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      in World Politics

      How the End of the Gulf Crisis Affects Sudan

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      Sudan has been at the center of the diverging interests of wealthy Gulf states for many years. Having been close allies of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar had longstanding business, military and political interests in the country prior to the Gulf crisis in 2017. In June of that year, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt — known as the Arab quartet — cut diplomatic and trade relations with Qatar.

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      After almost four years of severed ties, reconciliation in January led to the subsequent lifting of the blockade against Qatar and the formal restoration of relations. The resolution of the dispute is a positive regional development. However, it remains fragile because the issues that sparked the rift in the first place were never resolved.

      It is therefore unlikely that the Gulf reconciliation will usher in a new beginning or bring about a return to pre-crisis normalcy. Deep-rooted mistrust between the Gulf countries, ongoing rivalries between them, divergence in their policies and geostrategic competition in Africa could trigger the next diplomatic crisis among member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

      Sudan’s Attempt to Play All Sides

      Most Arab and sub-Saharan African states tried to resist pressure to join the anti-Qatar coalition and delicately maneuver their way into neutrality. These states were uneasy about their move because they feared that the Arab quartet would use their economic might against them. As a result, some African states cut or downgraded ties with Qatar.

      Financial influence in Africa has helped GCC states capitalize on their geostrategic location, increase their food security and advance their diplomatic and security goals. By offering substantial economic incentives, they have been able to bolster peace agreements between warring factions. Some GCC states have achieved notable success, growing influence and African allies that support their policies. Sudan is a case in point. In 2019, Saudi investments in Sudan were estimated at $12 billion, the UAE at $7 billion and Qatar at $4 billion, as per the Sudanese Bureau of Statistics. 

      Due to Saudi Arabia’s large investments, Sudan supported the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen in 2015 by deploying Rapid Support Forces and severing diplomatic ties with Iran. However, Bashir’s relationship with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi began stalling in the last few years of his rule. As part of the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s regional efforts to counter what they considered political Islam, Bashir was expected to root out Islamists in Sudan. However, since Islamists were deeply engrained in Sudan’s government, he could not risk alienating them and did not oblige.

      The Gulf dispute put Bashir in another uncomfortable position. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar were all key investors in Sudan and he could not afford to alienate any of them. Therefore, Bashir took the safest route of remaining neutral while offering to mediate between the opposing sides.

      The Sudanese leader’s reaction to the Gulf rift was not surprising. Historically, he cooperated with all regional powers, never fully aligning with any of them. His hands-off approach and ability to easily switch from the role of an army leader to an advocate of political Islam, enabled Sudan to simultaneously ally with rival GCC camps. It seems that Bashir’s key goal was to benefit economically from all Gulf states.

      Sudan Under the New Transitional Government

      Unfortunately for Bashir, Sudan’s economy collapsed, nationwide protests erupted in December 2018 and none of his Gulf allies came to his rescue. The GCC states were probably influenced by growing uncertainty regarding Bashir’s future. Their goal was to protect their investments, not Bashir. Without GCC financial support, the Sudanese president found his days in power numbered.

      In April 2019, Saudi Arabia and the UAE backed a military coup that ended three decades of Bashir’s rule and led to the creation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). The GCC duo promptly promised a staggering $3 billion in aid to support the TMC. However, growing international pressure pushed the TMC to sign a power-sharing agreement with Sudan’s pro-democracy movement. The TMC transferred power to a sovereignty council for a transitional period. Elections to usher in a civilian-led government are planned in late 2023 or early 2024.

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      Saudi Arabia and the UAE have vested interests in backing the Sudanese military and ensuring it maintains control of the political transition. Consequently, they continue to offer economic and humanitarian support to Sudan. In return, the TMC has supported their war efforts in Yemen and, more recently, in Libya.

      After the 2019 revolution, Sudan temporarily cut ties with Qatar, accusing it of supporting Islamists. Qatar had a close relationship with Bashir’s former ruling National Congress Party that drew the ire of the TMC. However, Qatar has since rebuilt its influence by supporting Sudan’s removal from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST). In October 2020, Doha announced that a peace agreement had been brokered between the transitional government and rebel forces. Qatar has also provided much-needed humanitarian relief.

