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      in US Politics

      The Guardian view on Biden and the climate crisis: fight for net zero | Editorial

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      There is no question that Joe Biden’s win will make a big difference to international efforts to deal with the climate emergency. A US president who recognises global heating as an “existential threat” will be a vital extra pillar propping up the teetering edifice of climate diplomacy. Four years of Donald Trump have done huge damage to the US’s reputation. But the world’s biggest economy, and second-biggest emitter of greenhouse gases (after China), remains vastly influential. With President Biden in charge, the prospects for next year’s Cop26 talks in Scotland, when drastic emissions cuts must be agreed if the world is to stand a chance of avoiding catastrophic heating, are already brighter.
      President Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the Paris agreement was a key plank of his nationalist “America first” agenda and an act of sabotage against both the UN climate process and the principle of a rules-based international order. It also gave cover to the world’s other climate vandals: Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Russia and Australia. With Mr Biden, that cover is gone, and ecocidal policies such as Amazon rainforest destruction and coal-power expansion should come under renewed and relentless pressure. It is striking that the president-elect put climate at the heart of his phone calls with foreign leaders.
      The path ahead is anything but smooth. A green stimulus package on the scale promised by Mr Biden’s campaign is unlikely to pass through Congress, with control of the Senate hinging on two undecided seats in Georgia. Conservative judges are a further roadblock. Legislation to limit emissions and punish polluters is certain to be challenged all the way to the supreme court. Fossil-fuel companies and other vested interests remain a formidable force. Nor can public support be taken for granted. Most voters are on board in principle, recognising the dangers of unchecked global heating. But the changes in lifestyle that will be needed to meet new targets, including reductions in meat-eating and flying, are challenging in the US as in other rich countries.
      Still, Mr Biden’s presence in the White House will be a huge opportunity, and one that the environmental movement and its supporters must seize with every hand they have. Global heating is a fact, not a hypothesis or ideology. It is not just the vast majority of Democrats who want their politicians to do more to tackle it, but also a sizable minority of Republicans. Younger people are the most anxious. Mr Biden will perform a valuable public service simply by doing the opposite of his predecessor, and telling the truth.
      Democrats have shown that climate can be a unifying force within their party. Mr Biden’s climate taskforce was chaired by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the New York congresswoman and star of his party’s progressive wing. Now, if they are to create sufficient momentum, Democrats must look beyond the ranks of committed green supporters, as the writer Arlie Russell Hochschild did in her book Strangers in Their Own Land, about environmental politics in Tea Party-supporting Louisiana. Already, Mr Biden has signalled that the harm caused by pollution to poorer Americans will be among his priorities.
      In recent weeks China, South Korea and Japan have all announced net zero emissions targets. Rapid falls in the price of renewables have made the process of weaning away from fossil fuels far less painful than most experts predicted. Climate protesters have shown how effective they can be in mobilising support for strong action. Now that the election is over, they must keep pushing Mr Biden and other legislators as hard as they can. More

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      in US Politics

      Joe Biden’s move to net zero emissions will leave Australia in the (coal) dust | Bill Hare

