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Before He Ran for President, Gustavo Petro Was a Guerrilla Fighter
Long before Gustavo Petro emerged as the apparently victorious leftist candidate for president, he was part of the M-19, an urban guerrilla group that sought to seize power through violence in the name of promoting social justice.For some Colombian voters, his past was a source of concern after decades of armed conflict. For others, it offered a sign of hope for one of most inequitable countries in Latin America.The M-19 was born in 1970 as a response to alleged fraud in that year’s presidential elections. It was far smaller than the country’s main guerrilla force, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, which was Marxist and sought haven in Colombia’s jungles and rural areas.The M-19 was an urban military group formed by university students, activists and artists who wanted to topple a governing system they believed failed to bridge a chronic divide between the rich and the poor.“The M-19 was born in arms to build a democracy,” Mr. Petro told The New York Times in an interview.It originally tried to promote a Robin Hood image, robbing milk from supermarket trucks to distribute in poor neighborhoods and, in a symbolic act of rebellion, stole a sword from a museum that Simón Bolívar used in Colombia’s war for independence.Mr. Petro, 62, joined the group when he was 17 and an economics student, dismayed by the poverty he witnessed in the town where has living, outside Bogotá, the capital.While the M-19 was less brutal than other rebel groups, it did orchestrate what is considered one of the bloodiest acts in the country’s recent history: the 1985 siege of Colombia’s national judicial building that led to a battle with the police and the military, leaving 94 people dead.The group also stole 5,000 weapons from the Colombian military and used kidnapping as a tactic to try to wrest concessions from the government.Mr. Petro, who spent 10 years in the M-19, largely stockpiled stolen weapons, said Sandra Borda, a political science professor at the University of the Andes in Bogotá.“What’s key is that he wasn’t part of the main circle who made the decisions in M-19. He was very young at that moment,” she said. “He didn’t participate in the most important operations of the M-19, the military operations.”At the time of the justice building takeover, Mr. Petro was in prison for his involvement with the group and he has described being beaten and electrocuted by the authorities.The group eventually demobilized in 1990, which was considered one of the most successful peace processes in the country’s long history of conflict. It turned into a political party that helped rewrite the country’s constitution to focus more on equality and human rights.Mr. Petro ran for Senate as a member of the party, launching his political career.Sofía Villamil More
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Jan. 6 Hearings Underscore Hard Truths About Democracy
When political leaders face a constitutional crisis, like that of Jan. 6, the process of collectively deciding how to respond can be messy, arbitrary, and sometimes change the nature of the system itself.If you look for international parallels to the moment last year when Vice President Mike Pence refused to bow to pressure from President Donald J. Trump to help overturn their election defeat, something quickly becomes clear.Such crises, with democracy’s fate left to a handful of officials, rarely resolve purely on legal or constitutional principles, even if those might later be cited as justification.Rather, their outcome is usually determined by whichever political elites happen to form a quick critical mass in favor of one result. And those officials are left to follow whatever motivation — principle, partisan antipathy, self-interest — happens to move them.Taken together, the history of modern constitutional crises underscores some hard truths about democracy. Supposedly bedrock norms, like free elections or rule of law, though portrayed as irreversibly cemented into the national foundation, are in truth only as solid as the commitment of those in power. And while a crisis can be an opportunity for leaders to reinforce democratic norms, it can also be an opportunity to revise or outright revoke them.Amid Yugoslavia’s 2000 election, for example, the opposition declared it had won enough votes to unseat President Slobodan Milosevic, whose government falsely claimed the opposition had fallen short.Both sides appealed to constitutional principles, legal procedures and, with protests raging, public will. Ultimately, a critical mass of government and police officials, including some in positions necessary to certify the outcome, signaled that, for reasons that varied individual to individual, they would treat Mr. Milosevic as the election’s loser. The new government later extradited him to face war crimes charges at The Hague.Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia, applauding during a passing-out ceremony of recruits at the military academy in Belgrade, in 2000. Mr. Milosevic was declared the loser of a disputed election, and later extradited to face war crimes charges at The Hague. Agence France-PresseAmericans may see more in common with Peru. There, President Alberto Fujimori in 1992 dissolved the opposition-held Congress, which had been moving to impeach him. Lawmakers across the spectrum quickly voted to replace Mr. Fujimori with his own vice president, who had opposed the presidential power grab.Both sides claimed to be defending democracy from the other. Both appealed to Peru’s military, which had traditionally played a role of ultimate arbiter, almost akin to that of a supreme court. The public, deeply polarized, split. The military was also split.The Themes of the Jan. 6 House Committee HearingsMaking a Case Against Trump: The committee appears to be laying out a road map for prosecutors to indict former President Donald J. Trump. But the path to any trial is uncertain.Day One: During the first hearing, the panel presented a gripping story with a sprawling cast of characters, but only three main players: Mr. Trump, the Proud Boys and a Capitol Police officer.Day Two: In its second hearing, the committee showed how Mr. Trump ignored aides and advisers in declaring victory prematurely and relentlessly pressing claims of fraud he was told were wrong.Day Three: Mr. Trump pressured Vice President Mike Pence to go along with a plan to overturn his loss even after he was told it was illegal, according to testimony laid out by the panel during the third hearing.At the critical moment, enough political and military elites signaled support for Mr. Fujimori that he prevailed. They came together informally, each reacting to events individually, and many appealing to different ends, such as Mr. Fujimori’s economic agenda, notions of stability, or a chance for their party to prevail under the new order.Peru fell into quasi-authoritarianism, with political rights curtailed and elections still held but under terms that favored Mr. Fujimori, until he was removed from office in 2000 over corruption allegations. Last year, his daughter ran for the presidency as a right-wing populist, losing by less than 50,000 votes.Modern Latin America has repeatedly faced such crises. This is due less to any shared cultural traits, many scholars argue, than to a history of Cold War meddling that weakened democratic norms. It also stems from American-style presidential systems, and deep social polarization that paves the way for extreme political combat.Presidential democracies, by dividing power among competing branches, create more opportunities for rival offices to clash, even to the point of usurping one another’s powers. Such systems also blur questions of who is in charge, forcing their branches to resolve disputes informally, on the fly and at times by force.Venezuela, once the region’s oldest democracy, endured a series of constitutional crises as President Hugo