      Sudan remains a country of great economic and security importance to the world. It has an abundance of natural resources. The African Development Bank Group estimates that approximately 63% of Sudan’s land is agricultural but only 15-20% is under cultivation. This offers vast investment opportunities in agriculture. Sudan is also strategically located on the Red Sea just south of the Suez Canal, a key shipping passage for world trade.

      Major Challenges and Future Scenarios

      Sudan’s transitional government recently set its priorities for 2021, which include a focus on the economy, peace, security, foreign relations and the ongoing democratic transition. However, the challenges facing the transitional government are dire. Foreign debt has risen to over $60 billion and inflation has crossed 300%. The country faces massive unemployment and chronic shortages of bread, fuel and foreign currency. Sudan is in the throes of a complex power struggle between civilians and the military. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) threatens Sudan’s water security. Sudanese and Ethiopian troops have clashed at the border. If this was not daunting already, Sudan has registered nearly 32,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19, as of April 9.

      In response to some of these challenges, the transitional government has instituted seismic constitutional changes. After nearly three decades, the US removed Sudan from the SST list in January, eliminating a major hurdle to debt relief and bringing an end to the country’s isolation from global financial systems. However, the transitional government remains under pressure to deliver quick economic wins. If it fails, power may shift back toward the military. In these tough circumstances, the transitional government’s success and Sudan’s democratic future depend on outside financial support.

      For Sudan, the Gulf crisis served as a minor inconvenience. The revolution and Sudan’s removal from the SST list are more significant developments. GCC states are now encountering a growing number of new regional and international players who are looking at Sudan with increased interest. This could very well cause a shift in Gulf–Sudan relations.

      Although GCC states have a shared strategic interest in Sudan’s stability, this takes a back seat to alliances that promote the individual interests of these Gulf countries. They are all trying to increase their regional influence and are turning post-revolution Sudan into another theater of GCC rivalry. Given Sudan’s fragile economic and political situation, it needs financial support. Economic forces played a major role in the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime and will determine the survival of the transitional government.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in Elections