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      The election of Joe Biden to the White House is likely to see Australia increasingly isolated as the world heads to net zero emissions, with quite fundamental implications for our economy. Let’s have a look at what has happened in the last two months.In September, the European Union proposed increasing its 2030 target from 40% to at least 55% reduction below 1990 levels in order to meet the net zero by 2050 target it adopted in 2019. Critically, the EU has made climate action one of its three main Covid-19 response priorities, so that at least 30% of its multi-annual budget and recovery fund is to be spent on achieving its increased 2030 emission reduction targets and its climate neutrality goal for 2050. These new goals for the EU27 would bring its domestic emissions very close to a 1.5°C Paris compatible level for the period to 2050. The UK has similar goals and ambitions to the EU27.Shortly afterwards, President Xi Jinping announced that China would “aim to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060”, the first time China has acknowledged the need to reach anything close to zero CO2 emissions by mid-century. If it covers all greenhouse gas emissions it would also be very close to what is needed by mid-century to be in line with the Paris agreement’s long-term goal. If this goal covers CO2 only, then China would need to achieve carbon neutrality around 2050 for this to be compatible with the Paris agreement.With China responsible for about a quarter of the world’s emissions, a move to net zero by mid-century has very significant implications for global temperature, lowering the Climate Action Tracker’s end of century projections by 0.2-0.3oC towards 2.4-2.5oC, compared with the previous 2.7oC projection.In October, both Japan and South Korea also announced net zero GHG goals for 2050. Japan’s prime minister, Yoshihide Suga, announced Japan would aim for net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 with several specific measures, including a fundamental revision of its policy on coal-fired power plants. In an important change to Japan’s narrative, Suga emphasised the benefits to economic growth from the net zero commitment, whereas he’d previously characterised it as a cost.Getting to net zero essentially means the phasing out of coal, gas and oilThis was followed two days later by the South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, announcing his commitment to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, replacing coal power generation with renewable energy to create new markets, industries and jobs.Taken together, these four countries account for about 40% of global GHG emissions. There is also a large number of smaller countries with comparable net zero emissions commitments that would bring the total global coverage to about 48% of global emissions.What’s notable about all of these announcements is that they were made in the absence of any commitment by the United States and before any US presidential election outcome. China’s announcement in particular seems to reflect a geopolitical judgement by the Chinese government that they intend to move forward with ambitious climate goals even without the US.Arguably, these moves by this set of countries on their own will generate a major global move towards increased ambition and towards net zero by 2050.So where does this leave Australia? These net zero by mid-century moves by its major export markets create huge challenges.In 2019 China, South Korea and Japan accounted for 72% by value of Australia’s exports of LNG and coal: 88% of Australia’s LNG exports; 75% of thermal coal exports; and 51% of metallurgical coal exports. It is notable that none of these countries have focused on natural gas and all have mentioned renewable energy and other technologies, and all recognise that early action on coal is needed.The election of Joe Biden could trip this already major momentum into a landslide towards higher climate ambition. His election means the US will re-enter the Paris agreement, reverse the Trump administration’s rollbacks and make a significant contribution to closing the Paris agreement’s ambition gap with a new 2030 target. If he took the initiative to reboot US action in line with his plan to reach net zero emissions by 2050, Biden could reduce US emissions substantially by 2030.If he is able to fully implement his proposed Energy and Climate Package, and continues to be supported by the existing strong sub-national action in the US, the US could significantly reduce its 2030 emissions, reducing the gap between where it is headed now and a Paris agreement-compatible emission range for that year.Even in the case of delays and challenges to federal action, the efforts of state and local actors, such as the We Are Still In campaign, are expected to continue. A recent study estimated that enhanced action by subnational actors in the US could reduce emissions by 37% below 2005 levels by 2030. Biden as US president may not have control of the Senate (although the vote count on this result is far from over – and may not be resolved until January), but there are workarounds.Biden also has a net zero 2050 goal, which will place the US close to a Paris agreement-compatible emissions pathway. This would further lower the 2100 projected warming by about 0.1°C, and further if America undertook negative emissions action of scale beyond 2050. So the EU, China, Japan, South Korea and the US – about two thirds of the global economy, about half the world’s emissions and close to 75% of our fossil fuel export markets –will have net zero goals for 2050 or shortly afterwards. This is a massive shift.Let there be no misunderstanding about what this means. Getting to net zero essentially means the phasing out of coal, gas and oil, with markets more or less halved by 2030. This is a seismic shift for Australia and it means that it’s very likely that demand for our coal and gas will drop at least as fast as it has risen in the past few decades.It would hardly be a strategy for Australia to follow Poland’s lead and simply start to stockpile coal in warehouses. Diplomatically, Australia will find itself increasingly isolated, even in its own region and in particular with its close Pacific Island neighbours, not to mention the two superpowers, China and the US.Australia needs a forward-looking strategy aimed at taking advantage of its massive natural advantages in renewable energy and the resources essential for the low and zero carbon transition, and one that provides for a just transition for the communities and workforces affected by the rapid reduction in the markets that they have hitherto dependent upon.There is no time to be lost dithering, denying and obfuscating.• Bill Hare, a physicist and climate scientist, is the managing director of Climate Analytics More

