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      What is at stake for Donald Trump? It’s certainly not just the election | Arwa Mahdawi

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      Going bankrupt once is unfortunate. Going bankrupt twice looks like carelessness. Driving your companies into bankruptcy six times, however, as Donald Trump has done, makes you a brilliant businessman.
      That is according to the US president, anyway. Trump, a self-described “king of debt”, is proud of his multiple business bankruptcies, boasting frequently about how he has “brilliantly” exploited corporate bankruptcy laws in order to wriggle out of his companies’ financial obligations. Time and time again, Trump has managed to make others – employees, investors and banks – pay for his failures. Trump, who has never declared personal bankruptcy, has been able to protect his own assets and move on to the next fiasco.
      But is Teflon Don’s luck finally running out? With just days to go until the US election, Trump is facing a potentially crippling combination of financial stressors. His business empire has been hit hard by the pandemic; according to a recent report by the Washington Post, Trump’s golf clubs and hotels are practically empty. They were not doing that well before the pandemic: the New York Times’ investigation into Trump’s taxes last month found his businesses were losing money at a staggering rate. (Seriously, what kind of genius invests heavily in a dying sport such as golf?)
      Then there is the fact that Trump is in the middle of a dispute with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) over a $72.9m tax refund he claimed in 2010; if the IRS rules against him, he may owe more than $100m. On top of all that, Trump has at least $400m in loans with repayments due in the next four years. In fact, that number may be optimistic: Forbes reckons he owes more than $1bn.
      Can Trump afford to pay all his loans? Absolutely, he says. In a “town hall” meeting earlier this month, Trump claimed his business loans constitute a “tiny percentage” of his net worth. Of course, anything that comes out of that man’s mouth needs to be taken with several heaps of salt. The fact is, Trump’s finances are a riddle wrapped in a mystery hidden inside an enormous number of enigmatic shell companies and offshore bank accounts. Nobody knows exactly how much money the president has. While we know that he owes significant amounts to Deutsche Bank (at least $320m) and a real estate investment trust called Ladder Capital (at least $113m), it is not clear to whom else he owes money.
      Much has been said about how, if Trump wins a second term, his debts represent a huge conflict of interest. However, we all know that Trump is not bothered by ethics. If he gets another four years, one imagines he will find it easy to pay off his loans. But what if he loses? Will banks be so eager to renegotiate the terms of their agreements with him? One reason Trump has been able to fail upwards is the value of his brand. Buildings with his name on them used to sell at a premium; a financial summary Trump issued in 2015 valued his “real estate licensing deal, brand and branded developments” at $3.3bn. In the past few years, however, Trump’s brand has taken a kicking. Indeed, his name has been stripped from a number of buildings because it has become a liability rather than an asset.
      If Trump loses the election, there is a possibility he will lose everything. He could face numerous legal problems. There is a not-insignificant chance he may end up in jail. (Joe Biden has promised that, if he becomes president, he will not pardon Trump if he is convicted of any crimes.) If Trump does manage to avoid jail, he might not be able to escape his debts. The jig might finally be up. Sure, no one knows how much money Trump has, but it is clear that this is an election he can’t afford to lose.
      Arwa Mahdawi is a Guardian columnist More

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      in World Politics

      No Democratic Guarantee in Myanmar and US

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      The presidential elections in Myanmar have been set for November 8, just days after the US goes to the polls on November 3. Both countries have a history of keeping minorities in line by blocking their ability to vote and hold office. A brief comparison between the two is enough to illustrate three troubling points: that an established democratic tradition does not necessarily erode such barriers over time, that it most certainly does not guard against the creation of future barriers, and that older democracies may nevertheless use the same voter suppression tactics as younger ones.

      360˚ Context: The 2020 US Election Explained

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      In November, both US President Donald Trump and Burmese State Minister Aung San Suu Kyi will be seeking reelection for their respective roles. In addition to being heads of state, both are the de facto leaders of their respective parties, and each wields a unique brand of populism. They both have exhibited substantial failings when it on matters of race and ethnicity during their current terms: Trump in his response to the Black Livers Matter movement, and Suu Kyi in her defense of the Rohingya genocide.