      Tensions With Arab Allies Undermine a Netanyahu Pitch to Israeli Voters

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      The Israeli prime minister has presented himself as a global leader, but that image has been tarnished by tensions with Jordan and the United Arab Emirates as Israeli voters head to the polls on Tuesday.JERUSALEM — Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel presents himself as a global leader who is in a different league than his rivals — one who can keep Israel safe and promote its interests on the world stage. But strains in his relations with two important Arab allies, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, have dented that image in the fraught run-up to Israel’s do-over election.Mr. Netanyahu’s personal ties with King Abdullah II of Jordan have long been frosty, even though their countries have had diplomatic relations for decades, and recently took a turn for the worse. And the Israeli leader’s efforts to capitalize on his new partnership with the United Arab Emirates before the close-fought election on Tuesday have injected a sour note into the budding relationship between the two countries.Senior Emirati officials sent clear signals over the past week that the Persian Gulf country would not be drawn into Mr. Netanyahu’s campaign for re-election, a rebuke that dented his much-vaunted foreign policy credentials.Mr. Netanyahu, Israel’s longest serving prime minister, has always portrayed himself as the only candidate who can protect Israel’s security and ensure its survival in what has mostly been a hostile region. He has touted peaceful relations with moderate Arab states, including Jordan and the Emirates, as crucial to defending Israel’s borders and as a buttress against Iranian ambitions in the region.But the tensions with Jordan and the U.A.E. undermine Mr. Netanyahu’s attempts to present himself as a Middle East peacemaker as part of his bid to remain in power while on trial on corruption charges.The first signs of trouble came after plans for Mr. Netanyahu’s first open visit to the Emirates were canceled. Israel and the United Arab Emirates reached a landmark agreement last August to normalize their relations, the first step in a broader regional process that came to be known as the Abraham Accords and that was a signature foreign policy achievement of the Trump administration.Mr. Netanyahu was supposed to fly to the Emirates’ capital, Abu Dhabi, on March 11 for a whirlwind meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, the country’s de facto ruler. But the plan went awry amid a separate diplomatic spat with Jordan, one of the first Arab countries to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.The day before the scheduled trip, a rare visit by the Jordanian crown prince to the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem — one of Islam’s holiest sites — was scuttled because of a disagreement between Jordan and Israel over security arrangements for the prince.That led Jordan, which borders Israel, to delay granting permission for the departure of a private jet that was waiting there to take Mr. Netanyahu to the Emirates. By the time permission came through, it was too late and Mr. Netanyahu had to cancel the trip.The signing of the Abraham Accords at the White House in September. Doug Mills/The New York TimesMr. Netanyahu said later that day that the visit had been put off “due to misunderstandings and difficulties in coordinating our flights” that stemmed from the disagreement with Jordan. He said that he had spoken with the “great leader of the U.A.E.” and that the visit would be rescheduled very soon.Mr. Netanyahu told Israel’s Army Radio last week that his visit to Abu Dhabi had been postponed several times over the past few months “due to the lockdowns and other reasons.”But he made things worse by publicly boasting after his call with Prince Mohammed that the Emirates intended to invest “the vast sum of $10 billion” in various projects in Israel.“It became clear to Prince Mohammed that Netanyahu was just using him for electoral purposes,” said Martin S. Indyk, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who was formerly a special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.The Emiratis threw aside their usual discretion and made no secret of their displeasure.“From the UAE’s perspective, the purpose of the Abrahamic Accords is to provide a robust strategic foundation to foster peace and prosperity with the State of Israel and in the wider region,” Anwar Gargash, who served until last month as the Emirates’ minister of state for foreign affairs and who is now an adviser to the country’s president, wrote on Twitter.“The UAE will not be a part in any internal electioneering in Israel, now or ever,” he added.Representatives of Israeli businesses  in a V.I.P. room in the Burj Khalifa, a Dubai landmark, in October. Dan Balilty for The New York TimesSultan Ahmed Al Jaber, the Emirati minister of industry and advanced technology, told The Nation, an Emirati newspaper, last week that the Emiratis were still examining investment prospects but that they would be “commercially driven and not politically associated.” The country is “at a very early stage in studying the laws and policies in Israel,” he said.Mr. Netanyahu’s aborted push to visit the Emirates before the Israeli election on Tuesday also upended a plan for the Arab country to host an Abraham Accords summit meeting in April, according to an individual who had been briefed on the details of the episode.That gathering would have assembled Mr. Netanyahu, leaders of the Emirates and of Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan — the other countries with which Israel signed normalization deals in recent months — and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken.Mr. Indyk described Mr. Netanyahu’s relationships with Prince Mohammed of the U.A.E. and King Abdullah II of Jordan as “broken” and in need of mending.In the first heady months after the deal between Israel and the Emirates, Israeli tech executives and tourists flooded into Dubai, one of the seven emirates that make up the country, despite pandemic restrictions. Now, analysts said, the honeymoon is over even though there has been no indication the normalization deal is in danger of collapse.The relationship is essentially “on hold,” said Oded Eran, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a former Israeli ambassador to the European Union and Jordan.Beyond Mr. Netanyahu’s electioneering, Mr. Eran said, the Emiratis were upset because as part of the normalization deal, Israel dropped its opposition to the Emiratis’ buying F-35 fighter jets and other advanced weaponry from the United States, but that transaction is now stalled and under review by the Biden administration.In addition, he said, the Emirati leaders were concerned about what might happen after the election in Israel. Mr. Netanyahu has said his goal is to form a right-wing coalition with parties that put a priority on annexing West Bank territory in one way or another.“They are not canceling the deal, but they don’t want more at this point,” Mr. Eran said of the Emiratis. “They want to see what the agenda of the new government will be.”Supporters of Mr. Netanyahu campaigning last month in Jerusalem. Menahem Kahana/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesMr. Netanyahu’s political opponents have seized upon the diplomatic debacle.“Unfortunately, Netanyahu’s conduct in recent years has done significant damage to our relations with Jordan, causing Israel to lose considerable defensive, diplomatic and economic assets,” said Benny Gantz, the Israeli defense minister and a centrist political rival.“I will personally work alongside the entire Israeli defense establishment to continue strengthening our relationship with Jordan,” he added, “while also deepening ties with other countries in the region.”Mr. Netanyahu has said that four more countries were waiting to sign normalization agreements with Israel, without specifying which ones. More