Chávez clashed with judges and other government bodies that blocked his agenda. Each time, Mr. Chávez, and later his successor, Nicolás Maduro, appealed to legal and democratic principles to justify weakening those institutions until, over time, the leaders’ actions, ostensibly to save democracy, had all but gutted it.Hugo Chavez, the former president of Venezuela, arriving at the National Assembly for his annual state of the union address in Caracas, Venezuela, in 2012. He and his successor appealed to legal and democratic principles to justify their weakening of democratic institutions.Ariana Cubillos/Associated PressPresidencies are rare in Western democracies. One of the few, in France, saw its own constitutional crisis in 1958, when an attempted military coup was diverted only when the wartime leader Charles de Gaulle handed himself emergency powers to establish a unity government that satisfied both civilian and military leaders.While other systems can fall into major crisis, it is often because, as in a presidential democracy, competing power centers clash to the point of trying to overrun one another.Still, some scholars argue that Americans hoping to understand their country’s trajectory should look not to Europe but to Latin America.Ecuador came near the brink in 2018 over then-President Rafael Correa’s effort to extend his own term limits. But when voters and the political elite alike opposed this, Mr. Correa left office voluntarily.In 2019, Bolivia fell into chaos amid a disputed election. Though the public split, political and military elites signaled that they believed that the incumbent, the left-wing firebrand Evo Morales, should step down, all but forcing him to do so.Still, when Mr. Morales’s right-wing replacement oversaw months of turmoil and then moved to postpone elections, many of those same elites pushed for a quick vote instead, which elevated Mr. Morales’s handpicked successor.Evo Morales, the former president of Bolivia, speaking to the press on election day in La Paz, Bolivia, in October 2019. The country fell into chaos after the election, which was disputed.Martin Alipaz/EPA, via ShutterstockThe phrase “political elites” can conjure images of cigar-chomping power-brokers, meeting in secret to pull society’s strings. In reality, scholars use the term to describe lawmakers, judges, bureaucrats, police and military officers, local officials, business chiefs and cultural figures, most of whom will never coordinate directly, much less agree on what is best for the country.Still, it is those elites who collectively uphold democracy day-to-day. Much as paper money only has value because we all treat it as valuable, elections and laws only have power because elites wake up every morning and treat them as paramount. It is a kind of compact, in which the powerful voluntarily bind themselves to a system that also constrains them.“A well-functioning, orderly democracy does not require us to actively think about what sustains it,” Tom Pepinsky, a Cornell University political scientist, told me shortly after the Capitol riot on Jan. 6, 2021. “It’s an equilibrium; everybody is incentivized to participate as if it will continue.”But in a major constitutional crisis, when the norms and rules meant to guide democracy come under doubt, or fall by the wayside entirely, those elites suddenly face the question of how — or whether — to keep up their democratic compact.They will not always agree on what course is best for democracy, or for the country, or for themselves. Sometimes, the shock of seeing democracy’s vulnerability will lead them to redouble their commitment to it, and sometimes to jettison that system in part or whole.The result is often a scramble of elites pressuring one another directly, as many senior Republicans and White House aides did throughout Jan. 6, or through public statements aimed at the thousands of officials operating the machinery of government.Scholars call this a “coordination game,” with all those actors trying to understand and influence how the others will respond until a minimally viable consensus emerges. It can resemble less a well-defined plot than a herd of startled animals, which is why the outcome can be hard to predict.Before Jan. 6, there had been little reason to wonder over lawmakers’ commitment to democracy. “It had not been a question of whether or not they supported democracy in a real internal sense — that had never been the stakes,” Dr. Pepinsky said.Now, a crisis had forced them to decide whether to overturn the election, demonstrating that not all of those lawmakers, if given that choice, would vote to uphold democracy. “I’ve been floored by how much of this really does depend on 535 people,” Dr. Pepinsky said, referring to the number of lawmakers in Congress.. More
Colombia Takes First Step in Joining Latin America’s Left Turn
Colombia, Latin America‘s third most populous country, held congressional and presidential primary elections on March 13. Citizens had a chance to vote for candidates to be elected to the two houses of Congress and in primary elections for presidential candidates of three political coalitions from the political left, center and right.
The elections have provided a crucial first indication of which direction Colombia is heading ahead of the presidential elections in May and June. According to preliminary results, Colombia remains with a highly fragmented Congress; none of the parties has achieved more than 16%. Yet the results are historic. The big winner of the elections is the Pacto Historico, a group of several left-of-center parties campaigning on a platform of social equality. The group won 19 out of 108 seats in the Senate and 28 out of 172 in the House of Representatives, up from nine and seven in 2018.
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Other parties performing well were Colombia‘s traditional liberal and conservative parties, which had lost influence in recent years after dominating the country until 1991 when a new constitution opened the political space for other political contenders.
In Colombia, which many observers consider one of Latin America‘s most conservative societies, left-leaning politics never managed to gain much ground. Therefore, the results indicate a potentially historic shift since a party with a distinct leftist platform and identity performed strongest for the first time.
The Electoral Prospects of Gustavo Petro
The results emphasize the chances of Gustavo Petro, the leader of the Pacto Historico, to become Colombia‘s next president since he won the group’s primary elections with 80.5%. Over the last two years, Petro has been the consistent front runner in all presidential election polls. He was a member of the urban revolutionary guerilla group M-19, which demobilized in the early 1990s, and later became a senator and mayor of Bogota, Colombia‘s capital, from 2012 to 2015. In 2018, Petro was a presidential candidate but lost in the second round to Ivan Duque from the right-wing Democratic Center party.
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However, the recent results and Pacto Historico’s strong performance show that a win of the left is more likely this time. Many Colombians feel it is time for political change after decades of right-leaning governments. Two waves of nationwide protests swept the country in 2019 and 2021, demanding, amongst others, wide-reaching social and economic reforms and intensified state protection against the killings of social activists. In the climate of national outrage, a president from the left suddenly seems not so out of place anymore.
While no one doubts that Petro will gain sufficient votes to reach the second round of presidential elections, the recent results show that he will need to convince Colombians from the center to vote for him too. Petro has already indicated after the election his move toward the center, claiming to “invite all the democratic forces that are not yet in the Pacto … we must give way to a large, broad and democratic front.”