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      in Elections

      What will President Biden's United States look like to the rest of the world? | Timothy Garton Ash

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      What is the best the world can now hope for from the United States under President Joe Biden, now that the election has been called for him? My answer: that the US will be a leading country in a post-hegemonic network of democracies.Yes, that’s a, not the leading country. Quite a contrast to the beginning of this century, when the “hyperpower” US seemed to bestride the globe like a colossus. The downsizing has two causes: the US’s decline, and others’ rise. Even if Biden had won a landslide victory and the Democrats controlled the Senate, the United States’ power in the world would be much diminished. President Donald Trump has done untold damage to its international reputation. His disastrous record on handling Covid confirmed a widespread sense of a society with deep structural problems, from healthcare, race and infrastructure to media-fuelled hyper-polarisation and a dysfunctional political system.In a recent eupinions survey, more than half of those asked across the European Union found democracy in the US to be “ineffective”. And that was before Trump denounced as “fraud” the process of simply counting all the votes cast in an election. When the US lectures other countries on democracy these days, the politest likely answer is: “Physician, heal thyself!”. Even compared with the grim period of Vietnam and Watergate, this must be an all-time low for American soft power.Europe has many problems of its own, but set against the record of US regress over the last 20 years, our European story looks like triumphal progress. The same can be said for Australia, New Zealand or Canada. Still more dramatic has been China’s rise, facilitated by years of American strategic distraction.Even assuming that all legal challenges to his election will have been dealt with when the 46th president is inaugurated next January, he will face an almost bitterly divided country, an almost certainly divided government and a far from united Democratic party. Thanks to Trump’s shameless mendacity, millions of Trump voters may not accept even the basic legitimacy of a Biden presidency. His ability to push through desperately needed structural reforms will be hampered, if not stymied, if the Republicans retain control of the Senate.Fortunately for the rest of us, the area in which he will have most freedom of manoeuvre is foreign policy. Biden has immense personal foreign policy experience, as a former vice-president and before that, chair of the Senate foreign relations committee. He has an experienced foreign policy team. Members of that team identify their greatest strategic challenges as the “3 Cs”: Covid (including its global economic aftermath), climate change and China. That’s an agenda on which allies in Europe and Asia can happily engage. Rejoining the Paris climate agreement, which the US formally left on Wednesday, will be an important first step.Nato remains essential for Europe’s security against an aggressive Russia, but the key to winning back disillusioned Europeans will be to offer a new quality of partnership to the European Union. Even before he becomes president, Biden might like to express his appreciation for the way the EU has kept the flag of liberal internationalism flying while the US under Trump was awol. His first presidential visit to the old continent should include the EU institutions in Brussels. (Perhaps an address to the European parliament?) A bipartisan reference back to President George HW Bush’s 1989 “partners in leadership” speech in Germany could be helpful, but applying it now to the entire EU. In this partnership of equals, the US will not always sit at the head of the table. That’s what I mean by “post-hegemonic”.Europeans should do more for their own security, but Biden would be unwise to start by hammering away at the old “Spend 2% of your GDP on defence” theme. The German strategic thinker Wolfgang Ischinger has suggested a good way to reframe the issue: think of it rather as 3% on 3D – that is, defence, diplomacy and development. A self-styled “geopolitical” EU must assume a greater burden in its wider neighbourhood, which means to the south, across the Mediterranean to the Middle East and north Africa, and to the east, in relations with Belarus (currently in peaceful revolt), Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s aggressive but also fundamentally weak Russia.A new emphasis on the EU will leave the ultra-Brexiters who dominate Boris Johnson’s government in Britain feeling slightly miffed. But the Johnson government does have one good idea, which is to extend the G7 meeting it will host next year to major democracies in Asia.This chimes perfectly with a central leitmotif of the Biden team: working with other democracies. The US already has the Quad format, linking it with Australia, Japan and India. They will be at least as important as the EU and Britain when it comes to dealing with China.If the Biden administration is wise, it will envisage this as a network of democracies, rather than a fixed alliance or community of democracies. Even a “summit of democracies”, reportedly a pet scheme of the president elect, would pose tricky questions of who’s in and who’s out. Think of it as a network, however, and you can keep it flexible, varying the coalitions of the willing from issue to issue and finessing the difficult borderline cases. For example, Narendra Modi’s India is anything but a model liberal democracy at the moment, yet indispensable for addressing the “3 Cs”.On every issue, both the US and Europe should start by identifying the relevant democracies; but of course you can’t stop there. You have also to work with illiberal and anti-democratic regimes, including China. China is the greatest geopolitical challenge of our time. It is itself one of the “3 Cs”, yet also crucial for addressing the other two: climate change and Covid. It is a more formidable ideological and strategic competitor than the Soviet Union was, at least from the 1970s onward, but its cooperation is also more essential in larger areas.In pursuing a twin-track strategy of competition and cooperation, the US has unique strengths. Although the “greatest military the world has ever seen” ended up losing a war against technologically inferior adversaries in Iraq, the US is the only military power that can stop Xi Jinping’s China taking over the Chinese democracy in Taiwan. The US still leads the world in tech, which is the coal and steel of our time. We watch French series on Netflix, buy German books on Amazon, contact African friends on Facebook, follow British politics on Twitter and search for criticism of the US on Google. In the development of AI, Europe is nowhere compared to China and the US.Yet, especially given its domestic travails, the US cannot begin to cope on its own with a China that is already a multi-dimensional superpower. It needs that network of partners in Europe and Asia as much as they need it. So let the world’s democracies stand ready to grasp the outstretched hand of a good man in the White House. What a change that will be. More

