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      in World Politics

      Understanding Russia’s Logic Vis-à-Vis Ukraine

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      When it comes to Russia’s troop deployment near the Ukrainian border, many Western governments are left wondering whether the escalation is merely intended to underpin Moscow’s demands for an end to NATO’s eastward expansion and the withdrawal of NATO and US troops and military infrastructure from eastern member states.

      In Ukraine, More Than European Peace Is at Stake

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      However, it cannot be excluded that the failure of the talks with the US and NATO on security guarantees has been calculated by Moscow from the outset in order to justify an intervention in Ukraine that was being planned regardless. The Russian leadership is deliberately playing on strategic ambivalence to complicate Western decision-making. It criticizes reports about a possible Russian invasion as a Western conspiracy theory, but at the same time, it brings a military response into play should the talks with the US and NATO fail.

      In this way, Moscow is trying to further polarize the Russia debate in Europe and make a unified European and transatlantic response more difficult.

      Russia’s Military Logic

      Against this backdrop, it is worth taking a look at the Kremlin’s previous pattern of using the Russian military as a foreign policy tool. From this, conclusions can be drawn regarding the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculations. First, the military show of force represents a firmly established instrument of Russian coercive diplomacy. For example, President Vladimir Putin achieved the first summit meeting with US President Joe Biden in May 2021 after moving Russian troops to the border with Ukraine.

      Second, Putin had kept Russia’s previous military interventions limited, either with regard to the duration or in terms of the number of forces deployed. In this way, he avoided causing resentment among the Russian population due to high casualty figures or massive economic costs.

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      Third, there has been only one case of military intervention leading to the annexation of territory — the conquest of Crimea in 2014, a mixture of military surprise, acceptable political and economic sanctions, and domestic mobilization potential that allowed Putin to raise his previously plummeting approval ratings to new heights.

      It cannot automatically be assumed that the previous logic for the military use of power will continue to apply unaltered. However, there are not yet sufficient indications that it has fundamentally changed. Based on this logic, three scenarios can be identified as more likely among the options being discussed in the media.

      How Will the Situation Develop?

      First, it is in line with previous logic to view the deployment on the border with Ukraine as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy to influence the US and NATO to make substantial concessions. The military exercise with Belarus scheduled for February is intended to increase pressure in the short term, given the stalled negotiations. If the talks fail, there is a risk of escalation. With its demands for a complete revision of the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture, Russia’s leadership risks running into a trap of its own making and losing the possibility of a face-saving solution.

      Moscow regards the negotiations being offered by the US and NATO on arms control and confidence and security-building measures as merely complementary to its demands, not as a substitute for them.

      Second, Moscow could further underpin its coercive diplomacy by permanently deploying Russian troops in Belarus. As a result, Russia would be in a better position to close the so-called Suwalki gap — a strategically important land corridor between Poland and Lithuania — and thus cut the Baltic states’ connection to the rest of NATO. Moreover, with a permanent military presence in Belarus, Russia could make its threat of a major invasion of Ukraine more credible.

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      Since the stationing of Russian troops requested by Belarusian ruler Alexander Lukashenko would not constitute a hostile incursion, Moscow would not be subject to political and economic sanctions, but it would have to expect increased military reassurance measures from NATO for the eastern member states.

      A third scenario is an open incursion by Russian troops into the separatist-controlled part of the Donbas region. The number of Russian soldiers massed on the border gives credibility to this version of events. The military costs for Moscow would be low, since pro-Russian forces and covertly deployed Russian soldiers already control the area. Russia would face sanctions from Western countries, but these would be limited compared to a full-scale invasion. To be sure, no surge of approval for Putin comparable to the one that followed the Crimean annexation is to be expected.

      Chain of Legitimacy

      However, a chain of legitimacy for the invasion could easily be constructed. In recent months, some 600,000 residents of Donbas have obtained Russian passports. The deployment of armed forces abroad is permitted under Russian legislation in order to protect Russian citizens against an armed attack. Some pretexts that could be used by Moscow for these actions include statements made by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy about wanting to retake the separatist areas and false flag terrorist attacks by supposedly Ukrainian or Western forces.

      According to the logic so far, Russia is not expected to annex Donbas but to recognize it as an independent entity. An initiative to this effect is already being prepared by the Communist Party of Russia, which is loyal to the Kremlin. By taking this step, Moscow would lose the opportunity to gain a political veto position in Ukraine by granting Donbas autonomous status. However, it is no longer putting much hope in it.

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      With an open military intervention in Donbas, Russia would also put Zelenskiy in a precarious domestic and foreign policy position, in which he would lose room for maneuver and credibility between the demands for a military response and the warnings not to let the situation escalate. This would also further polarize the Western states.

      All other military scenarios — from the establishment of a land bridge to Crimea to the occupation of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast or other parts of the country — cannot be ruled out. However, they would then be associated with significantly higher military and economic costs as well as domestic political risks. This would be a clear sign that the Kremlin’s calculations have fundamentally changed.

      *[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Is the Decline of Democracy Inevitable?

