Middle East

Subterms

    More stories

    • 125 Shares179 Views

      in Elections

      Kushner’s and Mnuchin’s Quick Pivots to Business With the Gulf

      by

      Weeks before the Trump administration ended, Jared Kushner and Steven Mnuchin met with future investors on official trips to the Middle East.Shortly before the 2020 election, Trump administration officials unveiled a U.S. government-sponsored program called the Abraham Fund that they said would raise $3 billion for projects around the Middle East.Spearheaded by President Donald J. Trump’s son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner, the fund promised to capitalize on diplomatic agreements he had championed between Israel and some Arab states — pacts known as the Abraham Accords. Steven Mnuchin, then Treasury secretary, helped inaugurate the fund on a trip to the United Arab Emirates and Israel, hailing the accords as “a tremendous foundation for economic growth.”It was little more than talk: With no accounts, employees, income or projects, the fund vanished when Mr. Trump left office. Yet after Mr. Kushner and Mr. Mnuchin crisscrossed the Middle East in the final months of the administration on trips that included trying to raise money for the project, each quickly launched a private fund that in some ways picked up where the Abraham Fund had ended.Mr. Kushner and Mr. Mnuchin brought along top aides who had helped court Gulf rulers while promoting the Abraham Fund, and soon, both were back in the same royal courts asking for investments, although for purely commercial endeavors.Within three months, Mr. Mnuchin’s new firm had circulated detailed investment plans and received $500 million commitments from the Emiratis, Kuwaitis and Qataris, according to previously unreported documents prepared by the main Saudi sovereign wealth fund, which itself soon committed $1 billion. Mr. Kushner’s new firm reached an agreement for a $2 billion investment from the Saudis six months after he left government.A New York Times report last month revealing the Saudi investments in the Kushner and Mnuchin funds raised alarms from ethics experts and Democratic lawmakers about the appearance of potential payoffs for official acts during the Trump administration.But an examination of the two men’s travels toward the end of the Trump presidency raises other questions about whether they sought to exploit official relationships with foreign leaders for private business interests.In the weeks after the election, Mr. Kushner made three trips to the Middle East, the last for a Jan. 5 summit in Saudi Arabia with leaders of the Gulf monarchies. Mr. Mnuchin that day began a tour through the region that was planned to include private meetings with the heads of the sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait — all future investors. (He cut it short after the Capitol riot, dropping the Kuwait stop and, in Saudi Arabia, meeting only with the finance minister.)Mr. Kushner and his aides have sometimes cast his private firm, Affinity Partners, as something like a continuation of the Abraham Fund. On a four-day trip to Israel in March to meet companies seeking investments, Mr. Kushner’s team portrayed the firm as a chance to invest in the peacemaking potential of the Abraham Accords, people who heard the pitch said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.Both Mr. Kushner and Mr. Mnuchin hired several aides who were deeply involved in the accords: A top executive at Affinity, retired Maj. Gen. Miguel Correa, is a former military attaché in the Emirates who later worked in the White House. Top executives at Mr. Mnuchin’s fund, Liberty Strategic Capital, include a former ambassador to Israel and a former Treasury aide who helped arrange meetings with Gulf leaders.The transition from government work for one Liberty Strategic executive was so fast that his jobs appeared to overlap. A roster of 11 top executives and advisers provided to the Saudis by April 2021 included the managing director Michael D’Ambrosio, even though he was still an assistant director at the Secret Service through the end of May. (A Secret Service spokesman said that Mr. D’Ambrosio had disclosed his new employment to the agency and spent his last weeks there on paid leave.)An organizational chart for Liberty Strategic Capital, Mr. Mnuchin’s new investment fund, that the Saudis were reviewing by April.A former Treasury aide known as a close confidant had resigned in 2019 and was waiting for Mr. Mnuchin in the private sector. That confidant, Eli Miller, had been working with Persian Gulf sovereign wealth funds at Blackstone, another investment firm, and immediately rejoined the secretary at his new firm’s founding.The path from public service to private investing is well trod by members of both parties. The two Treasury secretaries under President Barack Obama later went to Wall Street.But Mr. Kushner and Mr. Mnuchin stand out, ethics experts said, for the speed of their pivots and for the sums they raised from foreign rulers they had recently dealt with on behalf of the United States.The Saudi investment with Mr. Kushner was made despite an advisory panel’s objections about his lack of relevant experience, the absence of other big investors, a high fee and the “public relations risk” of his ties to the former president, according to the minutes of a Saudi Public Investment Fund meeting last June that were obtained by The Times. Ethics experts suggested that the payment could be seen as a bid for influence if his father-in-law returned to office.Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Massachusetts Democrat, has urged the Justice Department to “take a really hard look” at whether Mr. Kushner violated any criminal laws.Kathleen Clark, a law professor at Washington University in St. Louis who studies government ethics, said each fund raised different issues. For Mr. Kushner, she said, “the reason this smells so bad is that there is all sorts of evidence he did not receive this on the merits.”But for Mr. Mnuchin, who was a successful investor before entering government, the biggest question is whether he was burnishing relationships as Treasury secretary that he knew would be useful to him in the near future, Ms. Clark said.“If he was, that is an abuse of his office,” she said. “I don’t know if it is criminal, but it is certainly corrupt.”Through a spokesman, Mr. Kushner declined to comment.In a statement, a spokesman for Mr. Mnuchin denied that he had sought investments while in office and said without providing specifics that some of the details in the Saudi documents were inaccurate. The former secretary was returning to a decades-long career as a professional investor, the spokesman added, and the firm has diverse backers, “including U.S. insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, family offices and other institutional investors.”The Adviser and the SecretaryBefore vying for Persian Gulf investments, Mr. Kushner and Mr. Mnuchin sometimes competed for influence in the White House. During the transition to the Trump administration, Mr. Kushner sought to install his own candidates as Treasury secretary, until Mr. Mnuchin caught wind of it and launched a countercampaign, recalled several people familiar with the efforts.The two men had come from very different business backgrounds. Mr. Kushner had previously run his family’s real estate empire and owned a weekly newspaper, both with mixed results; Mr. Mnuchin had followed his father into a career at Goldman Sachs and made a fortune investing in Hollywood films and a California bank. They kept a cordial distance in the administration. But both took strong and sometimes overlapping interests in the Persian Gulf.President Donald J. Trump with Jared Kushner, his son-in-law, and Mr. Mnuchin at a diplomatic meeting involving Israel and the United Arab Emirates.Doug Mills/The New York TimesMr. Mnuchin had few business dealings in the region before the Trump administration. Yet he spent far more time there as Treasury secretary — and met far more often with the heads of sovereign wealth funds — than his immediate predecessors: He made at least 18 visits over four years to the Persian Gulf monarchies, compared with a total of eight made by his three predecessors over the previous decade.Former Treasury officials who worked with Mr. Mnuchin said that his time there reflected the priorities of the White House, including Iran sanctions, combating terrorist financing and the Abraham Accords. They noted that fund chiefs could be useful conduits to the rulers of the region.“He was a business guy who really knew how to do personal diplomacy, and they liked him,” said Michael Greenwald, a former Treasury attaché in Kuwait and Qatar who served in the Obama and Trump administrations. “So that was an effective tool.”Many of Mr. Mnuchin’s contacts appear to have been informal. One of his first meetings with Yasir al-Rumayyan, chief of the Saudi fund, was a September 2017 breakfast at the home of Stephen A. Schwarzman, Blackstone’s chief executive and Mr. Mnuchin’s neighbor. Mr. Miller, the secretary’s chief of staff at the time and now a senior managing director at Liberty Strategic, also attended.Mr. Mnuchin met with Mr. al-Rumayyan at least nine more times during the Trump presidency, including in Bahrain, Switzerland and a Treasury conference room, according to department emails that the group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and shared with The Times.In addition to multiple meetings with the Qatari emir and other officials, Mr. Mnuchin met at least 10 times with the head of the Qatar Investment Authority.