden what else the UK could do in a phone call last week, the US president replied: “We’re not going anywhere without you, pal.” That summed up Britain’s war to date. The rule of thumb for post-Brexit foreign policy: ask politely what Washington wants, then follow directions.TopicsUkraineThe ObserverRussiaVladimir PutinUS politicsJoe BidenVolodymyr ZelenskiyEmmanuel MacronfeaturesReuse this content More

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    Will diplomacy win over war? Politics Weekly Extra – podcast

    As scepticism continues over Russia’s claims it has withdrawn troops from the Ukrainian border, Joan E Greve speaks to congressman Tom Malinowski of New Jersey, who was in Ukraine a couple of weeks ago. He shares his thoughts on the Biden administration’s approach so far

    How to listen to podcasts: everything you need to know

    Send your questions and feedback to podcasts@theguardian.com. Help support the Guardian by going to gu.com/supportpodcasts. More

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    Time for a Sober Look at the Ukraine Crisis

    Recent wars and crises show us how dangerous it can be when dishonest political elites unite with a powerful media to direct an uninformed public. It might be difficult to comprehend the combination. But unfortunately, even tragically, that’s exactly the combination that enabled wars to be launched in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and is now being used in the case of Ukraine.

    The West’s Middle Eastern Playbook

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    Remember the Gulf of Tonkin lie? It cost more than 3 million Vietnamese their lives, murdered in cold blood, using the most lethal weapons American war industry could produce and sell. An identical modus operandi was used as recently as 2003 to start the Iraq War. The lies about Saddam Hussein’s WMDs cost the lives of a million Iraqis, and counting. Last year, the US finally drew the curtain on its 20-year war in Afghanistan, at a cost of over $2.3 trillion and nearly 50,000 civilian lives. How is that possible? Because the public is ignorant and, therefore, easily fooled by decision-makers and powerful media.

    Same Playbook

    It’s the same playbook, again and again. The media refocus public attention from a country to a specific individual, presenting them as a bogeyman from whom the people are to be liberated. Now the war is not against a nation in which millions will die but against an individual. It’s easy to turn your ignorant people against one person. In Vietnam, it was Ho Chi Minh, in Afghanistan, Mullah Omar and his Taliban, and Hussein in Iraq.

    Take a look at the Ukrainian crisis: The conflict is not with Russia — it’s with Vladimir Putin. The narrative is, will Putin invade? Why is Putin amassing his — not Russia’s — army? The Russian president is the new bogeyman. And what do the nice people at NATO want? Just freedom for Ukraine to join NATO, which incidentally includes Kyiv’s right to allow NATO armies to amass on its territory, on Russia’s doorstep. How could there possibly be something wrong with that? Right? Wrong!

    Embed from Getty Images

    Here are some real thoughts for our domesticated friends on the other side of sobriety. It might even help free them from the confinements of their media and actually take a global, rather than a parochial, view of their problems.

    Suppose Ukraine, after joining NATO, becomes emboldened and decides to challenge Russia (or is it Putin?) in Donbas or Crimea? Both have a sizeable Russian population and, like all of Ukraine and Russia, were part of the former Soviet Union. What will NATO do? Trigger Article 5 and embark on a direct military confrontation against Russia on Ukraine’s side? Or will it unprecedentedly abandon a NATO member in war and risk breaking up the alliance, giving French President Emmanuel Macron’s description of NATO more credence?

    If war breaks out over Ukraine, as some never-seen-action, gung-ho rocking-chair warriors want, what will happen in Asia? What if China decides that the moment is right to take over Taiwan and the whole of the South China Sea? Will our Western warriors start a war with China while fighting Russia?

    In the Middle East, where Washington’s client states are on the run, will they be able to rely on American protection, which they desperately seem to need despite hundreds of billions spent on military hardware? What will happen if their regional adversaries decide to go full scale on them, creating a wider conflict across the Arab world because all hell has broken loose in Europe and the South China Sea?

    Embed from Getty Images

    And who is doing the actual saber-rattling? The leadership of major European countries — the front-line states — is scared, not by Russia invading Ukraine but of their own Anglo-Saxon war-mongering allies in London and Washington. The Europeans realize that these are the same people who pushed the world to disastrous wars repeatedly, killing countless millions but losing each one of these conflicts — unless, of course, the purpose of war is exclusively to kill and destroy.