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      Perhaps the most critical immediate question facing the world in 2022 is whether the decline and eventual destruction of democracy are inevitable in the next decade. Thousands of words have been directed to this question over recent years, intensifying after the ascendency of Donald Trump to the presidency in the United States, the propagation of “the big lie” after his defeat in the 2020 election, and the subsequent insurrection at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.

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      In the same period, Great Britain moved to the right under Prime Minister Boris Johnson while autocratic regimes in Poland, Hungary, Turkey, the Philippines and Brazil tightened their grip on governance structures.

      What does the future hold for liberal democracies around the world in the next decade? Are current trends an aberration, or is Marc Plattner prophetic in noting in “Democracy in Decline?” that authoritarianism seems to have the “wind at its back even if it has not yet spread to many more countries”?

      Inevitable Decline Scenario

      Current trends produce compelling evidence that seems to suggest that the decline of democracies is an inevitability. In the United States, daily columns appear pronouncing that democracy is in peril and under siege, and asking whether another civil war is possible. The January 6 assault on the Capitol continues to be a flashpoint in what was already a very volatile political environment. Voting restrictions targeted at likely Democratic voters have been instituted in many pro-Republican states. Given the prominence of America as a symbol of liberal democracy, countries around the world are now thinking the unthinkable about the future of democratic governance.

      Last year’s Freedom House report, “Freedom in the World for 2021,” carries the subheading “Democracy under Siege.” It suggests that the aggregate decline in freedom has exceeded gains for the past 15 years. While much of the deterioration in 2020 was associated with regimes in Africa and the Middle East, European nations — Poland, Hungary and Turkey — recorded reductions in freedom. Moreover, the United States has seen a 10-year decline in freedom equivalent to that experienced in 25 other nations.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Meanwhile, as the left-wing populist party headed by Nicolas Maduro has captured the headlines because of his dismantling of democratic institutions in Venezuela, right-wing populist movements are increasing across Latin America — Brazil, Bolivia and Peru are examples. More recently, following Jair Bolsonaro’s playbook in Brazil, the leader of the right-wing populist Christian Social Front in Chile, José Antonio Kast, forced a run-off in a recent election after voicing a desire to return to the autocratic regime of Augusto Pinochet.  

      Kast eventually lost in a landslide, which bodes well for the stability of democracy in Chile for the near future, but still raises the disconcerting issue of the popularity of authoritarianism among a sizeable minority of Chile’s polity. 

      Predisposition to Authoritarianism

      All of these recent events would seem to posit an argument that many citizens are susceptible to an authoritarian appeal. However, forecasting trends from recent events is always hazardous. Yet there is a more ominous source for predicting inevitability than the recent accounts and actions of political leaders and pundits. The writings of a number of social psychologists, historians and political scientists are extremely relevant to the question at hand.

      Karen Skinner argues in her book “The Authoritarian Dynamic” that autocratic tendencies are baked into the psychic of citizens of liberal democracies. Fear of change and diversity is easily transformed into a call by a politician for a return to the status quo of the past, like “Make American Great Again.” Long before the ascent of Trump, Skinner estimated that as many as one-third of the population in liberal democracies have a predisposition to authoritarianism.

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      Given that democracies encourage diversity, alternative interpretations of history and open dialogue on difficult issues, these strengths may exceed people’s capacity to tolerate difficult issues. A growing lack of tolerance toward immigrants, people of color or bureaucrats provides a platform for opportunistic leaders to activate that “authoritarian dynamic.”

      Roger Griffin offers a similar argument when he attributes modernity as a force for fascism. With the unfolding of modernity, populist interpretations of an idealized national past arise in response to the anxiety that citizens feel about a future where the only certainty is that it will be different than the past. Leaders with autocratic ambitions use “restorative nostalgia” — Svetlana Boym’s concept introduced in her book “The Future of Nostalgia” to describe a hereafter that replicates the past — to rally citizens to a populist political movement, a revolt against democratic institutions and their advocates, “the bureaucratic elites.”

      The arguments offered by Skinner, Griffin and others provide an important understanding of how the internal vulnerabilities of liberal democracies can nurture their own demise. However, despite the presence of an authoritarian dynamic within liberal democracies, a political leadership factor is part of the calculus for predicting the future of democracies. The past decade has witnessed the emergence of Plutarchian leaders who have learned to navigate the pathway that enables populist sentiments to be integrated with autocratic predispositions.

      While their hold on the masses is important, what is required to secure power is their ability to bewitch a small key group of capable and principled people in leadership roles and convince them to submit to the autocratic impulses of a prophetic leader as a means of achieving limited policy goals.  

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      A cadre of Von Papenites — those who have no autocratic predisposition but are willing to align with anti-democratic politics as a means of achieving specific policy goals or to ensure their own power base in the governance structure — is required. The important and notorious role that Franz von Papen had in enabling the rise of fascism in Germany in the 1930s must not be duplicated if democracy is to be resilient in countries experiencing populist movements. The dangerous combination of a charismatic populist leader and a sizable component of politicians willing to compromise their political ideals for transitory political goals would make the downward spiral of democracy inevitable.