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      in US Politics

      A dysfunctional America helps China – but hurts Australia and our region | Natasha Kassam

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      As the US presidential election rolls into its fourth day of counting, Chinese leaders are not necessarily joining much of the world in frantically hitting refresh for updated vote tallies.
      As America edges towards a Biden victory in painful slow motion, there is no sense of urgency in Beijing, which benefits from the prolonged uncertainty.
      Chinese leaders – and many of its citizens – believe the United States is in terminal decline and that President Donald Trump has hastened the inevitable. The troubling story of decay in America paints a different picture in China from that in the rest of the world: the authoritarian model of politics and economics is just as good, if not better, than the liberal democratic model of the “west”.
      The coronavirus pandemic had already started the toppling dominos. China recovered from its disastrous response, wielding state capacity like an authoritarian sword to contain Covid-19. By contrast, the US has surrendered to the pandemic, tragically with a death toll 60 times that of China. The successes of democratic smaller nations, from Australia to Taiwan, barely register in Beijing.
      The four-day election count (so far) and divided polity are seen as further evidence of the wounds in US democracy. So too the increasingly erratic claims made by Trump that undermine US democratic institutions. These are chalked up as wins in Beijing’s column.
      More wins, from a Chinese perspective, are coming, and many in Australia’s immediate region. Beijing has threatened over $5bn exports from Australia. The issue has gained less traction than usual as eyes are glued to the circus that US politics has paraded for four years.
      China has also been extending olive branches across south-east Asia, providing technical assistance and protective equipment in the pandemic and attempting to repair the reputational hit that Covid-19 caused. Many have made deals with China guaranteeing preferential access if a Chinese vaccine candidate is approved.
      This vacuum was left by the US. When it comes to global public health, America has literally left the building. Ensnared in its own pandemic crisis, the world’s largest economy abandoned the World Health Organization. US allies are among the countries that China has promised priority access to vaccines, including the Philippines and Thailand.
      With the US missing in action, Australia has had to go it alone. Canberra has looked to counter China’s efforts, promising more than $500m in “vaccine diplomacy” across the region.
      China may struggle to find these opportunities if Biden is inaugurated. A globalist at heart, he has promised to reposition the US on the international stage and re-join the WHO. Australia should embrace that prospect.
      But for Beijing, the outcome of the US presidential election changes few of its policy settings. The Trump administration’s tough stance towards China is a rare glimpse of unity in a divided country.
      A potential Biden administration would continue to challenge China in most fields, including trade and technology. And any instinct by a potential president Biden to nominate Obama-era officials would need to get past the inevitable China-hawk test if the Republican-majority Senate remains.
      Tough China policy is also good politics in the US – as it is in Australia. Both Australian and American publics have soured on China as more evidence of China’s aggression and human rights abuses have come to light.
      One difference may be that a Biden administration would be better coordinated with partners and allies on China policy. Under Trump, US policy oscillated from praising Xi Jinping to attempting regime change. A stable and consultative approach would be music to Australia’s proverbial ears, as it faces the brunt of China’s economic coercion with little backup or support. Biden could also be convinced to revive the ailing World Trade Organization, though US concerns pre-dated Trump.
      Still, who wins the US election matters much more to Australia than China.
      A weaker United States, led by a president elected in a messy and marginal victory, would only make China more confident. And a new administration, distracted by domestic turmoil, may lack the bandwidth to wake up to the urgent support needed in Australia, and the broader region. A divided America may translate into an isolated Australia. And this, in turn, would embolden China.
      • Natasha Kassam is a research fellow at the Lowy Institute More

