Coups D’Etat and Attempted Coups D’Etat

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      Brazil’s Bolsonaro Is Preparing for a Revolution

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      RIO DE JANEIRO — It’s election season in Brazil, and the usual buzz of activity fills the air. The press is eagerly following the campaigns, running profiles of candidates and speculating about future coalitions. Supporters of the candidate in the lead, the former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, are heatedly debating who the next cabinet ministers will be. And all involved are crisscrossing the country for rallies, in an energetic effort to get out the vote.Yet Jair Bolsonaro, the country’s far-right president, stands apart. While his challengers have spent months looking forward to the election, he has sought to preemptively discredit it. He has questioned the role of the Supreme Court and cast doubt, volubly and often, on the electoral process. He speaks as if the election is an encumbrance, an irritation. He says he will not accept any result that is not a victory.To some, this looks like the groundwork for a coup. In this view, Mr. Bolsonaro intends to refuse any election result that does not please him and, with the help of the military, install himself as president permanently. The reading is half right: Mr. Bolsonaro doesn’t intend to leave office, regardless of the election results. But it’s not a coup, with its need for elite consensus and eschewal of mass mobilization, he’s after. It’s a revolution.Since the beginning of his term, Mr. Bolsonaro has behaved more like a revolutionary leader than a president. In his first month in office, he said that his role was not to build anything, but to “undo” everything. Rather than run a government, he’s tried to disrupt it. He refused to fill roles in crucial regulatory agencies, placed supporters with no technical expertise in high positions, underfunded social programs, punished civil servants for doing their jobs and neglected to provide a coordinated response to the pandemic, which killed over 680,000 Brazilians.It’s not destruction for its own sake, however. Dismantling the state is how Mr. Bolsonaro galvanizes his supporters. By identifying clear enemies and antagonizing them, he excites his followers and, crucially, enlists their support. Everything he does — decrees, bills, pronouncements, demonstrations, alliances — is framed for the digital infrastructure of YouTube, Telegram and WhatsApp. The more radical his actions and words, the more engagement he generates.Support for Mr. Bolsonaro may start online, but it leads to the streets. For the past year, Mr. Bolsonaro has conducted a bimonthly “motociata,” a march with thousands of motorcycles that looks very much like a brute show of strength. His presidency, in fact, aspires to be a permanent rally. On Sept. 7 last year, Brazil’s Independence Day, he gathered almost half a million people to protest against the Supreme Court. On the same day this year, he has promised a big military parade to show the army’s support for his government.It’s not just the military. Many of Mr. Bolsonaro’s most fervent supporters are notable for their power over common citizens. He is popular among police officers — a 2021 study estimated that 51 percent of Brazilian street-level police officers were active members of pro-Bolsonaro groups online — and he is also a favored candidate among gun owners. Of those who approve of his government, 18 percent say they already have a gun at home and almost half would like to have one.They may get their wish. One of the major achievements of the Bolsonaro administration has been to weaken gun control, flooding the country with firearms. In 2018, there were around 115,000 people with special licenses to carry a gun in the country. Now there are over 670,000 people holding these licenses — more than in the police and the armed forces. A substantial number of them adore Mr. Bolsonaro and are organized into a vast network of nearly 2,000 gun clubs.Militant and committed, these are the foot soldiers of any future revolution. There’s a lot we don’t know about how that might come about. But it’s clear that if a contingent of supporters, armed and determined to keep Mr. Bolsonaro in power, burst into Brasília, the capital, it would create chaos. In many major cities, it’s not impossible to imagine an insurrection led by police forces — while truck drivers, overwhelmingly pro-Bolsonaro, could block the roads as they did in 2018, creating havoc. Evangelical pastors, whose congregants by large margins support the president, could bless those efforts as part of the fight for good against evil. Out of such anarchy, Mr. Bolsonaro could forge dictatorial order.Who will stop him? Probably not the army. Mr. Bolsonaro, after all, has many supporters in the military and over 6,000 military personnel working in his government, filling civilian roles. For its part, the army seems to be relatively relaxed about a possible takeover and has — to put it mildly — no special attachment to democracy. There is no sign, as far as can be seen, that the armed forces could be protagonists of a coup. But neither is there a sign that they would resist an attempt at revolution.Democratic forces are unlikely to fare much better. For all Mr. da Silva’s popularity, left-wingers seem to have lost their capacity to rally the masses. The 13 years of a left-led government that ended in 2016 did much to disperse and weaken social movements, and they have struggled in the years since to recover their dynamism. Demonstrations against Mr. Bolsonaro, for example, have been poorly attended. And political violence is on the rise: A member of Mr. da Silva’s party, for example, was recently killed by a Bolsonaro supporter. People would certainly think twice before going to the streets to defend a Lula victory.The best bulwark against a revolution, curiously, might be the United States. The Biden administration could make clear the profound costs, in the form of sanctions and international isolation, that would follow any seizure of power. That in turn could frighten big Brazilian businesses — which, as influential backers, can exert considerable pressure on Mr. Bolsonaro — into defending democracy. If the difficulties of executing a revolution are too great and the rewards seem slim, it’s conceivable that Mr. Bolsonaro will back down — or simply stage a performance, as former President Donald Trump did, to maintain control over his followers and prepare the ground for the next election.The last time Brazil experienced similar political chaos was in 1964, when a military coup removed a democratic government that was trying to carry out progressive reforms. It took just a few hours for the United States, then led by Lyndon Johnson, to recognize the new government of Brazil.A lot hinges on the hope that the United States now values democracy a bit more.Miguel Lago is the executive director of the Institute for Health Policy Studies and teaches at Columbia University.The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram. More

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      Myanmar’s Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Gets More Prison Time