      Yet in the United States, a contingent of politicians did defy the urges of the Trump administration to decertify the election results and preserve democratic rule. In Chile, citizens and political leaders rejected the call to return to the autocratic governance model of Pinochet’s dictatorship. In Europe, despite the political uncertainties created by the pandemic, right-wing populist movements have not established themselves as viable alternatives to current regimes. 

      Democracy will be resilient and survive the current wave of right-wing authoritarianism if leaders and institutions demonstrate their ability to solve critical social and economic problems, reverse the erosion of trust between themselves and the public, and put the safeguarding of democracy at the forefront of their political agenda.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in Elections

      Italian Lawmakers Say They Have Agreed to Re-Elect Sergio Mattarella as President

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      Mr. Mattarella has presided over a chaotic seven years in which the country swung wildly from the left to the right, acting as the guardrails of Italy’s democracy.ROME — After noxious and chaotic back-room negotiations, Italian lawmakers said on Saturday that they had reached a consensus to keep the status quo in place and would ask the country’s current president, Sergio Mattarella, to serve another seven-year term.The Italian Parliament is expected to re-elect Mr. Mattarella later Saturday, in the sixth day of secret votes that have revealed the fractious politics and crumbling alliances just beneath the surface of Italy’s national unity government.In Italy’s unpredictable politics, nothing is certain until the ballots are officially counted, and Mr. Mattarella, at 80, has been reluctant to serve again. But a week of inconclusive voting had already revealed the inability of the different political interests within the governing coalition to rally around a new candidate.The apparent choice of Mr. Mattarella essentially amounted to a punt — to avoid early elections and to prolong Italy’s current period of stability under Prime Minister Mario Draghi, who himself had coveted the job.But in a private meeting on Saturday morning, Mr. Draghi personally asked Mr. Mattarella to consider staying on because the political chaos over the inconclusive ballots had begun to suck in institutional figures, like the president of the Senate and the head of the Secret Service, two prominent women who were proposed as candidates only to be roundly rejected and tarnished.Mr. Draghi returned from the meeting and then called the governing coalition’s party leaders to try to broker a deal, according to an official in Mr. Draghi’s office who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss it publicly.By leaving Mr. Draghi in place, the lawmakers hoped to avert the political chaos of early elections that his departure may have encouraged. The choice of Mr. Mattarella instead increased the likelihood that Mr. Draghi, a former president of the European Central Bank, would continue to lead the unity government.Having Mr. Draghi’s hand on day-to-day affairs was certain to calm international markets as well as the European Union’s leadership in Brussels, which is counting on Italy to effectively manage hundreds of billions of dollars in pandemic recovery funds and demonstrate the wisdom of the bloc’s experiment in collective debt.Mario Draghi, left, at the Quirinal Palace in Rome in February 2021.Francesco Ammendola/Presidential Palace, via ReutersMr. Draghi’s supporters would have preferred that he be elected president, hoping that his steadying influence, even in the often ceremonial role of the presidency, would provide Italy stability beyond the country’s next scheduled elections, in 2023.But for them, the re-election of Mr. Mattarella amounts to the second-best option because it freezes the current political situation in place and leaves open the possibility that Mr. Draghi could still someday ascend to the Quirinal Palace, the home of presidents and the past home of popes.While Mr. Draghi is expected to stay on as prime minister for the months ahead, speculation is rife that Mr. Mattarella would resign early from his second term as president and open the way for Italy’s next Parliament to elect Mr. Draghi at a less politically delicate time. The official in Mr. Draghi’s office said Mr. Draghi and Mr. Mattarella did not discuss anything of the sort on Saturday morning.Mr. Mattarella “understands that this is a critical time for Italy,” said Roberto D’Alimonte, an expert in the Italian political system at Luiss Guido Carli University in Rome. “And that the status quo needs to be kept.”But months can be an eternity in Italy’s volatile politics. Most experts agree that as the elections get closer, the political ambitions and gamesmanship of the opposing political parties in the government will make it increasingly hard for the government to act, to pass new legislation, or even to stay together.And there is no guarantee that Mr. Mattarella would resign, or if he did, that the new Parliament would be filled with electors partial to Mr. Draghi.Mr. Mattarella was first elected in 2015 when he was championed by the prime minister at the time, Matteo Renzi, and he enjoyed broad support across the political spectrum. Born in Palermo, Sicily, he is the younger brother of Piersanti Mattarella, whom the mafia assassinated in 1980 during his term as Sicily’s governor.Sergio Mattarella, a reserved lawyer who taught parliamentary law in Palermo, was elected to Parliament in 1983 as a member of the Christian Democratic Party, which dominated postwar Italy until it imploded after a series of bribery scandals in the early 1990s. He served in Parliament until 2008, holding a number of high-level government posts under the Christian Democrats and in later center-left governments. In 2011, he was elected by Parliament to Italy’s Constitutional Court.As president, the grandfatherly Mr. Mattarella, with his snow-white