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      in US Politics

      'What a spectacle!': US adversaries revel in post-election chaos

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      Rivals and enemies of the United States have come together to revel in the messiest US election in a generation, mocking the delay in vote processing and Donald Trump’s claims of electoral fraud in barely veiled criticisms of Washington’s political activism abroad.“What a spectacle!” crowed Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. “One says this is the most fraudulent election in US history. Who says that? The president who is currently in office.”With a large dose of schadenfreude, Washington’s fiercest critics declared deep concern about the US elections and the state of the country’s democracy.Russia’s foreign ministry spokeswoman on Thursday panned the “obvious shortcomings of the American electoral system”, calling the framework “archaic”.“It’s a show, you can’t call it anything but that,” Vyacheslav Volodin, the chairman of Russia’s Duma, said earlier this week. “They say it should be seen as a standard for democracy. I don’t think it’s the standard.”In China, state media savaged the delayed results, with one daily writing that the process looked a “bit like a developing country”.Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, could not resist baiting the US over what he called its “surprising electoral process”, and seemed so amused that at one point he broke into song with a rendition of the theme tune to the Miss Venezuela beauty pageant: “On a night as beautiful as this, either of them could win,” he crooned, before adding with a chuckle: “The United States. I don’t stick my nose in.” In two recent local elections, he noted, all the votes had been counted by 11pm.As a parliamentary campaign kicked off in Venezuela this week, Maduro claimed there were important lessons the US could learn from its elections rather than lecturing the world about democracy. Venezuela was a showcase of “civilised and peaceful” voting using “proven and transparent technology” and biometric voting machines that provided same day results, he said.Trump has spent the last two years unsuccessfully trying to topple the Venezuelan president and in a Wednesday night broadcast Maduro delighted in the electoral confusion gripping his northern neighbour.“The state department puts out statements that say: ‘In this country we don’t recognise the election. In that country we don’t like the election. In the other country we don’t like this or that,’” Maduro said, adding that the US would be better off focusing on its own problems.As Trump demanded states stop counting mail-in ballots, the US embassy in Abidjan issued a poorly timed statement urging Côte d’Ivoire’s leaders to “show commitment to the democratic process and the rule of law”. “We also need a Côte d’Ivoire statement on US elections,” quipped one BBC editor on Twitter.For many, it was a chance to give the US a taste of its own medicine. “Neither free nor fair,” wrote Margarita Simonyan, the head of Russian state-backed RT, parroting the language of a UN or Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) statement.And the OSCE itself did weigh in, with mission leader Michael Georg Link attacking Trump for making “baseless allegations of systematic deficiencies” and “[harming] public trust in democratic institutions”.The irony was not lost on many at home. A cartoon by the Russian critic Sergei Elkin made the rounds on Thursday, featuring an elderly babushka lugging buckets of water past a man in a rundown village somewhere in Russia. “They still haven’t finished counting in Pennsylvania and in Michigan,” the man says. A stray dog walks along an unpaved street behind him. More