      Voter Equality

      What is interesting to note is that the Black Livers Matter movement and the Rohingya genocide both share a dimension of demographic politics. African slaves were first imported to the British colony of Virginia in the 17th century, while the Rohingyas are believed to have arrived with British colonialists starting in the 19th century. Both groups have suffered systemic violence stemming from these histories, the former because of race and the latter because of both race and religion, with their right to vote consistently obstructed. While the Rohingya face outright exclusion, African Americans continue to face voter suppression tactics despite the many strides that have been made toward voter equality in the United States.

      The major difference between these two electoral processes is that November will mark the 59th US presidential election but only the second free vote Myanmar has had in 25 years. It is easy to assume that the US, being the modern world’s oldest democracy, would have a more inclusive voting process than Myanmar, whose shaky democratic transition was interrupted repeatedly by military coups. However, an argument can be made that voting regulations in both countries exclude the demographics judged to be undesirable by political elites, and these regulations evolve over time as a response to the excluded groups’ attempts to overcome them.

      Embed from Getty Images

      There are many ways to restrict voting by demographic. The most obvious would be to deny citizenship, since only citizens can cast their votes in national elections. Other options include making sure the targeted group cannot vote due to fear or inconvenience, that they have no desirable candidates to vote for, or that their votes count less than other votes.

      Both the US and Myanmar have a stratified citizenship system, and they share similarities in their history of denying citizenship as well. In the US, citizens enjoy the most privileges, while neither nationals nor permanent residents can vote or hold office. As an example, Americans born in American Samoa are to this day not considered US citizens, and US nationals like those born in Puerto Rico were not considered US citizens until the Jones-Shafroth Act in 1917. The act superseded the Naturalization Act of 1790 that limited naturalization to “free white persons,” effectively barring Native Americans, slaves and freedmen from obtaining citizenship and the ability to challenge other citizens in the court of law.

      In Myanmar, distinctions are made between full citizens, associate citizens and naturalized citizens depending on various factors. To be naturalized as a citizen, an applicant must also be able to speak one of the national languages well (of which the Rohingya language is not one), be “of good character” and “of sound mind.” The last few requirements are sufficiently vague to allow rejections without justification as well as made-up reasons that are difficult to challenge or overturn. No matter their rank, Burmese citizens are issued color-coded national registration cards, and their privileges are given in descending order.

      No registration cards were issued to the Rohingyas since the 1970s, and since every step in life, from school enrolment to job applications requires identification, it is no surprise that the Rohingya remain one of the most persecuted and most disenfranchised minorities not only in Myanmar, but globally.

      Fear and Bureaucracy

      Despite the protection of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that outlawed disenfranchisement through the use of literacy tests and the requirement of “good moral character” among other criteria, African Americans in the United States still suffer barriers to voter registration and new intimidation tactics around polling stations. The act also does not cover the many ongoing efforts that currently limit voting participation, such as purging rolls, voter caging, gerrymandering and decreasing the number of polling stations. By associating certain party leanings to certain locations and moving patterns, these tactics allow users to exclude demographics deemed unfavorable to their position.

      In Myanmar, the Rohingya were issued specific white cards in 2010 that did not confer citizenship but allowed them to vote, suspected to be distributed by the then-ruling party as a vote-buying scheme. The cards were then revoked before the 2015 elections that led to Suu Kyi’s victory. While the Rohingya who do not hold a national registration card cannot vote altogether at the moment, the tactics used by the Myanmar government also rely on capricious bureaucracy to limit the vote.