hair and quiet style, has demonstrated moral authority in his ceremonial role.But he has also presided with a firm hand over a chaotic seven years in which the country swung wildly from the left to the right and elected among the most populist and anti-European Parliaments in Europe before transforming once again into an establishment bedrock under Mr. Draghi, whom Mr. Mattarella personally brought in to end a government crisis last year.After populists scored large victories in the 2018 elections, Mr. Mattarella prevented from taking power a government that he considered in violation of the Italian Constitution for its anti-European character, resulting in leaders of the anti-establishment Five Star Movement calling for his impeachment. It is a mark of how much Italian politics has moderated around Mr. Draghi that those same leaders today urged their followers to vote for Mr. Mattarella. But many of them had a strong personal interest in stability, as early elections were likely to cost many of them their jobs and pensions.Counting votes on Saturday at Parliament in Rome.Pool photo by Roberto MonaldoMr. Mattarella repeatedly made it clear that he did not want to stay in the job and had moved his things to a new apartment in Rome. Memes swapped among Italian politicians and reporters this week showed Mr. Mattarella answering the phone and pretending he was not home, or tying sheets together to sneak out of a window of the presidential palace. After news of his selection became public, Italian commentators jokingly expressed solidarity with his plight of having to pack and unpack boxes.But over a week of disastrous negotiations that highlighted the lack of cohesion across the political spectrum, but especially in the country’s center right, which came into the election hoping to flex its muscles but left weak and splintered, he emerged as the only name anyone could agree on.Matteo Salvini, the leader of the nationalist League party who had hoped the election would act as a show of force for the center right and his role as its de facto leader, exited the week much weaker and politically bloodied. All of his proposed candidates, and there were many, failed to gain traction.“We’ll ask Mattarella to stay,” he said Saturday. “And like this, the team stays as it is. Draghi remains at Palazzo Chigi” in his office of prime minister.Silvio Berlusconi, who had himself hoped to become president before withdrawing his candidacy shortly before voting began, had put a veto on Mr. Draghi becoming president because it could endanger the government. Mr. Berlusconi had a “long and cordial” phone call with Mr. Mattarella “ensuring him our fullest support,” according to Antonio Tajani, a leader of Mr. Berlusconi’s political party, Forza Italia. Mr. Tajani said he was very satisfied with the choice of Mr. Mattarella.The centrist Italia Viva party, led by Mr. Renzi, applauded the choice of Mr. Mattarella. “We voted for him then and today we vote for him again enthusiastically,” the group said on Twitter.If Mr. Mattarella is the winner of the week’s voting, and Mr. Draghi remains a player and a potential president for Italy, the election had its fair share of casualties, too. While the Democratic Party got its chosen candidate, the center right emerged seeming battered and inept. Some of its biggest power players talked about resigning. The contempt and diverging interests among the nominal allies spilled into view.Mr. Mattarella on Saturday outside the Quirinal Palace.Massimo Percossi/EPA, via Shutterstock For days, the competing political parties engaged in all sorts of tactics to pursue their narrow interests, gain the upper hand or defend against partisan candidates. They cast blank ballots and floated symbolic candidates used to measure the compactness of their voting blocs. They timed their own voters to make sure they were not writing down names on blank ballots. They publicly offered what they called ideal, real, credible candidates, but in reality, they meant to burn those candidacies by merely articulating the syllables of their names.On Thursday, the threshold for victory went down to 505 votes, an absolute majority, and tensions increased. On Friday, the number of votes increased to two a day, and Mr. Salvini, tried to force a candidacy of a political ally, Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, the president of the Senate, despite threats from liberals and his nominal partners in the national unity coalition that it would prompt the collapse of the government.Her candidacy came up far short and did not even succeed in winning all of the votes of the center-right bloc. Momentum began to move toward Mr. Mattarella, but on Friday night, desperate politicians, including the embittered former prime minister Giuseppe Conte, whom Mr. Mattarella had replaced with Mr. Draghi, expressed backing for a generic female candidate. The move was roundly interpreted as a last-ditch power tactic and merely claimed new political casualties. But on Saturday, all of those gambits seemed to end and the members of the national unity government decided to keep things exactly how they were, with Mr. Mattarella as president and Mr. Draghi as prime minister. But everything also seemed different. The election had taken a toll.The election, Enrico Letta, the leader of the Democratic Party, told reporters on Saturday, showed “a political system that is blocked.” He added, “This isn’t working.”Elisabetta Povoledo More

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      in World Politics

      In Ukraine, More Than European Peace Is at Stake

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      “Everything has already been said, but not yet by everybody.” This quote by the Bavarian comedian Karl Valentin applies also to the ongoing Russian threat to Ukraine, which has brought a new level of tension to Europe. Yet it provides no comic relief as the situation is far too dangerous for everyone, but especially for the people of Ukraine who have been widely excluded from the ongoing discussions about their future.