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      Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the politician and Nobel laureate, was found guilty of election fraud on Friday, a sign that the junta has no intention of easing its pressure on her.Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s ousted civilian leader who was detained in a coup last year, was sentenced to three more years in prison, with hard labor, on Friday when a court found her guilty of election fraud in a case that the army brought against her after her political party won in a landslide in 2020.The latest sentence brings her total prison term to 20 years, an indication that the junta is not easing its pressure on Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi despite international condemnation. The guilty verdict comes as the military seeks to erase her influence in the country. Last month, Myanmar’s military-backed Supreme Court announced that it would auction off her residence, where she spent nearly 15 years under house arrest under a previous regime.The election fraud case stems from a November 2021 charge brought by the junta-controlled Election Commission: Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi and other senior officials were accused of manipulating voter lists to clinch the 2020 election. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy, crushed the military-backed party in that vote, which independent international observers declared free and fair.The election commission’s previous members also pushed back against the claim of voter fraud, saying there was no evidence. A day after announcing the coup in February 2021, the army dismissed all the members of the commission and installed their own people. It later announced that the election results had been canceled.In July, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi testified for the first time on the election fraud charge, saying she was not guilty. On Friday, a judge in Naypyidaw, the capital, also sentenced U Win Myint, the country’s ousted president, to three years, the maximum term, on the same charge.The junta, which has long rejected criticisms that the charges against Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi were politically motivated, has accused her of breaking the law. In the election fraud case, it said it had found nearly 10.5 million instances of irregularities and had identified entries where a person’s national identification number had been repeated — either under the same name or a different one. It also said it found ballots with no national identification number listed at all.Supporters of the National League for Democracy, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s party, celebrating her victory in Yangon in November 2020. A court found her guilty of election fraud after her political party won in a landslide in 2020.Sai Aung Main/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesThe U.S.-based Carter Center, which had more than 40 observers visiting polling stations on Election Day, said voting had taken place “without major irregularities being reported by mission observers.”Friday’s sentencing was the fifth verdict meted out against Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, 77, who has already stood trial on a series of other charges that include inciting public unrest and breaching Covid-19 protocols. It was the first time she had been sentenced to hard labor, which forces convicts to carry heavy rocks in quarries, a practice international rights groups have denounced. She is appealing the sentence, according to a source familiar with the legal proceedings.She had already been sentenced to a total of 17 years in prison, starting in December 2021. She still faces eight more charges relating to corruption and violating the official secrets act. If found guilty on all remaining charges, she could face a maximum imprisonment of 119 years.Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate, has denied all of the charges against her, while the United Nations and many other international organizations have demanded her freedom.No one has heard from Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi since she was detained, except for her lawyers, who are banned from speaking to the media. She is being held in solitary confinement, whereas previous military regimes allowed her to remain under house arrest.Despite the regime’s effort to make her disappear, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi is still revered by many in Myanmar. A paper fan that belonged to her sold in an online auction for more than $340,000 last month to help a victim who had been burned by the military in an arson attack. Her son, Kim Aris, auctioned off a piece of art that sold for more than $1 million, money that will go toward helping victims of the military’s brutality.Myanmar has been wracked by widespread protests since the coup. Thousands of armed resistance fighters are battling the army, carrying out bombings and assassinations that have handicapped the military in some parts of the country. The civil disobedience movement, started by striking doctors, teachers and railway workers, is still going strong.Protestors in Yangon in March 2021. Myanmar has been wracked by widespread protests since the coup.The New York TimesOn Friday, the junta sentenced Vicky Bowman, a former British ambassador, and her Burmese husband, Ko Htein Lin, to one year in prison for breaching immigration laws, according to a prison official.The Tatmadaw, as Myanmar’s army is known, has long resented Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, whose widespread popularity threatens military rule. Before her most recent arrest, she had kept a distance from Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the army and the general behind the coup.The two leaders were part of a delicate power-sharing arrangement in which Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi headed the civilian side of government and General Min Aung Hlaing maintained absolute control over the military, the police and the border guards. The two rarely spoke, choosing instead to send messages through an intermediary.Many political experts point to the time in 2016 when Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the N.L.D., introduced a bill in Parliament to create a new post for her as state counselor as a moment when ties fractured between the army and Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi. As state counselor, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi declared herself above the president and named herself foreign minister, a move that the military saw as a power grab.In November 2020, the N.L.D. won by an even greater margin compared with its previous election showing. Three months later, and hours before the new Parliament was scheduled to be sworn in, soldiers and the police arrested Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi and other party leaders.General Min Aung Hlaing announced the coup later that day, declaring on public television that there had been “terrible fraud” during the vote. More

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      Elecciones en Brasil: ¿Habrá un golpe de Estado de Bolsonaro?