The primary elections have also revealed Petro’s contenders. Although some presidential candidates decided to remain outside of the primaries, Petro’s key rivals will be the winners of the rightist and, to a lesser extent, of the centrist primary elections. Both centrist Sergio Fajardo and right-leaning Federico “Fico” Gutierrez have been mayors of Medellin, Colombia‘s second-largest city in the past. While Fajardo draws support from the wealthy and well-educated urban middle and upper classes, Gutierrez relies on the votes from Colombia‘s large conservative sectors and its stronghold, the department of Antioquia.
The End of Uribism?
The elections also showed that the influence of Uribismo, a right-wing populist political movement named after Alvaro Uribe, Colombia‘s president from 2002 to 2010, is vanishing. Uribe’s presidency was most known for the military regaining ground against several leftist guerrilla groups and alliances between state and right-wing paramilitary forces resulting in severe human rights violations. Uribe was for the last decade seen as the most influential politician in Colombia, leading a campaign against the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the FARC guerrilla group, and a key mentor of President Duque.
Uribe himself, who in 2018 received most votes of any elected senator, did not run again amidst a judicial process against him for bribing witnesses and procedural fraud. The political party associated with the movement, the Democratic Center, which in the previous Congress was the strongest, came fourth in the recent elections. The party suffered from the notorious unpopularity of the Duque administration, which has disapproval ratings of over 75%. “I am the main person responsible [for the loss of seats] due to my damage to [the party’s] reputation,” Uribe declared last week.
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The party’s presidential candidate, Oscar Ivan Zuluaga, who did not participate in the primary elections of the rightist coalition, has halted his campaign and is supporting Gutierrez instead.
A Similar Trend Across Latin America
Should Colombia vote for Petro, the result would confirm recent trends across Latin America. Since 2018, leftist presidential candidates have won elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru. Likewise, current polls for Brazil’s elections in October this year predict a landslide win of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a former president from the Workers’ Party, over far-right incumbent Jair Bolsonaro.
Over the following weeks, campaigning will become more intensified. In the highly polarized country, many participants in large-scale protests during recent years feel that with Petro, a politician addressing their needs could potentially assume power for the first time. Should their hopes amount to nothing and Colombia remain with a right-wing government, a reemergence of mass-scale protests is likely, which in the past resulted in severe police brutality and human rights violations. With the probable outcomes being Colombia‘s first leftist government or nationwide protests, the country faces some truly historic elections ahead.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More
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Elecciones presidenciales en Honduras: ¿qué está en juego?
Los hondureños van a las urnas el domingo; la violencia política generalizada durante la campaña y los resultados cuestionados de 2017 ensombrecen el panorama.En las que podrían ser las elecciones más significativas del país en más de una década, los hondureños acudirán el domingo a votar para elegir un nuevo presidente. La contienda política ha sido manchada por la violencia y será seguida con mucha atención en Washington.Elecciones en Honduras: actualizaciones en vivo aquíLos candidatos ven la carrera como una forma de transformar el destino del país, en el que temas como los crímenes violentos y la pobreza obligan a una cantidad cada vez mayor de huir al norte.Pero los analistas políticos dicen que, dado que la corrupción parece incrustada en los más altos niveles del poder, las posibilidades de un cambio realmente transformador son muy pocas.Sin embargo, a pesar de sus muchas dificultades, una elección libre y justa en Honduras sería clave para Centroamérica y le ofrecería un remanso a una región que ha virado hacia el autoritarismo. Y el resultado podría tener consecuencias para la gestión de Joe Biden.Los sondeos muestran que la carrera será cerrada. Pero si la oposición triunfa, Honduras elegirá a su primera presidenta mujer.Aquí están las claves de la elección presidencial de Honduras.¿Qué está en juego para Honduras y para Estados Unidos?Personas cruzan la frontera entre México y Estados Unidos cerca de Del Río, Texas. El presidente Biden ha visto frustrados hasta ahora sus esfuerzos por controlar la migración desde Centroamérica y combatir la corrupción en la región.Verónica G. Cárdenas para The New York TimesDado que la pobreza y la violencia siguen azotando la vida cotidiana de la mayoría de hondureños, miles de los cuales se han ido a Estados Unidos, muchos en el país esperan desesperadamente un cambio.Después de casi ocho años de mandato del presidente Juan Orlando Hernández, cuya gestión ha sido afectada por denuncias de corrupción, los dos principales partidos prometen que cortarán por lo sano.Para la oposición, las elecciones del domingo son una oportunidad de recuperar el poder por primera vez desde 2009, cuando el presidente Manuel Zelaya fue depuesto por un golpe de Estado. La coalición izquierdista ha prometido detener el deterioro de las normas democráticas que ha sucedido en el mandato de Hernández.Para el gobernante Partido Nacional, las elecciones son una oportunidad para recuperar algo de legitimidad luego de años de gobernanza corrupta y de las irregularidades generalizadas de la última votación.Las elecciones podrían tener repercusiones de gran alcance en Washington, donde el presidente Biden hasta ahora ha visto obstaculizadas dos de sus prioridades de política exterior: controlar la migración procedente de Centroamérica y combatir la corrupción en la región.Una elección libre y justa podría crear un pequeño faro de esperanza democrática en la región, que vive bajo la sombra del autoritarismo en países como Nicaragua y El Salvador.¿Quiénes son los candidatos?La contienda del domingo enfrenta a un carismático alcalde de la capital, Tegucigalpa, con la esposa de un expresidente que aspira a convertirse en la primera mujer jefa de Estado del país.Gustavo Amador/EPA vía ShutterstockLa contienda del domingo enfrenta a un carismático alcalde de la capital, Tegucigalpa, con la esposa de un expresidente que compite para ser la primera jefa de Estado del país.Nasry Asfura, de 63 años, más popularmente conocido como Papi, es un ex empresario que ha gobernado Tegucigalpa desde 2014. También ha sido legislador por el Partido Nacional en el Congreso Nacional de Honduras.Bajo el lema “Papi es diferente”, Asfura intenta distanciarse del presidente Hernández, miembro de su partido. Pero Asfura también enfrentaba acusaciones de corrupción y ha sido denunciado por malversación de fondos públicos. Los cargos, que Asfura niega, se han atorado en los juzgados.Asfura ha prometido crear nuevos empleos y mejorar la agobiada economía hondureña y su partido acusa a la oposición de comunismo y de querer transformar radicalmente al país.Su oponente es Xiomara Castro, que está casada con Manuel Zelaya, el expresidente izquierdista que en 2009 fue retirado del cargo por un golpe militar. Castro, de 62 años, lideró un movimiento de protesta después del golpe y se convirtió en la principal candidata de oposición luego de que en octubre varios partidos políticos la respaldaron en una coalición.Castro ha prometido establecer relaciones diplomáticas con China, flexibilizar las restrictivas leyes de aborto de Honduras y mejorar la economía hondureña a través de, entre otras medidas, un mejor manejo de la deuda nacional, que asciende a 13.000 millones de dólares.A pesar de los esfuerzos del partido gobernante de presentarla como una comunista fervorosa, Castro ha conseguido el apoyo del sector empresarial hondureño al integrar a su equipo económico a tecnócratas respetados y al mismo tiempo apelar a los partidarios más de izquierda de Zelaya.