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      in US Politics

      Trump finds unlikely backers in prominent pro-democracy Asian figures

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      Jimmy Lai, Hong Kong media tycoon and one of the most prominent pro-democracy figures in the city, waded into the US election in its final days, with an enthusiastic endorsement of the incumbent in his Apple Daily newspaper.“I find a stronger sense of security in [Donald] Trump,” he wrote in an editorial that praised the US president for his “hardline” approach to Beijing.His position is echoed by many in Hong Kong’s increasingly battered pro-democracy movement, across Taiwan and among many exiled Chinese dissidents living in America, including blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng, who endorsed Trump at the Republican national convention.The US president might not seem like a natural ally for pro-democracy campaigners after years of public support for strongmen and dictators, undermining the press at home, and even attacking domestic protesters as “rioters”.At a time of increased hate attacks on Asian Americans he has also used racist rhetoric about Covid-19, describing it as “kung flu” and the “China virus”. Advocacy groups have warned Trump’s language could have dangerous consequences.But Lai and others who want democracy for China see in Trump’s unpredictable approach to foreign policy, and his escalating confrontations with Beijing, their greatest hope of challenging Chinese Communist party rule.“The Trump administration might be the hand that eventually pushes China to democracy,” dissident Wang Juntao, who fled into exile after the crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989, told local New York paper The City.In Taiwan a recent poll found that independence-leaning Taiwanese back Trump strongly. 80% of Democratic Progressive party supporters wanted US voters to return him to office, the Taiwan Times reported.These enthusiastic Trump supporters are motivated by the president’s turn away from decades of US engagement with Beijing, rather than his personal politics, said Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China Institute in London.“They are focusing much more on confronting the challenges posed by the Communist party of China than they are focusing on the principles of democracy and human rights,” Tsang said.Since Nixon, US presidents had all “to slightly different extents, belonged to the school of engagement with China”, Tsang added. Trump began his presidency with a similar approach, so keen to strike a trade deal that he held off taking action over human rights abuses in Xinjiang to smooth negotiations.But amid escalating tensions over everything from the coronavirus to the economy and allegations of industrial espionage, he has broken definitively with that tradition, deploying the strongest rhetoric on China since the early days of the cold war.Timeline2020 US election: key datesShow3 November 2020Polling day. However in many states people have been able to vote early either in person or by absentee ballot since September.23 November 2020Washington is due to be the last state to stop accepting and counting votes – they must be postmarked on or before election day, but can be counted if they arrive as many as 20 days afterwards. In practice, however, Washington is among the safest Democratic party states and will have been called for one party or the other long before this deadline.8 December 2020Deadline for states to resolve any disputes over the selection of their electors of the electoral college.14 December 2020The electors meet in their respective state capitals to formally vote for the president and vice-president.6 January 2021The electoral college votes are formally counted in a joint session of Congress. The president of the Senate announces who will be the next president of the United States.20 January 2021The next president swears their oath and is inaugurated in a Washington DC ceremony.Trump has also brought in a series of sanctions over alleged abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, boosted diplomatic and military support for self-ruled Taiwan, and challenged Chinese-owned tech firms operating in the US.For prominent figures like Lai, that has meant support for both his cause, and him personally. When the tycoon was arrested by Hong Kong authorities in August, Trump denounced the detention as “a terrible thing”.Lai’s media empire has even been accused of trying to actively meddle in the US election. He recently apologised for the role the Apple Daily played in a report on Hunter Biden’s alleged Chinese business links.He admitted funds from his private firm had been used to pay for it, but said he personally had “nothing to do” with its commissioning or dissemination.Support for Trump is far from universal among critics of China, however. Kevin Yam, a Hong Kong-based lawyer, is among those who argue that the lure of a hardline stance against Beijing is superficial, and the president’s position on other issues will ultimately undermine everything they are fighting for.“I dispute the very idea that Trump is ‘tough on China’ given his record, and his words and deeds make it hard for him to have credibility when pushing a human rights agenda around the world,” said Yam who laid out his concerns in an editorial for Ming Pao and said he was showered with abuse when it came out.“If an anti-universal values power ‘beats’ another, that’s not a triumph for freedom, it’s just Orwellian Nineteen Eighty-Four-style endless mutual destruction as between hegemons,” he wrote in an English language summary of his argument on Twitter.In the US, another Tiananmen Square dissident, Wan Yanhai is campaigning hard against the incumbent, and says he too has faced verbal abuse and even a death threat, but is determined to continue.“Trump has inflicted major damage on democracy,” he told The City. “You want to fight against the CCP [Chinese Communist party], but you shouldn’t expect one monster to eat another monster.” More

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      in World Politics

      Why Is the US Losing Against China in an Espionage War?