“I will just do one-on-one with Mansoor,” he emailed an aide in 2019, referring to Mansoor bin Ibrahim al-Mahmoud, the fund’s chief executive. “We have communicated direct.”Mr. Mnuchin also met five times with the heads of the two main Emirati funds, once at a Washington dinner hosted by the co-founder of the Carlyle investment group.And he met repeatedly with the rulers of the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. That included a private meeting with the Saudi crown prince in Riyadh in 2018 shortly after the kingdom’s agents killed Jamal Khashoggi, a dissident and columnist for The Washington Post. And the documents suggest Mr. Mnuchin built a rapport with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, known by the initials M.B.Z., who recently became the Emirates’ president.Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, president of the United Arab Emirates.Frank Augstein/Associated Press“I am available anytime to see you and His royal highness M.B.Z.,” Mr. Mnuchin wrote to an unidentified recipient in February 2020, planning a visit. “If possible it would be great for us to have a bike ride and dinner as we had discussed.”Suggesting a blurring of the lines between government and business, he wrote to a top Treasury aide in December 2020, apparently about a meeting with Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund scheduled to take place after he stepped down.“Do we have any more info on PIF late January?” he wrote to the aide, Zachary McEntee, who accompanied him on Gulf trips that involved the Abraham Fund and later joined Mr. Mnuchin’s firm. A spokesman said Mr. Mnuchin was asking about a conference sponsored by the Saudi fund that he attended as a private citizen.Two weeks before he left office, Mr. Mnuchin flew to the region for official meetings with leaders across the Persian Gulf, with the stated purpose of discussing sanctions, terrorist financing and other national security matters. The visit included a private lunch on Jan. 8 at the National Museum of Qatar with the head of the country’s main investment fund.As for Mr. Kushner, he had made his highest goal in the White House the brokering of a Middle East peace plan centered on funding from Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. The core of the plan was to solicit investments from the Gulf that might persuade Palestinians to relinquish some of their demands for a future state. As the culmination of those efforts, he and Mr. Mnuchin organized a “Peace to Prosperity” conference in Bahrain that no Palestinian officials attended.To court Gulf rulers, Mr. Kushner helped persuade Mr. Trump to make the first foreign trip of his administration a 2017 visit to Saudi Arabia. Shortly after a meeting there with Mr. Kushner, the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates led a blockade of Qatar, accusing it of supporting extremism. Qatar hosts a major American military base, and the secretaries of defense and state pushed for an end to the blockade, but Mr. Trump initially backed it.Mr. Kushner returned repeatedly to the Persian Gulf — making at least 10 trips during the Trump administration, often to visit multiple countries — and formed a close alliance with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. After American intelligence agencies concluded that the Saudi leader had approved the brutal murder of Mr. Khashoggi, Mr. Kushner defended the prince in the White House.Mr. Kushner at a meeting in September 2020 with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.SPA handout/AFP, via Getty ImagesIn December 2020, Mr. Kushner visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar on a trip billed as an effort to end their three-year feud, returning to the kingdom on Jan. 5 for a Gulf summit where they formally reopened relations.“Jared led the diplomatic effort to heal the Gulf rift,” Mr. Kushner’s firm declared in a recent investor presentation.Allies of Mr. Mnuchin, though, said he also played a leading role, in part by working closely with Qatar to police terrorist financing and improve relations with Mr. Trump.In reality, diplomats said, the resolution was driven by the Saudis’ desire to end the rift before the start of a new American administration. But credit for ending the blockade may be valuable in courting investments.Exit StrategiesMr. Mnuchin wasted no time getting back to business. Three weeks after the Trump administration ended, he said in an interview that he had a plan but wasn’t ready to discuss it.By April 2021, his firm was showing potential investors a detailed list of target industries, according to documents obtained from the Saudi fund. The firm had arranged a legal structure that enabled foreign sovereign wealth funds to invest in strategically sensitive American industries, the documents show, and had already hired several former Treasury and State Department officials as top executives.Mr. Kushner got off to a slower start. Even by the time he reached his $2 billion agreement with the Saudi fund last July, he had not hired any executives with relevant investing experience.From left: Maj. Gen. Miguel Correa, Rabbi Aryeh Lightstone and Avi Berkowitz, whom Mr. Kushner hired for his fund.From Left: Bob Collet/Alamy Stock Photo; Steve Mack/Alamy Stock Photo; Mark Lennihan/Associated PressHe brought on his closest aide, Avi Berkowitz, and General Correa, the former military attaché. The general had left the U.S. embassy in the Emirates after clashing with senior diplomats who believed he had held unauthorized private meetings with the country’s leaders about arms sales and other matters. He had nonetheless been elevated to the White House, where he worked closely with Mr. Kushner. Career diplomats said that by the end of the administration, General Correa and Mr. Berkowitz were sometimes the only Americans accompanying Mr. Kushner to meet with Persian Gulf officials.Mr. Kushner also hired Rabbi Aryeh Lightstone, a former diplomat in Jerusalem who had worked on the Abraham Accords and been named a director of the Abraham Fund.A December 2021 presentation Mr. Kushner’s firm shared with potential investors, reported last month by The Intercept, suggests his firm’s focus may be blurring. As investment targets, the presentation listed a grab bag of high-growth industries including media, technology, health care, finance, consumer services and sustainable energy.But the presentation also touted Mr. Kushner’s “geopolitical experience” and role in Middle Eastern diplomacy.Mr. Kushner has continued to link his private firm to the Abraham Accords. “If we can get Israelis and Muslims in the region to do business together it will focus people on shared interests and shared values,” he recently told The Wall Street Journal, apparently referring to Muslims in neighboring countries (though about 20 percent of Israeli citizens are Muslim). The fund has so far invested in two Israeli companies.Adam Boehler, a finance official and Mr. Kushner’s college roommate, oversaw the Abraham Fund.Ali Haider/EPA, via ShutterstockThe Abraham Fund was overseen by Adam Boehler, at the time the head of a newly formed development finance agency and a college roommate of Mr. Kushner’s. Mr. Boehler joined Mr. Mnuchin on his Gulf visit in October and accompanied Mr. Kushner to Qatar and Saudi Arabia in December.Officials said the fund would invest in poorer countries that joined the accords, and its first projects were said to include upgrading checkpoints into Israel from the Palestinian territories and building a gas pipeline between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.Neither project went anywhere. Nor did the efforts to enlist Gulf money.In January last year, Mr. Boehler announced the only publicly disclosed investment in the Abraham Fund: a “commitment of up to $50 million” from Uzbekistan, a relatively low-income country. Uzbek officials said at the time that they sought to reduce poverty and foster regional cooperation. Long criticized for human rights abuses, Uzbekistan had begun a lobbying push in Washington to improve its image after a leadership change; its new president also gave Mr. Trump a $2,950 silver replica of a historic building and his wife a $4,200 bed cover.But no money for the short-lived Abraham Fund was ever delivered.Ben Hubbard More

    • 100 Shares149 Views

      in World Politics

      How Qatar Manages Economic Growth and CO2 Emissions

      by

      The linkage between economic growth and environmental degradation is a well-known topic. The burning question has become whether there is a trade-off between sustaining economic activities and maintaining the conditions of natural resources, or whether economic growth can go in harmony along with environmental protection measures. The direct interconnected relationship between fossil fuel consumption and environmental degradation has posed an interesting policy challenge.