¿Por qué ha sido tan mortífera la campaña?Un homenaje en Tegucigalpa, Honduras, para las víctimas de la violencia política, este mes. Los ataques mortales contra candidatos y sus partidarios se han duplicado en 2021 en comparación con hace cuatro años, según las Naciones Unidas.Orlando Sierra/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesLa violencia política ha sido durante mucho tiempo un elemento básico de las elecciones hondureñas, pero este año ha sido particularmente sangriento, con casi 30 candidatos, activistas y sus familiares asesinados en las semanas previas a las votaciones del domingo.Los ataques mortales a candidatos y sus seguidores han aumentado en más del doble en 2021, en comparación con el periodo electoral anterior hace cuatro años, según Naciones Unidas. De acuerdo con la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, se han registrado más de 60 casos de violencia política este año. En un ejemplo particularmente atroz, varios hombres ingresaron a la casa de la congresista Olivia Marcela Zúniga Cáceres en octubre e intentaron asfixiarla, según reportaron los medios de comunicación locales.Los expertos en violencia electoral dicen que la proliferación de grupos de delincuencia organizada, la falta de acceso a la justicia y los ataques a rivales políticos durante el gobierno de Hernández son en parte culpables de la situación.Y aunque ninguno de los bandos políticos se ha librado de la violencia, los activistas dicen que es más probable que los ataques beneficien al partido en el poder al crear un clima de miedo que podría mantener a los votantes en casa.¿Participarán los hondureños en el extranjero?Impresión de papeletas electorales en Tegucigalpa este mes. Algunos hondureños que viven en Estados Unidos se han quejado de que los nuevos documentos de identidad exigidos por el gobierno hondureño para votar han sido difíciles de conseguir.Fredy Rodriguez/ReutersLos hondureños que viven en el exterior, de los cuales unos 740.000 residen en Estados Unidos, seguirán muy de cerca una elección cuyo resultado muy probablemente afecte a sus amigos y parientes en casa.Los hondureños en Estados Unidos son una fuerza económica importante, al enviar miles de millones de dólares en remesas que representan alrededor del 20 por ciento de la economía de Honduras. Muchos de los que viven en Estados Unidos culpan al gobierno actual de fomentar la violencia, la corrupción y el desempleo que ha obligado a miles a marcharse.Si bien los hondureños que viven en el extranjero son elegibles para votar, algunos en Estados Unidos se han quejado de que las nuevas tarjetas de identidad requeridas para votar por el gobierno hondureño han sido difíciles de conseguir.En Honduras también hay alrededor de 300.000 personas que aún no reclaman su nuevo documento de identidad, según informes de la prensa local.En Estados Unidos, menos de 13.000 hondureños se registraron para recibir el documento, que debía entregarse la semana pasada según un activista que habló con el Times. El embajador hondureño en Estados Unidos reconoció fallos en el proceso, pero negó cualquier sesgo político.¿Qué puede esperarse el domingo?Soldados patrullan Cantarranas, Honduras, el sábado. Con los recuerdos de la violencia durante las elecciones de 2017 aún frescos en la mente de muchos hondureños, existe un temor generalizado de que las elecciones del domingo traigan consigo disturbios.Moises Castillo/Associated PressLa votación empezó a las 7 a. m. y termina a las 5 p. m. El consejo electoral deberá anunciar resultados preliminares tres horas después del cierre de las mesas de votación, incluido un estimado de los resultados finales.En la mente de muchos hondureños están aún frescos los recuerdos de la violencia y las protestas políticas durante las elecciones de 2017 y existe un temor generalizado de disturbios y una mayor inestabilidad política después de las elecciones. Muchas empresas cerrarán este fin de semana.Las encuestas han mostrado que la contienda se fue cerrando y ambos bandos están seguros de que triunfarán. Eso hace poco probable que alguno de los candidatos conceda la victoria a hora temprana lo que azuza aún más los temores de violencia. El voto de 2017 también estuvo afectado por inconsistencias y los resultados siguen siendo muy ampliamente cuestionados.Desde aquella ocasión, el país llevó a cabo varias reformas electorales, pero los críticos dicen que los cambios han sido insuficientes. More
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Honduras Election: What's at Stake
Hondurans head to the polls on Sunday, but widespread political violence during the campaign and questionable results from 2017 are looming large.In what may be their country’s most significant elections in more than a decade, Hondurans will head to the polls on Sunday to choose a new president, a political contest that has been marred by violence and is being closely watched in Washington.With issues like violent crime and poverty forcing an ever-increasing number of Hondurans to flee north, candidates are billing the race as a chance to alter the country’s destiny.But with corruption seemingly ingrained in the highest levels of power, political analysts say the chances of truly transformative change are slim.Still, a free and fair election in Honduras, despite its many problems, would be significant for Central America, offering a respite from the region’s antidemocratic turn. And the outcome could be consequential for the Biden administration.Polls are showing a tight race. But if the opposition triumphs, Honduras would elect its first female president.Here’s what else you need to know about Honduras’s presidential elections.What’s at stake for Honduras, and the United States?People crossing between Mexico an the United States near Del Rio, Texas. President Biden has so far been stymied in his efforts to control migration from Central America and combat corruption there.Verónica G. Cárdenas for The New York TimesWith poverty and violence continuing to plague daily life for most Hondurans, thousands of whom have fled to the United States, many in the country are desperate for change.After nearly eight years under President Juan Orlando Hernández, whose administration has been marred by corruption allegations, the country’s two major parties are both pledging a clean break.For the opposition, Sunday’s elections are a chance to