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      El presidente Bolsonaro ha advertido la posibilidad de fraude e insinuado que impugnará los resultados si pierde. La élite política considera que no tiene respaldo para intentar aferrarse al poder.Una pregunta simple pero alarmante domina el discurso político en Brasil cuando faltan apenas seis semanas para las elecciones nacionales: ¿Aceptará el presidente Jair Bolsonaro los resultados?Durante meses, Bolsonaro ha atacado a las máquinas de votación electrónica de Brasil diciendo que están plagadas de fraude —a pesar de que prácticamente no hay pruebas— y a los funcionarios electorales de Brasil por estar alineados contra él. Ha insinuado que disputaría cualquier derrota a menos que se realicen cambios en los procedimientos electorales. Ha alistado a los militares brasileños en su batalla. Y ha dicho a sus decenas de millones de seguidores que se preparen para luchar.“Si es necesario”, dijo en un discurso reciente, “iremos a la guerra”.Con la votación del 2 de octubre, Brasil se sitúa ahora en la vanguardia de las crecientes amenazas globales a la democracia, impulsadas por líderes populistas, extremismo, electorados muy polarizados y desinformación en internet. La cuarta democracia más poblada del mundo se prepara para la posibilidad de que su presidente se niegue a dejar el poder por acusaciones de fraude que podrían ser difíciles de desmentir.Sin embargo, según entrevistas con más de 35 funcionarios del gobierno de Bolsonaro, generales militares, jueces federales, autoridades electorales, miembros del Congreso y diplomáticos extranjeros, la élite del poder en Brasil se siente confiada de que, aunque Bolsonaro pudiera disputar los resultados de las elecciones, carece del apoyo institucional para dar un golpe de Estado exitoso.El último golpe de Brasil, en 1964, condujo a una brutal dictadura militar que duró 21 años. “La clase media lo apoyó. Los empresarios lo apoyaron. La prensa lo apoyó. Y Estados Unidos lo apoyó”, dijo Luís Roberto Barroso, juez del Supremo Tribunal Federal y ex jefe de la autoridad electoral de Brasil. “Pues bien, ninguno de estos actores apoya un golpe ahora”.Personas preparándose para un paseo en moto celebrado en apoyo de Bolsonaro en Salvador, Brasil.Victor Moriyama para The New York TimesEn cambio, los funcionarios se preocupan por el daño duradero a las instituciones democráticas de Brasil —las encuestas muestran que una quinta parte del país ha perdido la fe en los sistemas electorales— y por la violencia en las calles. Las afirmaciones de fraude de Bolsonaro y su potencial negativa a aceptar una derrota se hacen eco de las de su aliado Donald Trump; los funcionarios brasileños mencionaron repetidamente el ataque del 6 de enero de 2021 en el Capitolio de Estados Unidos como un ejemplo de lo que podría suceder.“¿Cómo tenemos algún control sobre esto?”, dijo Flávio Bolsonaro, senador e hijo de Bolsonaro, en una entrevista con el periódico brasileño Estadão en referencia a la violencia potencial. En Estados Unidos, dijo, “la gente estuvo al tanto de los problemas del sistema electoral, se indignó e hizo lo que hizo. No hubo orden del presidente Trump y no habrá orden del presidente Bolsonaro”.Este mes, más de un millón de brasileños, entre los que se encuentran expresidentes, académicos de alto nivel, abogados y estrellas del pop, firmaron una carta en defensa de los sistemas de votación del país. Los principales grupos empresariales de Brasil también publicaron una carta similar.El martes, en un acto al que acudieron casi todas las principales figuras políticas brasileñas, otro magistrado del Supremo Tribunal Federal, Alexandre de Moraes, asumió el cargo de nuevo jefe de elecciones del país y advirtió que castigaría los ataques al proceso electoral.“La libertad de expresión no es libertad para destruir la democracia, para destruir las instituciones”, dijo. Su reacción, añadió, “será rápida, firme e implacable”.La multitud se puso en pie y aplaudió. Bolsonaro se quedó sentado y frunció el ceño.Bolsonaro, cuyos representantes declinaron las solicitudes de entrevista, ha dicho que está tratando de proteger la democracia de Brasil mediante el fortalecimiento de sus sistemas de votación.Entre los funcionarios entrevistados, hubo un amplio desacuerdo sobre si al presidente derechista lo impulsaba una genuina preocupación por el fraude o simplemente el miedo a perder. Bolsonaro ha quedado constantemente por detrás del expresidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, un izquierdista, en las encuestas de opinión; si nadie gana la mayoría de los votos el 2 de octubre, está prevista una segunda vuelta para el 30 de octubre.Bolsonaro va por detrás del expresidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva en las encuestas.Dado Galdieri para The New York TimesSin embargo, hay cada vez más esperanzas de que suceda una transición sin sobresaltos si Bolsonaro pierde, porque el mandatario ahora parece estar dispuesto a una tregua.Sus aliados, incluyendo altos oficiales de las fuerzas armadas, están a punto de comenzar negociaciones con De Moraes sobre los cambios al sistema electoral diseñados para atender las críticas de seguridad del presidente, según tres jueces federales y un alto funcionario del gobierno cercano a las conversaciones previstas, que hablaron bajo la condición de anonimato porque son confidenciales.La idea es que Bolsonaro retroceda en sus ataques a las máquinas de votación, dijeron estas personas, si los funcionarios electorales aceptan algunos cambios solicitados por los militares de Brasil.