      Since the Rohingya have no right to vote and their candidates are barred from standing for election, the comparisons cannot continue beyond the two categories listed above. But the overlap in voter suppression tactics goes to show that a lengthier democratic tradition is not an automatic guard against voter exclusion. Disenfranchisement takes many forms, and it occurs in democracies irrespective of their age. The consequences of voter suppression are no less dire even if they do not result in immediate life-and-death situations — because disenfranchisement is disempowerment. It is nothing less than the deliberate undercutting of a group’s ability to make itself respected and heard.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.] More

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      in US Politics

      A Trump win or a disputed result are Canadians' worst fears

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      Before every US presidential election, a few disgruntled Americans can be relied on to promise that they’ll move to Canada if the results don’t go their way.
      Canadians watch US elections with close attention – and occasional horror – but they rarely expect many voters to make good on that vow. A few do make the move; most do not.
      However, in recent weeks the political temperature in the US has mounted: senior Republicans have called for supporters to“guard” polling stations, and right-wing militias have openly called for armed revolt in the event that Donald Trump loses.
      In Canada, fears are growing that the fallout from a contested vote could spill across the border.
      The spectre of unrest, trade disruption, and even violence is likely to have prompted frantic strategising among senior government officials, said Thomas Juneau, a professor of international relations and security studies at the University of Ottawa.
      “We are absolutely at the point where we have to think about scenarios that … start raising really difficult questions for Canada,” said Juneau.
      A contested election, or a second term of Trump where he begins making decisions that are bad for Canada, are both looking like plausible outcomes, he said.
      As one of the United States’ largest trading partners, Canada cannot afford to be caught off-guard. The two nations share the world’s longest undefended border and have highly integrated economies.
      “There are few things that Canada does better than understanding the United States,” he said. “There is not a single department in the Canadian government, that doesn’t devote a considerable proportion of its resources and time to managing relations with the US. Folks in the Canadian government think about the relationship every day.”
      The prime minister, Justin Trudeau, who has spent much of his tenure restraining any urge to overtly criticise Trump, has expressed cautious optimism about the upcoming election and downplayed fears of violence or disruption.
      “I think we’re certainly all hoping for a smooth transition or a clear result from the election, like many people are around the world,” he said earlier this month. “If it is less clear, there may be some disruptions and we need to be ready for any outcomes, and I think that’s what Canadians would expect of their government, and we’re certainly reflecting on that.”
      Hundreds of billions of dollars cross the border each year in trade networks that thrive not least because of mutual co-operation and the predictability of the bilateral relationship.
      Any disruption could prove catastrophic to Canada.
      “I’ve made no bones about saying that the greatest damage to the US-Canada relationship is Donald Trump,” said Bruce Heyman, former US ambassador to Canada. “[Trump] has never admitted failure. So when you get down to an election where you either win or lose, he has a hard time accepting the fact that he can lose. He has never used the words ‘defeat’ or ‘loss’ in terms of the election.”
      In office, Trump has frequently challenged the norms of the relationship with his country’s closest ally.
      He has feuded with Trudeau, calling the prime minister “two-faced”. He has slapped tariffs on aluminium and steel and forced a redrafting of the continent’s free trade agreement. He has called into question Canada’s critical alliances such as Nato, and the missile defence system Norad.
      Trump’s administration has also failed to stand up for Canada during diplomatic rows with China, Russia and Saudi Arabia, leaving the country to fend for itself.
      “And I think a second term of Donald Trump will be an extreme version of what we have seen in the first,” said Heyman.
      While the Trump era may mark a historic low in the relationship, he is not the first US president to oversee strained relations with Canada.
      Prime ministers and presidents have often sparred in past, most recently when Canada decided not to join the US in its invasion of Iraq.
      Trudeau’s father, Pierre Trudeau, who was prime minister for 15 years from the 1960s to the 1980s, likened the relationship to that of a mouse beside a snoring elephant. His clash with President Richard Nixon led to a period of chilled relations.
      “It is time for us to recognise … that we have very separate identities; that we have significant differences; and that nobody’s interests are furthered when these realities are obscured,” Nixon told the Canadian parliament in 1972.
      But the current damage is clear: a recent poll found that Canadian sentiment towards the US had reached its lowest point in 40 years. Only 29% of residents have a favourable view of their southern neighbour.
      And many blame Trump: nearly 66% want Joe Biden to win the election.
      But whatever happens on 3 November, tussles over trade and tariffs are likely to persist. A Biden administration would still face domestic pressure to bring manufacturing jobs home and to maintain hardline US positions on commodities such as softwood lumber.
      “Because Trump is so unpopular in Canada, people naturally tend to idealise what a Biden presidency would look like,” said Juneau. “But the idea Biden would just erase all of the bilateral trade irritants between the two countries is not true. And I think the Canadian government understands that very well.” More