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      Trump Incentives for Signing Peace Accords With Israel Could Be at Risk

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      Classifying Houthis as terrorists will worsen famine in Yemen, Trump is warned

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      The Trump administration is facing mounting calls to abandon threats to sanction Houthi rebels in northern Yemen to avoid an imminent danger of extreme famine in the country, where almost two-thirds of the population are in need of food aid.US state department officials are considering designating the Houthis as a terrorist group before the 20 January inauguration of Joe Biden, a move that would complicate the delivery of essential aid in large parts of the country, senior UN officials and NGOs have said.The widely predicted move would be alongside a raft of flagged sanctions against Iran and its interests over the final five weeks of Trump’s rule, in which squeezing Tehran and its allies looms as a central plank of Washington’s foreign policy.The Labour party in the UK added its voice to the concerns on Sunday, saying the expected move against the Houthis, whom Iran supports in Yemen, would result in aid being unable to reach much of the country’s north. The shadow minister for international development, Anna McMorrin, said this would deprive millions of people who had no choice but to remain under Houthi control of much-needed assistance.In a letter to the foreign secretary, Dominic Raab, imploring the UK not to follow the US’s lead, McMorrin wrote: “We are concerned that a blanket definition for the Houthis would create a near insurmountable hurdle to the delivery of essential humanitarian relief, with those providing material relief or economic support to agencies and multilateral programmes at risk of legal or financial sanctions.“Humanitarian organisations would also be denied practical contact with much of the Houthis’ administrative infrastructure and would be barred from using local civilian contractors to deliver programmes.”Human Rights Watch has also warned of the consequences of US designation. “Many Yemenis are already on the brink of starvation, and US actions that would interfere with the work of aid organisations could have catastrophic consequences,” said the organisation’s Yemen researcher, Afrah Nasser, in a report released on Friday. “Any designation of the Houthis should at a minimum provide clear and immediate exemptions for humanitarian aid, but millions of lives should not have to depend on that.”Yemen, one of the region’s most impoverished states, has been in turmoil over most of the past decade. Instability worsened when the Houthis overthrew the Yemeni government in early 2015. That was followed by a military intervention led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has further destabilised the country and led to soaring humanitarian needs. Despite temporary lulls in fighting, calls for a permanent ceasefire have not been met.The United Nations’ secretary general, António Guterres, said last month: “Yemen is now in imminent danger of the worst famine the world has seen for decades. In the absence of immediate action, millions of lives may be lost.”Calls to support humanitarian efforts have repeatedly met funding difficulties. Humanitarian needs have been exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has ravaged much of the country. However, a dysfunctional bureaucracy has made understanding the scale of the spread of disease almost impossible.Iran has provided support to Houthi rebels throughout the conflict with Saudi Arabia, which has led to mass displacement and disease and at least 12,000 civilian casualties. Riyadh insists Tehran’s level of backing is far higher than it acknowledges and amounts to a strategic threat against its eastern border. Ballistic missiles fired from Yemen have sporadically hit Saudi cities throughout the war, which has also been marked by repeated Saudi airstrikes inside the country.McMorrin and Human Rights Watch both say attempts to secure a negotiated ceasefire would be much more complicated if the US moves ahead with a designation of the Houthis.The US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, has told regional allies that he is determined to tighten pressure on Iran’s allies elsewhere in the region in the waning days of the administration, with proxies in Iraq and the powerful Lebanese militia and political bloc also in Washington’s crosshairs.A senior regional source said designating the Houthis and escalating pressure on Tehran over the next five weeks had been agreed between Washington and Riyadh during Pompeo’s most recent visit to the Middle East. More