      The diplomatic failures of the Russian and American negotiators and the steady escalation in rhetoric indicate an unwillingness to compromise on both sides. Russia wants guarantees that neither Ukraine nor Georgia will accede to NATO, which NATO categorically refuses to do. But Russia’s excessive list of demands shows that it doesn’t expect the West to agree. It would, conversely, mean that Russia would have to remove its own missiles from the Kaliningrad Oblast that borders Poland and Lithuania. 

      Coming to Terms With the Game Being Played on the Russia-Ukraine Border

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      The failure of the Russian Federation to respect the sovereign will of its neighboring states demonstrates well its 19th-century view of geopolitics that if it doesn’t belong to us now, it will soon belong to our enemies. By raising the stakes, Russia has shown that there are now only three options for Ukraine — siding with Russia, aligning with the West, or permanent neutrality — and it is testing to see just how much the West really wants Ukraine. But time is running out. Maintaining a large standing army on such a long border requires significant resources. They’ll have to be moved eventually. The question is, in which direction?

      Geopolitical Chess

      Like pieces on a chessboard, Ukraine acceding to NATO would, from the alliance’s perspective, be like the West gaining a pawn. From the view of the Kremlin, however, Russia would be losing its queen. The movement of NATO’s eastern flank into Ukraine would increase the length of the NATO-Russian land border nearly fourfold, from 703 kilometers to 2,677 kilometers — an unpleasant prospect for security-obsessed Moscow.

      As such, we believe that there are several scenarios regarding how the situation could develop, with a multitude of compounding factors. Three of them have been described here, which we still believe could prove most likely.

      Embed from Getty Images

      While it is impossible to know what will actually happen, one thing seems to be perfectly clear: There is no peaceful solution for Ukraine. Regardless of what outcome the negotiations have, Crimea is still occupied and the war in Donbas is ongoing. The Kremlin wants security guarantees, but so does Ukraine. Kyiv sees its best option in NATO membership, which is mutually exclusive to Moscow’s objective.

      It’s at this point that the debate about Ukrainian neutrality gains momentum. Such a declaration of neutrality could also be welcome in Western capitals. Although this currently disregards the stated sovereign will of those Ukrainians who support a Western path, one could nonetheless imagine a tripartite (NATO/US–Ukraine–Russian Federation) treaty on Ukrainian neutrality would ease security fears, while also not excluding the prospect of future EU membership for the country, like neutral Austria, Sweden and Finland. Indeed, the stability provided by a neutrality treaty would afford Ukraine the necessary conditions for significant economic growth and democratization.

      Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s security concerns regarding NATO are, to our understanding, not the dominant factor in this situation. Apart from the fact that there is also a sort of collective security provision in Article 42 (7) of the Treaty of the European Union, the main concern for the Russian regime is a democratic and prosperous Ukraine. Because if a “brotherly” nation, as Putin has referred to it on numerous occasions, could thrive in a climate of social freedom, the Russian population could demand this as well, which would ultimately lead to the collapse of the current administration.

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      Neutrality, moreover, doesn’t also necessarily prevent a Russian military presence. In Moldova — a neutral country — around 2,000 Russian soldiers are present, 500 of them as “peacekeepers,” following the war in Transnistria in 1992. Andreas Umland, an analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies, the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, asked (during a conference both authors attended) whether these and other Russian troops stationed in the former Soviet republics should not rather be referred to as “piece keepers” — pun intended.

      Umland is also the initiator of an open letter to the German government signed by 73 German experts on Eastern Europe and international security, among them one of the authors of this article. The aim here is to call for a German reaction to the threat the Russian Federation poses to the European security order.

      Europe’s Energy Leverage

      The new German government hasn’t changed its predecessor’s position regarding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would provide leverage in the negotiations but is constantly depoliticized by officials. Moreover, drastic sanctions, like excluding Russia from the SWIFT global payment system or even delivering defensive weapons to Ukraine, have been ruled out. The latter is based on what Berlin perceives as its historic responsibility toward Russia for Germany’s role in the Second World War, ironically ignoring that this should also include Ukraine as both were part of the Soviet Union.

      But a time is coming when Berlin must weigh up whether it is willing to stand in solidarity with its allies, Ukraine and the principles of international law and self-determination, or if its responsibilities for the past mean it would rather stay in the Kremlin’s good books. In any case, this German factor has long provided the Kremlin with the opportunity to pursue its divide-and-conquer strategy in the European Union.

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      Perhaps the greatest leverage the EU would have over Russia (and currently vice versa) is the control over the supply of natural gas. Moscow has for far too long fostered Europe’s reliance on Russian natural resources. Dependence works both ways, and if the EU, and especially Germany, were to take control and shut off Russian pipelines into Europe, the consequences would be far worse for Russia.

      Painful though it may be at first, it is entirely possible, and such a preemptive tactic — showing Russia that the EU is no longer dependent on its supplies — would have a powerful taming effect on Moscow. It would also spur on the increased diversification of European energy supplies, costing Europe less in the long run. This energy card is currently in German hands.