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      in World Politics

      The Importance of the US-South Korea Relationship

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      There are many things we look for in a president. We look for leadership and the ability to manage grave challenges like a pandemic. While most people are focused on avoiding COVID-19 and keeping their jobs, we would be wise to remember that one of the most important roles for any president is to build a set of global allies who will stand with us when inevitable conflicts occur.

      Today, America faces unprecedented challenges from foreign powers, especially China and North Korea. To meet the challenges, we must build a coherent foreign policy that the world — especially our allies — can understand and support. We are witnessing China increasingly flexing its muscles on the Indian border, in Hong Kong, in the South China Sea and with Taiwan. America puts itself at risk to not realize that China is investing much of its resources into a growing, multifaceted military.

      360° Context: The 2020 US Election Explained

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      The US needs to build alliances throughout Asia to ensure our stability for the next century. We need to be doubling down on our relationships with India, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and especially South Korea. South Korea is the world’s 12th-largest economic power and one of America’s strongest allies for the last 60 years. It has been a bastion of democracy housing one of the largest US military bases in Asia. It also houses an essential element of the West’s global supply chain for technology, transportation and telecommunications. This supply chain is more important than ever if relations with China continue to deteriorate.

      While the importance of a strong South Korea policy is at an all-time high, US President Donald Trump managed to stick his finger in the eye of our Korean allies. In 2019, Trump demanded “out of thin air” that the Koreans pay $4.7 billion per year to station US military forces on the Korean Peninsula, according to CNN.

      There is no question that our allies have to pay their fair share for defense. However, cost-sharing negotiations must be based on rationale and data. At precisely the time we need strong allies in Asia, President Trump is burning bridges. This is a major political gaffe that America needs to correct before our relationship suffers long-term damage. If the South Koreans cannot count on reasonable and predictable US foreign policy, they will have little choice but to abandon Washington and to seek out other alliances.

      The South Koreans weren’t the only ones taken by surprise. Even Republican Senators Cory Gardner and Marco Rubio were unprepared to discuss the president’s comments. Senator Ed Markey, the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, said, “If South Korea decides that it is better off without the United States, President Trump will have undermined an over 60-year shared commitment to peace, stability, and rule of law.”

      The United States can do better. We need to deepen our relationship with South Korea as an essential partner for dealing with North Korea and China. We should be doing the same with other Asian countries and continue to promote the policies that Democratic and Republican secretaries of state have built over decades. A president needs to communicate a consistent game plan that the American people — and our allies — can understand and count on.

      Presidential leadership needs to be even-handed and sensitive to the concerns of our allies. Demands should be replaced by reasonable requests and ample explanations. Insisting that allies vastly increase payments to the United States might make good domestic election-year politics at the cost of American safety in the world.

      If we do not rethink the importance of our allies soon, we may be left to fight the next war alone.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      Why Is the US Losing Against China in an Espionage War?

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      Chinese espionage cases in the US have assumed alarming proportions. On July 7, Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, declared: “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are all related to China.”

      Does Beijing Prefer Biden or Trump?

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      Since the mid-1990s, evidence of Chinese espionage in the US had been mounting. However, it is only recently that the US began taking this issue seriously. Washington’s inability to recognize the threat from Beijing early on is due to its failure to understand Chinese espionage culture. This, in turn, is because the US lacks a strategic counterintelligence culture and focuses excessively on operations.