      Water World: Is Climate Change Driving Our Future Out to Sea?

      READ MORE

      Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, making them major contributors to climate change. On the other hand, high industrial activities, alongside rapidly increasing populations, put growing pressure on energy demand.

      The Example of Qatar

      Qatar has made remarkable economic achievements over the past few decades. Yet Qatar is facing a trade-off between boosting its economic growth and lowering its carbon dioxide emissions. Its strategic mandate to boost economic development, along with other areas related to sustainability, makes Qatar an interesting country to analyze.

      The World Bank defines Qatar as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Its economy is highly dependent on oil and gas production, which accounts for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 70% of government revenues. The country is also a major player in liquefied natural gas. Nonetheless, Qatar’s high dependence on fossil fuels has resulted in an increase in the CO2 emissions level when compared to global averages.

      Embed from Getty Images

      To combat the rising carbon emission percentages and lower environmental pressures, Qatar is introducing strict policy measures to achieve sustainable development through four central pillars: economic, social, human and environmental development. While many disruptions have occurred over the past few years, including fluctuations in oil and gas prices, economic downturns and a deadly pandemic, nobody expected an economic blockade.

      The Diplomatic Rift

      In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. They prohibited Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes, and the Saudis also blocked Qatar’s only land border.

      This point is of particular importance as the deterioration in relations among the Gulf neighbors urged Qatar to rethink its sustainable development goals while meeting local demand. At the beginning of the blockade, the country relied heavily on importing several commodities, especially food items. Later, it accelerated initiatives and programs to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on imports.

      Achieving carbon neutrality is also factored into all Qatar’s initiatives. For example, by the end of 2022, Qatar aims to deliver the first carbon-neutral FIFA World Cup in the history of the event. All stadiums and infrastructure are subjected to rigorous sustainability standards. Several air quality monitoring stations and extensive recycling programs are being introduced, along with the construction of the eight stadiums that will be used during the football tournament.

      Qatar has since become much more independent across several sectors, including food production and transport, making it a case study on how to transform challenges into opportunities for growth.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      This was also evident with total carbon emissions. According to my own analysis, carbon emission per capita fell by 13% as of 2018 from a historical record in 2000. Since then, total carbon emissions have increased as the economy has grown but at a slower rate, meaning that Qatar is undergoing expanding relative decoupling. In the 2008 to 2018 period, a 1% change in GDP resulted in a fall of CO2 emissions, from 0.65% to 0.44%. This drop is very relevant to Qatar as several measures have been applied, particularly over the last 10 years, to reduce emissions.

      A Reduction in Emissions

      While Qatar’s total emissions have declined over recent years, policies to increase energy efficiency, diversify the energy mix by introducing more renewables, support technological development to improve energy efficiency in a desert climate, and implement energy demand management programs to maintain the same trend of decline and achieve climate change objectives have been increasingly crucial.  

      The heightened pressure caused by the blockade on Qatar is now over, but what is needed are more synergies and collective efforts across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to stimulate economic diversification and minimize carbon emissions. Member states of the GCC are sharing multiple environmental, social and economic factors that should incentivize them to cooperate to meet their climate change objectives and economic development goals.

      *[Saad Shannak is a scientist at Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute, part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) in Qatar. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the university’s official stance.]

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 100 Shares99 Views

      in World Politics

      Iraq Still Feels the Consequences of US Assassinations

      by

      The assassination of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) elite Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an Iraqi militia commander, head of Kataib Hezbollah and de facto leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), by a US drone strike outside Baghdad International Airport in January 2020 continues to reverberate across Iraq.

      The Evolution of National Security in the UAE

      READ MORE

      The killings, ordered by then US President Donald Trump, have served to exacerbate the severe security challenges the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi already faces. The PMF, without al-Muhandis’ leadership, is becoming increasingly splintered, threatening even more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis who are trying to recover from nearly two decades of war and terrorism.

      Growing Security Challenges

      Security is a prerequisite for the prosperity, welfare and economic development of any society. However, as long as Iran continues its extensive influence over Iraq and uses Iraqi territory as a venue to play out its conflict with the United States, security cannot be achieved.

      After the assassinations of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, the PMF appeared to be even more aggressively pursuing Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s strategic goal, namely the withdrawal of all US troops from Iraq. The US Embassy, the Baghdad Green Zone and US military bases have been repeatedly targeted by PMF militias. The US responded in kind and bombed PMF positions in various parts of the country, further escalating an already fragile security situation.

      Meanwhile, al-Kadhimi, viewed by his critics as catering to Washington, blamed the US for violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching unilateral operations inside the country. At the same time, he faced strenuous demands from the Americans for his government to do more to stop PMF attacks on US targets.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The withdrawal of foreign military forces had been approved by the Iraqi parliament just two days after the high-profile assassinations. Following the US-Iraqi strategic dialogue that launched in June 2020, the US evacuated some of its bases that have been in place since 2003, handing them over to the Iraqi army. But a final withdrawal agreed to be completed by the end of last year has stalled, and the remaining 2,500 US troops have stayed on, no longer in a combat role but rather to “advise, assist and enable” the Iraqi military.

      This quasi-exit was met with a stern reaction from the PMF, who threatened to treat the US forces as aggressors if they did not withdraw completely from Iraq. “Targeting the US occupation in Iraq is a great honor, and we support the factions that target it,” was how a spokesperson for one of the PMF militias put it. Such threats underline the risk of further confrontations between the militias and the US and the potential for more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis.

      The targeting of Baghdad’s airport on January 28, with at least six rockets landing on the runway and areas close to the non-military side, causing damage to parked passenger planes, underlines just how fragile the security situation remains.

      The PM and the PMF

      The conflicts over differences between the PMF and the government are another reason for growing insecurity in the post-assassination period. The PMF has a competitive relationship with the prime minister’s government, and this competition has only intensified over the past two years. PMF groups consider al-Kadhimi to be pro-US, seeking to reduce the influence of Shia militant groups in Iraq.

      Initially, in March 2020, major Shia factions rejected his nomination, accusing him of being inordinately close to the US. The Fatah Coalition, composed of significant Shia groups close to Iran, later accepted his candidacy. Still, tensions remain as al-Kadhimi strives to strike a balance between Iran on the one hand and the US and its allies on the other.