    Trusting these same people with decisions of war and peace is like using the same failed mindset and same failed plan but hoping for different results. This has never worked. It will never work.

    Sitting on a Powder Keg

    These are realistic scenarios in a world sitting on a powder keg with everyone wanting to redraw geopolitical maps. Are these global ramifications even considered in the West? Does the public in the West even know or understand these global realities? The media there are busy entertaining the public with war scenarios and military hardware. No one is telling them that if the war starts; we will know where and when it started, but we won’t know where or when it will stop. Of course, we will be able to estimate how destructive it will be, assuming that it still matters.

    The path to war is littered with bravado, brinkmanship and ego. We then lose control of events, and all that is required is a spark, or a single bullet, like the one that murdered Archduke Franz Ferdinand and created an uncontrollable chain reaction leading to a war that killed 40 million people.

    Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

    Following the fall of the Soviet Union, we drifted from a bipolar world that maintained decades of no major wars to a destructive unipolar system of unstoppable wars and invasions. With the reemergence of Russia and the rise of China, we now see a tripolar world in the making, with a number of regional superpowers such as India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey coming into their own. There is no going back on this.

    Attempts to prevent others from rising will only result in destructive wars. The sooner our friends across the big pond recognize and learn to coexist with that new world order, the better it is for everyone. This is not to say their time is up, rather that time has come to share power, and they must accept that new reality. The alternative is disastrous. Germany tried to control the world and become its dictator. We know how that ended. Lessons learned — time for sobriety.

    And here is a thought: Taking one’s nation to the edge of the cliff requires brinkmanship. Taking a step back requires leadership. 

    The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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    Emmanuel Macron cuenta sobre su reunión con Vladimir Putin