      Historical Roots of Chinese Espionage Culture

      Americans see the worsening of Sino-US relations from the prism of “betrayal” and “surprise.” This is because the US considers the 1972 US-China rapprochement as a watershed moment. Many in Washington believe the US was singularly responsible for the dramatic economic rise of China. Consequently, they had assumed that the Middle Kingdom would be grateful for American help and adopt Western norms over time. To their surprise, this did not happen. Beijing never really displayed gratitude and it has become increasingly defiant as it has become more powerful. The rising threat of espionage, both security and commercial, is just one of the many manifestations of this defiance.

      Embed from Getty Images

      A simple question arises: Why did the US fail to foresee the threat of espionage by China? The answer lies in the chronic inability of American intelligence and intelligentsia to pay adequate attention to the intelligence cultures of other countries. As early as the 1980s, this lacuna had been pointed out by some academics who understood the perils of neglecting foreign cultures. Their advice went unheeded, though.

      To understand Chinese intelligence culture, the operative date is not 1972 but the first recorded interaction between the Chinese and Western civilizations. In the 16th century, Italian-born Father Matteo Ricci led a team of Jesuit missionaries to the village of Shanghai. In a way, these missionaries were the first Western intelligence operatives in China. They came with the mission of converting the Chinese to Christianity. The Jesuits assumed that the lure of superior Western science and technology would convince the Chinese to embrace Christianity. This didn’t happen. By the end of the 19th century, the Jesuits concluded that their mission had been a “total failure.”

      The reason behind this failure is fairly straightforward. Hostility toward foreigners was deeply entrenched in the Chinese psyche. Any foreigner was categorized as “inferior” and “barbaric.” The missionaries were only welcome as long as they imparted knowledge in the scientific and technological realms. Beyond that, when they tried to propagate religion and philosophy, they were punished and sometimes executed. In essence, the Chinese saw the missionaries akin to a fat cow that was to be milked and then slaughtered. This episode offers important insights for understanding modern Chinese espionage culture.

      Today, China is again milking the West for advanced scientific and technical knowledge. This time, it has sent Chinese spies to infiltrate citadels of Western knowledge, especially in the US.

      Reassessing Chinese Espionage Operations

      Studies on Chinese intelligence have mostly focused on operational level analysis. Analysts have largely failed to place individual espionage operations within the cultural context. Few Americans understand that the principles guiding Chinese espionage operations are fundamentally at odds with western ones.  

      This difference could be spotted as early as the mid-20th century when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was building up its intelligence infrastructure with the help of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the CCP intelligence apparatus cooperated closely with Soviet intelligence. Yet, despite tutelage and operational cooperation, the influence of Soviet intelligence practices on the Chinese remained minimal.

      Just as 16th century China had welcomed Western science and discarded Western philosophy, the CCP followed the same practice. Operationally, the CCP intelligence services were keen to learn the tricks of the trade from the Soviets. However, they stuck with their ancient philosophies on the subject. In particular, the Chinese stayed true to Sun Tzu, the famous military strategist of the 6thcentury BCE. There was “no imitation or even emulation” of Soviet intelligence practices, but only “customization and improvisation.”

      One such customization can be seen in how the Chinese have employed the Sun Tzuvian concept of “expendable spies,” which conflicts with the Western philosophy of “ethical spying.” Empirical studies on the British, American and Soviet experience in running human intelligence operations reveal a remarkable degree of concern for field agents. In particular, Western intelligence agencies have historically shown great regard for the lives and security of their informers. The Americans and the British treated Russian informers like Adolf Tolkachev and Oleg Gordievsky rather well. The Soviets also took good care of strategic informants like the Cambridge Five. Western handling officers often insist on “informant security.”