      The prime minister believes that the PMF should exit the political stage. He also believes that the PMF should be freed from party affiliation and be fully controlled by the government. This would mean that their budget would come from the federal government and not from private sources or other states. In this regard, al-Kadhimi is seeking to strengthen government control over border crossings to fight corruption and smuggling.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The crossings are used by militias, including those reportedly active at Diyala’s border crossing into Iran. If the government effectively controls these vital channels, financial inflows from smuggling, which strengthens the militias, will decrease in the long term while federal coffers will directly benefit.

      The dispute between the PMF and the prime minister escalated in May of last year when police arrested Qasem Mosleh, the PMF commander in Anbar province, over the assassination of a prominent Iraqi activist. In response, the PMF stormed and took control of the Green Zone. Al-Kadhimi, not wanting to escalate the conflict, found no evidence against Mosleh and released him after 14 days.

      In November 2021, al-Kadhimi himself was targeted in an assassination attempt following clashes between various Iraqi parties during protests against the results of the parliamentary elections. Despite its failure, an armed drone attack on the prime minister’s Baghdad residence presented a disturbing development for contemporary Iraq and was attributed to a PMF militia loyal to Iran.

      Internal Struggles

      The assassination of al-Muhandis had a huge impact on the PMF. He was a charismatic figure able to mediate more effectively than anyone else between various Iraqi groups, from Shia clerics in Najaf to Iraqi government politicians and Iranian officials. After his death, the militia groups in the PMF face internal division.

      The PMF’s political leadership, including its chairman, Falih Al-Fayyadh, has tried to present itself as committed to the law and accepting the authority of the prime minister. In contrast, two powerful PMF factions, Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, have taken a hardline stance, emphasizing armed resistance against US forces. Tehran’s efforts to mediate between the leaders of the two factions and the Iraqi government have yielded few results.

      Meanwhile, internal disagreements over the degree of Iranian control caused four PMF brigades to split off and form a new structure called Hashd al-Atabat, or Shrine Units. Their avowed intention is to repudiate Iranian influence while supporting the Iraqi state and the rule of law.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      Another divide in the PMF has opened up between groups such as Kataib Hezbollah on the one hand, and Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Saraya al-Salam on the other, due to poor relationship management by Kataib Hezbollah in the PMF Commission after Muhandis’ death. While it is unsurprising that a number of critical PMF functions like internal affairs and intelligence are controlled by Kataib Hezbollah given that Muhandis founded the group before assuming the PMF’s leadership, he managed to exercise control in a manner that kept other factions onboard.

      But Kataib Hezbollah’s imposition, in February 2020, of another one of its commanders, Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi, to succeed al-Muhandis on the PMF Commission alienated key groups such as Badr and Asaib. Clearly, a severely factionalized and heavily armed PMF continues to pose a significant security threat in the country.

      Announcing the assassinations on January 3, 2020, Donald Trump said of Soleimani that “we take comfort knowing his reign of terror is over.” Two years on from the killing of the IRGC general and the PMF boss, ordinary Iraqis beset by violence and insecurity take no such comfort.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

      *[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner of Fair Observer.] More

    • 100 Shares169 Views

      in World Politics

      The Evolution of National Security in the UAE

      by

      The United Arab Emirates, a small and ambitious country in the Persian Gulf, faces a variety of security threats. Its geographic location puts it at the center of instability, sectarianism and regional rivalries in the Middle East, which has led the country to pay particular attention to its security. 

      In recent years, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the UAE, have recognized that trusting foreign governments, such as the United States, cannot offer them the best possible protection. The US has had a presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1990s and the Gulf Arab countries have relied on it to provide security. However, events in recent years have shown that the Gulf Arab states cannot rely solely on Washington.

      Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

      READ MORE

      Such developments include the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan amid the US withdrawal; the US pivot to Asia; the US retraction of most advanced missile defense systems and Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia; and the lack of a US military response to threats, missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil bases by the Houthis in Yemen.

      This has encouraged the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf to pursue security autonomy. The UAE, in particular, has sought to transform its strategy from dependence on the US and Saudi Arabia to a combination of self-reliance and multilateral cooperation.

      Self-Reliance Security Strategy

      Although the UAE is an important ally of America in the Persian Gulf, over recent years, the US has sought to push the Emiratis toward security self-reliance. Sociopolitical events in the Middle East over the last decade following the Arab Spring of 2010-11 have made it clear to the UAE that the primary goal of ensuring national security, in addition to benefiting from international cooperation, should be the use of national facilities and resources.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Hosni Mubarak’s ouster from Egypt during the Arab Spring protests and the reluctance of the US to defend him as an ally — which led to the rise of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood — further demonstrated to Abu Dhabi that it should not exclusively depend on the US for security assistance. Thus, the UAE began to develop a professional army.

      The UAE‘s self-reliance strategy is divided into different branches, but most of all, its military security efforts have been given the highest priority. The UAE‘s determination to create an independent and professional military is evident from its years of investment in the defense industry.

      Indeed, security is a top priority for the United Arab Emirates, and defense spending continues to make up a large portion of the national budget. The UAE’s defense spending typically accounts for 11.1% to 14% of the total budget. In 2019, the UAE’s defense spending was $16.4 billion. This was 18% more than the 2018 budget of $13.9 billion.

      The UAE has invested heavily in the military sector and defense industry in recent years. In November 2019, the UAE formed the EDGE Group from a merger of 25 companies. The company has 12,000 employees and $5 billion in total revenue. It is also among the top 25 advocacy groups in the world, ahead of firms such as Booz Allen Hamilton in the US and Rolls-Royce in the UK.

      EDGE is structured around five clusters: platforms and systems, missiles and weapons, cyber defense, electronic warfare and intelligence, and mission support. It comprises several major UAE companies in the defense industry, such as ADSB (shipbuilding), Al Jasoor, NIMR (vehicles), SIGN4L (electronic warfare services) and ADASI (autonomous systems). The main goal of EDGE is to develop weapons to fight “hybrid warfare” and to bolster the UAE’s defense against unconventional threats, focusing on electronic attacks and drones.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      The UAE has also come up with detailed plans to improve the quality of its military personnel, spending large sums of money each year on training its military recruits in American colleges and war academies. It also founded the National Defense College; most of its students are citizens of the UAE, because of its independence in military training. In addition, in 2014, the UAE introduced general conscription for men between the ages of 18 and 30 to increase numbers and strengthen national identity in its military. As a result, it gathered about 50,000 people in the first three years.

      Contrary to traditional practice, the UAE’s growing military power has made it eager to use force and hard power to protect its interests. The UAE stands ready to use military force anywhere in the region to contain Iran’s growing influence and weaken Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Participating in the Yemeni War was a test of this strategy.

      The UAE‘s military presence in Yemen began in March 2015. It sent a brigade of 3,000 troops to Yemen in August 2015, along with Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab countries. Over the past five years, the UAE has pursued an ambitious strategic agenda in the Red Sea, building military installations and securing control of the southern coasts of Yemen along the Arabian Sea in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Socotra Island. Despite reducing its military footprints in Yemen in 2019, the UAE has consolidated itself in the southern regions. It has continued to finance and impart training to thousands of Yemeni fighters drafted from various groups like the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite Forces, Abu al-Abbas Brigade and the West Coast Forces.