      Negotiations aside, one of the most striking things about this current escalation has been the sidelining of Ukraine’s position. If we’ve learned anything from history, it is that smaller countries should not be overlooked as their voices are silenced. We’ve seen this situation before: excessive demands, promises of being satisfied if conditions are met, protecting citizens, peaceful intentions but ready for war. All this sounds too familiar. Yet again, the wishes of the main country involved — in this case, Ukraine — are not being respected.

      We should not repeat the same mistakes from 100, 80 or even just eight years ago. Ukraine has made its move, and so has Russia. It is now up to the West to come together and show Russia that aggression no longer pays.

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      There is so much more at stake here than just peace in Europe. We need to understand that this is a direct attack on Europe’s collective achievements over the past decades. Ukrainians contributed to these achievements with the Maidan Revolution in 2014. The EU failed them then, so we must not fail Ukraine again. Otherwise, the hopes for democratic development in the east of the European continent will just be a piece of history, never to return.

      *[Fair Observer is a media partner of Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      Italy’s Presidential Race Puts a Strain on Political Balance

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      Italy’s parliament gathered in a joint session of both houses on January 24 to elect the country’s next president who will succeed Sergio Mattarella, whose term will end on February 3.

      A total of 1,009 voters, including 58 delegates chosen by regional councils and known as “great electors,” took part in the first stage of voting, which will be repeated every day until a consensus is reached. A clear vote is unlikely to be reached before Thursday as cross-party negotiations are still underway and the majority of lawmakers have decided to cast a blank vote as a delaying action amid intense backroom talks.

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      Usually a symbolic formality, Italy’s presidential election is this time a focus of special attention by media and citizens, as the country’s fragile national unity and political balance depend on its outcome. The vote comes at a pivotal time, as the country has recently agreed to an EU-sponsored €191.5 billion ($213 billion) program of economic and social reforms aimed at rebooting its national economy.

      Among the top contenders is Prime Minister Mario Draghi, a former president of the European Central Bank, who has openly signaled his willingness to run for the job. For Draghi, a seven-year presidential term is undoubtedly more appealing than ending his mandate with a disorderly, mixed coalition ahead of general elections next year.

      Embed from Getty Images

      But parties are reluctant to vote for Draghi as his eventual election as president and resignation as prime minister could lead to snap general elections. His exit as head of government, a role he was appointed to by Mattarella in February 2021 after the collapse of the so-called Conte II cabinet, in favor of the presidency could bring Italy back to a new phase of instability and political uncertainty. 

      Why Does This Election Matter?

      In recent decades, Italy’s national politics has undergone profound transformation concerning the structure and ideologies of both parties, and the role of the president has become increasingly important. Beyond exercising moral authority, representing national unity and being the guarantor of the independence and integrity of the nation, as defined by the Italian Constitution, the head of state takes charge during a political crisis.

      The president has the authority to select the new prime minister, as Mattarella did last year in choosing Draghi to lead the country out of a political impasse after the resignation of technocratic Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. The president also has the authority to approve or deny the appointment of ministers who will form the new cabinet, and they can refuse mandates to weak coalitions and dissolve parliament, setting the country on the path to national elections.

      Will the Government Fall Apart?

      The situation is particularly delicate as it involves the stability and longevity of the current government and the possibility of early general elections. The outcome of the presidential vote may lead to different scenarios, potentially able to shift allegiances, disrupt existing coalitions and alter the balance of power among Italy’s political parties.

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      If parliament fails to agree on a candidate, the vote will undoubtedly become a source of division between the left and the right, inevitably opening the path to a political rupture. 

      The government’s collapse would not only damage Italy’s political equilibrium, but also impact the European Union. Brussels has heavily bet on Italy’s ability to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic — which rocked the economy and markets — endorsing prime minister Draghi’s national recovery and resilience plan.

      What About Mario Draghi?

      The presidential election is also important because it could represent a turning point in determining the political future of Prime Minister Draghi, who has provided a period of balance and good governance in Italian politics.

      According to his supporters, choosing Draghi as the next president and having him in office for the next seven years would increase the chances to keep markets stable, which would imply the prospect of long-term economic recovery and, at the same time, give Italy more credibility at a European and international level.

      Yet, many lawmakers are pushing for President Mattarella to stay on for another year, arguing that this would be the best solution to guarantee the government’s stability until scheduled general elections in 2023.

      Who Are the Other Contenders? 

      As the prominent businessman and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi withdrew his candidacy, saying that Italy could not afford further political division, far-right leaders Matteo Salvini (Northern League) and Giorgia Meloni (Brothers of Italy) are considering a list of moderate right-wing figures. This includes former Senator Marcello Pera and ex-mayor of Milan Letizia Moratti as potential candidates, hoping to gain support from the center left.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Other possible contenders include Pier Ferdinando Casini, a long-serving centrist senator and former speaker of the lower house who reportedly has good cross-party relations, Marta Cartabia, a judge and former president of the Italian constitutional court currently serving as minister of justice, and Giuliano Amato, a former politician who served twice as prime minister and thrice as minister during the 1990s.