      The “expendable spies” doctrine, on the other hand, does not extend to the field agents the privileges that come with “ethical spying.” The arrest of Candace Claiborne, the State Department official, illustrates this point. Claiborne’s true identity was revealed when she unsuspectingly accepted a compliment from an undercover FBI operative that she was one of the “highest regarded” assets of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the intelligence, security and secret police agency of China. This incident reveals that Chinese intelligence seems to have offered zero security training to an agent who enjoyed top-secret clearance. The CCP treats agents as “disposable” because it still follows Sun Tzu’s theory of “expendable spies.”    

      The expendable and ethical schools of intelligence lead to a qualitative versus quantitative dichotomy when it comes to informer networks. Western agencies look for a few reliable informers who can be secured. The Chinese employ a vacuum cleaner approach and prefer using a large number of intelligence collectors instead of a few trained professionals. This qualitative-quantitative distinction is certainly well known, but few Americans appreciate its historical origins that date back to the formative years of the CCP intelligence apparatus.

      Beijing has used the quantitative approach relentlessly when it comes to commercial espionage. In 2015, John Lewis of the Obama administration insisted to his Chinese counterpart that they discuss this thorny issue. After a few failed attempts at dodging it, the Chinese official made a rather candid observation. According to the official, the Chinese intelligence culture did not distinguish between espionage for national security and for economics. Such a dichotomy was solely a Western one. For the Chinese, it did not exist. Despite this clear confession, it took another five years for the American establishment to completely wake up to the reality of the Chinese threat.

      Fixing the American Culture of Counterintelligence

      The US can contain the Chinese threat by effective counterintelligence. However, the current state of play does not inspire much confidence. American misreading of Chinese espionage culture has given birth to an inadequate counterintelligence response. The US focuses too much on individual cases and not enough on developing a strategic counterintelligence doctrine.

      In such a strategy, the US would employ offensive operations to disrupt enemy intelligence goals. Instead, the FBI currently deploys a defensive strategy that involves the prosecution and conviction of foreign agents. This has two obvious flaws.

      Embed from Getty Images

      First, prosecution takes up scarce time, energy and money. It has an opportunity cost. It fails to exploit a compromised spy who could be used as a double agent. Prosecution also alerts enemy intelligence agencies who can then cover up their tracks.

      Second, convictions are hard to obtain in intelligence matters. Evidence is often insufficient, critical details of operations cannot be revealed and the gray matters of espionage do not translate as easily to the cut and dried approach of the court of law. This makes convictions difficult to secure. In fact, the shrinking arrest-to-conviction ratio feeds into the Chinese intelligence offensive, which feeds on accusations of racism and witch-hunting by the Americans. Every person accused by the FBI who walks away free adds to China’s psychological operations (PSYOP).

      In theory, PSYOP is shaped and targeted at a particular set of audiences to achieve a well-defined set of objectives. By accusing Americans of racism, the CCP aims to appeal to the sentiments of the American people in order to turn them against the FBI. In this regard, Beijing seems successful as American academic and scientific institutions have repeatedly resisted the FBI’s requests to monitor Chinese students. These institutions fear accusations of racism and perhaps a drying up of Chinese money. China has cleverly created rifts between American security agencies and its intellectual institutions to further its own purposes.

      To extricate American counterintelligence from this imbroglio, the US will have to embrace a strategic counterintelligence doctrine. It will have to use PSYOP effectively too. In particular, it could focus on China’s violations of human rights such as the brutal “traitor weeding” program followed by its intelligence agencies. Already, educated Americans are turning against Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet.

      Therefore, the need of the hour is for Americans to embrace the famed Sun Tzuvian dictum: “[K]now thyself and know thy enemy; a thousand battles, a thousand victories.”