      The UAE‘s goal in adopting a self-reliance strategy is to increase strategic depth in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Thus, along with direct military presence or arms support for groups engaged in proxy wars, it affects the internal affairs of various countries in the region, such as Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Libya. With its influence, the UAE can turn the tide in its favor in certain areas.

      Multilateralism Security Strategy

      The United Arab Emirates faces a variety of security challenges in the Middle East, and addressing them requires cooperation with other countries. Currently, the most significant security threats in the UAE are: countering Iranian threats and power in the Middle East, especially in Arab countries under Iranian influence, such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon; eliminating threats from terrorist groups and political Islam in the region, the most important of which — according to the UAE — is the Muslim Brotherhood; and economic threats and efforts to prepare for the post-oil world.

      Embed from Getty Images

      In its multilateral strategy, the UAE seeks to counter these threats with the help of other countries in the region or beyond. It has used soft power through investments or providing humanitarian aid, suggesting that economic cooperation is more important than political competition and intervention. In this regard, the UAE has cooperated with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain and France, as well as normalized relations with Israel.

      On August 13, 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel. The UAE‘s goal in normalizing relations with Israel is to counter threats from Iran and the region. The Abraham Accords have not only a security aspect, but also an economic one. Following the signing of the accords, on October 20, 2020, the US, Israel and the UAE announced the establishment of the Abraham Fund, a joint fund of $3 billion “in private sector-led investment and development initiatives,” aimed at “promoting economic cooperation and prosperity.” In addition, it outlined a banking and finance memorandum between the largest banks in Israel and Dubai, and a joint bid between Dubai’s DP World port operator and an Israeli shipping firm for the management of Israel’s Haifa port.

      Through the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates seeks to invest and transfer Israeli technologies to the UAE through mutual agreements. The UAE has discovered that Israel is one of the bridges to the US economy and high technology. If the UAE intends to have an oil-free economy in the future, Israel may be the best option to achieve this by pursuing a strategy of multilateralization.

      UAE relations with Turkey also have a multilateral dimension to reaching common security goals. The two countries had good relations until the Arab Spring protests jeopardized ties between them. Abu Dhabi and Ankara began to defuse tensions after a phone call in August 2021 between UAE Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The nations mainly have differences around issues in Libya, Syria and Egypt. The UAE is trying to resolve its disputes with Turkey by investing in the country.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Turkey is the largest backer of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. The Turks claim the UAE participated in the failed coup of July 2016 against the Turkish government. Nonetheless, the UAE wants to end frictions with Turkey and has attracted Ankara by investing and increasing commercial ties. The Turkish lira has depreciated in recent years and Erdogan’s popularity has plummeted due to mismanagement in Turkey. Erdogan will not miss this economic opportunity with the UAE and welcomes Emirati investments. In this way, the UAE will likely easily resolve its differences with Turkey.

      The current tendency to use force is contrary to traditional Abu Dhabi policy, yet increasing the strategic depth of the UAE is one of Abu Dhabi‘s most achievable goals in its strategy of self-reliance. This plan is the exact opposite of multilateralism. Unlike the use of force and hard power, Abu Dhabi seeks to achieve its objectives by using soft power, investment and humanitarian aid. In this situation, the tactical exploitation of economic cooperation takes precedence over political competition and military intervention in the region.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 113 Shares149 Views

      in World Politics

      Why Barham Salih Deserves a Second Term in Iraq

      by

      In Iraqi Kurdistan, there is a growing debate over a potential second term for Barham Salih, the president of the Republic of Iraq. This matter has led to polarization in Kurdish politics and society, and it could destabilize relations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). If left unresolved, it could threaten political stability in the semi-autonomous federal region.

      Since 2005, as part of a power-sharing agreement, the Iraqi presidency has been set aside for a Kurd. Within the Kurdish community itself, the post has been informally reserved for a candidate of the PUK. Meanwhile, the speaker of parliament is held by a Sunni and the job of prime minister by a Shia.

      Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

      READ MORE

      The two main Kurdish parties have also agreed that in return for the Iraqi presidency being earmarked for the PUK, the KDP takes nearly all significant positions within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This includes the positions of president, premiership and the deputy of parliament as well as several ministries within the Iraqi federal government.

      Losing Support

      Recently, the KDP has made political gains and the PUK has lost significant support since the 2018 elections. Currently, the KDP has 31 members in the Iraqi national council, while the PUK has only 16. This has led the KDP to eye the position of the Iraqi presidency. If the party insists that President Salih should not be elected again, it could lead to a significant change of the political map of Iraqi Kurdistan.

      Both the PUK and KDP have lost the trust and confidence of the public. This was particularly reflected three years ago in the last parliamentary election when only around 40% of registered voters participated. The PUK and KDP have lost over 700,000 voters in the Kurdish region itself. Their legitimacy is declining day after day and smaller parties are emerging. This is because citizens do not believe the people and parties in power are competent enough to represent them and or deliver the basic services they need.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The KDP is strongly against the reelection of Salih because, in 2018, he ran for the presidency without the blessing of Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP; he went on to beat Barzani’s candidate, Fuad Hussein. Today, if the PUK and Barham Salih win the presidency again, it would have significant implications on intra-party, Kurdish, federal and regional politics.

      The KDP has nominated Hoshyar Zebari as their candidate to challenge the PUK’s Salih, according to Rudaw. Zebari served as the Iraqi finance minister from 2014 to 2016 before he was removed from his position following a secret parliamentary vote of no-confidence over alleged corruption and misuse of public funds. At the time, Zebari denied the allegations against him and said they politically led, and he was later cleared of charges.

      The KDP wants the PUK to nominate a new candidate. Currently, it appears that the PUK is leaning toward Latif Rasheed, a former Kurdish minister in Baghdad and a close relative of the Talabani family as an alternative person for the presidency should Salih not win the support he needs when parliament votes on February 5.

      The KDP claims that Salih has not succeeded in resolving the political differences and disagreement between the KRG and the federal government of Iraq. The budget for the Kurdistan Regional Government has also not been settled. It is hoped that Salih can find a solution to the economic and monetary issues between Erbil and Baghdad.

      Salih Is the Only Real Candidate

      There are currently five people who have nominated themselves for the job. Yet it is clear that the only powerful candidate is Barham Salih and the others are only competing against him to enrich their resumes and or undermine the position of the presidency.

      Across Iraq, Salih is known for his international and diplomatic experience and for being a politician with a vision. It was during his premiership that the KRG had boomed with a strong economy that saw the development of real estate. Hundreds of thousands of people rebuilt their homes, students went abroad to continue their studies and many others started small entrepreneurial projects thanks to his good governance and meritocracy.

      During his time as prime minister of the Kurdistan region between 2009 and 2012, Salih laid the foundations for several strategic projects, namely the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani, the airport, the new University of Sulaimani campus and the Hawari Shar, one of the greatest national parks in Iraq. Salih has also built many strategic projects like the underground water and sewage system of Sulaimani, along with dozens of other useful initiatives. Salih is widely known among the Kurdish people for his dedication to working in the public interest.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      At a regional level, many anticipate that Salih’s presidency will play an important role in maintaining Baghdad’s balance between the United States and Iran. On the one hand, Salih has a good working relationship with the Iranians and speaks Farsi. On the other, he has maintained a decade-long relationship with influential figures in Washington. The hope is that Salih will strive to minimize the damage done to Iraq as a result of the rivalry between the US and Iran. The election of Salih, in terms of person and approach, is a crucial step toward stability in the new government. The hope is that he will play a more positive and engaged role and fulfill the expectations the Iraqi people have of him.