“Tengo plena confianza en el sistema electoral de Brasil. Eso tampoco significa que sea infalible”, dijo Ciro Nogueira, jefe de gabinete de Bolsonaro. “Estoy seguro de que, como dice el presidente, el pueblo tendrá su opinión”. Y el sábado, Bolsonaro pareció insinuar en un mitin que aceptaría los resultados de las elecciones.Sin embargo, Bolsonaro ha hecho comentarios similares en el pasado y acordó una tregua similar el año pasado… y luego continuó sus ataques.Esos ataques han surtido efecto. Desde junio, los usuarios brasileños de Twitter han mencionado las máquinas de votación de Brasil más que la inflación o los programas de bienestar social en relación con las elecciones, y casi tanto como los precios de la gasolina, que han sido un punto importante del debate político, según un análisis realizado por investigadores de la Escuela de Comunicación de la Fundación Getúlio Vargas solicitado por The New York Times.Partidarios de Bolsonaro en Salvador, BrasilVictor Moriyama para The New York TimesUn sondeo realizado el mes pasado mostró que el 32 por ciento de los brasileños confía “un poco” en las máquinas de votación y el 20 por ciento no confía en ellas para nada.Y mientras que bastantes de los partidarios de Bolsonaro están convencidos de que el voto puede estar amañado, muchos más también tienen armas. Bolsonaro facilitó la compra de armas de fuego por parte de civiles con restricciones más laxas para los cazadores, y ahora más de 670.000 brasileños poseen armas bajo esas normas, 10 veces más que hace cinco años.Dentro de su gobierno, Bolsonaro se ha visto cada vez más dividido entre dos facciones.Una de ellas ha animado al presidente a dejar de atacar las máquinas de votación porque creen que el tema es impopular entre los votantes más moderados que necesita ganar y porque la economía de Brasil está repuntando, lo que ayuda a sus posibilidades de reelección, según dos altos asesores del presidente.Dijeron que el otro grupo, liderado por antiguos generales militares, ha alimentado al presidente con información errónea y lo ha instado a seguir advirtiendo de posibles fraudes.Los funcionarios electorales invitaron el año pasado a los militares a unirse a un comité para mejorar los sistemas electorales. Los militares sugirieron una serie de cambios, pero los funcionarios electorales dijeron que no podrían aplicarse a tiempo para la votación de octubre.Pero los líderes militares siguen presionando en busca de un cambio en particular: que las pruebas de integridad de las máquinas de votación se realicen con votantes reales, en lugar de con simulaciones.Durante meses, Bolsonaro ha acusado a los funcionarios electorales de estar alineados en contra suya.Victor Moriyama para The New York TimesA los militares les preocupa que un pirata informático pueda implantar un software malicioso en las máquinas de votación que reconozca las simulaciones y permanezca inactivo durante esas pruebas, lo que le permitiría evadir la detección.Un experto en seguridad electoral dijo que tal hackeo es concebible pero improbable.De Moraes, el nuevo jefe de elecciones, ha señalado que estaría dispuesto a realizar cambios en los sistemas de votación, aunque no está claro lo que podría lograrse para el 2 de octubre.Bolsonaro lleva mucho tiempo en desacuerdo con De Moraes, que ha dirigido las investigaciones sobre las denuncias de desinformación y filtraciones de material clasificado que implican al presidente y a sus aliados. Bolsonaro ha criticado a De Moraes por considerarlo políticamente motivado, y dijo en un mitin el año pasado que ya no acataría sus dictámenes, declaración de la que luego se retractó.Por lo tanto, se esperaba que el ascenso de De Moraes a la presidencia del tribunal superior electoral de Brasil agravara aún más las tensiones.Pero en las últimas semanas, él y Bolsonaro han comenzado a chatear por WhatsApp en un esfuerzo por arreglar su relación, según una persona cercana al presidente. Cuando De Moraes le entregó en mano una invitación para su investidura como presidente del tribunal electoral este mes, Bolsonaro le regaló una camiseta del Corinthians, el equipo de fútbol favorito de De Moraes. (El Corinthians es el archienemigo del equipo favorito de Bolsonaro, el Palmeiras).Con las tensiones a flor de piel, los dirigentes brasileños decidieron hacer de la toma de posesión de De Moraes el martes de la semana pasada —normalmente un acto de trámite— una demostración de la fortaleza de la democracia brasileña.Las caravanas de motos se han convertido en algo habitual en los actos de apoyo al presidente en todo el país.Victor Moriyama para The New York TimesEn un anfiteatro modernista y subterráneo, los jefes del Congreso brasileño, el Supremo Tribunal Federal y los militares se unieron a cinco de los seis presidentes vivos de Brasil para la ceremonia, incluidos Bolsonaro y Lula da Silva.Las cámaras enfocaron a Bolsonaro junto a De Moraes en la mesa principal, una escena poco habitual. Conversaron en voz baja, a veces entre risas, durante todo el evento. Entonces De Moraes se levantó para su discurso. Antes del evento, había advertido a Bolsonaro que no lo disfrutaría, según una persona cercana al presidente.“Somos la única democracia del mundo que calcula y publica los resultados electorales en el mismo día, con agilidad, seguridad, competencia y transparencia”, dijo. “La democracia no es un camino fácil, exacto o predecible. Pero es el único camino”.La sala le dedicó una ovación de 40 segundos. Bolsonaro fue de los primeros en dejar de aplaudir.Después, los dos hombres posaron para una foto. No sonrieron.Jack Nicas es el jefe de la corresponsalía del Times en Brasil, que abarca Brasil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay. Antes cubría tecnología desde San Francisco. Antes de unirse al Times, en 2018, trabajó durante siete años en The Wall Street Journal. @jacknicas • Facebook More