    El líder francés relató su cara a cara con Vladimir Putin y desestimó el intercambio de cartas de Washington con Moscú, apostando a que su diplomacia podría dar frutos antes de las elecciones de abril.PARÍS — La semana pasada, en una mesa mucho más pequeña que la ovalada de más de 6 metros de largo en la que el presidente de Francia, Emmanuel Macron, se sentó frente al presidente de Rusia, Vladimir V. Putin, en Moscú, el mandatario francés reunió a algunos periodistas. Ahí dijo que la crisis en Ucrania le estaba ocupando “más de la mitad de mi vida, la mayor parte de mi tiempo” porque el mundo se encuentra “en un momento crítico” de la historia.Esta mesa estaba a unos diez kilómetros de altura, en el avión presidencial que la semana pasada llevó a Macron con prontitud a Moscú; a Kiev, la capital de Ucrania, y a Berlín, donde alertó de un daño “irreversible” si Rusia invadía Ucrania y señaló que era crucial “no aceptar la fatalidad”.Macron está convencido de que la crisis actual —marcada por el revanchismo de Rusia tras su aparente humillación por parte de Occidente— significa que la seguridad colectiva de Europa no se ha podido repensar desde el fin de la Guerra Fría. Parece que, al menos en eso, coincidieron Macron y Putin. El enorme desafío que se le presenta a Macron es determinar cómo podría suplirse, y convencer a los demás, entre ellos a Estados Unidos, sobre sus beneficios.Para el final de la semana pasada, el estancamiento con Rusia, que derivó en maniobras militares cerca de las fronteras de Ucrania, parecía más amenazante que nunca. Sin embargo, a solo ocho semanas de las elecciones presidenciales en Francia, Macron ha tomado la arriesgada apuesta de intentar convencer a Putin de que recurra al diálogo y de que los electores franceses estén más complacidos con su autoridad a nivel global que enfadados por su falta de atención.Si fracasa, no solo se arriesga a perder sus votos y su confianza, sino a dañar su prestigio y el de su país al ser visto en el extranjero como un líder que fue demasiado ambicioso.Consciente de esa percepción, se ha esmerado mucho en coordinar sus esfuerzos con los de otros dirigentes europeos, algunos de ellos escépticos, y con Joe Biden, el presidente de Estados Unidos. El viernes, en una conversación de 75 minutos entre los líderes de Occidente, se activó un frente unido para convencer a Rusia de “distender la crisis y optar por el camino del diálogo”, manifestó la Comisión Europea.Una imagen satelital que muestra el despliegue de viviendas y vehículos militares en Rechitsa, Bielorrusia.Maxar Technologies, vía ReutersCuando cayó el Muro de Berlín, Macron tenía 11 años y Biden, 46, por lo que tal vez es inevitable que haya ciertas divergencias de opinión. Macron no ve ninguna razón para que la estructura de la alianza que prevaleció sobre la Unión Soviética sea eterna.“El asunto no es la OTAN, sino cómo creamos una zona de seguridad”, dijo. “¿Cómo podemos vivir en paz en esta región?”. Macron insinuó que parte de su objetivo en Moscú había sido sugerirle a Putin que abandonara su obsesión por la OTAN —que Ucrania no debe unirse nunca a esta organización— y se concentrara en otro “esquema”. Mencionó que le había dicho al dirigente ruso que “el esquema que usted propone es falso”.Understand Russia’s Relationship With the WestThe tension between the regions is growing and Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly willing to take geopolitical risks and assert his demands.Competing for Influence: For months, the threat of confrontation has been growing in a stretch of Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Threat of Invasion: As the Russian military builds its presence near Ukraine, Western nations are seeking to avert a worsening of the situation.Energy Politics: Europe is a huge customer of Russia’s fossil fuels. The rising tensions in Ukraine are driving fears of a midwinter cutoff.Migrant Crisis: As people gathered on the eastern border of the European Union, Russia’s uneasy alliance with Belarus triggered additional friction.Militarizing Society: With a “youth army” and initiatives promoting patriotism, the Russian government is pushing the idea that a fight might be coming.Macron advirtió que era necesario presentarse en el Kremlin y enfrentar al hombre que le ha puesto una pistola en la cabeza a Occidente con 130.000 soldados congregados en la frontera con Ucrania. Se ganaba tiempo al abrir otra ruta diplomática, más flexible que el intercambio de cartas entre Rusia y Estados Unidos, que en repetidas ocasiones Macron rechazó por considerarlas inútiles, y programar próximas reuniones. Los dos líderes se reunieron durante más de cinco horas el lunes pasado. Macron dijo que insistió tanto en “las garantías que podía darme sobre la situación en la frontera” que, en algún momento, Putin dijo que estaba siendo “torturado”.Putin, con la misma insistencia, atacó la expansión hacia el este de la OTAN desde 1997 y la agresión que esto implicaba.Marinos ucranianos en la región oriental de Donetsk el miércoles de la semana pasada.Tyler Hicks/The New York TimesCuando le preguntaron acerca de esa mesa tan larga y ridiculizada, Macron dijo: “Bueno, para nada era algo fraternal”.El Kremlin no ha aceptado que Macron haya obtenido alguna concesión, pero dijo que su enfoque tenía “simientes de razón”, a diferencia del intento de diplomacia por parte del Reino Unido, el cual fue tachado por el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Serguéi Lavrov, de una conversación entre “sordos y mudos”.No se sabe bien cuál podría ser el nuevo esquema propuesto por Macron para la