regain power for the first time since 2009, when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup. The left-leaning coalition has vowed to halt the erosion of democratic norms under Mr. Hernández.For the governing National Party, the elections represent a chance to re-establish some legitimacy following years of corrupt governance and widespread irregularities during the last election. The elections could have far-reaching repercussions in Washington, where President Biden has so far been stymied in two of his most important foreign policy priorities: controlling migration from Central America and combating corruption there.With the shadow of authoritarianism hanging over neighboring countries, including Nicaragua and El Salvador, a free and fair election could create a small beacon of democratic hope in the region. Who is running?Sunday’s contest pits a charismatic mayor from the capital, Tegucigalpa, against the wife of a former president who is running to become the country’s first female head of state.Gustavo Amador/EPA, via ShutterstockSunday’s contest pits a charismatic mayor from the capital, Tegucigalpa, against the wife of a former president who is running to become the country’s first female head of state.Nasry Asfura, 63, more popularly known as Papi, which means “Daddy” in Spanish, is a former businessman who has been mayor of Tegucigalpa since 2014. He has also served in Honduras’s National Congress, representing the National Party.Running under the slogan “Daddy Is Different,” Mr. Asfura is trying to set himself apart from President Hernández, a member of his party. But Mr. Asfura has also faced corruption allegations and been accused of embezzling public funds. The charges, which Mr. Asfura denies, have stalled in court.Mr. Asfura has promised to create new jobs and improve the crippled Honduran economy, and his party accuses the opposition of being communists intent on radically transforming the country.His opponent is Xiomara Castro, who is married to Manuel Zelaya, the former leftist president who was deposed in a 2009 military coup. In the wake of the ousting, Ms. Castro led a sustained protest movement. Ms. Castro, 62, became the leading opposition candidate after a number of political parties coalesced behind her in October.Ms. Castro has promised to establish diplomatic relations with China, loosen Honduras’s restrictive abortion laws and improve the Honduran economy through, among other things, better managing the nation’s $13 billion debt.Despite the governing party’s efforts to paint her as an ardent communist, Ms. Castro has won the endorsement of the Honduran business sector by bringing respected technocrats into her economic team, while also appealing to Mr. Zelaya’s more leftist supporters.Why has this campaign been so deadly?A memorial in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, this month to victims of political violence. Deadly attacks on candidates and their supporters have more than doubled in 2021 compared with four years ago, according to the United Nations.Orlando Sierra/Agence France-Presse — Getty ImagesPolitical violence has long been a staple of Honduran elections, but this year has been particularly bloody, with almost 30 candidates, activists and their relatives killed in the weeks leading up to Sunday’s election.Deadly attacks on candidates and their supporters more than doubled in 2021 compared with the previous campaign period four years ago, according to the United Nations. According to the National Autonomous University of Honduras, there have been more than 60 cases of political violence this year. In one particularly egregious example, several men entered the home of Olivia Marcela Zúniga Cáceres, a congresswoman, in October and tried to asphyxiate her, the local news media reported.Experts on electoral violence say that the proliferation of organized criminal groups, the lack of access to justice and the attacks on political rivals under the government of Mr. Hernández are partly to blame.And while neither side of the political divide has been spared the violence, activists say that the attacks are more likely to benefit the incumbent party by creating a climate of fear that could keep voters at home.Are Hondurans abroad participating?Electoral ballots being printed in Tegucigalpa this month. Some Hondurans living in the United States have complained that new identity cards required by the Honduran government to vote have been difficult to obtain.Fredy Rodriguez/ReutersHondurans abroad, some 740,000 of whom live in the United States, will be watching the election closely, with the outcome likely to affect friends and family at home.Hondurans in the United States are an important economic force back home, with billions of dollars in remittances accounting for some 20 percent of the Honduran economy. Many of those in the United States blame the current government for fomenting the violence, corruption and unemployment that has forced thousands to flee.While Hondurans living overseas are eligible to vote, some in the United States have complained that the new identity cards required to vote by the Honduran government have been difficult to obtain.In Honduras, too, some 300,000 people have yet to claim their new ID cards, according to local news media reports.Fewer than 13,000 Hondurans in the United States registered for the IDs, which were supposed to have been delivered last week, according to a Honduran activist who spoke with The Times. The Honduran ambassador to the United States acknowledged flaws in the process but denied any political bias.What can we expect on Sunday?Soldiers patrolling Cantarranas on Saturday. With memories of violence during the 2017 elections still fresh for many Hondurans, there is widespread fear that Sunday’s election will bring unrest.Moises Castillo/Associated PressVoting begins at 7 a.m. and ends at 5 p.m. The electoral council is set to announce preliminary results three hours after the polls close, including an estimate of the final results. With memories of violence and political protests during the 2017 elections still fresh in the minds of many Hondurans, there is widespread fear of unrest and further political instability after the election, and many businesses are shutting down this weekend.Polls have shown the race growing increasingly tight, with both sides certain of victory. That makes it unlikely that either will concede early, further stoking fears of violence. The 2017 vote was also marred by inconsistencies, and the results remain widely questioned.The country has since enacted several electoral reforms, but critics say the changes have been insufficient. More
Joe Biden Faces Many Challenges in Latin America
Donald Trump, the 45th US president, broke with decades of a relatively bipartisan foreign policy consensus by wreaking havoc on US bilateral relations with China and the European Union. Latin America was an exception to the Trump playbook.
It is true that US relations with Mexico were rocky during the beginning of the Trump administration. Immigration from Central America and Mexico was a bone of contention. Paradoxically, despite a tumultuous beginning, both leftist Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and Trump found a strong common ground to work together. In fact, Lopez Obrador developed a close relationship with his US counterpart.