      Barham Salih has also strongly advocated for the rights of the ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and is a great defender of the Iraqi Constitution, which has given the Kurds certain rights. Salih has a good reputation and has political experience. He is also well known for his integrity, righteousness, fairness and loyalty to the homeland.

      The president’s role is to serve as a symbol for the country. Their job is to represent Iraq’s sovereignty, safeguard the constitution and preserve its independence, unity and security. Many believe that Salih’s reputation, political demeanor and balanced stance enable him to implement these tasks of the presidency.

      Salih is a moderate politician and can lead Iraq as a mediator, rather than a nationalist, sectarian and or populist. If he is given a second chance as president, Salih could deescalate the existing tension and dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, and among Shia factions as well. After all, he was once the protégé of the late Jalal Talabani, the president who united Iraq and prevented further conflict. Hence, Salih meets the qualifications that the people and also his regional allies would prefer in an Iraqi to become a president. As it stands, Salih has the best chance of retaining his position, but not without encountering many challenges.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 113 Shares189 Views

      in World Politics

      What Yemenis Can Learn From the Indian Farmers’ Protests

      by

      Surprisingly, ending the war in, or rather on, Yemen is no longer an immediate concern. The gratuitous violence can continue, for there are now other priorities, or so we are told. Amongst them are development and fostering resilience, whatever these mean amidst an ongoing war. Wars do not have to come to an end. “Fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) has become the new development frontier,” reads a concept note by the World Bank. Once again, development agencies in Yemen are failing to walk the line between development and de-development. Have developmental interventions become an instrument of subjection and keeping countries of the agrarian south in check?

      Throughout the war, international policymakers have overemphasized the role of the private sector in addressing Yemen’s severe food crisis, insofar as they have tirelessly insisted since the late 1960s that opening the local market to unrestricted food imports would feed a growing population and drive economic growth. Commercial staple food imports — as well as food assistance — are vital during the war.

      Indian Farmer Protests Explained (Interactive)

      READ HERE

      However, be that as it may, the role of commercial food importers in postwar, post-neoliberalism Yemen must not be blown out of proportion. Reducing Yemen’s deep agrarian and rural social crisis to wartime and postwar commercial food import issues shows that the root causes of the country’s severe food crisis continue to be gravely misunderstood or deliberately overlooked.

      To begin with, Yemen’s absurd, inordinate dependence on staple food imports is but a consequence of bad policy. Regrettably, it was a policy that failed to preserve the rural sector’s productivity, let alone stimulating it and accumulating wealth. Rehashing past failed agricultural development policies is evidence of two distributing realities.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The first is Yemeni elites’ lack of capacity to imagine alternative paths of development in Yemen. The second is international policymakers’ position that developed countries exclusively can adopt national agricultural policy frameworks that avowedly control food supply through production and import controls and pricing mechanisms, whereas developing countries cannot do the same to support their agriculture sector.

      Inspiration and Lessons

      To end this long deadlock between Yemen’s autonomy and global capitalism, perhaps one ought to draw attention to India’s social struggle for inspiration and lessons.

      It is not in Yemen’s national interest to continue ignoring its small and marginalized farmers. In a rural society like Yemen, they are the engine of a healthy economy. The vast majority of the population continues to live in rural Yemen. Current official estimates put Yemen’s rural population at about 70%. This reality limits the role of the private sector in sustaining rural livelihoods. While some might argue that Yemen’s private sector should not be viewed as a monolith, consisting only of large conglomerates, to lump smallholding agriculture and agricultural commercialization together under the umbrella of the private sector is fundamentally flawed.

      Small farmers in Yemen are subsistence households, each representing a domestic unit of agricultural production that is economically self-sufficient and combines production and consumption functions. This rural social organization is not the same as one where farmers are reduced to landless, wage earners. Thus, small and marginalized farmers cannot be pigeonholed as private sector actors. Worse is to drop them from the economic equation altogether, especially in so-called developing countries.

      Without making this fundamental distinction between smallholding agriculture in Yemen and private sector activity, and without understanding why domestic food production is a matter of national priority to Yemeni citizens, Yemeni elites and international policymakers alike will continue to bungle the task of putting the country on the right path to development.

      Food Sovereignty and Security

      Many seem to think of Yemen as a big chicken farm that only needs to be fed somehow. They do not understand, or do not want to understand, that at issue is food sovereignty as well as food security. Yemen is a sovereign nation. Yemenis are a people who have the right, needless to say, to choose what to farm, how to farm and how to define the relationship between their local market and the international market. Choosing whether to eat homegrown sorghum or imported wheat is a fundamental national question of utmost importance, not a trade finance problem.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      Private sector activity is not an economic activity that occurs in an empty space; it occurs within social spheres. It impacts domestic production, changes the modes of production within a society and, consequently, remolds all social formations and economic relations. Agrarian changes are social changes. One cannot discuss private sector activity and commercial food imports in isolation from their long-term social impacts. This is lesson number one from five decades of steady economic decline and social regress. It is Yemen’s rural population that has marched down the road to impoverishment and starvation, and they know exactly how — but not why — they got there in the first place. In rural Yemen, lives and land are at stake.

      Millions of people in Yemen are famished neither because of the war nor because the private sector is unable to import enough staple foods, in spite of significant and critical wartime challenges. Yemenis are starving because the country has systematically lost its long-standing ability to produce food, particularly staple grains. The magnitude of production losses in Yemen’s agriculture sector has fundamentally limited the economy’s resilience to shocks. Economic resilience is the ability of the country’s main productive forces to cope, recover and reconstruct. How can you cripple a country’s most tangible, corporeal and immediate branch of production and, at the same time, foster resilience? Speaking of resilience of an incapacitated agriculture sector is a logical fallacy and is, therefore, meaningless and a distraction from the real problem.

      Causing Alarm

      According to the Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT), Yemen produced on its domestic soil on average 98% of its grains during 1961-65; namely, sorghum, millet, barley, maize and wheat, in this order. Sorghum production in Yemen peaked at 921,000 tons in 1975. In sharp contrast, the country domestically produced on average only 18% of its total supply of the same grains during 2011-15 and imported the rest. By 2015, the production of sorghum had plummeted to 221,510 tons. To make an already alarming situation unmanageable, the ongoing war more than halved Yemen’s total domestic grain production. Most notably, sorghum production reached a record low of 162,277 tons in 2016, followed by another record low of 155,722 tons in 2018. Yet, some still argue that this decline is due to population growth, not policy.

      In a country that primarily produces and consumes sorghum — the traditional staple of man and beast in Yemen — millet and barley, an over 80% dependency on imported wheat is evidently catastrophic during war and peace. This is a well-documented socioeconomic problem. In its 2004 edition of “The State of Food and Agriculture,” the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) noted that the long-term damaging impact of the loss of domestic food production and exposure to price volatility on individual countries outweigh the plausible short-lived collective benefits.