seguridad de Ucrania y de Europa. Pero, al parecer, de alguna manera ofrecería garantías inquebrantables a Ucrania de su soberanía e independencia en una forma en la que su ingreso a la OTAN quedara como un espejismo; al tiempo que Rusia permanecería satisfecha de que la seguridad de Ucrania no se hubiera reforzado a expensas de Moscú.En la práctica, Macron cree que es posible hacer un truco de prestidigitación que logre al mismo tiempo dos cosas: que los ucranianos permanezcan libres y seguros para mirar hacia Occidente para su futuro y que Putin siga pensando que ambos países forman un “espacio histórico y espiritual”, como lo llamó el líder ruso en una reflexión de 5000 palabras publicada el verano pasado sobre “la unidad histórica de los rusos y los ucranianos”.Se trata de una maniobra híbrida, pero que no es inusual en el presidente francés. A través de los años, Macron se ha dado a conocer como el mandatario de “al mismo tiempo” por sus constantes malabares de diferentes aristas de los asuntos —primero a favor de disminuir la dependencia de Francia en la energía nuclear, ahora a favor de aumentarla— y por su intrincada disección de los problemas que a veces deja a los analistas preguntándose qué es lo que él cree en realidad.Es incuestionable que cree apasionadamente en la Unión Europea y en el desarrollo de Europa como una potencia más independiente. Es un tema en el que nunca ha vacilado, y ahora parece pensar que ha llegado la hora de rendir cuentas/jugársela/arriesgarse por esa convicción.Al menos, con la reunión del canciller de Alemania, Olaf Scholz, con Putin en Moscú esta semana, Macron ha hecho que el papel de Europa cuente en esta crisis, junto con Estados Unidos. Eso es más de lo que se puede decir del Reino Unido.El presidente de Rusia, Vladimir V. Putin, durante una reunión con el presidente de Francia, Emmanuel Macron, en Moscú la semana pasada.Foto de consorcio por Thibault Camus“Europa, a través de sus principales Estados, ha regresado de una etapa de la que parecía haber sido marginada”, dijo Michel Duclos, exembajador de Francia, en un artículo publicado recientemente por el Institut Montaigne.Macron ha tenido que trabajar mucho para mantener alineados a los gobiernos europeos indecisos, sobre todo los que solían vivir bajo el yugo soviético, con sus esfuerzos diplomáticos. Puesto que ahora Francia tiene la presidencia rotatoria del Consejo de la Unión Europea, ha tratado de comunicarse con todos, lo cual es una de las razones por las que Ucrania le está consumiendo su tiempo.Sus horarios tendrán que cambiar de alguna manera las siguientes semanas. Macron todavía no anuncia su candidatura para ser reelegido como presidente, pero es casi seguro que tenga que hacerlo en el transcurso de las próximas semanas. La fecha límite es el 4 de marzo y la primera ronda de votaciones es el 10 de abril.Por ahora, Macron lidera las encuestas, que le dan alrededor del 25 por ciento de los votos, con tres candidatos de derecha que le siguen y los partidos de izquierda divididos muy por detrás. Entre los rivales a su derecha hay un apoyo importante a la imagen de caudillo de Putin y su denuncia de la “decadencia” occidental, por lo que un vínculo con el líder ruso también beneficia políticamente a Macron.Aunque es el favorito para ganar, la probabilidad de una alta tasa de abstención entre los franceses desilusionados con la política y el atractivo poderoso de la extrema derecha hacen que la reelección de Macron no sea segura. Si Putin ignora sus esfuerzos diplomáticos e invade Ucrania, las certezas desaparecerán.Partidarios de Éric Zemmourl, candidato presidencial de extrema derecha, en Lille, FranciaChristophe Petit Tesson/EPA vía ShutterstockÉric Zemmour, candidato de la extrema derecha, dijo el mes pasado que Putin “debe ser respetado”, y agregó que “los argumentos y demandas de Putin son completamente legítimos”. También dijo: “Creo que la OTAN es una organización que debió haber desaparecido en 1990”.Marine Le Pen, la perenne candidata nacionalista y antiinmigrante, dijo el año pasado que “Ucrania pertenece a la esfera de influencia de Rusia”.“Al intentar trastocar esta esfera de influencia”, agregó, “se crean tensiones y miedos, y se llega a la situación que estamos viendo hoy”. Le Pen se negó a firmar una declaración emitida el mes pasado por partidos de extrema derecha reunidos en Madrid porque criticaba a Putin.Sus posturas revelan el abismo que separa la admiración de la extrema derecha francesa por Putin de los esfuerzos de Macron. A la convicción del presidente francés de que Rusia necesita ser parte de una nueva arquitectura de seguridad europea se une la determinación de que Ucrania mantenga su soberanía.Aunque Macron haya provocado malestar por sus críticas a la OTAN, se ha mantenido firme en no ceder a las demandas de Putin.Al preguntarle cuándo se dedicaría a anunciar su candidatura, señaló: “En algún momento tendré que ponerme a pensar en ello. Nada se puede hacer con premura. Tiene que ser en el momento adecuado”.Si Macron no encuentra ese momento ideal, su diplomacia y sus ideas de una seguridad europea reinventada pueden quedar en nada. Lo que puede ser factible en un segundo periodo de cinco años al frente de Francia, seguramente no lo será antes del 24 de abril, la fecha de la segunda ronda de las elecciones.Roger Cohen es el jefe del buró de París del Times. Fue columnista del diario de 2009 a 2020. Ha trabajado para el Times durante más de 30 años y se ha desempeñado como corresponsal y editor en el extranjero. Criado en Sudáfrica y Gran Bretaña, es un estadounidense naturalizado. @NYTimesCohen More