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The Mexican president might even have wanted Trump reelected. AMLO, as Lopez Obrador is popularly called in Mexico, took longer than most world leaders to recognize Joe Biden’s election victory in November 2020. Curiously, AMLO and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro recognized Biden’s win after hesitating for six weeks and receiving much criticism. The AMLO-Trump camaraderie indicates that Trump made no radical break in US policy toward Mexico despite his inflammatory rhetoric.
The same holds true for Venezuela. Trump regularly called for action against this oil-rich nation and threatened military intervention, but the main thrust of his policy was to tighten sanctions imposed by his predecessor, Barack Obama. Only with Brazil and Colombia did Trump change US policy somewhat. Trump saw Bolsonaro as a fellow populist of the right and embraced the Brazilian leader in a manner previous administrations would not have. Trump was also very supportive of the right-wing government of Colombia because of ideological reasons.
What Issues Need Urgent Attention?
Unlike US policies toward the EU, China and Iran, President Biden’s Latin America policy does not need radical redefinition. Yet the Biden administration will have to address some issues in the short term and others in the medium or long term.
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There are three pressing short-term issues in the region that will require Biden’s attention. The first is the US border problem with Mexico. If Mexican authorities stop the flow of immigrants from Central America, the United States will have less of a crisis on its southern border. The second issue is the shoring up of weakened regional institutions, especially the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The third issue involves developing a comprehensive policy to manage the Venezuelan crisis.
The first issue involving the southern border has reached crisis proportions because Mexico and Central American states have responded inadequately to the COVID-19 pandemic. There is also a public perception in these countries that the US will pursue a more open-border policy under Biden, leading to immigrants flocking to the US. The border issue has dented Biden’s popularity and many Americans believe it has not been handled well. In fact, March was the worst month in US history regarding the number of child refugees knocking at the US border. It was nearly 19,000 in that month alone.
The key to any solution is held by Mexico. The country controls the flow of immigrants from Central America and can restrain people from reaching the US border. During the last three years of the Trump administration, the United States and Mexico had an informal agreement, as per which the latter served as a secondary gatekeeper for the US border. Mexico regulated the flow of immigrants to the US border and even absorbed significant numbers of migrants itself. This mechanism stopped as soon as Biden entered the White House. Mexico would use the resuscitation of this mechanism as leverage to gain concessions on other issues.
On December 29, 2020, the US Department of Homeland Security announced that Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras had signed the Asylum Cooperation Agreement (ACA). The ACA was significant because more than 71% of migrants apprehended on the US southwest border came from these three countries. The ACA aimed to confront “illegal migration at the source” from a region in Central America that has come to be known as the Northern Triangle. Waves of migrants are fleeing poverty, violence and other challenges in this region and making their way to the US. The longer-term solutions that stop such waves of migrants will require resources to mitigate poverty and violence and will have to wait.
The second issue facing the Biden administration is restoring the influence of the OAS and the IADB. During the 1990s and the 2010s, these two organizations increased in importance. They were able to promote democracy and economic growth in the region. The OAS played a key role in political crises such as Peru in 1992 and Honduras in 2009. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, two institutions created by the OAS, promoted and protected human rights in the American hemisphere. In recent years, both the OAS and the IADB have weakened.
The late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez and his allies created new regional organizations to counter the OAS and the US. These organizations, such as UNASUR, ALBA and CELAC, sought to limit US influence in the region. Today, they have withered away. Yet the polarization in the region has chipped away at the credibility of the OAS. Its capacity to mediate in conflicts or mobilize the region on important issues has been affected. The OAS has been largely silent on the COVID-19 pandemic, raising questions about its irrelevance.
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As well as the OAS, the IADB was born with very strong regional roots. By the end of the 20th century, the bank incorporated new members from outside the region. European nations, Japan and even China joined the IADB. Political controversies have plagued the organization for years. In recent times, they have gotten worse.
In 2019, Venezuela’s opposition leader, Juan Guaido, whom many countries recognized as interim president, appointed Harvard University economist Ricardo Hausmann as the country’s representative to the IADB. China sided with Nicolas Maduro’s Venezuelan regime and barred Hausmann from attending the IADB meeting in Chengdu. In response, the IADB canceled its meeting in China that was meant to mark its 60th anniversary. Needless to say, recent developments have weakened the IADB.
The Biden administration will need to relaunch both the OAS and the IADB. Washington will have to restore their credibility and efficacy. Both organizations will be essential for solving the longer-term issues facing the region.
The Venezuela Conundrum
The third issue that the Biden administration has to address is Venezuela. As per many analysts, the country is on the brink of collapse. Criminal gangs and other armed non-state actors control not only remote parts of Venezuela but also shantytowns and working-class neighborhoods in the national capital, Caracas. The economy is in a dire state. US economic sanctions and reserves mismanagement have led Venezuelan oil production to fall to its lowest level since the 1940s.
After low figures of infection in 2020, COVID-19 has now spiraled out of control. In per capita terms, Venezuela has vaccinated the least number of people in Latin America. Even Haiti is doing better. As per The Lancet, “Venezuela does not have a known national COVID-19 vaccine plan, and the supply of vaccines is spasmodic, insufficient, and unplanned.” The reputed publication also observes that “the health-care system has collapsed and is incapable of responding to the ever-increasing number of patients who require hospitalisation.”
Maduro has rejected most plausible options for mass vaccination. Only the Venezuelan elite, Maduro’s close supporters and the regime’s Cuban advisers have been vaccinated. The government rejected a deal with opposition leader Guaido to import the AstraZeneca vaccine through the COVAX mechanism of the United Nations at the last minute. Despite popular clamor for mass vaccination, it is unclear how the process will advance even though the funding for vaccination is available.
Hunger has been on the rise and diseases like malaria are back. Such is the dire state of affairs that Venezuelans are fleeing the country. Over 5 million of them have left. This has led to the worst refugee crisis in the Western Hemisphere and rivals the Syrian crisis. Countries in Latin America have largely been hosting these refugees, but they are increasingly overstretched. Emulating the Biden administration, Colombia has designated “temporary protected status” for Venezuela.