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      in US Politics

      Saudi king tells Trump he wants a fair and permanent solution for Palestinians

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      Saudi Arabia’s King Salman has told Donald Trump that the kingdom is eager to achieve a fair and permanent solution to the Palestinian issue, which he said was the main starting point of the kingdom’s proposed Arab Peace Initiative, the state news agency reported.The leaders spoke by phone following a historic US-brokered accord last month under which the United Arab Emirates agreed to become the third Arab state to normalise ties with Israel, after Egypt and Jordan.King Salman told Trump he appreciated US efforts to support peace and that Saudi Arabia wanted to see a fair and permanent solution to the Palestinian issue based on the Arab peace initiative proposed by the kingdom in 2002.Under the proposal, Arab nations have offered Israel normalised ties in return for a statehood deal with the Palestinians and full Israeli withdrawal from territory captured in the 1967 Middle East war.Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Islam and site of its holiest shrines, does not recognise Israel.However, this month the kingdom said it would allow flights between UAE and Israel, including by Israeli airliners, to use its airspace.White House adviser and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner has said he hoped another Arab country normalised ties with within months.No other Arab state has said so far it is considering following the UAE.King Salman’s son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Kushner discussed the need for the Palestinians and the Israelis to resume negotiations and reach a lasting peace after Kushner visited the UAE last month.The UAE-Israel deal was met by overwhelming Palestinian opposition.This story was amended after a correction was issued by Reuters More

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      in World Politics

      The UAE’s Deal With Israel Is a Sham

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      Gary Grappo, the chairman of Fair Observer, has commented in these columns on the deal between Israel and the UAE that has shocked many in the Arab and Muslim world. As a former US diplomat, Grappo expresses his satisfaction, or perhaps simply his relief, at the idea “that Arab states will no longer hold their interests hostage to the long-dormant Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations.”

      That formulation of the dynamics of a complex multilateral relationship reveals what may appear to be a less than diplomatic bias. Accusing one party of holding a hostage sounds like taking sides rather than playing the honest broker. Moreover, Grappo’s judgment may be premature when he evokes “Arab states” using the plural. The United Arab Emirates is only one state. The most influential nation in the region, Saudi Arabia, has remained prudently silent on the UAE’s initiative.

      Israel-UAE Deal: Arab States Are Tired of Waiting on Palestine

      READ MORE

      Echoing the US claims that the deal to normalize relations between Israel and the UAE was a major step toward peace, Grappo asserts: “The UAE extracted one apparent concession from Jerusalem: [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu will suspend annexation plans for the West Bank.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Concession:

      In diplomatic language, anything that can be presented as an impressive, painful sacrifice from one side that will be made highlighted even more emphatically if it entails no actual sacrifice
      Example: “We tend to equate progress with concessions. We can no longer make that mistake.”
      — H. Rap Brown, Oakland, 1968

      Contextual Note

      In an article for Haaretz, Anshel Pfeffer underscores the one major problem with calling this a concession. “Netanyahu never had a real plan for annexing parts of the West Bank,” he writes. “There was no timetable, no map, no draft resolution to be brought to the government or the Knesset.”

      Grappo does call the concession “apparent” while admiring Netanyahu’s “remarkable ability to advance Israel’s interests.” This translates as his ability to marginalize Palestinian interests. Grappo understands that the postponement of the annexation of Palestinian territory in the West Bank “is a mere short-term sop” and that “annexation will be a fact of life.”

      Embed from Getty Images

      In other words, the deal was shamefully one-sided and, as a negotiation, thoroughly meaningless. To consider it a negotiation would require believing that the UAE was bargaining in favor of the Palestinians’ interests. But its rulers care no more about the Palestinians than they do about the Yemenis, whose civilian populations they have been bombing for the past five years in partnership with Saudi Arabia.

      Grappo gives an indication of his personal attitude to this complex question in a paragraph that contains a series of what might be called “attitude tropes.” He tells us Ramallah should “get on with it … while there’s still some chance for an independent Palestinian state.” Americans are prone to judge even moral issues in terms of the cost of wasted time. The rhetoric continues with the complaint that “previous Arab conditions to the normalization of ties with Israel have exceeded their shelf life.” What could be more insulting to Palestinians than seeing comparing what is for them an existential question to the presentation of perishable consumer products?

      Grappo then offers this unfounded assertion: “Arab states are moving on.” This is only marginally different and slightly more diplomatic than Elon Musk’s recent tweet defending US foreign policy: “We will coup whoever we want. Deal with it.” Grappo continues by offering this avuncular advice to the Palestinians: “[President Mahmoud] Abbas and the Palestinians need to do the same.” He menacingly warns that even a Joe Biden victory in the US presidential election “won’t change this.”