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      The Question Menacing Brazil’s Elections: Coup or No Coup?

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      President Bolsonaro has warned of voter fraud and suggested he would dispute a loss in October’s vote, but the political establishment believes he lacks support to stage a coup.BRASÍLIA — A simple but alarming question is dominating political discourse in Brazil with just six weeks left until national elections: Will President Jair Bolsonaro accept the results?For months, Mr. Bolsonaro has attacked Brazil’s electronic voting machines as rife with fraud — despite virtually no evidence — and Brazil’s election officials as aligned against him. He has suggested that he would dispute any loss unless changes are made in election procedures. He has enlisted Brazil’s military in his battle. And he has told his tens of millions of supporters to prepare for a fight.“If need be,” he said in a recent speech, “we will go to war.”With its vote on Oct. 2, Brazil is now at the forefront of the growing global threats to democracy, fueled by populist leaders, extremism, highly polarized electorates and internet disinformation. The world’s fourth-largest democracy is bracing for the possibility of its president refusing to step down because of fraud allegations that could be difficult to disprove.Yet, according to interviews with more than 35 Bolsonaro administration officials, military generals, federal judges, election authorities, members of Congress and foreign diplomats, the people in power in Brazil feel confident that while Mr. Bolsonaro could dispute the election’s results, he lacks the institutional support to stage a successful coup.Brazil’s last coup, in 1964, led to a brutal 21-year military dictatorship. “The middle class supported it. Business people supported it. The press supported it. And the U.S. supported it,” said Luís Roberto Barroso, a Supreme Court justice and Brazil’s former elections chief. “Well, none of these players support a coup now.”People preparing for a motorcycle ride in Salvador, Brazil, held in support of Mr. Bolsonaro. Victor Moriyama for The New York TimesInstead, the officials worry about lasting damage to Brazil’s democratic institutions — polls show a fifth of the country has lost faith in the election systems — and about violence in the streets. Mr. Bolsonaro’s claims of fraud and potential refusal to accept a loss echo those of his ally Donald J. Trump, and Brazilian officials repeatedly cited the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol as an example of what could happen.“How do we have any control over this?” Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator and Mr. Bolsonaro’s son, said in an interview with the Brazilian newspaper Estadão in reference to potential violence. In the United States, he said, “people followed the problems in the electoral system, were outraged and did what they did. There was no command from President Trump, and there will be no command from President Bolsonaro.”This month, more than one million Brazilians, including former presidents, top academics, lawyers and pop stars, signed a letter defending the country’s voting systems. Brazil’s top business groups also released a similar letter.On Tuesday, at an event with nearly every major Brazilian political figure present, another Supreme Court justice, Alexandre de Moraes, took office as the nation’s new elections chief and warned that he would punish attacks on the electoral process.“Freedom of expression is not freedom to destroy democracy, to destroy institutions,” he said. His reaction, he added, “will be swift, firm and relentless.”The crowd stood and applauded. Mr. Bolsonaro sat and scowled.Mr. Bolsonaro, whose representatives declined requests for an interview, has said that he is trying to protect Brazil’s democracy by strengthening its voting systems.Among the officials interviewed, there was broad disagreement over whether the right-wing president was driven by genuine concern about fraud or just fear of losing. Mr. Bolsonaro has consistently trailed former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leftist, in opinion surveys; if no one wins a majority of the vote on Oct. 2, a runoff is scheduled for Oct. 30.Mr. Bolsonaro trails the former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the polls.Dado Galdieri for The New York TimesYet there are increasing hopes for a smooth transition of power if Mr. Bolsonaro loses — because he now appears open to a truce.His allies, including top officials in the armed forces, are about to begin negotiations with Mr. de Moraes about changes to Brazil’s election system designed to address the president’s security critiques, according to three federal judges and one senior administration official close to the planned talks, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they are confidential.The idea is that Mr. Bolsonaro would back off his attacks on the voting machines, these people said, if election officials agreed to some changes requested by Brazil’s military. More

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      The Jan. 6 attack was a crisis. So why wasn’t it more of a scandal?