The Maduro regime has lost control of the country. Its military strikes against armed groups are only exacerbating an already terrible situation. The military’s offensive against Colombian illegal armed groups near the Venezuela-Colombia border has led to more Venezuelans fleeing the country. Venezuela’s recent economic measures to revive the economy such as reversing Chavez’s total control over PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, and privatization of a selected number of state-owned enterprises have not worked. The government suffocates business and has no talent for economic management.
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.custom-post-from .error{ display: block; color: #ff6461; order: 3 !important;}Paradoxically, the COVID-19 pandemic has benefited the government in one significant way. By imposing a radical quarantine, the Maduro regime and its cronies exercise tight social control over the population’s movements in areas of their control. After putting the ruling elite in a difficult position and isolating it internationally during 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, the opposition has run out of steam. Nominally led by Guaido, the opposition is highly fragmented and has failed to come up with a common strategy.
Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy of using sanctions to topple Maduro’s regime did not work. Cuba, Russia and China have ganged up to support Maduro and ensure his survival even as Venezuela increasingly becomes a failed state. The Biden administration needs fresh thinking and a new strategy for a state that is threatening the stability and security of Latin America.
What Are the Long-Term Challenges?
If short-term prospects are grim for Latin America, then the mid-term ones are anything but rosy. The commodities boom that enabled the region to grow continuously for nearly two decades is over. This boom brought tens of millions out of poverty. As per the International Monetary Fund, Latin America bounced back from the COVID-19 in 2020, but the pandemic’s resurgence “threatens to thwart an uneven recovery and add to the steep social and human costs.”
Countries like Peru, which managed to grow at high rates despite a dysfunctional political system, have plunged back into grinding poverty and, lately, political chaos. The prospects in most other Latin American countries are similar. Economic hardship will inevitably heighten social and political tensions. Over the last two decades, many protests that mushroomed across the region against corruption or injustice quietened as public services improved. When the pandemic recedes, these protests may come back with a vengeance, reclaiming the relative prosperity the people have lost.
Economic woes might also create new perils for democracy. Already, there is a worldwide trend of declining democracy. In Latin America, countries like Brazil, El Salvador and Nicaragua are worrisome examples of this trend.
Bolsonaro, the populist right-wing politician, famously won the Brazilian election in 2018 on an anti-corruption agenda that implicated a host of politicians, including former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who was the most popular politician in decades and whose policies brought millions out of poverty. Bolsonaro has rolled many of those policies back. More importantly, he has mishandled the COVID-19 pandemic. More than 490,000 Brazilians have died. This number is the second-highest after the US. With more than 17.5 million confirmed cases of COVID-19, Brazil ranks third-highest in the world. Protesters blame Bolsonaro’s disastrous policies from downplaying the threat of COVID-19 and opposing lockdowns to mishandling vaccination and causing the near-collapse of the health system.
In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele has strengthened his grip over the legislature and the judicial system. His party has voted to “remove the magistrates of the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court.” Earlier, Bukele ordered heavily armed troops to occupy the parliament to pressure legislators into voting to better equip the troops.
If the threats to democracies in Brazil and El Salvador come from the right, those to Bolivia and Nicaragua come from the left. In Bolivia, former President Evo Morales began dismantling democratic institutions when he sought to win a fourth consecutive term in 2019. In doing so, he contravened the provisions of the constitution. Bolivians had voted against Morales’ attempt to amend the constitution so that he could run for a fourth term, but he got around this vote by appealing to the nation’s highest court that was packed with his cronies. After a disputed election, Morales fled to Mexico after the military asked him to stand down, and Jeanine Anez took over as interim president. Anez promptly set out to persecute and prosecute Morales and his supporters.
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Another election followed in 2020 and the socialist candidate Luis Arce won. He had served as economy minister under Morales. As president, Arce has turned upon Anez and other political rivals. They have been arrested for participating in a coup against Morales. This cycle of political vendetta has left Bolivia highly polarized, and the country’s political crisis is far from over.
In Nicaragua, the decades-long president, Daniel Ortega, just recently imprisoned the four most important contenders of the opposition, in practice moving into a one-party system. Mexico also faces challenges too, but in more milder forms.
Finally, there remains the thorny issue of Cuba that every US president since John F. Kennedy has had to face. In 2016, Barack Obama tried to turn back the clock on the Cold War by visiting Cuba and inaugurating a new era of engagement. Trump reversed almost all of Obama’s policies. Now, Biden has to craft a new policy on Cuba, a country that remains influential throughout the region. Along with Venezuela, Cuba is a magnet for attracting the attention of the two big external powers: Russia and China. This tripartite meddling of Russia, China and the US in Latin America could sow instability in the region.
Already, Cuba is facing its worst economic crisis since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The new generation of Cubans has lost faith in the communist regime. The Cuban leadership is going through a highly choreographed transition of power to a younger generation. Given the flux, the Biden administration would be well advised to bide its time. Eventually, it may want to craft a new policy that avoids the bitter confrontation of the Trump era and the open engagement of the Obama years.