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      Chinese espionage cases in the US have assumed alarming proportions. On July 7, Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, declared: “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are all related to China.”

      Does Beijing Prefer Biden or Trump?

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      Since the mid-1990s, evidence of Chinese espionage in the US had been mounting. However, it is only recently that the US began taking this issue seriously. Washington’s inability to recognize the threat from Beijing early on is due to its failure to understand Chinese espionage culture. This, in turn, is because the US lacks a strategic counterintelligence culture and focuses excessively on operations.

      Historical Roots of Chinese Espionage Culture

      Americans see the worsening of Sino-US relations from the prism of “betrayal” and “surprise.” This is because the US considers the 1972 US-China rapprochement as a watershed moment. Many in Washington believe the US was singularly responsible for the dramatic economic rise of China. Consequently, they had assumed that the Middle Kingdom would be grateful for American help and adopt Western norms over time. To their surprise, this did not happen. Beijing never really displayed gratitude and it has become increasingly defiant as it has become more powerful. The rising threat of espionage, both security and commercial, is just one of the many manifestations of this defiance.

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      A simple question arises: Why did the US fail to foresee the threat of espionage by China? The answer lies in the chronic inability of American intelligence and intelligentsia to pay adequate attention to the intelligence cultures of other countries. As early as the 1980s, this lacuna had been pointed out by some academics who understood the perils of neglecting foreign cultures. Their advice went unheeded, though.

      To understand Chinese intelligence culture, the operative date is not 1972 but the first recorded interaction between the Chinese and Western civilizations. In the 16th century, Italian-born Father Matteo Ricci led a team of Jesuit missionaries to the village of Shanghai. In a way, these missionaries were the first Western intelligence operatives in China. They came with the mission of converting the Chinese to Christianity. The Jesuits assumed that the lure of superior Western science and technology would convince the Chinese to embrace Christianity. This didn’t happen. By the end of the 19th century, the Jesuits concluded that their mission had been a “total failure.”

      The reason behind this failure is fairly straightforward. Hostility toward foreigners was deeply entrenched in the Chinese psyche. Any foreigner was categorized as “inferior” and “barbaric.” The missionaries were only welcome as long as they imparted knowledge in the scientific and technological realms. Beyond that, when they tried to propagate religion and philosophy, they were punished and sometimes executed. In essence, the Chinese saw the missionaries akin to a fat cow that was to be milked and then slaughtered. This episode offers important insights for understanding modern Chinese espionage culture.

      Today, China is again milking the West for advanced scientific and technical knowledge. This time, it has sent Chinese spies to infiltrate citadels of Western knowledge, especially in the US.

      Reassessing Chinese Espionage Operations

      Studies on Chinese intelligence have mostly focused on operational level analysis. Analysts have largely failed to place individual espionage operations within the cultural context. Few Americans understand that the principles guiding Chinese espionage operations are fundamentally at odds with western ones.  

      This difference could be spotted as early as the mid-20th century when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was building up its intelligence infrastructure with the help of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the CCP intelligence apparatus cooperated closely with Soviet intelligence. Yet, despite tutelage and operational cooperation, the influence of Soviet intelligence practices on the Chinese remained minimal.

      Just as 16th century China had welcomed Western science and discarded Western philosophy, the CCP followed the same practice. Operationally, the CCP intelligence services were keen to learn the tricks of the trade from the Soviets. However, they stuck with their ancient philosophies on the subject. In particular, the Chinese stayed true to Sun Tzu, the famous military strategist of the 6thcentury BCE. There was “no imitation or even emulation” of Soviet intelligence practices, but only “customization and improvisation.”