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      The political dog that didn’t bark.Protesters storming the Senate side of the U.S. Capitol after a rally where President Trump spoke on Jan. 6 last year.Jason Andrew for The New York TimesNever underestimate the power of a political scandal. I don’t mean in the gossipy, prurient, sense of the term, like a splashy story about celebrity cheating on a spouse. Rather, I’m talking about an event that provokes such outrage that it can unite previously divided populations and politicians in condemnation. That kind of scandal can change history, opening up paths to political change that may have seemed unimaginable up to that point.In Chile in 2019, for instance, the president’s decision to call out the army to quell mass protests provoked national fury, uniting the country behind the demonstrators’ demand for a new Constitution. In Guatemala in 2015, a corruption scandal involving President Otto Pérez Molina provoked huge demonstrations, eventually causing his resignation. And in Argentina and Colombia, scandalous incidents of police violence united public opinion, making police reform programs that once seemed politically impossible a reality, Yanilda González, a Harvard political scientist, found.It seemed, at first, as if the Jan. 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol would be a similar moment. The attack had little precedent in U.S. history. It was covered live by the news media, beaming images of the deadly violence to the televisions and phones of Americans across the country. The public reacted with shock and anger. A CBS News poll conducted the week after the attack found that 87 percent of Americans disapproved of what had happened. Within days, Congress had impeached President Donald Trump on charges of inciting an insurrection.But then the outrage seemed to lose momentum, as if the events of Jan. 6 got halfway to being a publicly galvanizing scandal and then became stuck.Trump was acquitted by the Senate, after all but seven Republicans voted in his favor. And despite sustained media attention and a public congressional investigation that has continued to generate headlines, the attacks have not — at least so far — provoked the kind of mass fervor that leads to real political change. The Republican Party has largely rallied around Trump. His wing of the party is still ascendant.That relatively muted response stands in sharp contrast to the reaction from prominent Republicans this week after the F.B.I. searched Trump’s Florida home, apparently in order to locate classified documents that the former president may have stored there. In an interview on Fox News, Rick Scott, a Republican Florida senator, compared the F.B.I. action to the activities of Nazi Germany and Latin American dictatorships. Other Republican officials threatened retaliatory investigations of Democrats in the future if they retake control of Congress.Some Republican leaders have also criticized the Jan. 6 attacks. Mitch McConnell, the leader of the Senate Republicans, said that the riot “was a violent insurrection for the purpose of trying to prevent the peaceful transfer of power after a legitimately certified election.” But that has not translated into public mobilization.“It reminds me of the current discussion in U.S. media and among economists about whether we’re currently in a recession,” González told me via email. As with a recession, she said, some of the elements that experts usually look for are present, such as sustained media coverage of the event, and public disapproval of what occurred. But the outcomes that usually follow such elements are bafflingly absent, she told me. “Specifically, it doesn’t seem like there’s much in the way of mass or political mobilization around the issue to hold people accountable or prevent it from happening again.”It’s always difficult to figure out why something didn’t happen. But the question of this scandal-that-wasn’t seemed important enough to give it a try. So I started calling experts.One word: polarizationSteven Levitsky, a Harvard political scientist who studies democratization and democratic decline around the world, and Lilliana Mason, a Johns Hopkins political scientist who studies American political divisions and political violence, both had the same answer: polarization.Key Revelations From the Jan. 6 HearingsCard 1 of 9Key Revelations From the Jan. 6 HearingsMaking a case against Trump. More

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      Chad’s Military Junta and Rebels Sign a Deal, but a Main Player Is Missing

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      The accord paves the way for national reconciliation talks and democratic elections. However, it was snubbed by the main rebel group responsible for the death of Chad’s previous leader.DAKAR, Senegal — Chad’s military government and more than 40 rebel groups signed a cease-fire agreement on Monday in Qatar, paving the way for reconciliation talks later this month as the Central African nation seeks a way out of a troubled political transition.But the signing of the agreement, after five months of negotiations, was overshadowed by the absence of Chad’s most powerful armed group, which refused to to join in the accord, making any prospects for a return to stability all the more uncertain.After Chad’s longtime autocratic ruler, Idriss Déby, died while fighting against rebels in April last year, his son Gen. Mahamat Idriss Déby seized power and vowed to lead the country through an 18-month transition period.With less than two months left in that transition period, Mr. Déby’s military government and rebel groups have been negotiating in Doha, Qatar, what comes next. On Monday after nearly five months of talks, they agreed to hold national reconciliation talks later this month in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena, which would then pave the way to democratic elections.But the absence among the signatories of one of Chad’s main rebel groups, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (F.A.C.T., by its French acronym), threw the outcome of the coming talks into question. It was while visiting troops fighting against the F.A.C.T. that Mr. Déby was killed last year, according to the Chadian military authorities.On Sunday, the group’s spokesman said the accord didn’t respect key requests such as the immediate release of prisoners and parity between the government and opposition groups during the coming reconciliation talks.Thus the agreement may bring some temporary stability, but any lasting peace is unlikely, said Remadji Hoinathy, a Chadian political analyst based in N’Djamena.Chadian soldiers parading through N’Djamena after battling rebel forces last May.Djimet Wiche/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images“Some protagonists have long understood that the only way to have a frank discussion in Chad is to go through armed rebellion,” said Mr. Hoinathy, an analyst with the Institute for Security Studies.Even as a broad mix of political parties, rebel groups and the military government are set to convene in N’Djamena this month, Mr. Hoinathy said, “Those who didn’t sign the accord may as well invite themselves to the conversation — but through weapons.”Mamadou Djimtebaye, a Chadian political journalist, said that scenario could have been true years ago, but is not anymore. “That’s an old framework — people won’t let it happen,” he said. “They want elections, and both the government and F.A.C.T. have understood that.”Issa Ahmat, the spokesman for F.A.C.T., said any resolutions from the reconciliation talks would likely be biased in favor of the government. But he said that violence wasn’t on the table. “We haven’t closed the door to dialogue,” Mr. Ahmat said in a telephone interview.The presence of myriad groups in Doha — more than 50, with nearly 10 of them rejecting the accord — highlighted the key role they have played in Chad since the country’s independence from France in 1960. The country’s history has been characterized by military dictatorship and repeated attempts to seize power by such groups, often operating from neighboring Libya or Sudan.Besides the cease-fire, the agreement signed on Monday includes a disarmament program; amnesty and the safe return of rebels outside Chad; the end of recruitment by rebel groups; and the release of prisoners on both sides.The Union of Resistance Forces, which tried to oust the elder Mr. Déby in 2019 by sending a column of fighters in 50 pickup trucks from Libya — only to be beaten back by French airstrikes — signed the agreement. But another powerful group, the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic, rejected the pledge.Now, as the transition period is likely to exceed its 18-month term, Chadians have been increasingly frustrated with the junta.In May, supporters of the country’s main political opposition group, Wakit Tama, were arrested following protests against the military government. They also denounced France’s presence in the country and its support for the military leaders, echoing a rising anti-French sentiment in former French colonies.France has long considered Chad, a nation of 17 million, a strategic partner in the Sahel region. France’s counterterrorism operation, Operation Barkhane, has been headquartered in N’Djamena since its launch in 2014.But critics have pointed to a double standard by France. In Mali, it has been unflinching with military leaders who seized power in a coup last year, yet it has been more accommodating toward Chad’s government, even though Mr. Déby’s takeover following his father’s death was also unconstitutional.Human rights organizations have also criticized Mr. Déby for a broad crackdown on peaceful protests and the arrests of hundreds of members and supporters of the opposition.“Chad’s significant military commitments in the fight against terror have meant that the international community has felt comfortable to turn a blind eye to the serious human rights violations in country,” Human Right Watch’s director for Central Africa, Lewis Mudge, wrote in April.Chad’s troubled history has been marked by several peace agreements similar to those signed on Monday, which Mr. Hoinathy said had often brought limited results.Jérôme Tubiana, an independent expert on Chad, said “Key groups are missing, but the government’s plan may not have been to have all those groups as signatories.” He continued, “Instead, it may have tried to avoid negotiations between the government on one side, and all the groups together on the other.”“If the government had a divide-and-rule strategy, then it won.” More