      After the first three ballots, where a two-thirds majority is required (673 out of 1,009 voters), an absolute majority of 505 votes is enough for a candidate to be elected. Yet if the voting process continues past the end of Mattarella’s term, it would be clear that the presidential election has paved the way for another unpredictable political earthquake.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in World Politics

      From the Maghreb to the East, Poking the EU Has an MO

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      Contemporary diplomatic relations between Morocco and Spain saw their genesis after the Spanish departed from Western Sahara and the tripartite agreement was reached in 1975. Signed in Madrid, this agreement between Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain tried to normalize the future of the region’s borders and of the people of Western Sahara.

      However, after signing the deal, the government in Madrid never formalized its political and diplomatic position regarding Moroccan sovereignty over Spain‘s former colony in Western Sahara. A geopolitical matter of vital importance for Morocco, the question of Western Sahara remains an unhealed wound in the relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

      Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

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      In 2021, this wound was reopened after Spain, in a somewhat secret and irregular move, welcomed Brahim Ghali, secretary-general of the Polisario Front, a nationalist movement seeking independence for Western Sahara vis-à-vis Morocco. On top of the fact that Ghali is wanted in Spain for crimes against humanity, rape and torture, among others, he is also a staunch enemy of the government in Rabat.

      This politically embarrassing situation, a product of a diplomatic miscalculation by the Spanish government, created a feeling of betrayal in Rabat. Morocco quickly conveyed its discomfort, considering Spain’s harboring of Ghali a challenge to the kingdom’s sovereignty and interference in an internal state matter. Thus, Morocco issued a warning that continuing to host Ghali would have consequences.

      Spain in North Africa

      Despite these warnings, the government in Madrid decided not to make any political or diplomatic overtures to Morocco, declining to resolve the misunderstanding in a consensual manner. Therefore, in a way, the Spanish government forwent its diplomatic relationship with Morocco and disregarded the important role that Rabat has always played as a critical partner in the fight against illegal trafficking and terrorism stemming from the Maghreb and the Sahel.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Though the relationship between Morocco and Spain has lived through ups and downs, the tensions last year felt much different. Through relaxation of its military controls, Rabat‘s threat became a reality in May 2021 when Morocco effectively opened its border with Ceuta, a Spanish enclave and autonomous city located on the African continent, which made it easier for waves of irregular migrants to reach Tarajal beach. Around 8,000 people, including more than 1,500 estimated minors, tried to cross the Spanish-Moroccan border on foot and by swimming to enter Spanish soil illegally.

      As crude as it may seem, this political move by the government in Rabat, using Moroccans and Africans in general as a weapon against Spain, is not new. For years, Morocco has used this modus operandi as a diplomatic weapon to pressure and obtain concessions from its European neighbor. However, there has not been such a mass arrival of people, especially such a high percentage of minors, to the Spanish border in recent history.

      The diplomatic crisis last May led to authentic moments of chaos and siege along Ceuta‘s border, making the passage of many of these immigrants to the European territory possible. Through its actions, Rabat sent a message without palliatives and implored the Spanish government to back down from political moves, such as open invitations to regional nationalist leaders.

      The Existential Issue of Territorial Integrity

      Morocco’s red lines related to Western Sahara have been drawn, and the kingdom has reiterated that interferences with its national sovereignty will not be tolerated. The crude political response at the Spanish border of Ceuta represents the harshness of Rabat‘s diplomatic relations, choosing, yet again, to weaponize its population.

      Spain needs Morocco; indeed, Europe needs Morocco. Rabat is a crucial partner in Africa, especially given the many challenges in the region. However, Spain and the European Union should not allow the pressure and blackmail from their North African neighbor to stand because they embolden others. Spain and the EU should impose strict red lines on Morocco as well as clear and intelligent economic sanctions concerning development, education and health funds.

      Political, and diplomatic issues can be resolved with class and delicacy without cheap blows and without trivializing despair and compassion. For this, Spain needs to reach a rapprochement with Morocco regarding the status and future of Western Sahara.

      Energy and Copycats

      In tandem with Morocco’s migrant valve vis-à-vis Spain, Algeria started leveraging its gas valve to counter France’s escalation on matters like issuing visas to Algerian citizens. In this latter issue, Spain and Morocco, neither of whom are particularly close with Algeria, are collateral damage to the Paris-Algiers feud whether in the form of declining pipeline revenues or a higher power bill.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      Since these episodes toward the middle of last year, the same playbook has been used by Moscow’s client in Minsk, who has fostered a migrant cul-de-sac along the EU’s Polish border. In doing so, Russia and Belarus are feeding the euroskeptic spirits within the Visegrad countries and beyond, which are particularly sensitive to migration and border sovereignty issues. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin are playing good cop, bad cop on the issue of Europe’s gas supply by offering both threats and assurances that further highlight the EU’s vulnerable dependency on external providers when it comes to energy.

      On the migration front, the European Union needs to reinforce its external borders and FRONTEX agency, particularly within the Schengen area, and formulate a common framework to tackle both migration quotas and allocation throughout Schengen member countries. Not only is the migrant reality in places like Spain, Greece, and Poland a human tragedy, but it is also increasingly a geopolitical lever weaponized by Morocco, Turkey, Belarus and other adversaries to destabilize the EU and bolster internal chaos to the benefit of figures such as Viktor Orban, Geert Wilders, Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Eric Zemmour.