      One such customization can be seen in how the Chinese have employed the Sun Tzuvian concept of “expendable spies,” which conflicts with the Western philosophy of “ethical spying.” Empirical studies on the British, American and Soviet experience in running human intelligence operations reveal a remarkable degree of concern for field agents. In particular, Western intelligence agencies have historically shown great regard for the lives and security of their informers. The Americans and the British treated Russian informers like Adolf Tolkachev and Oleg Gordievsky rather well. The Soviets also took good care of strategic informants like the Cambridge Five. Western handling officers often insist on “informant security.”

      The “expendable spies” doctrine, on the other hand, does not extend to the field agents the privileges that come with “ethical spying.” The arrest of Candace Claiborne, the State Department official, illustrates this point. Claiborne’s true identity was revealed when she unsuspectingly accepted a compliment from an undercover FBI operative that she was one of the “highest regarded” assets of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the intelligence, security and secret police agency of China. This incident reveals that Chinese intelligence seems to have offered zero security training to an agent who enjoyed top-secret clearance. The CCP treats agents as “disposable” because it still follows Sun Tzu’s theory of “expendable spies.”    

      The expendable and ethical schools of intelligence lead to a qualitative versus quantitative dichotomy when it comes to informer networks. Western agencies look for a few reliable informers who can be secured. The Chinese employ a vacuum cleaner approach and prefer using a large number of intelligence collectors instead of a few trained professionals. This qualitative-quantitative distinction is certainly well known, but few Americans appreciate its historical origins that date back to the formative years of the CCP intelligence apparatus.

      Beijing has used the quantitative approach relentlessly when it comes to commercial espionage. In 2015, John Lewis of the Obama administration insisted to his Chinese counterpart that they discuss this thorny issue. After a few failed attempts at dodging it, the Chinese official made a rather candid observation. According to the official, the Chinese intelligence culture did not distinguish between espionage for national security and for economics. Such a dichotomy was solely a Western one. For the Chinese, it did not exist. Despite this clear confession, it took another five years for the American establishment to completely wake up to the reality of the Chinese threat.

      Fixing the American Culture of Counterintelligence

      The US can contain the Chinese threat by effective counterintelligence. However, the current state of play does not inspire much confidence. American misreading of Chinese espionage culture has given birth to an inadequate counterintelligence response. The US focuses too much on individual cases and not enough on developing a strategic counterintelligence doctrine.

      In such a strategy, the US would employ offensive operations to disrupt enemy intelligence goals. Instead, the FBI currently deploys a defensive strategy that involves the prosecution and conviction of foreign agents. This has two obvious flaws.

      Embed from Getty Images

      First, prosecution takes up scarce time, energy and money. It has an opportunity cost. It fails to exploit a compromised spy who could be used as a double agent. Prosecution also alerts enemy intelligence agencies who can then cover up their tracks.

      Second, convictions are hard to obtain in intelligence matters. Evidence is often insufficient, critical details of operations cannot be revealed and the gray matters of espionage do not translate as easily to the cut and dried approach of the court of law. This makes convictions difficult to secure. In fact, the shrinking arrest-to-conviction ratio feeds into the Chinese intelligence offensive, which feeds on accusations of racism and witch-hunting by the Americans. Every person accused by the FBI who walks away free adds to China’s psychological operations (PSYOP).

      In theory, PSYOP is shaped and targeted at a particular set of audiences to achieve a well-defined set of objectives. By accusing Americans of racism, the CCP aims to appeal to the sentiments of the American people in order to turn them against the FBI. In this regard, Beijing seems successful as American academic and scientific institutions have repeatedly resisted the FBI’s requests to monitor Chinese students. These institutions fear accusations of racism and perhaps a drying up of Chinese money. China has cleverly created rifts between American security agencies and its intellectual institutions to further its own purposes.

      To extricate American counterintelligence from this imbroglio, the US will have to embrace a strategic counterintelligence doctrine. It will have to use PSYOP effectively too. In particular, it could focus on China’s violations of human rights such as the brutal “traitor weeding” program followed by its intelligence agencies. Already, educated Americans are turning against Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet.

      Therefore, the need of the hour is for Americans to embrace the famed Sun Tzuvian dictum: “[K]now thyself and know thy enemy; a thousand battles, a thousand victories.”

      *[Atul Singh provided guidance for this article.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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