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    Ukraine crisis: miscalculation could trigger unintended wider conflict

    Ukraine crisis: miscalculation could trigger unintended wider conflict‘Risk of something going down like a mid-air collision, or a trigger-happy Russian or American, can really escalate things quickly’ The unprecedented Russian military encirclement of Ukraine has not only brought closer the prospect of a devastating war in that country, it has also raised the risks of triggering an unintended wider conflict.The US and Nato have been adamant that their troops will not enter Ukraine no matter what happens, and the Pentagon has pulled out the 160 national guard soldiers who were acting as military advisers.Biden warns Putin: you’ll pay a heavy cost if you attack UkraineRead moreEven during the cold war, Washington and Russia made sure their forces did not clash, and Joe Biden has made clear he would seek to keep it that way.“That’s a world war when Americans and Russia start shooting at one another,” Biden said.However, the massing of Russian troops in Belarus and the deployment of a substantial Russian naval force in the Black Sea, matched on a smaller scale by Nato land, sea and air reinforcements on the alliance’s eastern flank, means there is much far more military hardware in close proximity than is normal. And with proximity comes the increased danger of accidents and unintended consequences.“The risk of something going down like a mid-air collision, or a trigger-happy Russian or American, can really escalate things quickly,” said Danny Sjursen, a former army major and director of the Eisenhower Media Network.“You’re setting yourself up for accidents and miscalculation, and that’s when you can get out of control real quick, because there are domestic considerations both in Russia and in the United States. An American pilot dies – now what? I’m not saying that necessarily means we go to cataclysmic nuclear war but it escalates things.”The US national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, told CBS News on Sunday that the US had sought to be transparent about its troop deployments in eastern Europe in order “to avoid mistake miscalculation or escalation and also to send a very clear message to Russia we will defend every inch of Nato territory”.There is a long history of close encounters over the Baltic and Black Seas. Earlier this month US jet fighters scrambled to intercept Russian warplanes operating close to Nato airspace while British and Norwegian planes took off to monitor Russian aircraft flying into the North Sea.While Russia has shut off large parts of the Black Sea to conduct its manoeuvres, Nato navies have stayed out of the immediate vicinity for now, while building up their presence in the Mediterranean. If they do decide to go through the Bosphorus in a show of strength, or to safeguard commercial shipping, the risk will rise again.Elisabeth Braw, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said the danger is further heightened by Russia’s suspected use of “GPS spoofing”, interference with the navigational equipment of other vessels.On several occasions recently, civilian ships traveling in the Black Sea have encountered mysterious GPS troubles that showed the vessels being in a different part of the Black Sea or even on land. It was widely though the incidents were caused by Russia testing its technology.“It raises the risk for naval vessels that are in the Black Sea, which we should remember is not that big, and it’s crowded,” Braw said. “There’s enormous shipping activity in the Black Sea, and so all those crews face the risk of having no GPS.”The transfer of combat troops from Russia’s far east to Belarus has not only significantly increased the imminent threat to Ukraine, but also made eastern European Nato members increasingly nervous.“The closest training ranges in Belarus are 150 to 200km from Vilnius or Warsaw,” said Kristjan Mäe, the head of the Nato and EU department at Estonia’s ministry of defence. “This is a Russian force posture that hasn’t been there previously.”A refugee crisis at the Polish-Belarus border year led to a close encounter between the troops facing each other, with Warsaw complaining that Belarus forces opened fire in the direction of their soldiers.“We have to remember that the people who are actually out on the frontline are very young men and women and they face enormous responsibility,” Braw said. “Yes there is a chain of command but if there is some sort of provocation or aggression, intentional or unintentional, that is directed against them, then they have to respond.”The close encounters so far have occurred in peacetime. In the event of war, nerves will be far more on edge, communications could be hampered or flooded with disinformation.“We cannot be entirely confident that in the lead up to or during a conflict that Nato and Russia will be able to communicate, especially as current civil and military communication systems between them are not as robust or technically resilient as they should be,” Sahil Shah, a policy fellow at the European Leadership Network, said.“The world’s two largest nuclear-armed states have returned to the brink of conflict exactly 60 years after the Cuban missile crisis. If diplomacy is not pursued to the fullest extent, the risks of miscalculation and miscommunication could potentially pull in wider Europe into a devastating war. Without dialogue on how to manage de-escalation, it will be as if our leaders are running into a monsoon with newspapers over their heads.”TopicsUkraineEuropeRussiaJoe BidenVladimir PutinVolodymyr ZelenskiyUS politicsanalysisReuse this content More