      Whether nuclear, solar or wind, a common and comprehensive European defense framework urgently requires a holistic approach that tackles the issue of energy independence, in addition to that of border security, particularly in an increasingly hostile and multipolar neighborhood.

      Building Solutions Where Possible

      Along the Maghreb, one of the best solutions would be a new pragmatic and flexible bipartisan agreement between Spain and Morocco. An agreement that commemorates the golden jubilee of the Tripartite Agreement provides a firm solution to the Western Sahara dispute in a framework that benefits coexistence in the region and maintains collaboration in critical matters such as the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

      In the same way, Spain and the EU must encourage the good behavior of Morocco with humanitarian aid and fruitful commercial relations to definitively close the post-colonial wound that sometimes reopens between the two countries.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

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      in UK Politics

      UK defence secretary ‘not optimistic’ Russian invasion of Ukraine can be stopped

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      The UK defence secretary has admitted he is “not optimistic” that Russian president Vladimir Putin can be persuaded against invading Ukraine as the prospect of war between the neighbouring countries grows increasingly likely.Ben Wallace has travelled to Europe to engage with the leaders there about the crisis and to drum up support for sanctions against the Kremlin as Moscow continues to build up its military presence on the border. Prime minister Boris Johnson said earlier this week that the UK would send troops to its allies in eastern Europe should Moscow press ahead with an invasion in the coming days or weeks.Russia denies it is planning an invasion.On Wednesday night Joe Biden’s White House issued its first written response to Russia, which is demanding that Nato will not grow any further east, citing security concerns. Moscow is also seeking assurances that Ukraine will never be allowed to join the military alliance.The US is said to want reassurances from the UK that it would help reinforce Nato’s eastern flank, from the Baltic states to Romania and Bulgaria in the south, by bolstering military presence. Reports say British military officials are in advanced talks about how to respond to the request.Mr Wallace has confirmed he will head for Moscow to speak with Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister, once he has finished talks with leaders in Europe. Before making the trip east, he told the BBC that the prospect of a Russian invasion looks increasingly likely. There is still “a chance” that Russia could be stopped, although he warned: “I’m not optimistic”. More

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      in UK Politics

      UK ‘considering sending hundreds of troops to Eastern Europe’ amid Russia-Ukraine crisis

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      British military officials are reportedly deciding whether to send hundreds of troops to Eastern Europe after Washington asked the UK and other Nato allies to support member countries in the face of a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine. The US is said to want reassurances from the UK that it would help reinforce Nato’s eastern flank, from the Baltic states to Romania and Bulgaria in the south, by bolstering military presence. It comes after US president Joe Biden’s administration delivered its first written response to Russia’s security demands over the crisis on the border, including a rejection of Vladimir Putin’s call for Ukraine to never be allowed to join the alliance. “Very advanced discussions” are now taking place among UK defence figures, according to The Daily Telegraph, with an announcement on new deployments expected as soon as Thursday. While CNN reported that groups of 1,000 troops could be offered to each of several eastern flank countries by the UK, US and some other Nato allies, it is thought the British military would offer no more than a few hundred of its personnel.Units from the Army, Royal Navy and RAF are said to be under consideration for dispatch, though no final decision has been made. Defence secretary Ben Wallace travelled to Nato’s headquarters in Brussels on Wednesday to discuss the crisis, and held talks with his various European counterparts, including Germany’s Christine Lambrecht.He is said to have told reporters travelling with him that a “key focus” was to encourage Berlin to support tougher sanctions on Russia – including halting the opening of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is set to bypass Ukraine – if it were to attack. Mr Wallace said that the pipeline represented a “genuine piece of leverage” against the Kremlin, but the German government is reportedly split on the issue.The UK, which has already sent anti-tank weapons to Ukraine and offered military training to its forces, leads a Nato battlegroup in Estonia with around 850 personnel – and it has 150 based in Poland on other missions. On Tuesday, Boris Johnson told MPs that in the event Russia invades Ukraine, “we would look to contribute to any new Nato deployments to protect our allies in Europe”. Just two days earlier, though, Dominic Raab, the deputy prime minister and former foreign secretary, told Sky News it was “extremely unlikely” the government would send additional troops to the region – suggesting the government’s position is hardening. Downing Street has consistently tried to focus attention on the Ukraine crisis in recent days, in a bid to divert anger and speculation away from the prime minister amid the ongoing Partygate scandal.During prime minister’s questions (PMQs) on Wednesday, Mr Johnson suggested Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer needed to “raise his game” and focus on the situation in Europe instead of lockdown-breaching parties in Downing Street.“He talks about the most serious issue before the public today, and before the world today, it is almost as if he is ignorant to the fact that we have a crisis on the borders of Ukraine,” the prime minister said of Sir Keir after being asked if he understood “the damage his behaviour is doing to the country”. More