      Marwan Bishara, Al Jazeera’s senior political analyst, sees things differently. He explains the UAE’s initiative in these terms: “The agreement rewards US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for their protracted assault on the Palestinians over the past four years.” Trita Parsi, a Middle East specialist at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, quotes a knowledgeable Arab official: “This was something that the UAE did in order to be able to help Trump with re-election.”

      Bishara makes an important point that Grappo prefers to ignore or dismiss. “Once signed, and implemented, [the deal] is likely to embolden Netanyahu‘s coalition, deepen Israel‘s occupation [of Palestinian territory] and strengthen Israel‘s alliance with Arab autocrats,” Bishara writes. If true, that can hardly be a recipe for future peace.

      Parsi and others have noted of the deal that “the Arab street sees it as a betrayal of the Palestinians.” This may be the best explanation for Saudi Arabia’s silence. Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia and its de facto ruler, can’t afford to provoke his own people any more than his outrageously autocratic behavior has already done. As with any population — Belarus, for example — there is a point at which even an authoritarian rule begins to crack.

      Moreover, as The Indian Express points out, though Mohammed bin Salman is almost certainly on board with the US-Israel–UAE alliance, “as the leader of the Arab world, and the custodian of Islam’s holiest shrines, [Saudi Arabia] might have preferred someone else to take the revolutionary first step on this.” And most commentators seem not to have noticed another factor. This new alliance reinforces the already growing role of Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, as the top strategic leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It propels the UAE into a stronger geopolitical position within the Arabian Peninsula that could eclipse troubled Saudi Arabia.

      This is occurring at the same time as when Mohammed bin Salman’s image has taken a new hit. The crown prince is being sued in the US by former Saudi intelligence officer Saad al-Jabri for an attempt on his life, similar to the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018.

      Historical Note

      Marwan Bishara reminds his readers of the UAE’s recent role in Middle Eastern history. He calls the UAE “the most pro-war in the region, rivalled only by Israel.” Created in 1971, this young nation’s political actions over the past decade have been marked by its government’s increasingly aggressive bellicosity. “The UAE and Saudi Arabia’s opposition to the Arab Spring [in 2011] and to any form of democracy in the region, and their deep hostility towards all popular, progressive, liberal or Islamist movements, put them at the helm of counter revolutionary forces throughout the Middle East and North Africa,” Bishara reminds us.

      So, if the UAE’s interest isn’t the furthering of the prospects of peace in the eastern Mediterranean, what is its goal? Bishara describes it as an act of “‘bandwagoning’ with Israel and the United States, in the hope of establishing a trilateral US-Israeli–Arab strategic alliance to contain Turkey’s influence and tame or destroy the Iranian regime.”

      Trita Parsi adds that the GCC is counting on the continued presence of the US military in the region, which Saudi Arabia’s best friend, Donald Trump, has in the past promised to reduce. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and their allies see it as their security umbrella. They know that an increasingly disunited and despotically-managed GCC cannot handle it on its own. Israel is part of that umbrella. The region is thus divided between countries and peoples that either actively seek the maintenance of a US military presence or that, on the contrary, wish to see it removed from their lands after decades of strife. On this issue, the governments and their own populations are often at odds.

      Bishara offers a challenge to those who, like Gary Grappo, celebrate the touted “breakthrough” announced by Trump. “Those celebrating the ‘historical peace agreement’ may soon discover it is nothing more than a drive towards another regional conflict or worse, war,” Bishara writes. This difference of appreciation merits a debate, and it’s a debate that goes beyond the relationship between two Middle Eastern nations, with wide-ranging geopolitical significance. Fair Observer is an open platform to continue the debate.

      For decades, US diplomacy has adopted a model that seeks primarily to get the economic and political elites of a range of willing nations to agree strategically on their common interests and form the kind of loose alliance that promises to maintain some kind of general order in the world. Grappo’s analysis conforms perfectly to that model. The model works on one of two conditions: that the government and its people agree on the direction of that policy, or that the government wields the authoritarian power that can stifle opposition by the people.

      The first case is rare and, when it exists, requires careful management. The second represents the norm, particularly in the Middle East. The careful management it requires focuses on the needs of the elite and, in most cases, leaves in the background the expectations of the people. That is how the new Israeli-UAE alliance came into being and why it merits the positive appreciations of Western media outlets that are willing to see it as an overture to peace.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More