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      Las democracias no siempre se comportan de manera democrática

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      Cuando los líderes políticos se enfrentan a una crisis constitucional, como la del 6 de enero en EE. UU., el proceso de decidir colectivamente cómo responder puede ser desordenado, arbitrario y, a veces, cambiar la naturaleza del propio sistema.Cuando buscamos casos similares en el mundo al momento del año pasado en el que el entonces vicepresidente Mike Pence se negó a ceder ante la presión del presidente Donald Trump para ayudarlo a revertir su derrota electoral, algo queda claro casi de inmediato.Este tipo de crisis, en las que el destino de la democracia queda en manos de un puñado de funcionarios, rara vez se resuelven únicamente sobre la base de principios legales o constitucionales, aunque luego sean citados como justificación.En su lugar, por lo general la resolución está determinada por las élites políticas que logran formar rápidamente una masa crítica a favor de un resultado. Y esos funcionarios pueden seguir cualquier motivación —principios, antipatía partidista, interés propio— que los movilice.En conjunto, la historia de las crisis constitucionales modernas destaca algunas duras verdades sobre la democracia. Las normas supuestamente fundamentales, como elecciones libres o el Estado de derecho, aunque se presenten como si estuvieran cimentadas de manera irreversible en las bases de la nación, en realidad solo son tan sólidas como el compromiso de quienes estén en el poder. Y si bien una crisis puede ser una oportunidad para que los líderes refuercen las normas democráticas, también puede ser una oportunidad para revisarlas o revocarlas por completo.Por ejemplo, en medio de las elecciones de Yugoslavia de 2000, la oposición declaró que había obtenido suficientes votos para destronar al presidente Slobodan Milosevic, cuyo gobierno aseguró falsamente que la oposición se había quedado corta.Ambas partes apelaron a los principios constitucionales, los procedimientos legales y, con furiosas protestas, a la voluntad del pueblo. Al final, una masa crítica de funcionarios del gobierno y de la policía, incluidos algunos en puestos necesarios para certificar el resultado, señalaron que, por razones que variaban de persona a persona, tratarían a Milosevic como el perdedor de las elecciones. Posteriormente, el nuevo gobierno lo extraditó para enfrentar cargos por crímenes de guerra en La Haya, en los Países Bajos.Slobodan Milosevic, expresidente de Yugoslavia, aplaudiendo durante una ceremonia en la academia militar de Belgrado, en 2000. Milosevic fue declarado perdedor de unas disputadas elecciones y posteriormente extraditado para ser acusado de crímenes de guerra en La Haya.Agence France-PresseLos estadounidenses parecieran tener más cosas en común con Perú. Allí, en 1992, el entonces presidente Alberto Fujimori disolvió el Congreso controlado por la oposición, que estaba haciendo gestiones para destituirlo. Los legisladores de todo el espectro votaron rápidamente para remplazar a Fujimori con su propio vicepresidente, quien se había opuesto al abuso de poder presidencial.Ambos bandos aseveraron estar defendiendo la democracia de la amenaza que representaba el otro. Ambos apelaron a las fuerzas militares de Perú, que tradicionalmente había desempeñado un rol de árbitro final, de forma casi similar al de una corte suprema. El pueblo, profundamente polarizado, se dividió. Los militares también se dividieron en dos bandos.En el momento más crítico, una cantidad suficiente de élites políticas y militares indicó su apoyo a Fujimori y logró que prevaleciera. Se juntaron de manera informal, cada uno reaccionando a los eventos de manera individual. Muchos apelaron a diferentes fines, como la agenda económica de Fujimori, la sensación de estabilidad o la posibilidad de que su partido prevaleciera bajo el nuevo orden.Perú cayó en un cuasi-autoritarismo, con derechos políticos restringidos y elecciones celebradas, pero bajo términos que favorecían a Fujimori, hasta que fue destituido de su cargo en 2000 por acusaciones de corrupción. El año pasado, su hija se postuló para la presidencia como una populista de derecha y perdió por menos de 50.000 votos.La América Latina moderna ha enfrentado repetidamente este tipo de crisis. Esto, según muchos académicos, no se debe tanto a rasgos culturales compartidos, sino más a una historia de intromisión de Guerra Fría que debilitó las normas democráticas. También surge de sistemas presidenciales de estilo estadounidense y de la profunda polarización social que allana el camino para el combate político extremo.Las democracias presidenciales, al dividir el poder entre ramas en competencia, crean más oportunidades para que cargos rivales se enfrenten, incluso hasta el punto de usurparse unos a otros los poderes. Dichos sistemas también enturbian las preguntas sobre quién está al mando, lo que obliga a sus ramas o poderes a resolver disputas de manera informal, sobre la marcha y, en ocasiones, por la fuerza.Venezuela, que solía ser la democracia más antigua de la región, sufrió una serie de crisis constitucionales cuando el entonces presidente Hugo Chávez se enfrentó con jueces y otros órganos gubernamentales que bloquearon su agenda. Cada vez, Chávez —y luego su sucesor, Nicolás Maduro— apeló a los principios legales y democráticos para justificar el debilitamiento de esas instituciones hasta que, con el tiempo, las acciones de los líderes, en apariencia para salvar la democracia, prácticamente las destriparon.Hugo Chávez, expresidente de Venezuela, llegando a la Asamblea Nacional para su discurso anual sobre el estado de la nación en Caracas, en 2012. Él y su sucesor apelaron a los principios legales y democráticos para justificar su debilitamiento de las instituciones democráticas.Ariana Cubillos/Associated PressLas presidencias no son comunes en las democracias occidentales. Una de las pocas, en Francia, experimentó su propia crisis constitucional en 1958, año en el que se evitó un intento de golpe militar cuando el líder Charles de Gaulle se otorgó poderes de emergencia para establecer un gobierno de unidad que satisficiera a los líderes civiles y militares.Si bien otros tipos de sistemas pueden caer en grandes crisis, a menudo se debe a que, al igual que en una democracia presidencial, los centros de poder en rivalidad chocan hasta el punto de intentar invadir al otro.Aun así, algunos académicos argumentan que los estadounidenses que esperan comprender la trayectoria de su país no deberían mirar a Europa, sino a América Latina.Ecuador estuvo cerca del precipicio en 2018 debido al esfuerzo del entonces presidente Rafael Correa de extender sus propios límites de mandato. Pero cuando los votantes y la élite política se opusieron, Correa dejó el cargo de manera voluntaria.En 2019, Bolivia se sumió en el caos en medio de una elección disputada. Aunque la opinión pública estuvo dividida, las élites políticas y militares señalaron que creían que el líder de izquierda en funciones en aquel momento, Evo Morales, debía dejar el cargo y prácticamente lo obligaron a hacerlo.Sin embargo, cuando el remplazo de derecha de Morales no pudo evitar meses de inestabilidad y turbulencia y luego se dispuso a posponer las elecciones, muchas de esas mismas élites presionaron para que estas se realizaran rápidamente, lo que benefició al sucesor elegido por Morales.Evo Morales, expresidente de Bolivia, hablando con la prensa el día de las elecciones en La Paz, en octubre de 2019. El país se sumió en el caos tras las elecciones, que fueron objeto de controversia.Martin Alipaz/EPA vía ShutterstockLa frase “élites políticas” puede evocar imágenes de poderosos que fuman puros y se reúnen en secreto para mover los hilos de la sociedad. En realidad, los académicos usan el término para describir a legisladores, jueces, burócratas, autoridades policiales y militares, funcionarios locales, líderes empresariales y figuras culturales, la mayoría de los cuales nunca coordinarían directamente, muchos menos acordarían qué es lo mejor para el país.Aun así, son esas élites las que, en colectivo, preservan la democracia día a día. Del mismo modo en que el papel moneda solo tiene valor porque todos lo tratamos como valioso, las elecciones y las leyes solo tienen poder porque las élites se despiertan cada mañana y las consideran primordiales. Es una especie de pacto, en el que los poderosos se vinculan voluntariamente a un sistema que también los restringe.“Una democracia organizada y en buen funcionamiento no nos exige pensar activamente en qué la sostiene”, me dijo Tom Pepinsky, politólogo de la Universidad Cornell, poco después de los disturbios en el Capitolio, el 6 de enero de 2021. “Es un equilibrio; todos están motivados a participar como si continuara”.Pero en una enorme crisis constitucional, cuando las normas y reglas destinadas a guiar la democracia se ponen en duda o se dejan de lado por completo, esas élites, súbitamente, se enfrentan a la pregunta de cómo —o si se debe— mantener su pacto democrático.No siempre estarán de acuerdo sobre cuál es el mejor camino para la democracia, para el país o para ellos mismos. En ocasiones, el impacto de ver la vulnerabilidad de la democracia los llevará a redoblar su compromiso con ella. En otras, a deshacerse de ese sistema en parte o en su totalidad.El resultado, a menudo, es una lucha de élites que se presionan entre sí directamente, como lo hicieron muchos republicanos de alto rango y asesores de la Casa Blanca durante el 6 de enero, o mediante declaraciones públicas dirigidas a los miles de funcionarios que operan la maquinaria del gobierno.Los académicos denominan esto como un “juego de coordinación”, en el que todos esos actores intentan comprender o influir en la manera en que otros responderán, hasta que surja un consenso mínimamente viable. Puede no parecerse tanto a una trama bien definida, sino más bien a una manada de animales asustados, por lo que el resultado puede ser difícil de predecir.Antes del 6 de enero, no había muchas razones para cuestionar el compromiso de los legisladores con la democracia. “No se había cuestionado si apoyaban o no la democracia en un sentido interno real; eso nunca había estado en juego”, afirmó Pepinsky.Ahora, una crisis los había obligado a decidir si anular las elecciones, y eso demostró que no todos esos legisladores, de tener esa opción, votarían para defender la democracia. “Me ha sorprendido demasiado cuánto de esto en realidad depende de 535 personas”, confesó Pepinsky, refiriéndose a la cantidad de legisladores en el Congreso.Max Fisher es reportero y columnista de temas internacionales con sede en Nueva York. Ha reportado sobre conflictos, diplomacia y cambio social desde cinco continentes. Es autor de The Interpreter, una columna que explora las ideas y el contexto detrás de los principales eventos mundiales de actualidad. @Max_Fisher • Facebook More