      *[Atul Singh provided guidance for this article.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in US Politics

      Amy Coney Barrett takes oath after being confirmed to US supreme court – video

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      A majority of US senators have voted to confirm Donald Trump’s supreme court nominee Amy Coney Barrett. ‘On this vote, the yays are 52. The nays are 48,’ announced US senator Chuck Grassley. Trump then held a celebratory swearing-in ceremony on the White House lawn. Barrett said. ‘I will do my job without any fear or favour and … I will do so independently of both the political branches and of my own preferences.’ Lawmakers voted along party lines, although Republican Susan Collins of Maine joined Democrats to vote against Barrett’s confirmation. Barrett, 48, will secure a 6-to-3 conservative majority on the nation’s highest court. Long term, her appointment could have a major impact on a range of policies governing abortion rights, immigration and LGBTQ+ rights
      Amy Coney Barrett confirmed to supreme court in major victory for US conservatives – live More

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      in US Politics

      CBS releases footage of Trump walking out of 60 Minutes interview

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      US president halts recording after question about his use of social media and name-callingUS politics live – the latest updatesFootage of the US president abruptly walking out of a CBS 60 Minutes interview has been released by the network, in a row that has been rumbling since the interview was taped on Tuesday.Donald Trump had already posted clips on his own social media, in an effort to show he had been mistreated by the interviewer, Lesley Stahl. He had called the segment “fake” and “biased” in advance. Continue reading… More

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      in World Politics

      Is Realism in Foreign Policy Realistic?

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      The year 2020 has understandably been a time of deep confusion in the world of diplomacy, marked by the parallel phenomena of a Donald Trump presidency that may come to an end in January 2021 and the ongoing global curse of COVID-19. Those factors and other more local ones — such as yet another countdown for Brexit — have brought to a virtual standstill serious consideration of how the most powerful nations of the world will be conducting their foreign policy in the years to come. 

      With the increasing likelihood of a Joe Biden presidency and a hoped-for fadeout of COVID-19, it may be time to begin looking at the prospects some influential thinkers in the realm of international relations have been putting forward.

      The New York Times Under the Influence

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      Last year, in those halcyon days when COVID-19 was still hiding in the recesses of a bat cave on the outskirts of human society and President Trump — who was headed for another four years in the White House — was gloating over unemployment levels in the US that had reached a record low, celebrated political scientist John Mearsheimer took a trip “down under” to teach Australians his doctrine of “offensive realism.”

      The University of Chicago professor informed them that the rise of China would lead to a military standoff with the reigning hegemon, the US. Though Australia may appear in geographic terms to be an appendage of Asia, with strong economic ties, Mearsheimer insisted that Australians should see their role as an outpost of the American continent, which he occasionally referred to as Godzilla.

      In a 2019 debate with Australian strategic thinker Hugh White, Mearsheimer reduced his lesson to the Aussies to its simplest terms: “If you go with China, you want to understand you are our enemy. You are then deciding to become an enemy of the United States. Because again, we’re talking about an intense security competition. You’re either with us or against us.”

      Does this sound like the language of war? Mearsheimer wants us to believe it’s something else. Not even a cold war. Even less, a global chess game. Those obsolete metaphors should be put to pasture. It has a new name: “intense security competition.”

      Here is today’s 3D definition:

      Security competition:

      A contest concerning political reputation and global power that requires little more than demonstrating the capacity and readiness to launch a nuclear war, now seen as the principal attribute of any nation claiming to assume the responsibility for writing a rulebook that the rest of humanity will be obliged to follow

      Contextual Note

      This definition sums up Mearsheimer’s ideology. Breaking with the idealistic tradition in US diplomacy that justifies aggression and imperial conquest by citing its commitment to establishing or defending liberal democratic values in other parts of the world, Mearsheimer prefers to recognize reality for what it is (or what he thinks it is). Some may be tempted to call this political Darwinism, inspired by Herbert Spencer’s 19th-century social Darwinism.

      Lecturing the Australians, Mearsheimer makes no bones about the brutally expansionist history of the growth of the US empire that began in 1783. He sees it as a consistent, continuous development. Referring to the culture of his childhood neighborhood in New York, he calls it the political equivalent of becoming “the biggest and baddest dude on the block.” As a social scientist, he gives it another more technical name: regional hegemon.