      Lower international prices have moderated the food import bills of developing countries, which, as a group, are now net food importers. However, although lower basic food prices on international markets bring short-term benefits to net food-importing developing countries, lower international prices can also have negative impacts on domestic production in developing countries that might have lingering effects on their food security.

      Embed from Getty Images

      The heart of the matter is that the agriculture sector is the country’s main productive force. Unchecked private internationally integrated capital has destroyed Yemen’s rural capital and silenced the interests of the country’s sizable rural population. Further, the malintegration of Yemen’s local food market with global markets has jeopardized the country’s economic independence and prevented any real development in Yemen.

      The Issue

      There is great, non-monetary economic and social value in reclaiming and revalorizing Yemen’s domestic food production and rebuilding its basic rural infrastructure. Domestic food production is too important to Yemenis to be addressed as an afterthought. At issue is not how to procure wheat from international markets, but how to stop the hemorrhage of surpluses out of the agriculture sector.

      What serves Yemen’s national interest is to refrain from calling for increasing the country’s dependency on speculative, volatile international food markets; imposing in the guise of development and economic resilience policies that undermine the country’s ability to domestically produce adequate food for local consumption; overstating the benefits of export-oriented agriculture and cash cropping more broadly; and overlooking or downplaying the role of smallholders in generating abundant jobs and sustaining rural infrastructure. In a nutshell, any serious discussion of Yemen’s food security crisis must take into account ecological sustainability, rural livelihoods and both food security and sovereignty in the long term.

      Yemeni farmers do not yet fully understand why policymakers and development practitioners insist on promoting imports and more broadly large commercial activity, at a time when the whole world is prioritizing the opposite of these dictates: strengthening self-reliance, planning and regulating limited resources, and minimizing local markets’ exposure. Yemeni struggle has not yet reached the level of political awareness seen in India during its 2020-21 farmers’ protests. To get there, we must understand one point: tying the rural sector’s destiny to large commercial organizations cannot lead to any real growth and prosperity of the entire population.

      Indian farmers inspire us to rethink development paradigms in Yemen, for there is more to farming than exporting bananas and onions to Saudi Arabia, and there is more to the role of the private sector in national development than flooding local markets with wheat from Australia, Russia, the United States, France and other international source markets, or even import substitution.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 125 Shares149 Views

      in World Politics

      Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East?

      by

      Since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States has been the unchallenged dominant power in the Middle East and North Africa. As such, it often saw its role, for better or worse, as fixing the region’s many problems. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq and Saddam Hussein, Iran, high oil prices, Gulf security, Western Sahara, menacing non-state organizations, counterterrorism, human rights, democracy, autocratic leaders, failed states — whatever the concern or challenge, the Americans came to view them as priority issues and their responsibility. Moreover, many regional states and even their citizens often saw America’s involvement as a necessity, sometimes even an obligation to tamp down the region’s frenzied political climate.

      Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

      READ MORE

      But times have changed. Three recent presidents — Barack Obama, Donald Trump and now Joe Biden — have made efforts to distance the US from its endless, exasperating entanglements in the Middle East. Those efforts had distracted the United States from its principal challenges in the world — China and Russia — and sapped it of its military, economic and political might and influence. America received very little in return on its investment. Furthermore, years of US involvement in the region had also fractured the American public’s support for the more critically important role it must play in anchoring the international order.

      Enter the Others

      Downgrading America’s involvement in the Middle East isn’t necessarily a bad thing. For decades, many in the Middle East and in the US had argued that the region’s problems must be tackled by the governments and people of the region. Outsiders can play a supporting role, but the tough decisions can only be made by the governments themselves. That may now be happening.

      But handing off the task of addressing the region’s manifold challenges got off to a poor start. Neither the US, nor the international community, nor the states of the Middle East seemed able to solve the conundrum of the region’s three failed states.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Then, starting around 2015, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman started ordering others around — imposing a blockade on Qatar, detaining the Lebanese prime minister, jailing courageous dissidents and largely harmless millionaires, ordering a hit job on journalist Jamal Khashoggi and jumping into the Yemeni Civil War. And it all went bad, very bad in fact. Additionally, it provoked other would-be movers and shakers to get in the act, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, China, Russia and even Israel. And not always with good intent or positive results.

      After years of misdirection, however, governments now seem to be taking a more sober and responsible approach that could prove genuinely beneficial for the region. For starters, they have embarked on a simple approach: dialog. They are talking about their problems, especially those between and among one another. Dialog leads to understanding, which can lead to shared interests. Ultimately, to be effective, dialog must lead to compromise. That involves the inevitable give-and-take that allows nations, especially those close to one another, to live and thrive in peace and prosperity.

      It’s a Start

      One of the most encouraging initiatives may be the most unexpected: dialog between the Middle East’s two major powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and hosted by perhaps the most unlikely state, Iraq, unquestionably the region’s most conflict-ridden for decades. The issues are many between these two historic rivals, separated by a narrow gulf on whose name neither seems able to agree. But the larger gulf lies in their differing views of the other, their competing religious sects — the Saudi uber-conservative Wahhabi Sunni Islam vs. Iran’s clerically-led, conservative Shia Islam — perceptions of the other’s role and intentions in the region, their wealth, and relations with and ties to the broader international community, almost non-existent in the case of Iran.

      One especially neuralgic issue for both is their respective roles in the Yemen War. It is now abundantly clear that the Saudis’ overwhelming military power, bolstered by the US and some European nations, cannot defeat the Houthi rebels. Nor can it end either the war or even its costly intervention in it. The Saudis need help. Enter the Iranians, who have been supporting the Shia-affiliated Zaydi Houthis in this war since 2013. With ideology and much-needed weapons and funding, though much less than what Saudi Arabia has expended, the Iranians have empowered the rebels to the point where they are now an established power in a future Yemen, whether unified or bifurcated.

      So, the two regional powers are talking it out. The Saudis want out of the war, but they also want reliable security along their southwestern border. The Iranians want a Shia power on the Arabian Peninsula, but preferably one at peace.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      Yemen may be the most immediate challenge for the two states. But there are others. More broadly, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to reach a modus vivendi in the region. On-again, off-again formal relations, menacing behavior toward each other’s oil and shipping interests, and verbal assaults do little more than increase the temperature in a region plagued by heat, literally and figuratively.

      Brothers Reconcile?

      Saudi Arabia has also launched a campaign to repair the frayed relations among its Arab neighbors. Last week, Mohammed bin Salman week began a PR campaign to demonstrate a new and improved political environment. In a swing through the neighboring Gulf states of Oman, the UAE, Bahrain and, most importantly, Qatar, he seems to be trying to rebuild what once had been the region’s preeminent multilateral organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

      Mohammed bin Salman single-handedly fractured the Gulf alliance when he imposed his 2017 blockade on Qatar, joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. It backfired. Qatar remained in the good graces of the US, drew the political and military support of peripheral power Turkey and earned the support of Iran. Consider it the young prince’s on-the-job training in global as well as regional politics. He is now devoting particular attention to Doha in the hope of what yet we aren’t quite certain. But this repair work and goodwill tour cannot help but create progress.