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      Jan. 6 Hearings Underscore Hard Truths About Democracy

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      When political leaders face a constitutional crisis, like that of Jan. 6, the process of collectively deciding how to respond can be messy, arbitrary, and sometimes change the nature of the system itself.If you look for international parallels to the moment last year when Vice President Mike Pence refused to bow to pressure from President Donald J. Trump to help overturn their election defeat, something quickly becomes clear.Such crises, with democracy’s fate left to a handful of officials, rarely resolve purely on legal or constitutional principles, even if those might later be cited as justification.Rather, their outcome is usually determined by whichever political elites happen to form a quick critical mass in favor of one result. And those officials are left to follow whatever motivation — principle, partisan antipathy, self-interest — happens to move them.Taken together, the history of modern constitutional crises underscores some hard truths about democracy. Supposedly bedrock norms, like free elections or rule of law, though portrayed as irreversibly cemented into the national foundation, are in truth only as solid as the commitment of those in power. And while a crisis can be an opportunity for leaders to reinforce democratic norms, it can also be an opportunity to revise or outright revoke them.Amid Yugoslavia’s 2000 election, for example, the opposition declared it had won enough votes to unseat President Slobodan Milosevic, whose government falsely claimed the opposition had fallen short.Both sides appealed to constitutional principles, legal procedures and, with protests raging, public will. Ultimately, a critical mass of government and police officials, including some in positions necessary to certify the outcome, signaled that, for reasons that varied individual to individual, they would treat Mr. Milosevic as the election’s loser. The new government later extradited him to face war crimes charges at The Hague.Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia, applauding during a passing-out ceremony of recruits at the military academy in Belgrade, in 2000. Mr. Milosevic was declared the loser of a disputed election, and later extradited to face war crimes charges at The Hague. Agence France-PresseAmericans may see more in common with Peru. There, President Alberto Fujimori in 1992 dissolved the opposition-held Congress, which had been moving to impeach him. Lawmakers across the spectrum quickly voted to replace Mr. Fujimori with his own vice president, who had opposed the presidential power grab.Both sides claimed to be defending democracy from the other. Both appealed to Peru’s military, which had traditionally played a role of ultimate arbiter, almost akin to that of a supreme court. The public, deeply polarized, split. The military was also split.The Themes of the Jan. 6 House Committee HearingsMaking a Case Against Trump: The committee appears to be laying out a road map for prosecutors to indict former President Donald J. Trump. But the path to any trial is uncertain.Day One: During the first hearing, the panel presented a gripping story with a sprawling cast of characters, but only three main players: Mr. Trump, the Proud Boys and a Capitol Police officer.Day Two: In its second hearing, the committee showed how Mr. Trump ignored aides and advisers in declaring victory prematurely and relentlessly pressing claims of fraud he was told were wrong.Day Three: Mr. Trump pressured Vice President Mike Pence to go along with a plan to overturn his loss even after he was told it was illegal, according to testimony laid out by the panel during the third hearing.At the critical moment, enough political and military elites signaled support for Mr. Fujimori that he prevailed. They came together informally, each reacting to events individually, and many appealing to different ends, such as Mr. Fujimori’s economic agenda, notions of stability, or a chance for their party to prevail under the new order.Peru fell into quasi-authoritarianism, with political rights curtailed and elections still held but under terms that favored Mr. Fujimori, until he was removed from office in 2000 over corruption allegations. Last year, his daughter ran for the presidency as a right-wing populist, losing by less than 50,000 votes.Modern Latin America has repeatedly faced such crises. This is due less to any shared cultural traits, many scholars argue, than to a history of Cold War meddling that weakened democratic norms. It also stems from American-style presidential systems, and deep social polarization that paves the way for extreme political combat.Presidential democracies, by dividing power among competing branches, create more opportunities for rival offices to clash, even to the point of usurping one another’s powers. Such systems also blur questions of who is in charge, forcing their branches to resolve disputes informally, on the fly and at times by force.Venezuela, once the region’s oldest democracy, endured a series of constitutional crises as President Hugo Chávez clashed with judges and other government bodies that blocked his agenda. Each time, Mr. Chávez, and later his successor, Nicolás Maduro, appealed to legal and democratic principles to justify weakening those institutions until, over time, the leaders’ actions, ostensibly to save democracy, had all but gutted it.Hugo Chavez, the former president of Venezuela, arriving at the National Assembly for his annual state of the union address in Caracas, Venezuela, in 2012. He and his successor appealed to legal and democratic principles to justify their weakening of democratic institutions.Ariana Cubillos/Associated PressPresidencies are rare in Western democracies. One of the few, in France, saw its own constitutional crisis in 1958, when an attempted military coup was diverted only when the wartime leader Charles de Gaulle handed himself emergency powers to establish a unity government that satisfied both civilian and military leaders.While other systems can fall into major crisis, it is often because, as in a presidential democracy, competing power centers clash to the point of trying to overrun one another.Still, some scholars argue that Americans hoping to understand their country’s trajectory should look not to Europe but to Latin America.Ecuador came near the brink in 2018 over then-President Rafael Correa’s effort to extend his own term limits. But when voters and the political elite alike opposed this, Mr. Correa left office voluntarily.In 2019, Bolivia fell into chaos amid a disputed election. Though the public split, political and military elites signaled that they believed that the incumbent, the left-wing firebrand Evo Morales, should step down, all but forcing him to do so.Still, when Mr. Morales’s right-wing replacement oversaw months of turmoil and then moved to postpone elections, many of those same elites pushed for a quick vote instead, which elevated Mr. Morales’s handpicked successor.Evo Morales, the former president of Bolivia, speaking to the press on election day in La Paz, Bolivia, in October 2019. The country fell into chaos after the election, which was disputed.Martin Alipaz/EPA, via ShutterstockThe phrase “political elites” can conjure images of cigar-chomping power-brokers, meeting in secret to pull society’s strings. In reality, scholars use the term to describe lawmakers, judges, bureaucrats, police and military officers, local officials, business chiefs and cultural figures, most of whom will never coordinate directly, much less agree on what is best for the country.Still, it is those elites who collectively uphold democracy day-to-day. Much as paper money only has value because we all treat it as valuable, elections and laws only have power because elites wake up every morning and treat them as paramount. It is a kind of compact, in which the powerful voluntarily bind themselves to a system that also constrains them.“A well-functioning, orderly democracy does not require us to actively think about what sustains it,” Tom Pepinsky, a Cornell University political scientist, told me shortly after the Capitol riot on Jan. 6, 2021. “It’s an equilibrium; everybody is incentivized to participate as if it will continue.”But in a major constitutional crisis, when the norms and rules meant to guide democracy come under doubt, or fall by the wayside entirely, those elites suddenly face the question of how — or whether — to keep up their democratic compact.They will not always agree on what course is best for democracy, or for the country, or for themselves. Sometimes, the shock of seeing democracy’s vulnerability will lead them to redouble their commitment to it, and sometimes to jettison that system in part or whole.The result is often a scramble of elites pressuring one another directly, as many senior Republicans and White House aides did throughout Jan. 6, or through public statements aimed at the thousands of officials operating the machinery of government.Scholars call this a “coordination game,” with all those actors trying to understand and influence how the others will respond until a minimally viable consensus emerges. It can resemble less a well-defined plot than a herd of startled animals, which is why the outcome can be hard to predict.Before Jan. 6, there had been little reason to wonder over lawmakers’ commitment to democracy. “It had not been a question of whether or not they supported democracy in a real internal sense — that had never been the stakes,” Dr. Pepinsky said.Now, a crisis had forced them to decide whether to overturn the election, demonstrating that not all of those lawmakers, if given that choice, would vote to uphold democracy. “I’ve been floored by how much of this really does depend on 535 people,” Dr. Pepinsky said, referring to the number of lawmakers in Congress.. More