      Mearsheimer insists that Australia must ally with the US instead of China, not because it is less authoritarian, but mainly because the US is bigger and badder. China is too far behind to catch up in the near future. And for a realist, the name of the game is simply “follow the leader.” And though Australia’s economy is closely tied to China’s, Mearsheimer warns the Aussies that if they don’t ally with the US, they will likely receive the same treatment as Fidel Castro’s Cuba (embargos, blockades, sanctions and perhaps even assassination attempts on a future leader).

      Appearing to address the question of the choices Australians must make on their own, Mearsheimer nevertheless claims to know what Australia’s future will inevitably look like. “Security is more important than prosperity because if you don’t survive, you’re not going to prosper,” he says. “That’s why you’ll be with us.”

      His Aussie audience at the conference may or may not see a resemblance between this and the mafioso telling a local shopkeeper, who resists paying protection, to be careful because “things break.” But at least one Australian commentator, Caitlin Johnstone, has understood his message. She provocatively offered what may be the best and most logical translation of Mearsheimer’s point by turning it on its head. “Australia is not aligned with the U.S. to protect itself from China. Australia is aligned with the U.S. to protect itself from the U.S.,” she writes.

      Mearsheimer was even more blunt in his lecture on the same tour: “You understand that the United States is the ruthless great power.”

      Historical Note

      In a lengthy academic article, “Bound to Fail, The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” John Mearsheimer situates his theory within the perspective of post-World War II history. Contradicting the standard account of the Cold War, he offers this correction: “The Cold War order, which is sometimes mistakenly referred to as a ‘liberal international order,’ was neither liberal nor international.” He claims that its idealism was a sham. It was realistic. It was about hegemonic power.

      Instead, he asserts that what followed the collapse of the Soviet Union should be called the rise of the liberal international order. And he explains that “the post–Cold War liberal international order was doomed to collapse, because the key policies on which it rested are deeply flawed. Spreading liberal democracy around the globe … is extremely difficult” and it “often poisons relations with other countries and sometimes leads to disastrous wars.”

      Having given precise instruction to the Australians, Mearsheimer now addresses his compatriots with the question: “How should the United States act as it leaves behind the liberal international order that it worked so assiduously to build?” His answer is that the US must abandon the goal of forcefully spreading democracy and “engaging in social engineering abroad.” 

      He wants the US to consolidate its power through a conjoined focus on economic control and military might. He acknowledges that China is positioned to become a regional hegemon in Asia. But he reminds us that “the United States does not tolerate peer competitors. The idea that China is going to become a regional hegemon is unacceptable to the United States.”

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      Some may find this contradictory. Mearsheimer explains to the Australians that the only legitimate hegemony is regional and not global and then claims that the US — the dominant regional hegemon in the Americas — should not allow another regional hegemon to exist. That surely means that by default the US becomes the global hegemon. 

      Mearsheimer confirms this impression when he describes the merits of a “rules-based order,” which so many commentators believe Donald Trump has compromised. This is what Mearsheimer told the Australians: “The United States writes the rules. We obey them when it suits us and we disobey them when it doesn’t suit us.” 

      He then adds this remark: “Those rules are written to benefit the great powers so that they can wage security competition … and if they don’t like the rules they just disobey them.” His choice of the verb “wage” clearly demonstrates that his idea of “security competition” is nothing more than a euphemism for war. That apparently is how realists have been thinking ever since Thomas Hobbes.

      So, what about the coming US presidential election? Stephen Walt, who famously collaborated with Mearsheimer to expose the influence of the Israel lobby on US politics, has titled his recent article in Foreign Policy: “Biden Needs to Play the Nationalism Card Right Now.” Walt cites Mearsheimer’s insistence that “nationalism remains the most powerful political ideology on the planet and a critical source of identity for most human beings, including the vast majority of Americans.”

      In an interview, Mearsheimer recently articulated his expectations of a new Democratic administration: “I think that will all be for the good.” In other words, he sees Trump’s “America First” nationalism (which he appreciates) being replaced by Biden’s more realistic brand of hegemonic nationalism, which he also appreciates. Australians will simply have to learn to live with it.

      *[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More