In the long-term, the Biden administration needs a robust OAS and a strong IADB to restore democracy and rebuild the economy in Latin America. The region will need a robust reconstruction plan once COVID-19 recedes. If the US ignores Latin America, Russia and China will continue to make inroads. They will undermine the relative stability Latin America has enjoyed for the last few decades. Biden has no choice but to pay attention to a region that lies in the same hemisphere as the US and remains crucial to American strategic calculus.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy. More
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Daniel Ortega, el hijo de Somoza
En solo unos días, han sido detenidos líderes de la oposición en Nicaragua. ¿Acaso la diplomacia puede hacer algo eficaz para detener a un líder que ha decidido convertirse en dictador?El 17 de julio de 1979, el dictador Anastasio Somoza Debayle abandonó definitivamente Nicaragua. Esa fecha —conocida como el Día de la Alegría— parecía cerrar definitivamente una etapa terrible y sangrienta en la historia del país centroamericano. Tras años de lucha, en múltiples frentes, el pueblo había conquistado la libertad y podía comenzar a construir una vida en democracia. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, el comandante del ejército rebelde de 33 años, era uno de los líderes fundamentales de esa revolución. Cuatro décadas después, sin embargo, se convirtió en lo que ayudó a derrotar: es el nuevo Somoza que ahora oprime salvajemente a Nicaragua.Una de las de características del reciente autoritarismo latinoamericano es el descaro, la falta de pudor. Se comporta de manera obscena, con absoluta tranquilidad. Esta semana, en Nicaragua, han sido detenidos cinco líderes de la oposición, cuatro de ellos posibles adversarios a Ortega en las elecciones presidenciales de noviembre. No se trata solo de una estrategia de fuerza, de control interno, también hay un mensaje desafiante hacia el exterior: Ortega actúa con arrogante impunidad, como si la reacción de la comunidad internacional no le preocupara demasiado. Habiendo pasado el tiempo de las invasiones, ¿acaso la diplomacia puede hacer algo eficaz por detenerlo?Conocí a Daniel Ortega en una visita que hizo a Venezuela, buscando fondos para apoyar la lucha contra Somoza. Yo tenía 18 años y formaba parte de una brigada de solidaridad con Nicaragua en la ciudad de Barquisimeto. Ahí, un grupo de jóvenes nos reunimos una noche con el comandante guerrillero. Era un hombre sencillo, sin pretensiones personales, se expresaba siempre de manera directa. Nos habló de la guerra en Nicaragua pero, también, de la necesaria batalla en el exterior, de la imprescindible ayuda de los otros países de la región para lograr la caída de la dictadura de Somoza. Hoy todo es tan distinto y tan igual que la historia parece un relato absurdo.Tras la victoria de la revolución en 1979, Daniel Ortega y el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional gobernaron el país hasta 1990, cuando perdieron las elecciones frente a Violeta Chamorro.Década y media pasó Daniel Ortega en la oposición hasta que logró ganar las elecciones con un mínimo margen y regresar al poder en 2007. A partir de ese momento, con la ayuda de los petrodólares venezolanos (entre 2008 y 2016, recibió alrededor de 500 millones de dólares anuales de manos del chavismo), comenzó a construir y a desarrollar un proyecto autoritario, destinado a ocupar los espacios de poder y a eliminar la institucionalidad, a someter a la sociedad civil y a garantizar su permanencia indefinida al frente del gobierno.Es un proceso que, con sus diferencias y atendiendo a sus circunstancias particulares, sigue un libreto similar al aplicado por el chavismo en Venezuela. Tiene grandes visos de nepotismo, ha secuestrado y socavado la autonomía de los poderes, limita a la prensa independiente, controla el aparato de justicia, los órganos electorales, el ejército. Es un modelo que permite que Ortega pueda reelegirse de manera ilimitada mientras sus adversarios —de forma ilegal— son inhabilitados, suspendidos o encarcelados.La crisis que comenzó en 2018, que tienen en las protestas estudiantiles un protagonista esencial, han mostrado cuán dispuesto está Ortega a emular a Anastasio Somoza. La represión, las detenciones ilegales, los juicios fraudulentos, las denuncias de tortura, el acoso más feroz a la prensa y la persecución política cada vez más implacable dibujan un cuadro crucial de violación permanente a los derechos humanos. Tampoco los diversos intentos de diálogos han logrado prosperar. El país, sin duda, está ante el peor escenario para que se puedan dar unas elecciones libres. Sergio Ramírez, extraordinario escritor y figura emblemática de la lucha contra Somoza y de la Revolución sandinista, retrata así el panorama: “El Estado de derecho dejó de existir en Nicaragua. Lo demás es ficción y remedo”.Frente la avanzada autoritaria, el Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos ha sancionado a tres funcionarios cercanos a Ortega y a su propia hija. Ya antes, tanto Estados Unidos como la Unión Europea, Canadá y el Reino Unido han puesto en vigencia medidas coercitivas contra el gobernante nicaragüense. También esta semana, António Guterres, secretario general de la ONU, instó a Ortega a liberar a los líderes opositores y a recuperar la credibilidad en la democracia en su país. Todas estas posturas y declaraciones, sin embargo, son cada vez más inocuas frente al desparpajo con el que actúa el poder en Nicaragua. Parecen una representación lejana en el aire, mientras los ciudadanos están cada vez más indefensos y acorralados. “Somos rehenes de la dictadura”, define acertadamente el periodista nicaragüense Carlos Fernando Chamorro.Parece evidente, al menos en la región, que urge reinventar la diplomacia. Las experiencias de Cuba, de Venezuela, ahora de Nicaragua, son más que elocuentes. Ni las sanciones económicas ni las presiones más formales, por separado o en conjunto, parecen haber tenido resultados medianamente palpables. Tampoco los organismos multilaterales o los bloques de varios países han conseguido en la mayoría de los casos alguna consecuencia positiva. El autoritarismo no solo sigue obrando a sus anchas, institucionalizando su violencia, sino que además avanza sin miramientos tratando de legitimar hoy en día las antiguas formas de tiranía militar del siglo XX latinoamericano.Hay que crear un tipo de relaciones internacionales distintas, que no terminen atrapadas entre una imposible invasión militar o la lentitud de la burocracia de las asociaciones o grupos multilaterales. Tiene que haber una manera de inventar nuevos mecanismos, pactos diferentes, que permitan otras alternativas de intervención regional que —al igual que en el siglo XX— apoyen a las ciudadanías y frenen el avance autoritario en la región.Para todo esto, es necesario comenzar a despolarizar los conflictos. No estamos ante un debate entre ideologías sino ante una pugna entre el despotismo y la democracia. En distintos niveles y en coyunturas diferentes, lo que está en riesgo es lo mismo. No importa si el gobernante se llama Nayib Bukele o Daniel Ortega. Si se define como liberal o como socialista. Lo que importa es el poder de los ciudadanos, la independencia de las instituciones, la libertad y la alternancia política. El caso de Nicaragua, en ese sentido, es proverbial: un mismo actor ha elegido jugar papeles opuestos. Quien enarboló las banderas contra la dictadura y se proclamó un orgulloso “hijo de Sandino” es hoy, por el contrario, el más perfecto y genuino hijo de Somoza.Alberto Barrera Tyszka (@Barreratyszka) es escritor venezolano. Su libro más reciente es la novela Mujeres que matan. More