      And not to be outdone, the Gulf’s other power, the UAE, has embarked on its own diplomatic repair mission. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to lower the temperature in the Gulf, and their position as the region’s prime economic entrepôt gives them special heft. The UAE’s ties to the US, still the unquestioned but now quiescent power in the Gulf, also lend special weight.

      Could It All Be for Naught?

      Looming over all of these laudable efforts, however, is Iranian behavior in the region. All eyes are now on the recently restarted talks over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna, Austria. Following a near-six-month hiatus at Iran’s request, the P5+1 group and Iran renewed negotiations to reinstate the JCPOA — aka the Iran nuclear deal.

      But it is the critical non-dialog between the US and Iran — the two countries are still not meeting face-to-face but rather communicating through the intermediation of the other P5+1 countries — that bears the most serious watching. Unless they can agree on a way forward that puts Iran’s nuclear weapons potential well into the very distant future while also lifting America’s onerous and inescapably crippling sanctions on the Islamic Republic, the heat in the Middle East will become white hot.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Judging from the US State Department’s uncharacteristically downcast semi-official readout of the first round of the negotiation restart, there is cause for concern. Iran’s counterproductive, albeit predictable, maximalist opening gambit soured the P5+1, even China and Russia. Negotiators met again last week. Unless there is a greater attitude toward compromise, however, pessimism will win out. Positions will harden. And more extreme (and dangerous) measures will become viable.

      President Biden has reiterated the US pledge that Iran will not get nuclear weapons. But neither he nor his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, will state what the consequences of failed talks might be.

      Israel, however, is not so coy. Recent Israeli statements confirm that the military option is very much in play. As if to put an even finer point on the matter, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Jerusalem late last week for meetings with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Benny Gantz. Both men are retired top generals of their respective armed forces and will have discussed military and other options.

      Military action would be an unspeakable disaster for the Middle East. But so would a nuclear-armed or even nuclear-capable Iran. Even an approach that stops short of armed conflict will impose extraordinary hardship on the region, certainly prompting other states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons and further isolate Iran.

      It would be unfair to place the entirety of the burden for the success of these talks on Tehran. However, unless Iran understands the futility of its mindless pursuit of nuclear weapons, no effort at fostering understanding elsewhere can temper the region’s mercury-popping political heat.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More

    • 125 Shares129 Views

      in World Politics

      The Assad Family Has Been Shaping Syria for 50 Years

      by

      It has been over a decade since a civil uprising began in Syria during the height of the Arab Spring. What started in March 2011 soon developed into a civil war between the government of Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition, made up of various factions with different ideologies. Throughout the ongoing conflict, the opposition have been supported by international actors with interests not only in Syria, but in the wider region too.

      Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

      READ MORE

      After years of conflict that have caused one of the biggest migration crises since World War II, it is clear that the Assad government, with the support of Russia and Iran, will maintain its grip on power. The question now is what a post-war Syria will look like with President Assad and his regime still in office.

      In order to understand what may lie ahead, it is necessary to understand the origins of the Assad family, their Alawite background and their influence on Syrian identity over the past 50 years.

      The Alawite Community

      The two largest sects in Islam are Sunni and Shia. Both sects overlap in most fundamental beliefs and practices, but their main difference centers on the dispute over who should have succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as leader after his death in 632. Today, between 85% to 90% of Muslims are Sunni and around 10% are Shia. Sunnis live in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan. Shias are largely located in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan, with significant minorities in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

      Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

      Alawites, although not doctrinally Shia, especially venerate Ali ibn Abi Talib, one of the earliest Muslims and the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet. Shias consider Ali to be the first imam and rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad, while Sunnis see him as the fourth rightly-guided caliph who made up the Rashidun Caliphate. Before the French took control of Syria in 1920, members of the Alawite community considered themselves to be Nusayris. The French “imposed the name ‘Alawite,’ meaning the followers of Ali,” to emphasize the sect’s similarities with Shia Islam.

      Syria is ruled by Alawites, but the community itself is a minority making up around 12% to 15% of the pre-war Syrian population. Sunnis account for the majority of the country.

      The Rise of the Alawites

      After Syria attained independence in 1946, the Alawite community began to play an active role in two key areas: political parties and the armed forces. On the one hand, the Baath party, founded in 1947 by Arab politicians and intellectuals to integrate Arab nationalism, socialism, secularism and anti-imperialism, was “more attractive to Alawites than the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious organization” founded in Egypt with a large base in Syria.

      Furthermore, Alawites and other minorities continued to be overrepresented in the military due to two main factors. First, middle-class Sunni families tended to despise the military as a profession. Alawites, on the other hand, saw the army as an opportunity for a better life. Second, many Alawites, due to their difficult economic situation, could not afford to pay the fee to exempt their children from military service.

      The Alawite presence in the army culminated in a series of coups in the 1960s. Supporters of the rising Baath party were a minority in Syria at the time. As scholar Rahaf Aldoughli explains, the regime embarked on a course of “rigorous state-nationalist indoctrination to consolidate Baathist rule and establish” its popular legitimacy. Among other efforts, “the Baathists sought to manipulate tribal and sectarian identities, seeking patronage by” upgrading the status of previously marginalized groups. This included the Alawite community.

      The last coup d’état in Syria was carried out by General Hafez al-Assad, who had been serving as defense minister and was an Alawite. His actions brought the minority to power in November 1970. Three months later, Assad became the first Alawite president of Syria.

      Embed from Getty Images

      Once in office, “his project centered on homogenizing these diverse [marginalized] Syrians into a single imagined Ba’athist identity.” More broadly, Aldoughli adds, the overall aim of “nationalist construction was to subsume local identities into a broader concept of the ‘Syrian people,’ defined according to the state’s territorial” boundaries.

      The Sectarianism of the Syrian Civil War

      Shortly before the outset of the US-led war on terror, Hafez al-Assad died in 2000. His son, Bashar, took over the reins and continued in his father’s footsteps. This included policies of coopting the religious space and portraying a moderate Islam under the guise of a secular state that sought to curb Islamism and blur religious differences. Despite these efforts, the confessional fragmentation of Syrian society provided a factor of tension and instability for a state that ultimately never succeeded in addressing these differences in the political arena.

      The Arab Spring consequently arrived in Syria at a time marked by a crisis of legitimacy of secular ruling parties such as the Baath. The crisis of governability meant the secular balance imposed by the regime in society began to crack, exposing anger around the Alawite minority’s overrepresentation in the state apparatus and the Sunni majority’s underrepresentation. The result was anti-government protests that began in March 2011.

      Ultimately, the ensuing sectarianism of the Syrian conflict only makes sense if we also incorporate the geopolitical rivalries affecting the region. On the one hand, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iran are the Assad government’s main supporters and are interested in propping it up. On the other hand, Sunni actors such as the Islamic State group, the al-Nusra Front and Saudi Arabia want the government to fall.

      That has failed. After 10 years of war, military forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad have retaken the vast majority of Syrian territory with the support of Iran and Hezbollah. As a result, both repression of the Sunni-dominated opposition and the strengthening of the Alawite community in the state apparatus are likely to remain part of a post-war Syria. How the Sunni majority reacts to the fact that Assad and the Alawites remain at the center of Syrian politics is unknown.

      The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More